YOUNG MONGOLS AND VIGILANTES IN INNER MONGOLIA'S INTERREGNUM DECADES, 1911-1931

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YOUNG MONGOLS AND VIGILANTES IN INNER MONGOLIA'S INTERREGNUM DECADES, 1911-1931

BY

CHRISTOPHER P. ATWOOD

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
BPC: Beijing Political Council (of the Kuomintang)
CC: Central Committee
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
CEC: Central Executive Committee
EBPP: Eastern Border People's Party
ECCI: Executive Committee of the Communist International
IMAR: Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
IMPASC: Inner Mongolia Party Affairs Steering Committee
KMT: Kuomintang or Nationalist Party of China
KIM: Communist Youth International (*Kommunisticheskiĭ Internatsional Molodëzhi*)
KUTV: Communist University of the Toilers of the East (*Kommunisticheskiĭ Universitet Trudiashchikhsia Vostoka*)
MP: Member of Parliament
MPP: Mongolian People's Party (1921-1925)
MPR: Mongolian People's Republic
MPRA: Mongolian People's Red Army
MPRP: Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (1925 on)
MTAC: Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission
PLA: People's Liberation Army
PRC: People's Republic of China
PRPIM: People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia
RRIAC: Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China
RYLIM: Revolutionary Youth League of Inner Mongolia
UCA: United Citizen Armies

CONVENTIONS OF TRANSCRIPTION AND USAGE

The transcription of Mongolian terms and names is an occasion of tremendous confusion at present. My practice has been to attempt to compromise between the demands of strict transcription and the relative ease of pronunciation for the reader.

Transliterated Mongolian-Language Terms and Short Texts

Institutional names are given in Mongolian in the vertical (Mongolian) script. When citing words or texts in Mongolian, however, I have followed the source from which the word or phrase is derived, whether the vertical script or Cyrillic. I have simplified the unnecessarily complicated philological transcription of the Mongolian script forms by eliminating all diacriticals and non-Latin letters except the umlaut (¨). I have also made a few changes to reflect the difference between Khalkha (Outer Mongolian) pronunciation and that in Inner Mongolia, and to conform with familiar spellings. In the bibliography, I have, however, used the Library of Congress system, which is itself a slightly modified version of the philological system (see the table of transcription systems below).

Chinese personal names, terms, and titles are given in the Pinyin system. Certain customary spelling (for example, Sun Yat-sen, Canton, Kuomintang, Kwantung Army, etc.) have been retained. Russian terms and names are given in the Library of Congress system (with ï for й). For Manchu, I have used the Möllendorf system, but made it consistent with Mongolian by replacing š with s and h with kh.

In transcribing Cyrillic-script Mongolian, I have not followed the Library of Congress system, which is based purely on Russian and does great violence to Mongolian phonetics. Instead the following replacements have been made based on the actual Mongolian pronunciation: w for v (в), ye/yö for e (е), yo for ë (ё), j for zh (ж), i for ĭ (й), yu/yü for iu (ю), and ya for ia (я). The soft sign (' or ь) I have transcribed as i; since in Mongolian it is a mere positional allophone of i (и), no ambiguity results. The also unnecessary hard sign is omitted.

Where toponyms of human habitation changed over the course of time, for example, Neislel Khüriye to Ulaanbaatar, Beijing to Beiping, etc. I have used the form contemporary to the period being discussed.

Table of Transcription Systems

Philological System	System used here for Inner Mongolia	System used here for Khalkha	System used here in notes & bibliography
a	a	a	a
ayi, etc.	ai, etc.	ai, etc.	ayi, etc.
q	kh	kh	q
γ	g	g	g
k	kh	kh	k
si	shi	shi	si
š	sh	sh	sh
ča	cha	tsa	ca
či	chi	chi	ci
ǰa	ja	za	ja
ǰi	ji	ji	ji
c	ts	tz	ts
j	dz	dz	dz

Personal and Place Names

Since this history concerns Inner Mongolia and, moreover, the period before the introduction of the modern Cyrillic script even in Mongolia, I have used the Mongolian script spellings for all personal names. The one exception is for the occasional person who lived in independent Mongolia and whose lives fall mostly after 1946. Inner Mongolian place names are given in the Mongolian script spelling while place names currently in use in Mongolia are given in their Cyrillic-script forms.

With personal and place names I have added a few further changes to the transcription system. The Mongolian script spellings contain a number of features that long ago ceased to reflect the spoken pronunciation, such as the use of intervocalic -g- to mark long vowels. As a result, it was common for the Mongol scribes of the 1920s to modernize the orthography particularly in the case of personal and place names, so that names which should correctly be spelled "Sir-a Nagur" and "Jirgal" for example, would be written "Shara Nuur" and "Jargal" (cf. the modern Cyrillic spelling of "Shar Nuur" and "Jargal"). Following this example I have modernized the script spelling in two ways:

replacing silent intervocalic -g- with the appropriate long vowel, and "breaking" the -i- when it follows a sh-, ch-, or j-. In Ordos and Alashan dialects, where the breaking of the -i- is inconsistent, I have followed the pronunciations in Antoine Mostaert's *Dictionnaire ordos*, thus writing "Shara Juu," but "Öljeijirgal." With common nouns and titles, however, I have held to the correct Mongolian script spellings.

For the current pinyin equivalents for Mongolian-language place names found today in most atlases, please refer to Appendix F.

When Mongolian names are found in Chinese transcription, I have restored them in the most conservative way possible. Those that I have not been able to fully restore have been left in Pinyin, with quotation marks. Similarly, Chinese names found only in (usually terribly inexact) Mongolian transcription appear for the first time in quotation marks.

Mongolian orthography in the 1920s was less standardized than it is today; I have attempted to use where possible the autograph spelling for personal names. The common element in personal names, originally spelled *wachir* "powerbolt," came to be written in the East Mongolian orthography used by many party leaders as *wchir*, with the w– playing the role of the "o" found in pronunciation. For them I have thus transcribed this name-element as "ochir" but added it directly to preceding element if present (for example, "AltanOchir"). In Khalkha and western Inner Mongolia, where it is still written "wachir" I have transcribed it as such. The -ô in, for example "Korlô," represents the final -o-a, which indicates a long -oo in pronunciation.

Most of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia at this time had at least two names, one Mongolian and one Chinese, and many had a number of political aliases. The choice of which name to use in English is often somewhat arbitrary, but I have tried to avoid using what seem to be purely political aliases. Those confused by the multiplicity of strange names may find the biographical glossaries in Appendices B and C helpful. When citing archival documents in the footnotes, however, I use whatever form is found there.

Inner and Outer, Mongol ~ Mongolian

Any author dealing with both independent Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, faces the problem of how to refer to the two areas in a way that keeps them separate without unnecessary qualifiers. Although the usage of "Inner" and "Outer" Mongolia, dating from the Qing dynasty has been rightly criticized as Sino-centric, it is clear that such usage for Inner Mongolia is now the accepted English translation even for the

Mongols themselves. Just as clearly though, "Outer Mongolia" is generally not accepted today by the Mongolians of independent Mongolia. While "Outer Mongolia" for the period up until November 1924, as it was still commonly used by Mongolians themselves, and from 1924 to 1992, the "Mongolian People's Republic" may be used, a general term, independent of specific governments, for the area of independent Mongolia is still useful. In this work, I have thus restricted the use of the term "Mongolia" by itself, in the twentieth century at least, to independent Mongolia. Thus, just as "Mexico" is generally understood not to include New Mexico and "California" understood not to include Baja California, so I hope the reader will understand "Mongolia" not to include Inner Mongolia. For referring to the entire area inhabited by ethnic Mongols, I find the term "Mongolian plateau" very convenient.

The areas of the former Jirim, Josotu, and Juu Uda leagues, I have termed East Mongolia, following the usage of the people there themselves.

The usage of "Mongol" and "Mongolian" is somewhat confused in English; here I have tried to follow the usage established by Ivo Banac[1] for the South Slavic peoples. As a noun, "Mongol" refers to someone of Mongol ethnicity, regardless of citizenship, while "Mongolian" refers to a citizen of independent Mongolia, regardless of ethnicity. As an adjective, "Mongol" refers to things pertaining to ethnic Mongols, regardless of territory or institutional history; thus "Mongol herders," "Mongol leaders," "Mongol aspirations," "Mongol militia," etc. The adjective Mongolian is used first for institutions and cultural traits that have a long history and are shared by all Mongols, such as "Mongolian language," "Mongolian banners," "Mongolian literature," etc. It is also used for all institutions and things pertaining to independent Mongolia. Thus, "Mongolian army," "Mongolian economy," or "Mongolian government" refer unambiguously to the institutions of independent Mongolia after 1911 centered on Ulaanbaatar, while "Mongol army," "Mongol economy," or "Mongol government" would refer to such institutions among ethnic Mongols outside of Mongolia proper. This distinction does not cover every instance, but in combination with the restriction of "Mongolia" by itself to the independent state, it eliminates most ambiguities without cumbersome qualifiers.

[1] Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ith-aca, 1984), pp. 17-18.

PREFACE

I first conceived of the present study while fresh out of college and traveling and studying in Inner Mongolia. The mid-1980s were a time in Inner Mongolia of great optimism, and during a year of study at Inner Mongolia Normal University, I could feel my classmates' enthusiasm about Inner Mongolia's future. Yet just newly released from their parents' nightmare of oppression under the Cultural Revolution, their optimism was laced with a deep anxiety about the future, their own and that of their Mongolian nationality in China.

They were indeed children of the Young Mongols, believing implicitly in the importance of mastering modern culture and science for the survival of their nationality and supporting, for the most part, the professedly revolutionary government that made promoting science and modernity its business. As it had been for the Young Mongols, modern culture was a ticket out of flat and sandy banner towns and into the big cities. Each year only in a few in any class got that golden ticket.

At the end of the spring semester the students in the Mongolian-language classes gathered in the warm June air before the main class building to perform skits, sing earnest songs about the nation and sentimental songs about mother and father, and show magic tricks that didn't really come off. Knowing the results of their *fenpei* (assignment) it was for almost all a bitter-sweet envoy to their few years of city student life. A graduating senior read a poem about her past, learning Mongolian language in a banner primary school, her present, studying science and culture in the university, and her future, teaching Mongolian language to the new generation of pupils in her dusty banner town, all in order to help her nationality progress. Reading her poem, she summed up for me what this year had meant to her and her class-mates.

Since then, Inner Mongolia has changed, my classmates have changed, and I have changed, too. As it has before, each time in a different way, the Young Mongol dreams of the 1980s, like those of the 1920s, or of the 1940s and 1950s have withered, without entirely being killed, by the aging both of the dreamers and of the world in which they lived. This study of the Young Mongols has led me to areas I had not before suspected and increased my awareness of the price the Mongols have paid in pursuing the Young Mongol cause. Many of my classmates in Inner Mongolia have lost their great dreams, sometimes to be replaced by more private satisfactions, but sometimes not. Yet my affectionate

memory of my classmates, dutiful grand-children of that Young Mongol cause, and of the year and green hopes they let me share, has not dimmed.

My research for this book has been funded by several organizations. My first travel in Inner Mongolia as a graduating senior, in which I originally conceived the plan of this book, was funded by a Benjamin Trustman Travel Grant for the years 1986-1988. I hope this book is a small token of gratitude for the late Mr. Trustman's farsighted approach to philanthropy and a repayment for the confidence shown in me. Research for this dissertation was also supported in part by a grant from International Researches and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the U.S. State Department, which administers the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).

During my period of archival research in Ulaanbaatar, I had the pleasure to associate with a group of scholars who embodied the spirit of intellectual freedom and open-minded patriotism at a time, almost forgotten now, when the idols of state socialism and narrow nationalism were fighting a rear-guard battle to cut off international communication with Mongolia. Many people in the institute helped make my study more productive. In particular, my academic advisor Lhamsürengiin (Khereid) Jamsran gave me crucial help both in source materials and in interpretation. Without him this dissertation would have been much poorer. The director, Ts. Batbayar, and the scientific secretary, S. Dashtsewel, helped me in every sort of difficulty. A. Damdinsüren, M. Hurmethan, and J. Bor also brought important materials to my attention. Arwinzayaa at the Academy of Sciences also helped me resolve problems of access at the MPRP's Central Party Archives.

In 1991-2, several people in Mongolia gave generously of their time to allow me to interview them. In particular I would like to thank Sanjiin Damdinsüren, Yadamsürengiin (Galzuud) Shaariibuu, Ochiryn Namsraijaw (Ina I. Oshirov), Rentsensonomyn Nyamsüren, Ürjingiin Dashnyam, Tsendiin Khandsüren, and Oyuuntodyn Khosbayar. In 1997, Professor Ardajab also graciously granted me an interview and responded by mail to my further queries. I would especially like to thank Namsraijaw and Khosbayar for allowing me to make copies of valuable and historic photographs in their possesion, and I would like to thank Magsarjawyn Tserenjamts for replicating these photos for me. Sechin Jagchid generously responded to my questions.

Many people at the archives in Mongolian assisted me. These include the then-director Ochir and archivist Myagmardawaa in the Central Historical Archives of Mongolia, director Baljinyn Zorigt, former director Choikhüügiin Mijeekhüü and archivist Lhamyn Ayuush in the MPRP's Central Party Archives, and Jigjidiin Boldbaatar, secretary of the MPRP CC for academic work. I would also like to thank those researchers who had patience with my requests for help in reading some of the more illegible handwriting in the documents. These included L. Bat-Ochir, Dorjsüren, and O. Batsaikhan in the Central Party Archives and Baatarjol in the Central Historical Archives.

During the writing of the dissertation which was the precursor for the second half of this book, my adviser György Kara gave unstintingly of his time to discuss all aspects of this work. Afterwards, he continued to assist me repeatedly with my queries. The other members of my committee, Elliot Sperling, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, and Larry Moses also gave me important suggestions and criticisms on drafts of the dissertation, as did the anonymous reader for E.J. Brill. I would also like to thank Nicola DiCosmo, Albert Hofstadter and Patricia Radder for their assistance in seeing this book to print.

While in Höhhot, David Sneath, Hürelbaatar, and Uranchimeg in long discussions all helped me think through issues in Inner Mongolia history. There and later in Ulaanbaatar, Susan Lawrence, Lincoln Kaye and his family, and Peter Hannam provided hospitality, conversation, and much-needed breaks from the problems of the 1920s. My thanks to them all.

Ellen McGill, Joshua Goldstein, and Dr. James Huang read drafts of this book and offered many helpful suggestions and much-needed encouragement. E. Pürewjaw, Tabuchi Yoko, Ellen McGill, and Dandii-Yadamyn Tserenpil all assisted me by supplying valuable material. Melissa Čakars carefully proof-read the entire draft. Tristra Newyear provided valuable last-minute Russian translation services. John M. Hollingsworth produced the maps.

Needless to say, responsibility for all errors, whether misspellings undetected, facts unchecked, or erroneous interpretations stubbornly persisted in, lies solely with the author.

Finally I would like to thank my children Jeffrey and Claire who lost so much of their time with their father to this book, and especially my wife Okcha who kept up our home life, whether in Ulaanbaatar, in the most difficult year of rationed goods, or in Bloomington, during the difficult years of a junior faculty member. Late in the project, she ably took on the indexing and tables, but it was her home-making that truly made it possible for me to write this book.



Map i.1: Inner Mongolia under the Qing Dynasty

INTRODUCTION

> In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes (Judges 21:25).

On Friday night, June 26, 1925, two officials from the United States and British consulates in the Northeast Chinese city of Harbin, set out by train for the northeast corner of the Inner Mongolian steppes. The region they were aiming for, called Hulun Buir, had come back under the rule of the Republic of China five years ago, after a decade of autonomy, but the Mongols there still retained their distinctive system of local government and their aspirations for greater independence. At the beginning of the month, reports had come into the American consulate in Tianjin, center of the hide, wool, and fur trade in Northern China, that the local Mongol government there was preventing the sale of wool to ethnic Chinese and foreign firms and trying to secure a monopoly for its own state firm. At the beginning of the century, the Russians had built the Chinese Eastern Railway through Northeast China, cutting through the Hulun Buir steppe, passing through the commercial center of Harbin, and continuing through Chinese territory to Vladivostok, Russia's outpost on the Pacific. That railway had made Hulun Buir, tucked into a corner of Chinese territory between Russia and Outer Mongolia, an important center for the export of squirrel, fox, and marmot skins to Germany, live animals and beef to Russia, and sheep and camel's wool to Japan and especially the United States. Mongols owned the livestock, but itinerant Chinese did the shearing, selling the wool they received as pay to Chinese merchants, who acted as middlemen for the Anglo-American firms that controlled the trade.

The American consul-general at Harbin, Samuel Sokobin, who had a history of unpleasant dealings with radicals in Outer Mongolia, consulted with his British counterpart, and dispatched two consular clerks to clear up the situation. The two clerks, Mr. T. Leonard Lillienstrom from the United States, and Mr. F.G. Whittick from Great Britain, arrived at Hailar, the Sino-Russo-Mongolian railway town that served as capital of the Hulun Buir district, on Saturday afternoon. Their mission was to enforce the treaties that Britain and the United States had used after the Opium War to make sure China kept wide open her doors

to trade. These treaties had been specifically tailored to prevent petty officials in China's vast interior from putting discriminatory roadblocks in the way of trade with foreign firms, and the consular officials intended to find the officials responsible for the restrictions, make them aware of the treaties, and insist they live up to their provisions.

What they found over the next couple of days confirmed the rumors of an organized trade monopoly. Hulun Buir had two local governments, one for the ethnic Chinese concentrated in Hailar and a few other railway and mining towns, and one for the Mongols, who lived by nomadic herding and ranching in the out-lying districts. The acting head of the Chinese government followed the lead of the Chinese merchant community which had excellent relations with the foreign merchants and were just as apprehensive of the new trade monopoly as the British and American firms were. He soon came around to the consular officials' views. Guifu, the head of the Mongol government, however, first insisted that there was no monopoly, and then admitted that although there was, he had little power to stop it.

Four years earlier, in 1921, when all of China's northern frontier was in disorder from the backwash of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Russian Red Army, aided by pro-Soviet Mongols, had seized power in Outer Mongolia, Hulun Buir's neighbor to the west. Since that time, Guifu explained, the influence of the Soviets on the youth and people of Hulun Buir had grown, and pan-Mongolist ideas, calling for the unity of all Mongols under the new "People's Government" in Outer Mongolia were increasingly heard even in China's Inner Mongolia, where the princes, lamas, and old-style mandarins still ruled. These Young Mongols in Hulun Buir, who had influential sympathizers in the Mongol local government, were the organizers behind the trade monopoly. For his part, Guifu had no taste for bucking the foreign powers and his Chinese colleagues, but the young nationalists hardly listened to him.

Once they understood what the situation was, Lillienstrom and Whittick with an escort of Chinese and Mongol soldiers and police motored out to the steppe to personally enforce the open-trade regime which China had agreed to almost a century before. It was a fine summer in Hulun Buir and the officials could see the unsheared sheep on the lush steppe that made the region one of the richest in Inner Mongolia. Arriving near the camp of one of the chief rural officials, Erkhimbatu, they watched with him a *naadum* or traditional Mongolian games of wrestling, horse-racing, and archery in the morning, before confronting him in his yurt or felt tent, which the Mongols call *ger*. After some sharp arguments, Erkhimbatu agreed to give way and sent out letters under his

seal canceling the monopoly order. A further drive of a hundred miles, delayed by rains which made the roads too muddy to pass, secured the much less stubborn compliance of Erkhimbatu's colleague on the very border of Outer Mongolia. The officials motored back to Manchuria Station, a railway town on the Russo-Chinese frontier, where they had a bath and a good night's rest before returning through Hailar and on to Harbin. Before they left, they saw with satisfaction that the sheep were being sheared and trade proceeding freely.

In the whole trip, the two officials had never once seen the Young Mongols who were so agitating the countryside or found out what, beyond some vague Soviet proclivities, was the purpose of the trade monopoly. The consular clerks could hear behind the stage, as it were, the scuffling feet of the Young Mongols, and at one point they received a defiant letter from the agitators, but the Young Mongols always disappeared when the moment of personal confrontation came.[1]

Early in 1926, another American consulate, this time that in Zhangjiakou, became aware of the activities of the shadowy network of Young Mongols inspired by the Bolshevik-style government in Outer Mongolia. Zhangjiakou was situated in the dry hills northwest of China's capital Beijing, hills which the Ming emperors had crowned with the turrets and ramparts of the Great Wall to keep out the Mongol raids. When China's last dynasty, the Qing (1636-1912), unified the Mongol and ethnic Chinese lands under one imperial house, the city was no longer a frontier outpost but for more than two hundred years continued to serve as an entrepot for the trade of China's heartland with both the Mongol nomads and beyond them with Siberia and Russia. Its common Western name, "Kalgan," came from the Russian rendering of the Mongolian *khaalga(n)*, or "gate," and that name, together with the Chinese Zhangjiakou, "Zhang Family Gate," testified to the role of trade in the city's history.

With the expansion of China's maritime trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Zhangjiakou found a new role as a packing and processing center for sheep-skin rugs, lamb-skin jackets, and the hair of cashmere goats brought in by the camel caravans which came from all over northern China, from Mongolia, both Inner and Outer, and even

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[1] T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga..." in U.S. State Department, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia..." (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State, July 13, 1925).

from the Tibetan plateau off to the west, all bound for the world market. In 1911, as the rebellions in southern China shook the Qing dynasty, the great lama of Outer Mongolia, the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, with the support of his realm's swarm of princes and dukes, had declared Mongolia an independent theocratic state. This might have hurt American trade, as the new government relied on Russian support, but the new government was also friendly to American traders and explorers. In 1915, Outer Mongolia was forced by international pressure to accept a status as an autonomous government in China, and Beijing opened Zhangjiakou to foreign traders. British, American, and German firms competed eagerly with the established Chinese and Russian merchants for a share of Mongolia's wool, furs, meat, and horses. In 1920, the American government, moved by a vision of American trade and influence reaching Mongolia, opened a consulate in Zhangjiakou.

By 1925, however, these expansive ambitions had withered. The Russian Revolution in 1917 eventually destroyed the widely used Russian currency, the gold ruble, causing a constant shortage of cash. The full Chinese recovery of Outer Mongolia in 1919 opened new possibilities, but the White Russian invasion in February, 1921, and the Red Army invasion in July of the same year cut off all trade between Outer Mongolia and Zhangjiakou. Trade had started up again in 1923, but American merchants faced competition from the new cooperatives which under Soviet protection were slowly implementing the monopoly which Anglo-American pressure would stymie in Hulun Buir. Chinese merchants in Zhangjiakou were also not happy with the competition and an unsolved murder of an American businessman in Zhangjiakou in late 1923 was widely attributed to Chinese rivals. The first consul-general in Zhangjiakou, Samuel Sokobin, had visited the new Mongolia a few times, but was now on the People's Government's bad list. After his transfer to the Harbin consulate, no new consul general was appointed and the U.S. Consulate in Zhangjiakou languished in the hands of an acting Vice Consul, E.F. Stanton.

By 1925, Mr. Stanton had written off productive ties with Mongolia, whose government he believed to be completely Bolshevik-controlled. Instead his main concern was with Marshal Feng Yuxiang, one of many army commanders who had alternately dominated and partitioned the Chinese Republic since its birth in 1911. A year ago, in 1924, Marshal Feng had emerged as a contender for power, building a base of power in Northwest China and the western part of Inner Mongolia. Under the Republic, the central and western part of Inner Mongolia had been divided into three "Special Regions," one of which, Chahar, had its seat

in Zhangjiakou. At the end of the last of China's incessant civil wars, Marshal Feng had received Chahar and its western neighbor, the special region of Suiyuan, for his own territory. Although he came out of the warlord milieu, Marshal Feng tried to distinguish himself as a man of the people, titling his troops the Guominjun, or "Citizen Army." He allowed agitators from the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, to freely denounce the foreign imperialism of countries like the United States and the domestic feudalism of the warlords. From May 30, 1925, on, when students, workers, and shopkeepers in cities all over China poured out into the streets to denounce the shooting of Chinese workers by British police in Shanghai, Marshal Feng gave his vocal support to the protests. Coupled with his alliance with both the Soviet Union and Mongolia, from whom he received arms, Feng Yuxiang's support of the Chinese radical nationalists in the Kuomintang promised continued isolation for the consulate and the further decline of American interests in Zhangjiakou.

On January 13, 1926, Mr. Stanton wrote to the U.S. Minister in China, J.V.A. MacMurray, about a group of Mongols that were being "actively fostered" by the military leaders of the Guominjun. By this time, Marshal Feng had become locked in a hard-fought battle with his arch-rival, Marshal Zhang Zuolin, the military ruler of Manchuria. According to Stanton, Feng intended this group of Inner Mongols "styling itself the 'Executive Society of the Mongolian Party of the Chinese Republic'" to counter the influence of the conservative Marshal Zhang whose support among "various influential Mongol princes and dukes" gave him influence in "a considerable section of Inner Mongolia."

Mr. Stanton enclosed a carefully folded copy of this group's Mongolian-language broadside written on one large sheet covered with the flowing vertical alphabet of the Mongols, quite different from Chinese characters, and stamped at the end with a chop containing a red star. He had, however, only a few concrete details to report: the group as a whole and its chairman, "Ts'e Lin Chien La Fa" were resident in Zhangjiakou, there was a branch in Guihua, the capital of the Suiyuan Special Region to the west, and the organization called on the Mongols to drill an army against Marshal Zhang. When this organization started, who this "Ts'e Lin Chien La Fa" was, and whether the propaganda was having any effect, he could not say for sure. Despite being the resident acting consul, Mr. Stanton had few or no good contacts in Zhangjiakou and was often reduced to interpreting vague statements of anonymous in-

formants even for the actions of Marshal Feng himself, let alone for an obscure group of Mongol agitators.

Like Lillienstrom and Whittick, E.F. Stanton had only the haziest idea of the real motives and ideas of the insurgent Mongols. What notion he did have came from the English version, and he could not know that the appended English "translation" bore only the most coincidental relation to the actual text. The vice consul had evidently been taken advantage of by someone who knew little or no Mongolian and who, after composing in Chinese a very loose paraphrase, turned that into English. Even the names were garbled far beyond the usual distortion of Mongol names when rendered in the very different Chinese syllabic and phonetic structure.

In fact, one of the signatories, the party's secretary, Mersé ("Promoter Meng Er Ssu" in the translation), had been the Young Mongol leader behind the monopoly attempt in Hulun Buir only half a year before. A man of extraordinarily diverse talents, Mersé was in the middle of a long career in which Christian evangelist, distinguished minority educator, trade-union boss, mounted guerilla commander, and shamanist elder would be only some of his job descriptions. Mr. Stanton's "Ts'e Lin Chien La Fa" was really "Serengdonrub," the revolutionary alias of Bai Yunti. Two years before, in Canton, Sun Yat-sen, the founder of China's Kuomintang or Nationalist party, had personally chosen this Bai Yunti to be his man in Inner Mongolia. The analysts in the American legation might also have sat up and taken notice if Mr. Stanton had been able to tell them that one signatory "Ch'i Ch'i Pi Lin T'u" actually meant "Tse-tsenbiligtü" the alias of Buyannemekhü, a propagandist and poet straight from Outer Mongolia, and another, "Hwa Ch'i Er" was actually "Ochir" the pseudonym of Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov, an agent of the notorious Moscow-based Communist International, the so-called general staff of the world revolution. The organization that put its name to the broadside, properly translated as the "Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia" was indeed fighting for Feng Yuxiang and against Zhang Zuolin, but it was by no means simply a creation of the Chinese marshal.[2]

[2] U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 50, 893.00/7085 (Vice Consul E. F. Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926). On the background, see Alicia J. Campi, *The Political Relationship between the United States and Outer Mongolia 1915-1927: The Kalgan Consular Records,* Ph. D. Thesis, Indiana University, 1987, or her brief account in "Early U.S.-Mongolian Diplomatic Contacts," *Mongolia Survey*, No. 6 (1999), pp. 47-57.

The war in China between the Soviet-backed coalition of Feng Yuxiang and the Kuomintang and the anti-Communist forces led by Zhang Zuolin continued, and within another six months, the Manchurian marshal had soundly thrashed Feng Yuxiang and driven him into the farthest west corner of Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile, however, the Chinese Nationalists in the Kuomintang were sweeping up from their base in Canton and inspiring fevered stories about "Red Canton" and its "Red General" Chiang Kai-shek. Journalists sympathetic to the anti-colonial and anti-feudal cause, like the American Anna Louise Strong, flocked to China to report on what was the most newsworthy revolution since 1917. Disillusionment, however, was not long in coming, as first the "Red General" Chiang Kai-shek, and then Feng Yuxiang, shot or imprisoned labor activists and expelled their Soviet advisers. In the summer of 1927, Miss Strong followed Michael Borodin, the most famous of these expelled advisers and "Stalin's man in China," as he traveled north in defeat, full of bitter ruminations about the irremediable corruption of Chinese generals and politicians.

As they rested in Ningxia, the last city before tackling the Mongolian deserts on the way to Siberia, Borodin and his advisers received an invitation to a banquet of soups, chicken, duck, sweet apples, and peaches given by the "Inner Mongolian Kuomintang." Borodin accepted the invitation but left early claiming he had a flu, a few other advisers arrived late, but most did not show up at all. Only Miss Strong, who alternately amused and exasperated her travel mates with her insatiable inquisitiveness, took the opportunity to find about this organization previously unknown to her. The main hosts, "Mr. Pao" and "Madame Pei," explained that the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang was a branch of the Kuomintang that carried on the revolution among the Inner Mongols. Mr. Pao spoke bravely about thousands of cavalry being ready to sweep away Zhang Zuolin, but did not conceal that the party had so little money, it had to borrow $15 silver[3] to pay for the dinner which the Soviet advisers had taken so lightly.

In contrast to the Soviet advisers or the American diplomats, the reporter learned quite a bit about the background of this nationalist movement, facts which she subsequently published in her 1928 book, *China's Millions*. According to Mr. Pao, it had started more than a decade ago among the more settled Mongols of eastern Inner Mongolia who had registered some signal educational achievements and knew more about the modern world than the typical herdsmen. As a result they had achieved a position of leadership over the back-yard herding

[3] On contemporary currencies in China and Mongolia, see Appendix D.

Mongols in the less developed parts of Inner Mongolia, and were a significant factor even in Outer Mongolia. In the last few years, these Inner Mongolian intellectuals had widened their perspective and made their revolution not a purely nationalistic one, but a part of China's revolution and of the world revolution.

In fact this "Inner Mongolian Kuomintang" was the same group that E.F. Stanton, misled by the bogus translation, had called the "Mongolian Party of the Chinese Republic" and which the Mongolian text had named the "People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia." "Mr. Pao" (whose full Chinese name was Bao Yueqing) had signed his Mongol name, Sainbayar, to the letter E.F. Stanton had forwarded to the U.S. State Department ("Sainbayar" somehow came out as "Tsai Pa Yen"!). "Madame Pei's" name would have been more properly written "Madame Pai"; she was the wife of Bai Yunti, the party's chairman, whom Stanton had brought to the attention of the U.S. State Department as "Ts'e Lin Chien La Fa."

Miss Strong with Michael Borodin, Percy Chen and the other Russian advisers soon set off on their grueling motorride through the Gobi desert to Ulaanbaatar, the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic, where she also penned another sympathetic portrait of Mongols in revolution, this time trying to build a modern and enlightened people's state on the ruins of a Buddhist theocracy. In *China's Millions*, she wondered what would happen to the Inner Mongols she had met, still looking to Moscow and Ulaanbaatar for support in a China that was turning harshly against Communism.[4]

East of Ningxia, in the Suiyuan region, ensconced behind the high mud-brick walls of their compound, the Belgian missionary fathers, like E.F. Stanton in Zhangjiakou, also felt the high hopes of the beginning of the decade slowly fading away. As it passes Ningxia city, the Yellow River swings north and makes a huge bend enclosing a high plateau of dry loess soil called in Mongolian the Ordos. Famous for its shrine to the great Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan to the Mongols), Ordos was a dry, barren plateau, in patches a desert of shifting dunes, and scored by canyons cut by years of flash floods. Sheep and goats nibbled the scanty cover of feather-grass and wormwood. Liquorice roots and salt lakes added to the Mongols' meager livelihood, one threatened by the advancing cultivation of destitute Chinese farmers.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, the Scheut missionaries of the Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (C.I.C.M.) had

[4] Anna Louise Strong, *China's Millions* (New York, 1928), pp. 318-322.

chosen this barren territory as their base for the conversion of the Mongols to the Roman Catholic faith. The most successful station in this enterprise had been Boro-Balagasu "Brown Fort," a town of mud-brick walls built against the Suiyuan region's notorious bandits, where the missionaries resettled Mongol converts. The seamless web of Buddhist and Mongol community life made it impossible for new converts to reside peacefully among their Buddhist neighbors without grave peril to either their faith or their lives and so the Belgian missionaries borrowed a leaf from the pages of Jesuit mission history in Mexico and Paraguay and settled their wandering flock in "reductions," purely Christian towns settled under the firm discipline of the missionary fathers.

The turn of the century had seen beatings, plunderings, and martyrdoms, as the Buddhist Mongols of Ordos heeded the call of the Boxers to destroy the foreign religion and defend the Qing. With the support of the French and Belgian government and their own unyielding confidence in their mission, the missionaries had persisted and earned the respect and fear, if not love, of the local rulers and high lamas of the Ordos. Boro-Balagasu lay on the very southern frontier of Ordos, just beyond the humped remnants of the Great Wall, where the Chinese farmers had been trickling in on a seasonal basis since the eighteenth century. It also lay, as the missionary fathers later discovered, on land disputed between two "banners" or counties of Ordos (Inner Mongolia had forty-nine of these "banners," each with its own prince or duke as ruler). The title to the mission land was held from the grand duke of the banner of Otog, but the neighboring Üüshin Banner had claimed this land in a dispute that had festered for decades.

The turbulent political life of Ordos gave no quarter to those unable to arm themselves in self-defense: banner fought banner, the people gathered in vigilante "circles" and fought the dukes and princes, bandits fought the banner militia, and the strong-men commanding the militia fought the popular vigilantes, while all resented impotently the repeated incursions of the neighboring Chinese authorities on Mongol rights and privileges. But in the multiplicity of warring parties, the mission fathers, fully able and willing to defend their flock, found their opportunity. By the 1920s, they had become power-brokers in Otog, collecting pasture and soda lake leasing fees for the grand duke, mediating the periodic quarrels of the popular "circles" and the local strongmen, and enjoying both the admiration and resentment which the successful exercise of power always brings.

By 1928, this golden age for Boro-Balagasu had come to an end, and for a few months the current Reverend Father of the mission station,

Florent Claeys, felt the days of martyrdom might have returned. Two years earlier an army of "Kharachins" had come into Üüshin and Otog banners. Strictly speaking, the Kharachins was one of the "tribes" or sub-ethnic groups in the far-eastern part of Inner Mongolia, and one of the most accomplished both in education and in monopolizing positions in the Chinese Republic's Mongol bureaucracy. The Ordos Mongols, however, used Kharachin in a broader sense to mean any one from the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, where long intermixing with the Chinese had given the Mongols a strongly sinicized cast. This groups of "Kharachins" came, however, not in the name of Beijing or the Chinese Republic, but in the name of the Soviets in Outer Mongolia, where they had also enrolled a fugitive Buddhist monk and vigilante leader from Ordos, Öljeijirgal, and made him commander of the Üüshin regiment of the Inner Mongolian Red Army.

For some reason the missionaries knew not, the danger had abated for a year or so, but suddenly in the spring of 1928, the Kharachin propagandists again bullied the grand duke of Otog into making threats against the small colony of Catholic Mongols. The mission station's chief catechist assisted the agitators from within; the catechist held a bitter grudge against the commander of the Boro-Balagasu station's Christian militia, and the wily Kharachins had promised him the command should they come to power. With the catechist as go-between, the new powers in the land demanded a personal interview with Father Claeys. Thus the Belgian missionaries came face-to-face with the same agitators of which the American diplomats had heard only the rumor. The experience was not a pleasant one for Father Claeys. The chronicler of the mission described the encounter:

> The Reds, convinced that [the mission] would not sustain a vigorous attack, directed all their guns on Poro Balgason; they personally visited the mission and were even led into the quarters of the missionary. With an astounding and utterly shameless insolence they insulted the priest and demanded the immediate return of the mission's lands and of all its arms.
>
> A categorical refusal by Fr. Claeys petrified them with shock. With a fury like erupting volcanoes, they spit in the face of the missionary all their hatred of the Church and of religion, and threatened the Mongol catechists with prison and tortures, assuring them that they would soon come with a strong army and great canons to pound the mission into powder.

At the same time, their ally, the lama Öljeijirgal, now holding full power as the military commander of Üüshin Banner, demanded that the mission station return to his control those Mongols within its walls who originally hailed from Üüshin. Faced again with refusal, he joined with the Kharachins who dominated Otog for a combined attack on the mission station.

On June 15, 1928, the red armies of Üüshin and Otog appeared near the sand dunes that lay just north of Boro-Balagasu. Fr. Claeys had called on all his Mongol converts wandering on the plain after their herds to rally to the strong place, and they had abandoned their homes and herds to crowd into the mission station and man the walls, while inside in the church, their women and children added their prayers to those of the orphans and sisters permanently resident, storming Heaven with their uninterrupted appeals to the Lord and His Mother. That very day, the feast of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the native Üüshin Mongols, led by Öljeijirgal, came to blows with the Kharachin strangers, and after a brief affray, the Üüshin troops decamped back to their home banner, while the Kharachins fled west, toward Ningxia, never to return again.

Would it have diminished the certainty of the missionaries that their deliverance had been divine if they had known all the details of how the affray had come about? No, indeed, but what they did not know was that sharing command with Öljeijirgal was Anna Louise Strong's "Mr. Pao," Sainbayar, and that it was his insistence that the native Üüshin regiment follow the party leaders back to Ningxia which sparked the shooting between the "Kharachins" and the Üüshin Mongols. Behind the monolithic front of revolutionary determination that they had presented to the foreign "reactionaries," conflict between the two had been brewing for months, and the first deployment of the Üüshin troops outside their native banner had raised the tensions to a boiling point.[5]

The year of 1928 was the last year of the Young Mongol disturbances. In Suiyuan, a drought burned up the grass, forcing the Mongols to follow their perishing herds in futile journeys for fodder and the starving Chinese to tramp the dusty roads, begging and dying. The Kuomintang's National Revolution ended in May, with the now anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek, China's new maximum leader, entering Beijing as triumphant conqueror. Marshal Feng emerged a victor too, but with a very unsatisfying share of the spoils. Marshal Zhang Zuolin retreated to Manchuria, and was blown up in a mysterious explosion that threw his personal train compartment off the tracks shortly before it pulled into the station.

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[5] J. van Hecken, C.I.C.M. *Les missions chez les Mongols aux temps modernes* (Beiping, 1949), pp. 181-184.

That August, in Harbin, a new Mongol crisis suddenly confronted the next consul general, George C. Hanson, when bands of insurgent Mongol cavalry from across the Outer Mongolian frontier cut the Chinese Eastern Railway east of Hailar, sealing it off from Harbin. In the weeks that followed, as the Japanese-language tabloids in Manchuria screamed about Red Cossacks bestriding the gate to China, the incident dwindled in the eyes of less hysterical observers into a strangely bungled effort by the Young Mongols of Hulun Buir to make the authorities there sit up and take notice of their demands. Within a month, the incident died out as suddenly as it had started. One of the few practical results was that Marshal Zhang's son, the "Young Marshal" Zhang Xueliang, invited one of the Young Mongols, Mersé, to come to his Manchurian capital of Mukden (modern Shenyang) and fulfill the Mongol's long dream of a Mongol and Chinese school that would train students of both nationalities to live together and learn from each other to build a better Asia.

While teaching at his new school, the Northeast Mongolian Banners' Normal School, Mersé met an American business reporter, Owen Lattimore, who had tired of writing pieces for the *China Year Book* on the livestock resources and caravan trade of China's Inner Asian dominions and set out on a long caravan trip through western Inner Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan (modern Xinjiang), down through Ladakh and Kashmir into British India. In 1929-30, Mr. Lattimore and his new wife took another trip through China's Northeast and became shocked observers of the Khinggan colonization project, in which settled Mongols on the eastern frontiers of Inner Mongolia were evicted from their houses and farms and Chinese settlers brought in to replace them. Inquiring about the background of this brutal mistreatment of the Mongols and the financial interests involved, Mr. Lattimore hit pay dirt when he met the headmaster Mersé in Mukden. Mersé shared his ideas on the past and the future of the Mongols with Owen Lattimore, setting the foundation of many of the ideas which he would later popularize in his widely read books on Inner Asia.

Mersé, under his Chinese name of Guo Daofu (old style, "Kuo Tao-fu") had written several books in Chinese, of which he acquainted Mr. Lattimore with his latest, "Lectures on the Mongolian Question" (*Menggu wenti jiangyan lun*). In return, Mr. Lattimore helped Mersé publish an English resume of these lectures in the August, 1930, issue of the American journal, *Pacific Affairs*. By the time he met Mr. Lattimore, Mersé was disillusioned with the Soviet Union and its policy in Mongolia. The Mongolian People's Republic, in his view, had been

turned into little more than a puppet regime of Soviet Russia. Mersé never told Owen Lattimore the full story of how deeply he had been involved in the failed revolution against the Hulun Buir officials and Zhang Zuolin, nor the story of how he come to believe that both the Communist International and even his Outer Mongolian brethren were only using the Inner Mongols for their own cynical political purposes.

When the American suggested that he needed to be able to speak Mongolian, so that he could speak to those common Mongols least affected by Chinese culture, Mersé said at once that he was going about it in the right way. As Owen Lattimore was returning to Beiping (Beijing's new name), Mersé could not teach him himself, but arranged for Bökhekheshig, a teacher at the Mongolian and Tibetan School there, to tutor him in Mongolian. A few months later, the Japanese invaded Northeast China, and Mersé fled back to his homeland, dying in circumstances that remain obscure to this day. Bökhekheshig returned to Inner Mongolia, but introduced his American student to Sainbayar, who at this time was living in Beijing. Unlike Mersé, Sainbayar had no hesitation about telling the American about his involvement in the "Inner Mongolian Kuomintang," or about his ancestor who as an eastern Inner Mongolian prince under the last dynasty had fought against both the Taiping rebels and the British. Sainbayar himself after 1931 joined the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement led by the Mongol Prince De that resulted in an autonomous state for Inner Mongolia under Japanese protection. Sainbayar, who ended up serving as the director of this autonomous regime's state bank until his death in 1939, also introduced Mr. Lattimore to Prince De.

In Owen Lattimore's 1934 book, *Mongols of Manchuria*, Mersé appeared, as did a page or two on the "Inner Mongolian Kuomintang." Sainbayar's name was not mentioned, but the Mongol politician's belief, which he had also shared with Anna Louise Strong, that the educated nationalists of eastern Inner Mongolia were the key to the long-term survival of all the Mongol peoples, was. Like *China's Millions*, *The Mongols of Manchuria* created a certain stir among those with interest in modern China, but with the drama of Chiang Kai-shek betraying China's nationalist revolution, or the Japanese making a bid for empire in Asia taking the foreground, what seemed to be just an Inner Mongolian branch of the Kuomintang was hardly worthy of a second look.[6] In his next book, *Mongol Journeys*, Lattimore mentioned his three

[6] Owen Lattimore and Fukiko Isono, *The Diluv Khutagt: Memoirs and Autobiography of a Mongol Buddhist Reincarnation in Religion and Revolution* (Wiesbaden, 1982), pp. 2-4; Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (1934; rpt. New

distinguished acquaintances in Inner Mongolian politics by name and described them as aristocrats pushed by the pressure of events into democratic politics, and alienated from the die-hard conservatism of the Buddhist clergy:

> In recent years, the few Mongol princes and nobles, like Te Wang, Sain Bayir (Pao Yü-ch'ing) or Merse (Kuo Tao-fu), who have tried to be active in the nationalistic movement, have been looked on by some as democrats and by others merely as demagogues. At any rate they have not been typical of the European idea of what an "aristocratic" leader should be...Since in both Outer and Inner Monoglia the few aristocrats who tried to act at all effectively moved perforce nearer to the wishes and needs of the people, the kind of Bourbonism that "learns nothing and forgets nothing" centered primarily in the Lama Church.[7]

Perhaps this is how they presented themselves to him; it was at any rate the primary English-language portrait of Inner Mongolian nationalists for the next two decades.

The Inner Mongolian Movement in China's National Revolution

What were all these outsiders seeing in Inner Mongolia: a social movement of modernization, a political party, or an army? Was it run by the Communist International and the radical Mongols in Ulaanbaatar, by the Chinese Kuomintang, by Marshal Feng Yuxiang, or was it an indigenous movement of Mongol intellectuals? As the five vignettes above indicate, it was all of these things, being at times more social, at other times more political, and at other times again, more military. It also received support from the revolutionaries in the Mongolian People's Republic, from the Kuomintang of China, from the Communist International, and from Marshal Feng and his so-called Citizen Army. The consulates in Harbin correctly noted how the example of the new government in Outer Mongolia had inspired the Inner Mongolian nationalists. As Sainbayar had told both Anna Louise Strong and Owen Lattimore, a key role was played by the Mongols of southeastern Inner Mongolia, who had long been influenced by Chinese culture, both in its high and low forms, and seized early upon the modernizing agenda of the reformers in the cities and treaty-ports of the vast country. Yet, as the Scheut missionaries observed, these modernizing Mongols from the

York,1969), pp. 127-133.

[7] *Mongol Journeys* (New York, 1941), p. 318. He has a more specific account of how he came to meet Prince De at a banquet on pp. 261-62 of the same book.

eastern part of the region ended up coming to blows with the more traditional Mongols from the western areas, such as Ordos.

One way to look at the movement is to look at their own writings. Vice Consul Stanton's propaganda broadside, once its Mongolian text is correctly translated, reveals one side of the movement. It was written at a moment in late December, 1925, when Marshal Feng's "Citizen Army" seemed on the verge of overthrowing the power of the Manchurian Marshal, Zhang Zuolin, and of what it called "those benighted nobles who have tormented everyone, relying on the reactionary Zhang Zuolin as bats cling to a cliff." The broadside informed the Inner Mongolian people of a new party, calling itself sometimes the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, and sometimes just the Inner Mongolian People's Party, and of a new army, which it called the People's Army of Inner Mongolia. The old system of Mongol government through dukes and princes was on the eve of rightful destruction, the broadside announced, and a new system of government, based on the masses and led by this new party, would soon replace it. Against the danger that the Mongol people would sit passively by, or else take the destruction of the traditional Mongol authorities to mean that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia would now lose all their autonomy from the Chinese Republic, the broadside called on the Mongols to support the Inner Mongolian People's Party and its People's Army.

These great events were part of a grander scheme, and the broadside told the people that the Inner Mongolian party "takes counsel and aid with the parties in China and Mongolia" and is "combining forces with the People's Army of China." The "parties in China and Mongolia" meant the Kuomintang in China proper, then striving to achieve control over the whole country from its base in the south, and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the ruling party in Mongolia proper (that is, Outer Mongolia). The "People's Army in China" meant Feng's Citizen Army. As everyone interested in Chinese politics knew, the Kuomintang, Marshal Feng, and the revolutionary Mongolian government were all allies in 1925, supported by the Soviet Union, and all directing their fire at Marshal Zhang, China's chief "reactionary." Thus the broadside made the Inner Mongolian events part of what was called China's "Great" ("great" in comparison to the 1911 revolution which had overthrown China's last, Qing, dynasty, but had not been able to set the new republican regime on a firm foundation), or "National," Revolution ("national" both because it mobilized the whole nation, including the workers, the farmers, and urban shopkeepers, not just the generals and politicians, and because it attacked the colonial privileges

that Europe, America, and Japan held in China). This revolution began in 1923 with the Kuomintang's acceptance of the offer of aid from the Soviet Russia and China's indigenous Communists. It ended, depending on one's viewpoint, either in 1927, when the alliance with the Communists broke down, or in 1928, when the Kuomintang, acting alone, drove Zhang Zuolin out of Beijing and united the country under its own rule.

Although observers from the United States and Western Europe were to remain almost wholly ignorant of the Inner Mongolian share in this revolution, the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese reading publics received more detailed pictures of the Inner Mongolian party. In the 1926 issue of *Novyï vostok* "The New East," the journal of the "All-Russian Scholarly Association of Oriental Studies," I.I. Genkin, a Russian Mongolia-watcher, published an account of recent developments both in the Mongolian People's Republic and in Inner Mongolia. There he briefly described how certain figures like Mersé, and especially Bai Yunti, from the different regions of Inner Mongolia had come together in December, 1924, to form a central organ of Inner Mongolian revolution, and through the succeeding year had organized "National Renaissance Clubs" to pursue their nationalist and revolutionary goals. In October, 1925, they had held the First Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, and issued a manifesto capped by a set of immediate demands. Genkin gave the complete text of the manifesto in Russian translation and included a copy of the official photograph of the new party leadership.[8]

On January 31, 1927, the liberal Beijing newspaper, *Chen bao*, published an article in its series on Mongolia, entitled "The Inner Mongolian Bolshevik Movement under Outer Mongolian Influence." The article reported the party's early activities, likewise highlighting the leadership of the Kharachin, Bai Yunti, and quoting, now in Chinese, the full text of the First Congress's manifesto. Genkin's account had stopped with this First Congress, but the Chinese newspaper article described how the party had gone on to form an army, had advanced with the Citizen Army in its winter 1925 offensive against Marshal Zhang and then followed it in pell-mell retreat, as the Manchurian commander delivered his powerful counterattack. The party leaders retreated back to Ulaanbaatar, but also set up a military school in Baotou, a Chinese

[8] I.I. Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoï narodnoï partii," *Novyï vostok*, No. 12 (1926), 184-95. I would like to thank E. Pürewjaw for very kindly sending me a copy of this article.

county town in the west of Inner Mongolia. This account was then incorporated by the anti-Communist Japanese journalist Katsuji Fusé in his 1927 book, translated into English as *Soviet Policy in the Orient*.[9]

What could an attentive reader learn from the text of the First Congress's manifesto? Those familiar with China's political scene would note how the Inner Mongolian party had fully assimilated the Soviet-style ideological language of China's "National Revolution," a language which, originating in Leninist views about imperialism and feudalism, proved both infuriating and paralyzing to the journalists, businessmen, and diplomats in China's treaty ports, who were accustomed to a totally different way of looking at China's domestic situation and foreign relations. While the central idea for them was China living up, or not living up, to standards embodied by the world's prosperous, orderly nations, especially Britain and the United States, the central idea for the revolutionaries was the concept of the "reactionaries," that is, social figures and forces, who through their own selfish ambition stood in the way of social progress. The tide of the times was running for the people and against the rulers, and the "reactionaries" stood against this tide, defending the privileges of the ruling classes against the people. (In the following description I will put quotation marks around the first appearance of key words, not to cast doubt on their validity, but to indicate that they were new terms either previously unknown or used in very different ways before the Great Revolution.)

As the Inner Mongolian party's manifesto declared, China like all poor countries had two sets of "reactionaries," external and internal (or foreign and domestic—Mongolian, like Chinese, uses one word for both "external" and "foreign" and another for both "internal" and "domestic"). The "capitalists" or "bourgeoisie" (again Chinese and Mongolian do not distinguish the two terms) in China, such as Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, far from assisting China's modernization with their advisers and loans, had gotten rich by "exploiting" the natural and human resources of China and other colonial countries. The governments of these rich countries served these capitalist/bourgeois interests, inflicting "unequal treaties on China," seizing railway and mining concessions, opening treaty ports, and dividing the country into spheres of influence. This complex of political privileges serving economic interests constituted "imperialism"; thus "foreign reactionaries" and "imperialists" were more or less equivalent. The imperialists, threatened

[9] "Shou Wai Meng yingxiang zhi Nei Menggu chihua yundong," *Chen bao* (Beijing), Jan. 31, 1927; Katsuji Fusé, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Beijing, 1927), pp. 186-94.

by the rise of "small and weak" or "oppressed" peoples all over the world, but especially in China, were looking for reactionaries within China who could help them suppress the Chinese "masses" in their struggle against this oppression and exploitation.

Up until 1911, the imperialists had used the old Manchu ruling class of the Qing dynasty as their domestic collaborators. With the 1911 revolution, the imperialists used the generals of the new republic. At first they used one general, Yuan Shikai, as China's military ruler, but after his death in 1916, each imperialist country came to support generals in its own sphere of influence. Thus Britain and America supported Marshal Wu Peifu in Central China and the Japanese supported Marshal Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria (Northeast China). These warring generals had come to be known as "warlords" in European-language and Chinese journalism and for the revolutionaries, "warlord" was the most baneful species of "domestic reactionaries." These warlords, whose constant fighting constituted for conservative observers the primary obstacle for doing business in China, and the prime reason why the country could not be trusted with rights equal to other nations, were thus in the revolutionary view actually working hand-in-glove with the foreign powers. Behind the warlords lay also the small cliques of Chinese officials, "landlords," and "compradore" businessmen who protected their selfish profits by supporting both the warlords and the imperialists.

Given this situation, the "people" of China needed to attack two main enemies: the warlords who were dividing China and plunging it into the horrors of war, and the imperialists who sucked its blood and exploited its labor and resources. The main social force for this attack would come from the "masses," that is, the farmers (or "peasants"—the importation of this Russian term was another new feature of the revolutionary vocabulary), "workers," merchants, and "intellectuals." China's Kuomintang (a name which could be variously translated as the "People's Party," or the "Citizen's Party," or the "National Party," just as well as the "Nationalist Party" which was actually used), being the party of the revolution, would organize and unite the masses, and lead them in the struggle against the imperialists and warlords, and all reactionaries. If China's force internally was the masses, externally China had the assistance of Soviet Russia. Before World War I and its revolution, Russia had been in the ranks of the imperialist powers. Having eliminated its capitalists/bourgeoisie, and been subjected to the hostility of the imperialist powers, however, Russia was no longer in the imperialist ranks, and had a policy of friendship to the oppressed nations of the world, aiding them against the imperialists. The Kuomintang, along with friendly generals who by their patriotism escaped the label of "warlords" such as Marshal Feng Yuxiang, thus supported Soviet Russia as the only foreign country with a true interest in China's welfare.

Of course, all was not unanimity in the revolutionary ranks; significant, indeed bloody, differences existed. The primary quarrels were over the existence and breadth of domestic reactionaries apart from the warlords, and the question of support from Soviet Russia. Did China itself have "class" divisions, such that "landlords" were the natural enemy of the "peasants" and not only the foreign "capitalists"—that was agreed by all—but even Chinese "capitalists/bourgeoisie" were the natural enemies of the "workers"? Did "warlordism" come out of "landlordism"? Was it not in fact a symptom of the chronic disease of "feudalism," the division of the country based on landed estates? And was the Soviet Union, as a non-capitalist country, inherently non-imperialist and thus a permanent friend of all oppressed peoples? Or else was its non-imperialist policy due only to its political position as a loser in the post-World War I settlement? In that case China should be on its guard lest Soviet Russia turn imperialist when opportunities presented themselves. Or indeed was it something in the white race, or advanced industrial civilization itself, which led to imperialism? In that case, Soviet Russia might be imperialist right now, and only using the people's revolution to exploit and divide China. Despite these debates, all those who thought in terms of wealthy imperialists using warlords and other reactionaries to oppress and exploit China and other weak and subjugated people of the world shared a common vocabulary and thought-world quite alien to that of conservatives, both Chinese and foreign.

How did the Inner Mongolian party fit their own region into this picture? It would seem that an ideology developed to justify a Chinese nationalist movement would not be well suited to a movement of an ethnic minority people within China for its own freedom and autonomy. In the party manifesto, however, the whole ideology of imperialism and warlordism, external and internal reactionaries, was replicated for Inner Mongolia and nested within the larger context of China and the colonial world. The external reactionaries in Inner Mongolia, equivalent to the capitalists and imperialists of Europe, America, and Japan, were the Chinese money-lenders, officials, and warlords. Since the Inner Mongols were primarily a pastoral people, breeding livestock on the region's pastures, Chinese capitalists or bourgeoisie lent money to the herders to buy goods, charging ruinous interest, and also bought land from the Mongol authorities at a low price and settled this land with destitute Chinese farmers from whom they then collected high rents. If the

Mongol people objected, the warlords would use their armies to crush these rebellions. The warlords also fought each other for spheres of influence in Inner Mongolia. In all respects, the internal reactionaries of China treated the Inner Mongols just as the imperialists treated China. On top of that, foreign imperialists (like the consular officials in Hailar and Zhangjiakou, and the Belgian priests we have already met) also subjected Inner Mongolia to their direct exploitation.

Who were Inner Mongolia's domestic reactionaries? Whom did the external reactionaries rely on to keep the Inner Mongolian masses in check? These were the dukes and princes. Inner Mongolia since the Qing dynasty had been divided into forty-nine "banners" or counties, each with its own hereditary ruler, holding from the emperor various feudal ranks such as duke or prince. Certain areas of Inner Mongolia, such as Hulun Buir had a somewhat different banner system in which the officials were appointed, although in other ways they had powers quite similar to the other banner rulers. Although the Republican Revolution of 1911 had overthrown the emperor, these feudal remnants still remained in power, a standing contradiction of all the republic stood for. These dukes and princes clung to the warlords of the neighboring regions for power and tried to prevent the liberating influences of new culture and enlightenment from reaching the Mongol masses.

As presented in the manifesto, the work of the "Inner Mongolian People's Party" was thus analogous to that of the "Chinese People's Party" (that is, the Kuomintang). The party needed to rally the Mongol masses under its leadership, and in alliance with the Kuomintang itself, use propaganda, agitation, and military force to overthrow the Chinese warlords, expel the land-grabbing officials and usurious money-lenders, and dispossess the Mongol dukes and princes, thus completing the Republican revolution in China. Since the Mongols were an oppressed, small, and weak nation within China, they would receive an autonomous position with the new People's China, thus realizing the idea of China as a republic of five races (the Han or ethnic Chinese, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Muslims, and the Tibetans) which had been announced in 1911, but never fulfilled due to the disaster of the warlords. Soviet Russia would, of course, help the Inner Mongolian people's struggle, but the Inner Mongols would also receive assistance from the Mongolian People's Republic to its north, which, having overthrown the same combination of reactionaries and imperialists with Soviet aid in 1921, was now actively assisting their oppressed Inner Mongolian brethren to do the same.

As might be expected, understanding the party's ideology helps in understanding of the motives behind the party's actions. Since the party members believed trade with the foreign and Chinese merchants exploited the Mongol herdsmen, the cooperative monopoly in Hulun Buir was a strike at exploitative economic relations too long permitted. The resulting intervention of the consular officials was just another example of how capitalists used imperialism to preserve their exploitative economic privileges. The broadside calling on the Mongols to rise up against Zhang Zuolin was only the Mongols playing their part in the great alliance of progressive forces against the most powerful reactionary in China, and his imperialist patron, Japan. The position of the Scheut missionaries—running a walled town with armed guards on the ramparts, collecting taxes for Mongol banners, intervening in the disputes of their neighbors—exemplified on a small scale how the imperialists used religion in China to secure its own control. Finally the Inner Mongols were allied with the Kuomintang, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Communist International not because they were instruments of others' ambitions, but because these other organizations were the only outsiders genuinely interested in destroying Inner Mongolia's true enemies: the warlords, the Chinese usurers and land-grabbing officials, and the imperialists.

Of course the party's ideology did not answer all questions. Several questions remained, all of which Inner Mongolian nationalists would ask, sooner or later. Since Feng Yuxiang himself ran colonization programs, used the nobility to transmit his directives, and ruthlessly taxed the Mongol and Chinese masses together, was not he a warlord just like Zhang Zuolin? Many Mongols in Ordos opposed the missionaries not because they were against imperialism, but because as Mongols they supported the established Buddhist church. Were the Inner Mongolian nationalists really against religion itself, as the priests evidently believed, even including Buddhism? Was that why they were allied with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, where the privileges of the Buddhist church had been taken away, and also with the Kuomintang and Feng Yuxiang who turned temples into schools and openly ridiculed Buddhism? If the Mongols were one nation yearning for liberation, then why the violent antagonism between the Ordos Mongols and the "Kharachins" in the party army? Finally, if the Inner Mongols were one in race and nation with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia, how could they slight their ties to their Mongolian brothers in favor of the Kuomintang, which after all was a party of the nation that had been oppressing Mongols for centuries?

These questions marked the explicit areas of conflict between the different groups of Inner Mongolian revolutionaries. Yet all of them shared the revolutionary ideology of "foreign and domestic reactionaries," an ideology that justified massive changes in the existing ways of doing things. Like all public broadsides and manifestos from organizations determined to change the world, the public statements of the Inner Mongolian nationalists cannot be taken at face value. The ideological program of the Great Revolution presented the state (that is, both the various governments and the politicians who run them) as an instrumental entity, transparently serving either the interests of the reactionaries or of the people and thus systematically diverted attention away from the whole issue of the state and its relations to society.[10]

From the beginning, the revolutionary program planned a tremendous growth in the power of the state: calling on the local revolutionary regimes to submit to the party's central committee, separating the local government's administration from the Chinese gentry or Mongol nobility and putting it in the hands of professional politicians and bureaucrats, proscribing unapproved religious practices, labeling some people as enemies of the state, conscripting citizens into schools and armies where their world view could be transformed by the new democratic ideology, confiscating both the property of reactionaries and shifting control of leased resources from the lease-holders to the new revolutionary regime, expanding the rolls of soldiers who became dependent on the new regime for their pay and social position, taxing a wider range of commodities at higher rates, and inserting the revolutionary state as middle-man between the Mongols and the outside world.[11] A crucial result of the ideology was

[10] I have adopted the distinction of instrumental vs. structural views of the state from Germaine Hoston, *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan* (Princeton, 1994), esp. pp. 70-74.

[11] I have here followed the extremely useful list of measures of building central state authority found in Richard Franklin Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 114. This list divides central state-building measures into seven categories: 1) *centralization*, which moves power from the localities to the center; 2) *administrative competence*, which separates the state's deliberations from social control; 3) *citizenship*, in which the state defines legitimate participants in society and politics and controls personal movement; 4) *control of property*, which includes confiscations and enforcement of marketplace and labor regulations; 5) *creation of client groups*, through payment of salaries, pensions, welfare, issuing of bonds, and control of currency; 6) *extraction*, basically non-confiscatory taxation, and moderate inflationary policies, and 7) *The central state in the world system*, including measures such as limiting foreign access to the domestic market, raising the state's diplomatic and military profile, and broadly conceived programs of national development and industrialization. The Inner

to make this dramatic increase seem like a mere byproduct, a necessary, and not particularly noteworthy, means of performing the really vital and absorbing task, which was crushing reactionaries and all enemies of the people. Yet one could ask, for example, about the Hulun Buir cooperatives: was putting all trade in the control of one organization run by officials in the local government really a way of helping the people, or in fact a way of helping the officials of the would-be new regime?

The history of Inner Mongolian revolutionary movements and the perspective of three-quarters of a century, suggest that far from being a side-issue, this question about the power of the state remains a vital one, which went rather deeper than many of the other issues which divided the revolutionaries. By seeing the existing weak government as a fundamental problem behind the revolution, and the primary issue of controversy as being who will be allowed to control the powerful new state once built up, a new perspective also emerges which allows one to connect the seemingly abstract issue of ethnicity with the concrete political issues in a more satisfying way than by treating both as independent variables. A key background to this perspective, and to the historical pages which follow, is a brief history of the government institutions in Inner Mongolia, and their relations both with the Chinese governments, and with the newly independent government in Outer Mongolia or Mongolia proper.

Banner Institutions

Inner Mongolia surrendered to the Qing empire in 1636, a new empire founded by the rising Manchu people who had borrowed their script and much of their civilization from the Mongols. When the Qing emperors made themselves masters of China as the Ming dynasty dissolved in anarchy in 1644, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia came to be ruled from Beijing for the first time since the fall of Khubilai Khan's Mongol dynasty in China more than three hundred years before. The Qing, however, kept Inner Mongolia separate from the eighteen provinces of China and instead of modeling its administration on that of China, created in most of the Inner Mongolian banners a set of composite

Mongolian party program, as well as that of the Kuomintang, explicitly involved dramatic increases in central state authority in all seven of these areas. Bensel's theoretical discussion of the measures of state expansion on pp. 106-13 and his application of these measures to U.S. Civil War state building on pp. 113-237 is a masterpiece of political analysis and has formed much of the theoretical background for what follows.

institutions which mixed the Manchu militia system known as the "banners" with the aristocratic traditions of the Mongols. These institutions underwent significant development, and were further modified to fit the Khalkha Mongols, the main Mongol people of Outer Mongolia, who submitted in 1691, but I will describe them as they existed for the Inner Mongols in the nineteenth century.

The banner formed the primary unit both of administration and of community life in Inner Mongolia.[12] As I mentioned before, most of Inner Mongolia was divided into forty-nine banners, each of which had a single ruler or *jasag*, who was almost always of the lineage of either the great Mongol conqueror Chinggis (Genghis) Khan or of one of his brothers. Although the various banner rulers held ranks bestowed by the Qing emperor in consideration of military achievements, intermarriage with the Qing family, need to be conciliated, and so on, every banner ruler or *jasag* had the same powers and dignities within his banner regardless of rank (see table i.1). Inner Mongolian banners averaged about 3,000-8,000 members in the high steppe, and 15,000-25,000 near to China proper, and their territory covered hundreds of square miles. (Actual residents were often much more numerous and included Chinese tenants, merchants, salt and mine workers, and out-banner Mongols.) Membership in the banner was hereditary and since it traditionally involved free access to the natural resources—pasture, water, salt and

[12] On the banner institutions, see the summary account in H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, trans. A. Beltchenko and E.E. Moran, *Present Day Political Organi-zation of China* (1911; rpt. Taipei, n.d.), pp. 445-449, whose terminology I have largely followed, and the detailed studies in Antoine Mostaert, "Matériaux ethno-graphiques relatifs aux Mongols ordos," *Central Asiatic Journal* 2 (1956), 242-257, David Miller Farquhar, *The Ch'ing Administration of Mongolia up to the Nineteenth Century*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1960, pp. 63-70, 90-122, and 129-166, and Jacques Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie qalq-a* (Paris, 1976), pp. 105-143 and 176-187. It should be noted that Legrand describes the Khalkha banner institutions which differed in several important aspects from those of the Inner Mongols. David Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 1-53 describes the administration of the somewhat different banners of the Chakhar, in which the aristocratic character had been more thoroughly suppressed than in other banners of Inner Mongolia. Yet many of his comments about administration, the closed community nature, and the central role of the banner head are fully applicable to the rest of Inner Mongolia. The amban (the Manchu word simply means "high official"), which in Chakhar was the head of the banner, was equivalent in role and powers to the ruling nobleman (*jasag noyan*) in other Inner Mongolian banners, and must be keep quite separate from the ambans (Chinese *dutong*) who served as banner garrison commanders in various Qing forts, and the ambans (Chinese *dachen*) who served as imperial residents or agents in major Inner Asian political centers.

soda lakes, forests, right to plough with only nominal fees, etc.—was a jealously guarded privilege. The banner thus approached being a closed community, although a small amount of naturalization did occur.

The Qing regulations prescribed a set staff and hierarchy for banner government (see figure i.1). Under the ruler were two administrators (*tusalagchi*), distinguished as the right and the left administrators, with the right administrator as the senior one. According to Qing regulations, these administrators had to belong to the same noble lineage as the ruler of the banner. In some cases they were thus close relatives, uncles or cousins, of the ruler, but in others the position was filled by branches which may have separated from the banner ruler's branch hundreds of years before. The right administrator was, under the ruler, the chief official of the banner and in times of the ruler's absence, death, or minority, held the regency and control over the seal which was the very physical incarnation of sovereignty. Below the administrator was another official, the adjutant (*jakhirugchi janggi* or *jakhirugchi*) who was required by Qing regulations to be a commoner. If the noble-blooded administrator represented the aristocratic element, the adjutant, usually a commoner, oversaw the administration related to the bannermen's position as servants of the emperor—training of clerks, supplying horses and weapons for the militia, supervising the rotating services on post roads, etc.—and in eastern Inner Mongolia, the adjutant sometimes came to overshadow the administrator. Below the adjutant and the administrator were, in all but the smallest banners of Inner Mongolia, two deputy adjutants (*meiren-ü janggi*) who assisted the adjutants, and were also commoners. On paper all of these officials served at the pleasure of the banner ruler, but the actual degree of control which the ruling nobleman exercised varied according to his history and personality; in many banners, either the senior administrator or the adjutant reduced him to a figurehead.

At least one of the five officials, collectively called in Ordos the "five principals" (*tabun jingkhini*) but found in all banners, was always on duty at the seat of the banner government and the five principals often convened there to discuss affairs. The Mongols borrowed their term for this seat, *yamu(n)*, from Chinese *yamen*, the usual term in late imperial China for a government office. By the early twentieth century, the yamen was usually a group of a few mud-brick buildings set in the midst of an open steppe. Next to the yamen was the banner ruler's residence or *shang*, sometimes a Mongol felt-tent or *ger* (yurt) or sometimes a mud-brick building. The yamen was occupied not only by the five major officials but also by a variable number of clerks who served in rotation for two or three months at a time. Petty officials, literally called

Table i.1: Ranks of Banner Rulers

Mongolian name	Chinese name	Translation	Yearly salary (taels silver; lengths of silk)
Khoshoi Chin Wang	Heshe Qinwang	Prince, 1st Rank	2,500-2,000; 40-25*
Törö-yin Giyün Wang	Duoluo Junwang	Prince, 2nd Rank	1,500-1,000; 20-15†
Törö-yin Beile	Duoluo Beile	Grand Duke, 1st Rank	800; 14
Khoshigun-u Beise	Gushan Beizi	Grand Duke, 2nd Rank	500; 10
Ulus-un Tüshiye Güng	Feng'en Zhenguo Gong	Duke, 1st Rank	300; 9
Ulus-dur Tusalakhu Güng	Feng'en Fuguo Gong	Duke, 2nd Rank	200; 7
Jasag Taiji (jerge 1-4)	Zhasake Taiji (deng 1-4)	Ruling Taiji (ranks 1-4)	100; 4

*The Jorigtu Chin Wang, the Tüshiyetü Chin Wang, and the Darkhan Chin Wang of Khorchin and the Tüshiyetü Khan, Setsen Khan, and Zasagtu Khan of Khalkha received 2,500 taels and 40 lengths; other princes, 1st rank, received 2,000 taels and 25 lengths.
†The Jorigtu Giyün Wang of Khorchin received 1,500 taels and 20 rolls; all other princes, 2nd rank, received 1,000 taels and 15 lengths.

Sources: Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, p. 445; Nayiraltu and Altan'orgil, ed., *Gadagadu Monggol-un törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u qauli jüil-ün bicig*, I, 249-51.

"pushers" (Manchu, *boshokû*, pronounced *boshokho*, or Mongol *khögegchi*), a group similar in duties and reputation to the yamen runners in China proper, carried orders from the yamen to the banner commoners.

Outside the yamen, all of the common bannermen were divided into *sumu* or squadrons, averaging about 25 or so per Inner Mongolian banner, although some had as many as 80 or 90, while others had only 1. Six *sumu*s made a regiment (*jalan* or *khariya*). As the names indicate,

the primary duty of the common bannermen was to serve as militiamen, fighting for the emperor. Each *sumu* or squadron was originally designed to contain 150 adult men, aged between 18 and 60, and supply 50 on-duty cavalrymen. The sumu commanders and the regiment commanders held titles as captains (*sumun-u janggi*) and colonels (*jalan-u janggi*), respectively, with each captain being assisted by a lieutenant (*khündü*, or *orulan khögegchi*). The sumu population was in turn divided into twenties and tens, each of which had its own appointed head of sergeants (*boshokho*) and chiefs (*daruga*), who arranged the distribution of banner duties and collection of taxes.

As is obvious from the description, this government apparatus had as its primary purpose the mobilization of Mongols for military and military-related services. These included the provision of armed and trained troops for the emperor's campaigns, the maintenance of remounts and stations for the post-roads, and guard services at strategic locations. The pre-Qing system of Inner Mongolian socio-political organization, however, had been founded on a quite different idea, that of the aristocratic privilege of the Chinggisid family. In all banners the military principle of the Qing banner organization had weakened this principle to a significant degree, but in most banners the Qing still recognized it.

This class distinction separated the *taiji* who were the descendants of Chinggis Khan's family from the *albatu* or commoners who were descendants of other lineages, and who had the obligation to pay various goods—a certain number of livestock, dairy products, etc.—and services—herding animals, collecting dung for fuel, acting as personal servants, etc.—to their taiji. Upon the death of a taiji or nobleman, his *albatu* or commoners would be divided between his sons; daughters would receive a dowry of commoners as her *inje*. Thus every taiji would have subjects and every subject would have a taiji. In Inner Mongolia, the Qing regulations superimposed upon these ties the military-style obligations incumbent upon all those registered in the squadrons and regiments, often without regard to previously existing taiji-subject ties. Since all taijis and commoners were enrolled in the sumus and regiments, and officials could be chosen from either class, it thus sometimes happened that a commoner colonel or sergeant would be in command of a taiji soldier, which obviously diminished the taiji's prestige.

The Qing made extensive provisions for the preservation of the taiji-albatu distinction, however. In Inner Mongolia, every bannerman or *arad* remained in theory also a personal subject (*albatu*) to the taijis, owing his lord and lady duties of milking, sewing, herding and so on, duties which the taiji would transfer to his sons by inheritance. Around the

Figure i.1: Official Organization in the Inner Mongolian Banners

Jasag noyan
(Chinese, *Zhasake*)
"Ruler"

Khoshigu Tusalagchi taiji
(Chinese, *Xieli taiji*)
"Senior Administrator"

Baga Tusalagchi taiji
(Chinese, *Xieli taiji*)
"Junior Administrator"

Jakhirugchi janggi
(Chinese, *Guanqi zhangjing*)
"Adjutant"
i. jacinth button

Meiren-ü janggi/Khoshigu meiren
(Chinese, *guanqi fuzhangjing*)
"Deputy Adjutant"
iii. turquoise button

Meiren-ü janggi/Khoshigu meiren
(Chinese, *guanqi fuzhangjing*)
"Deputy Adjutant"
iii. turquoise button

Each banner has a variable number of:
jalan/khariya "Regiment"
each with
one *jalan-u janggi* (Chinese, *canling*)
"colonel"
iv. azure stone button
××××××××××××××××
Each regiment has six sumus, each with:
one *sumun-u janggi* (Chinese, *zuoling*)
"captain"
v. rock crystal button
and
one *tabin-u kündü/orolan kögegchi*
(Chinese, *xiaoqixiao*)
"lieutenant (of fifty)"
vi. shell button

Each sumu has six:
khorin-u boshokho/baga khögegchi
(Chinese, *lingcui*)
"corporal (of twenty)"

Roman numerals: ranks in the Qing military rank system; rank displayed by buttons worn on hats. The ruling nobleman and the administrator, as taijis, wear the jacinth button. Only those officials above the ×'s participated in assessing tax rates.
Sources: Nayiraltu and Altan'orgil, ed., *Gadagadu Monggol-un törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u qauli jüil-ün bicig*, I, 69-70, 156-58; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 446-48; Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*.

banner prince's residence there was also a small population of subjects dedicated to the personal service of the ruler and exempt from all banner duties. The taiji seemed to have multiplied faster than the commoners, however, and by the twentieth century, poor taijis (*khokhi taiji*) who had no subjects were a stock figure in every banner. Even where the taiji had subjects, however, these subjects often nomadized far away from their nominal master and in practice wealthy subjects rarely paid their in-kind dues to their taiji.

Yet since the banner rulers and administrators were also usually descendants of Chinggis Khan and always taijis, there remained a strong tendency, one productive of numerous lawsuits, for the banner's chief ruler to treat the entire population of the banner as his personal subjects. If banner ruler spent wildly on luxurious living, he expected the bannermen to pay his debts; he would send a human dowry or *inje* with his daughters on their marriage, chosen from among the subjects of the banner. These sorts of privileges often became the subject of lawsuits in which the nobility often justified these practices as expressing "the fundamental way of ruler and subject" or "the way of father and son, master and slave" (*noyon albatyn gol yos...etseg khöwgüün ezen boolyn yos*).[13] The regular banner system in the Mongolian lands thus preserved, far more than the original Manchu banner system on which its formal structure was based, an essential foundation of monarchic and aristocratic privilege, that the Young Mongols would find an outrageous denial of human equality.

The banner was not only a political community, but also a religious one.[14] In almost all of Inner Mongolia at this time, Tibetan-rite Buddhism was the established church. Qing laws required banners throughout Inner Mongolia to collect alms regularly for the monasteries at Dolonnuur in Chakhar and Yonghegong Temple in Beijing, and most

[13] Ts. Nasanbaljir and Sh. Natsagdorj, *Ardyn zargyn bichig* (Ulaanbaatar, 1966) pp. 98, 125; cf. Š. Rasidondug with Veronika Veit, trans.,. *Petitions of Grievances Submitted by the People* (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 88-89, 113.

[14] Robert James Miller, *Monasteries and Culture Change in Inner Mongolia* (Wiesbaden, 1959); Magdalena Tatar, "Two Mongol Texts Concerning the Cult of the Mountains," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung.*, 20 (1976), 1-58; C. R. Bawden, "Notes on the Worship of Local Deities in Mongolia," in *Mongolian Studies*, ed. Louis Ligeti (Budapest, 1970), pp. 57-66; Antoine Mostaert, "Sur le culte de Saγang Sečen et de son bisaïeul Qutuγtai Sečen chez les Ordos," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 20 (1957), 534-66; Antoine Mostaert "'L'Ouverture du sceau' et les addresses chez les Mongols ordos," *Monumenta Serica*, 1 (1935/6), 315-37; Henry Serruys, "A Genre of Oral Literature in Mongolia: The Addresses," *Monumenta Serica*, 31 (1977), 555-613.

leagues and banners had their own state-supported monasteries. Banner rulers and other nobility could and did grant their albatu to monasteries as "lay disciples" (*khara shabinar*), owing labor service to the monasteries. Both the yamens and the princely households also budgeted for the regular chanting of Buddhist sutras, and the attendance of lamas, whether scholars or physicians, at banner centers. Perhaps more important from the point of view of political identity was the cult of local landmarks. These included *oboos* or cairns placed on hill-tops and along the borders of the banner, as well as mountain and lake cults. The taijis also led offerings at the tombs of their local noble blooded ancestors; the cult of Chinggis Khan in Ordos was simply the largest and most widespread of these ancestral cults. (In East Mongolia, these cults often took a more Confucian form as ancestral halls and visits to the tombs on the Qingming day.) Finally, each of the autonomous banners had its own war standard (*sülde*) and banner (*tug*), each with a figure on a field and border with tails.[15] These standards and banners, along with the banner seal itself were the object of collective worship, led by the taijis and officials, but participated in by the banner soldiers and other members. All of these cults created a very strong sense of connection between the banner land, the banner members, and the Chinggisid ancestors of the banner nobility.

Having been created for a Mongol society largely without cash and in which complex administrative systems were previously unknown, the Qing rulers and the Mongol princes ruled a system that in theory ran

[15] That of Shili-yin Gool's Üjümüchin banners, for example, had a white field with a blue boundary and red fringed border. The center of the banner was charged with a tiger; that of Üjümüchin Left Banner had wings, that of Üjümüchin Right did not. The pole itself was hung with hairs taken from the forelock of thirty-two unbroken stallions. See Pa. Dugar, *Üjümücin-ü teüke-yin barimta bicig-üd* (Üjümüchin Left Banner: 1985), frontispieces and explanations. See also Ch. Aryaasüren and Kh. Nyambuu, *Mongol yos zanshlyn ikh tailbar toli* (Ulaanbaatar, 1992), pp. 150-154, 160-169. The state and war flags of theocratic Mongolia (1911-1919) were clearly based upon this pattern, having a yellow field, a red border, with three red tails. In the center, the flag was charged with the a multi-colored *soyombo* (the symbol found on the haft of the current Mongolian state flag) over a lotus, and the Tibetan letters *e* and *bum*. The pole of the war flag was capped by a trident and hung with red threads. Each office of the government had its own designated size, and that of the Ministry of the Army was the largest. See *BNMAU-yn tüükhiin zarim ner tomyoo, on tsagiin tailbar toli* (Ulaanbaatar, 1991), pp. 21-22, under "Bogd khaant mongol ulsyn töriin tug (dalbaa)," and "Bogd khaant mongol ulsyn tsergiin yaamny tug" and Aryaasüren and Nyambuu, *Mongol yos zanshlyn ikh tailbar toli*, pp. 215-18, under "Mongol ulsyn süld dalbaa."

virtually without the use of money.[16] The officials from the administrator down to the lowest clerk and runner were either unpaid or received only a nominal sum. Taijis received their living from their subjects, and commoners serving outside the yamen—whether militiamen standing guard or those permanently assigned to post road stations waiting to provide an ox to carry a sack of flour to the yamen or a horse for a runner on mission—all received their living from their families whose duty it was to supply a man for these tasks. When runners went on assignment from the yamen, they carried neither cash nor an expense account but a metal and leather *paisa* or badge with which they could requisition anything necessary for their task. Qing regulations limited direct taxes on the bannermen to one sheep out per twenty-five or two per forty, but in fact the taxes by the twentieth century were paid mostly in silver and sometimes in wool. The expected revenues for daily yamen costs (only a small part of the banner's actual expenses) were fixed at annual meetings, carried on around the "White Month" (*chagan sara*), the Mongolian lunar new year, with the ruler and the five principals determining how much the yamen needed and the regimental colonels (*jalan-u janggi*) distributing the obligations among their subjects. Since the officials received either no salaries or only nominal ones, embezzlement was virtually universal.

Thus, the taxation system had the defects of being simultaneously onerous and unpredictable to the subjects and yielding very little fungible revenue to the yamen. By the twentieth century, most of the fungible revenue in many banners was coming from the leasing of the banner's natural resources to outsiders. Since the banner members had the right, tenaciously defended by the commoners, of nomadizing anywhere in the banner and using its resources with at most small fees (although their squadron status was fixed), the yamen could not derive revenues from banner resources used by banner members. To generate fungible revenue, the banner yamens were thus forced to turn to non-banner residents. Hearth taxes paid by out-banner residents, salt taxes paid by Chinese merchants collecting salt at the region's dry lakes, leasing fees paid by Chinese firms exploiting coal mines or making charcoal, pasture taxes paid by Chinese or Hui (Chinese-speaking

[16] On banner finances, in addition to the above sources, see also Nakami Tatsuo, "Guanyu Qingmo Nei Menggu de yibu shiliao—Wang Guojun zhi 'Nei Menggu jiwen,'" trans. Zhao Lingzhi, in *Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan xiansheng bashi shouchen xueshu lunwenji*, ed. Chang Jiang (Shenyang, 1993), pp. 594-600, and Henry Serruys, "A Socio-Political Document from Ordos: The *Dürim* of Otoγ from 1923," *Monumenta Serica*, 30 (1972/3), 526-621.

Muslim) caravaneers pasturing their cattle, and above all land-leases paid by Chinese farmers to Mongol banner yamens whose land they tilled—these formed the preferred type of revenue from the point of view certainly of the yamen, and often of the bannermen as well. Revenues of such leases were often earmarked and paid directly to expenses, such as a banner school, or a garrison patrol. The Qing banner system was intended to operate without any unified, central budgeting at all, and in all but the most well-organized banners this tradition of budget-less finance, attaching revenue sources directly to particular expenses, continued.

In the scattered data on banner budgets in the twentieth century, both from Ordos and Ulaanchab in the west and from Kharachin in the east, leasing of natural resources far outstrips direct banner taxes as a source of revenue. The same evidence also indicates that one of the main expenses was the payments to the ruling nobleman or *jasag noyan*, who always received the lion's share of the banner salary, and a significant salary for senior administrator. The provision of grain, meat, and milk, and other foods for those on service at the yamen was another major expense. By the twentieth century, however, in most banners the commoner militia system had broken down, and in face of increased banditry, most of the banners had to maintain professional or semi-professional garrisons which patrolled the banner permanently. The upkeep of these defense forces grew to be the largest single outlay in many banner budgets. Finally, another major expense, particularly in banners with a history of financial mismanagement, was debts to Chinese merchants. The banner office contracted loans partly to pay extraordinary public expenses, but more usually to pay for the ruling nobleman's personal expenses, either in his banner or in Beijing, where the prince was required by Qing regulations to attend upon the emperor. When the interest on such debts became an intolerable expense, the banner yamen could resort to either an extraordinary levy of livestock or the leasing of further plots of land to pay down the debt. Such measures, however, often led to popular opposition, leaving the yamen trapped between the demands of its creditors and the resistance of its subjects.

The Banners and Beijing

As virtually closed communities, the banners contained within themselves no principle of integration either with the rest of Inner Mongolia or with the Chinese state of which Inner Mongolia formed a part. The Qing empire, however, exercised a tight control over the

Mongol banners, and although certain aspects of this control fell into disuse with the overthrow of the Qing and the establishment of the Republic in 1911, the basic features remained.

The Qing administered and controlled its outer dominions—the Inner and Outer Mongol banners, Kumul and Turpan, the Kazakhs, and Tibet—through the Lifan Yuan or "Court of Colonial Affairs," which held a rank equivalent to the Six Boards of Chinese administration traditional since the medieval period.[17] Acting on behalf of the emperor, the Court of Colonial Affairs confirmed the accession of new ruling noblemen, deposed the disloyal, incompetent, or generally troublesome, paid salaries to the ruling nobles, organized their tours of rotation in Beijing and their imperial audiences, preserved copies of the genealogies of the noble families, heard appeals of yamen punishments and lawsuits, and on the basis of the resulting decisions gradually produced a law code for the Mongol banners which was more or less complete by the 1820s.

Between the Court of Colonial Affairs in Beijing and the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia lay six Mongol "leagues" or "confederations" (*chigulgan*) which in Inner Mongolia were weak institutions.[18] The league's head or captain-general (*chigulgan-u da*) was theoretically any Mongol noblemen of the rank of duke or above, but in practice only banner rulers were appointed. The position was normally held for life, although the Qing government occasionally deposed league captains-general for offenses, real or imagined. The captain-general's deputy was chosen at the same time as the captain-general, and upon the death or deposition of his superior, normally ascended to the supreme position in

[17] On the Court of Colonial Affairs, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 160-166, and the detailed studies in Farquhar, *The Ch'ing Administration of Mongolia*, pp. 271-87, Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie qalq-a*, pp. 147-68, and Ning Chia, *The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty*, Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1992. Important comments on the law code and legal procedures of the Court of Colonial Affairs can also be found in three articles by Charles R. Bawden: "A Case of Murder in Eighteenth-Century Mongolia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 32, no. 1 (1969), 71-90; "The Investigation of a Case of Attempted Murder in Eighteenth-Century Mongolia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 32, no. 2 (1969), 571-92; and "A Juridical Document from Nineteenth Century Mongolia," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 3 (1969), 225-56.

[18] On the league institutions in Inner Mongolia, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 443-44, 446-59, Mostaert, "Matériaux ethnographiques relatifs aux Mongols ordos," pp. 248-49, Farquhar, *The Ch'ing Administration of Mongolia*, pp.73-76, 122-29, and Henry Serruys, "A Document from 1904 Dismissing an Ordos Prince from Office," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 19 (1975), 206-10.

the league, although again policy considerations, sweetened by bribes, were sometimes effective in settling the office on a different banner ruler.

The Inner Mongolian leagues were named after the place of meeting for the banner rulers who gathered to discuss business with a representative of the Court of Colonial Affairs every three years. The league itself had, however, no yamen of its own; when a banner ruler became league captain-general, his banner yamen served as the concurrent yamen of the league for the time of his term of office. The league served primarily as a conduit for orders from the Court of Colonial Affairs down to the banners and for appeals from the banner yamens up to the court. It carried with it for the holder an automatic elevation in dignity to that of prince, with a concurrent increase in salary, which gave it a certain cachet for banner rulers of otherwise low rank, and there were many cases of banner rulers squeezing their subjects to collect bribes to secure the appointment.

Finally the Qing court included Inner Mongolia within the empire-wide network of military governors, stationed at the strategic cities of the empire and commanding the large garrisons of internal garrison bannermen.[19] These internal garrison banners, which should not be confused with the 'outer' or autonomous Mongol banners, had formed the original military force of the Manchu dynasty as it began its rise to imperial power. The Manchu Qing dynasty settled these banner forces, composed of ethnic Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese-martial units, each divided into eight divisions by the color of their banners, in the capital of Beijing and also in all the strategic realms of the empire. The division into eight banners, formed by taking four colors—yellow, white, blue, and red—and doubling each with a plain and a bordered form, thus making eight different banners. For this reason, the garrison banners

[19] On these viceroys, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organ-ization of China*, pp. 324-25, 333-35, 384-85, 452-5, and 461-63. See also J. Legrand, "Données biographiques sur les fonctionnaires des Qing en Mongolie (1796-1820)," *Études Mongoles*, 4 (1973), 75-119, and Veronika Veit, "The Qalqa Mongolian Military Governors of Uliyasutai in the 18th Century" in *Proceedings of International Conference on China Border Area Studies*, ed. Lin En-shean (Taipei, 1984), pp. 629-646. These dutongs and fudutongs are often referred to in Mongolian sources as ambans, a term from the Manchu *amban* "high offical." The term *amban* was also commonly used for the *dachen* or imperial agents or residents, appointed to the major garrisons in Outer Mongolia, Kökenuur (Qinghai), and Tibet. Although both offices were restricted to garrison bannermen, and came to play similar roles of supervising Inner Asian peoples the dutong/fudutong offices were rather different in origin and purpose from the various *dachen*.

were often called the "Eight Banners," or in Chinese *baqi*, to distinguish them from the banners of the autonomous Mongols. These bannermen lived in garrisons, usually within a separate wall, and so stayed separate from the local population legally, and to a large degree spatially and socially. Thus a Chinese-martial bannerman living in Canton was quite separate from an ordinary Cantonese resident, and a Mongol garrison bannerman living in a garrison in Uliyasutai remained quite separate from the ordinary Mongol bannermen subject to their autonomous princes and dukes. Those commanding these major provincial garrisons held titles of dutong (or military lieutenant governors) or fudutong (or deputy lieutenant-governors); some of the more important cities had one of each. Four large garrisons bordered Inner Mongolia—Chengde, Zhangjiakou, Suiyuan, and Ningxia and the dutongs of these four garrisons held an at first ill-defined supervisory function over the neighboring leagues, an arrangement which would eventually harden into the partition of Inner Mongolia.

The first decades of the twentieth century saw a strange combination of tenacious conservatism and radical change in the institutions and ideas linking Inner Mongolia to China proper. The Qing dynasty initiated the change in a set of comprehensive reforms known as the New Policies, reforms which were confirmed and extended in the succeeding Republic of China. All of these reforms, it should be emphasized, affected only the relation of the Mongol banners and leagues to the rest of the state. Neither the New Policies, or the Republic, directly initiated any changes in the actual internal organization either of the leagues or of the banners, yet many of the frontier-strengthening and state-strengthening policies, such as colonization, had a tremendous impact on the actual internal operations of the banners. Even so, no changes were made to the formal administrative structure of the banners and leagues.

The late Qing reforms and the Republican revolution also made remarkably little change in the formal institutions and practices that linked the Mongolian banners to Beijing. In Beijing, the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifan Yuan*) was renamed the Ministry of Dependencies (*Lifan Bu*) in a 1906 reorganization of the central ministries. The following year, the government added new offices for colonization (that is, settlement of Chinese in Mongolian and Tibetan territories) and frontier defense, and the existing school was reorganized to train students not only in the Mongolian and Tibetan languages, but also in geography, political economy, and finance. Under the Republic, the Inner Asian tradition of the Manchu Qing empire came under suspicion and the term "Colonial Affairs" was thought to have an inappropriate air, so the office was renamed the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau. In

May, 1914, the dictator of the new Republic of China, Yuan Shikai, raised the bureau in dignity, entitling it the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department (*MengZang yuan*). The Department's school was further reformed and expanded in a move that would have important consequences for the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement.

Despite the new republican environment, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department exercised the same functions it had always done. It still issued promotions to loyal noblemen, raising ranks, salaries, and honorific distinctions, such as what color button they could wear on their official hats, or how many eyes they could have on the peacock feathers with which they decorated them. Genealogies were still kept and the post road and militia reviews still held, although they now held no military significance whatsoever for Beijing. Only the yearly imperial audiences did not survive the transition to a republic. Even so, many rulers in eastern Inner Mongolia had come to reside more-or-less permanently in Beijing, serving in the bureaucracy or the Chinese parliament, while the less influential officials in the central and western part of Inner Mongolia found their local role actually strengthened as the central government no longer required them to leave their banner for several months of every year. The old Court of Colonial Affairs, which also controlled high titles and positions among the Mongolian Buddhist clergy, had prevented the high incarnate lamas from being identified among the Mongols, but Beijing's control over Buddhism slackened in the late Qing and the Republic and in western Inner Mongolia, native Mongolian incarnate lamas became common, whereas before they had all been Tibetan.

Probably the largest single institutional change came about as an unintended side-effect of the destruction of the garrison banner system in 1911. As the ethnic core of the Manchu Qing dynasty, the garrison bannermen and their families were devastated by the battles and pogroms that accompanied the fall of the imperial regime. In China proper, the whole network of dutongs and fudutongs, meant to ensure Manchu control over all the empire, disappeared. In Inner Mongolia, however, the dutong system suddenly acquired a new function of being Beijing's supreme authorities in areas where the provincial system had not yet been extended. In 1914, President Yuan Shikai formally created three "Special Regions" (*tebiequ*) in Inner Mongolia: Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan, headed by a Chinese official called, as before, a dutong. The regions were based on the jurisdictions of the Qing dutongs based in Chengde, Zhangjiakou, and Guisui respectively. Unlike the previous Qing dutongs, however, the Republican dutongs had no connection to the banner system. They were simply governors for districts which were too poor and had too many non-ethnic Chinese residents to be immediately

elevated to the ranks of provinces. After President Yuan's death in 1916, the new dutong positions were, like the provincial governorships of Northern China, divvied up among Yuan's officers. Thus while Mongol banners reported to the Mongolian and Tibetan Department for some purposes, for others, including law and order, military, taxation, and opium suppression, they reported to the new dutongs, who in the repeated civil wars which followed Yuan's death, soon became effectively independent satraps.

Radical changes, however, came in the broad conception of the role of the Mongols in the state. Under the Qing empire, the major peoples of the empire, Manchus, ethnic Chinese or Han, Mongols, Tibetans, and Turkestanis also preserved much of their own native institutions, administered in their own languages, and received patronage of their own distinctive religious and cultural establishments. The Mongols, unified by a single administrative language, a distinctive script, and the legacy of their Holy Lord (*Bogda Ejen*), Chinggis, whose aristocratic descendants had dominated the country since the sixteenth century, thus came under no pressure to trade in their own identity for an all-imperial one.

The question of identity in Mongolia in the Qing period is indeed a very complex one as numerous identities can be seen operating in different contexts. Since "Mongolia" did not exist as a separate unified administrative unit under the Qing, Mongolian identity and solidarity was easily trumped by local identities identified with particular banners or "tribes" (*aimag*), groups of neighboring banners whose nobility were closely related, customs and dialects were similar, and shared a common name element (for example, the three Kharachin Right, Kharachin Middle, and Kharachin Left banners made up one *aimag*). At the same time, the presence of foreigners, such as European missionaries, could also trigger a strong identification with the Qing as a whole.

Despite these larger or smaller identities, however, the Mongols also nurtured, particularly in historical and geographical contexts, a Mongol identity in which Mongolia appeared as a constituent realm or *ulus* within the Qing empire, existing alongside China (*Khitad*), Tibet (*Töbed* or *Tanggud*), and so on.[20] In this view each realm had its own distinctive way of life and its distinctive government system, which the Qing, as

[20] On the issue of Mongolian identity in the Qing, see Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution; or How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?" *Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China*, No. 5 (July, 1994), pp. 37-50.

good rulers, preserved and nourished. An eastern Inner Mongolian writer in 1775, for example, wrote that

> The people of other realms (*ulus*) make a living exerting themselves in manual labor such as farming, handicrafts, commerce, and so on. The people of our Mongolian realm (*Monggol ulus*) make a living herding livestock, living off the yearly increase, and in between using them for riding and transport and selling the excess to buy goods.[21]

An Ordos Mongolian writer expressed the separate political characters of the realms within the Qing realm or dynasty as a whole as follows:

> When, without lifting a single weapon, this emperor [Shunzhi, r. 1644-1662] of the Manchu received all in the world, the eighteen provinces of China (*Khitad*) to the south, the great Kökenuur-Tibetan realm in the west, the Korean realm (*Gaoli ulus*), also called the "White Solonggos," and the great Mongolian realm to the north, he ruled all with great mercy and harmony. In China (*Khitad*), the *Zongdu*s [governors-general] and *Zongfu*s [governors] were placed to administer the *fu* [prefectures] and *xian* [counties], in Kökenuur-Tibet he appointed deliberative ministers and imperial residents. Sharing out this great Mongolian realm (*yekhe Monggol ulus*) among the noble-born descendants of Taizu Chinggis Khan [r. 1206-1227] and descendants of the eleven sovereign children of Batumöngke Dayan Sechen Khan [r. 1487-1524], he created banners and *sumu*s and placed one ruler over each banner...[22]

At this time, moreover, general Mongolian usage did not contain any separate term for China as a political unit (corresponding to modern Chinese *Zhongguo*), and for the Han or ethnic Chinese as a nationality or ethnic group (corresponding to the modern Chinese *Han*). Instead *Khitad*, or Han was used both for the Chinese ethnic group, as well as for the realm of China defined by its traditional eighteen provinces.

Most Mongols up to the very eve of the Republic then defined "Mongol" not simply as an ethnic group, but as a realm or country, which even without a unified independent government retained distinctive language, customs, and political institutions focused on Chinggis Khan and the Mongol nobility. Mongolia was thus part of the Qing empire (*Ching ulus*) but not part of China (*Khitad*). The Mongols had their place within the empire and the Chinese had theirs, and a

[21] Rasipungsug, *Bolor erike*, ed. Köke'öndör (Höhhot, 1985), p. 7.

[22] Kesigbatu, "Erdeni-yin tobci," in *Ordos kümün-ü teüken tulgur bicig-ün emkidkel* (Yeke Juu ayimag-un dangsa ebkimel-un sang, 1984), I, 97. *Zongfu* seems to be an error, either of Kheshigbatu, or more likely of the copyist, for *xuanfu* "governor."

Mongol south of the Great Wall or a Chinese north of it was properly a guest of the native residents there. By the late nineteenth century, the originally legal term of *irged* "subjects" for the Han Chinese not enrolled in the garrison banners had also come into popular use as a term for the Han Chinese as a whole, distinguishing them from the Mongols who in their own eyes had a more honored status as banner auxiliaries of the Qing emperor. With the identification of banner membership with rightful access to resources, and non-membership with not having such legitimate right to resources, it is not surprising that in certain Mongolian sources, Chinese, under the name of "subjects" (*irgen*), appear repeatedly as a proletariat of distinctly criminal propensities, composed of hired hands, vagrants, and pedlars.[23]

The Republic of China transformed this idea of Mongolia and China as separate realms within the Qing realm into the very different one of a single country or realm containing many races or nationalities. The revolutionaries who overthrew the Qing realm had been originally motivated not only by republican and egalitarian beliefs, but also by a deep revulsion against the rule of China by an alien people, the Manchus. Thus in the early days of the Republicans' military government in 1911-1912, their first flag consisted of the eighteen balls in two concentric circles, standing for the traditional eighteen provinces of China proper, on a red field; red was the color of the Han. With the negotiated settlement that led to the abdication of the last emperor, the removal of the capital to Beijing, and the news of independence movements in Outer Mongolia and Central Tibet, Sun Yat-sen and the other leaders of the original revolutionaries acceded to a less racial version of the Chinese revolutionary vision, one which could preserve the integrity of the Qing empire in the new republican era. This new vision was one of quinque-racial harmony (*wuzu gonghe*) in a quinque-racial republic (*wuzu gonheguo*). In this view, China was a single nation formed of five races: the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Hui (Muslim peoples, including both the Turkestanis and the Chinese-speaking Muslims of China proper), and the Tibetans. Unlike the Qing, which had created racial hierarchies which put the Manchus at the top, and enforced separation between the peoples, the new republic would treat all five races as equal before the law, eliminate any special status, and represent all of them in the new parliament. Yuan Shikai, and the conservative Han Chinese establishment of the Beijing-Tianjin area which he represented, replaced the various revolutionary flags with a five-striped flag in which (from

[23] See, for example, Henry Serruys, "A Question of Thievery," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 10 (1976), 287-309.

top to bottom), the red, yellow, blue, white, and black stripes represented the Han, the Manchu, the Mongol, the Hui, and the Tibetan races.[24]

In practice, as we have seen, the northern establishment, did not dare to eliminate the Qing institutions in Inner Asia, all of which operated on an ethno-legal foundation of special status for different ethnic groups. The autonomous banners in the Mongol lands thus retained their ethnic-specific membership, as did the ethnarchs (*tusi*), and monastery-states of the Tibetan borderlands. First Outer Mongolia in 1911, and then Central Tibet in 1913 achieved independence from the infant Republic of China, and for a few years China's control over Inner Mongolia appeared touch-and-go. In this situation, President Yuan wooed the support of the Inner Mongolian nobility by continuing the traditional methods of the Qing: raising the ranks of the loyal banner rulers, increasing their salaries, and giving them prestigious sinecures in Beijing.

Yet despite the preservation of Qing institutions, the Inner Mongols could not ignore the radical change in the political context and ideology introduced both by the Republican Revolution and the secession of Outer Mongolia.[25] The most obvious difference was that the aristocratic and monarchic principle which dominated the banner system now appeared as a grotesque anomaly in a republican state. Periodically, the presidents and generals of China, such as Yuan Shikai in 1915, and Zhang Xun in 1919, strove to start a new dynasty or restore the Qing emperor, but all attempts foundered on the strong consensus of China's political class that monarchy was both tyrannical and obsolete. By the terms of his abdication, the Qing emperor still lived in his palace-grounds in the Forbidden City with his wives and servants, who still addressed him with the imperial titles. These "articles of favorable treatment"to the deposed monarch, like the continued existence of dukes and princes and even body servants and dowry serfs in Inner Mongolia, were a standing invitation to consistent republicans to apply their principles and abolish them.

Likewise the belief that the Mongols, as a different country or realm from China, had special political institutions had received a mortal blow, even among the Mongols. From the victory of the 1911 Revolution, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia accepted that they no longer lived in the

[24] On the flags, see Whitney Smith, *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World* (New York, 1975), pp. 109-111, and John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996), pp. 180-185.

[25] On these changes, see Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution," pp. 50-66.

Mongol realm, but that they lived in China, for which they quickly came to use the calque translation of *Dumdadu ulus* "Middle Realm." Mongolia, or the Mongol realm (*Monggol ulus*), now meant only the independent state of Mongolia proper or Outer Mongolia. The term *Dumdadu ulus* "Middle Realm" as a translation of the Chinese *Zhongguo* was not entirely new; it had appeared in the history of the Mongolian nobility written in 1735 by the Eight-Banners bannerman Lomi, and in the writings of Injannashi (1837-1892) from southeast Inner Mongolia whose *Khökhe Sudur* or "Blue Chronicle" of 1871 exercised a tremendous influence on those Mongols familiar with Chinese literary culture.[26] While both Lomi and Injannashi accepted the Sino-centric view point implicit in calling China "The Middle Realm," both limited this realm to the area south of the Great Wall and both continued to speak of Mongolia as a separate *ulus* or realm. It was only after 1911, however, that the term spread widely in Inner Mongolia, and it was only after 1911 that the Inner Mongols recognized themselves as living in that "Middle Realm."

The other major transformation in 1911-1912 was in the conception of what the Mongols really were. If the Inner Mongols were no longer living in "Mongolia" then Mongolia was no longer a realm or country, but a race or ethnic group without its own proper realm or *ulus*. This usage had already begun by 1908, when a Kharachin Mongol, writing of the need for modern education, spoke of the Mongols as an *aimag ugsaga ündüsü* or "tribe-race-lineage." With these terms, the writer implicitly expressed his assumption that the Kharachin Mongols at least were not part of a Mongol country or realm, but rather a people defined by ancestry within a different country whose majority belonged to a different, Chinese, ancestry. The official documents of the 1911 Revolution introduced the Mongolian word *törül* "stock" or "type" for *zu* "race," but this unidiomatic term never gained currency in non-official circles and eventually died out. The terms for the Mongols as a race or nationality fluctuated in the early years of the Republic—the concept itself was new, and the terminology was still being worked out—but eventually the term *ugsaga*, originally derived from *ug* ("stump," "base," or "origin") and previously meaning "lineage" or "race," as in *khagan-u ugsaga* "imperial lineage" or "race of khans," became the preferred translation of Chinese *zu*, and so the preferred

[26] For use of *Dumdadu Ulus* for China in Lomi, see his *Monggol Borjigid obog-un teüke*, ed. Nagusayinküü and Ardajab (Höhhot, 1989), pp. 67-68. On Injannashi, see John Gombojab Hangin, *Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle): A Study of the First Mongolian Historical Novel by Injannasi* (Wiesbaden, 1973).

definition of what the Mongols were. No longer a people in their own country, the Inner Mongols had become a race in a country whose majority was of a totally different race. The old aristocratic institutions of the Mongol autonomy under the Qing had outlived their original political context, and the question was, would they be replaced by a new republican autonomy or by pure assimilation?

The New Policies, State-Building, and Resistance

While the largest changes in political ideology came with the Republic, the Qing had already initiated dramatic changes in the social, demographic, and economic context of the Mongolian autonomous institutions. These changes, going under the name of the "New Policies" (Chiense *Xin Zheng*, Mongolian *Shine Jasag*), resulted in the growing social and economic integration of Inner Mongolia into the neighboring provinces, generally as poor, unruly peripheries. While these New Policies have been traditionally dismissed in the historiography of the succeeding Republican period as "too little, too late," they have in recent years come to be recognized as marking a milestone in Chinese history, planting deep in the soil of China the gendarmes that would police, the military that would garrison, the statistical offices that would count, the hygiene offices that would sanitize, and the schools that would train rural and urban Chinese in the decades of the Republic. Although the New Policies' reforms slackened after 1910, provincial government after the 1911 Revolution implemented new reforms that followed in the same paradoxical directions of the New Policies, strengthening the power of the local governments over the persons, beliefs, and property of their subjects, while making no headway at all in either centralization or professionalization of administration.[27]

The New Policies intended to imitate the Meiji Japanese reforms that had made Japan a world power and built European-style institutions that could guard the empire from the threat of partition and colonialization which had become so imminent in the wake of China's 1895 defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The

[27] Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). Other important studies treating the New Policies in China include Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908* (Berkeley, 1980). On the liberal provincial governments, see Ernest P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China* (Ann Arbor, 1977), pp. 89-104.

Qing government had been historically a very weak one, compared to those of Japan or Europe, at least if measured in terms of its percentage take of the total national income.[28] The New Policies envisioned both a major increase in the scale of public institutions and their redirection toward promoting modernization. Guarding China's frontiers was one of the most urgent problems for the Qing court and received its full share of attention. Previously, the overall direction of traditional Qing policy towards the Mongolian lands had been one of isolation, keeping the people and institutions of China's eighteen provinces and the almost two hundred Mongolian banners separate and distinct to the extent consistent with their rule from a single capital. The Qing court excluded the autonomous Mongols from the Chinese exam system and official positions in China proper, and likewise excluded Han Chinese from any decision-making roles in the supervision of the Mongol banners. Qing regulations also aimed, with varying degrees of success, to limit Chinese colonization and the operation of Chinese merchants and bankers in Mongol lands, intermarriage of Mongols and Han Chinese, and to prevent the assimilation by Mongols of Han Chinese language and culture. With the advent of the New Policies, however, the aim became one of border-defense by integrating the Inner Asian frontiers into China proper. Now the Qing government allowed intermarriage, and promoted Chinese agricultural colonization, and the teaching and study of the Chinese language among the Mongol banners.

Existing studies of the New Policies in Inner Asia have emphasized the cultural, ecological, and ethnic basis both for the implementation of the policies and for the massive resistance, both bureaucratic and popular, which they generated.[29] In other words, the aim of the New

[28] Dwight H. Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China," *Journal of Economic History*, 27 (1967), 478-492. Cf. Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century*(New Haven, 1987), pp. 218-221.

[29] The only general study of the New Policies on the Mongolian plateau is Mei-hua Lan, "Chinese 'New Administration' in Mongolia," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman (Armonk, N.Y., 1999), pp. 39-58. Other useful studies of specific areas of New Policies implementation in Inner Asia include G. Navaangnamjil, "A Brief Biography of the Determined Hero Togtokh," in *Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth Century*, ed. and trans. Urgunge Onon (New York, 1976), pp. 43-76; Roger DesForges, *Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution* (New Haven, 1973), pp. 1-14, 36-46, 72-82, 154-159; S.A.M. Adshead, *Province and Politics in Late Imperial China: Viceregal Government in Szechuan, 1898-1911* (London, 1984); pp. 43-104, Elliot Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'ams, 1904-1911, and the Role of Chao Erh-feng," *The Tibet Journal*, 1 (1976), 10-36; and Sechin Jagchid, "The

Policies was to turn traditional nomadic Mongols into modernizing sedentary Chinese, and the stubborn resistance of the Mongols centered upon their desire to remain culturally traditional, ecologically nomadic, and ethnically Mongol. Certainly these factors played a major role, and were a good deal of the reason why the opposition to the New Policies was so violent in Inner Asia.

At the same time, it is important to note that the New Policies were also highly controversial in China itself. Again the previous historiography of the Republican period in China had tended to dismiss the widespread riots and rebellions against the New Policies as mere backward reactions of a superstitious peasantry. Recent research here too, however, suggests that the protests against the New Policies represented a serious challenge to the central government's modernizing agenda.[30]

The fundamental objections for the anti-New Policies protestors in China proper were triple: 1) the new organs of government power were payed for by new local taxes, which were collected by the gentry and were usually indirect and regressive; 2) the New Policies' agenda often involved the conversion of temples into schools, and other measures to restrict or outright suppress traditional religious and cultural practices; and 3) the chiefs of the new schools, police precinct offices, hygiene bureaus, and so on were usually unscrupulous operators known in their locality for their ambition and social irresponsibility. Behind these three outstanding issues lay the peculiar contradiction of the New Policies both in China and in Mongolia. In some measures it dramatically increased state power, giving the state more power over persons by creating schools, prisons, and conscript armies, by curtailing religious practices defined as superstitious, by adding surcharges and new taxes to increase government revenue, regulating sanitation and hygiene in food markets and by creating client groups of publicly funded students, both at home and abroad, as well as expanding the rolls of soldiers, police, and other officials. Yet at the same time, the New Policies did not increase centralization—the expanding local state was both paid for and administered locally—and seems to have actually decreased the state's

Yigu Episode and Its Repercussions" in *Opuscula Altaica* ed. Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt (Bellingham, Wash., 1994), pp. 349-370.

[30] See especially Roxann Prazniak, *Of Camel Kings and Other Things: Rural Rebels Against Modernity in Late Imperial China* (Lanham, Md., 1999). Mary Backus Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911* (Stanford, 1986), pp. 225-27, agrees on the nature of the opposition and the issues energizing it, although she disagrees about its extent.

administrative capacity by implementing the reforms through the gentry philanthropists and local notables, thus allowing private individuals to control the agenda of the newly empowered state. In remoter rural areas, the indirect result was a growing influence of often brutal power-brokers, commonly called "local bullies" using their role in enforcing local taxes and surcharges to get rich quick.[31]

All of these features also characterized the New Policies in the Mongolian banners, only more so. In no case were the reforms to be paid for by increased central government expenditures; local banners were expected to fund them. Indeed given the structure of banner finance explained above, in which it was politically and administratively easiest to finance new expenses through leasing natural resources rather than through taxing the local population, the opening of lands for cultivation was a necessary first step in the creation of the public institutions which the central government required of the localities. At the same time, large tracts were assigned for direct colonization by the central government; land rents from these areas would not be controlled by the banners but appropriated by the dutong and amban offices supervising the Mongol banners. While the Qing government treated Mongolian Buddhism much more cautiously than it did Chinese religions, turmoil in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama, assaults on monasteries in the Kham region of Eastern Tibet, and riots between the lamas and the expanded garrisons placed by the New Policies in the major Outer Mongolian city of Da Khüriye (known in Russian as "Urga"), gave a significantly anti-Buddhist cast to the new Qing policies. Finally, as the dutongs and ambans implemented the New Policies through the existing banner and league institutions which were completely unequipped to handle them, they created a climate of opportunism in which the established banner hierarchy gave way to ambitious men, the Inner Mongolian equivalent

[31] See especially Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China*, pp. 202-47 for the more urbanized areas of the Lower Yangtze as well as Prasenjit Duara's *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford, 1988), esp. pp. 73-77, and 158-243, on rural areas in northern China. In terms of Bensel's measures of central state authority (see *Yankee Leviathan*, p. 114), we can say that the New Policies and the early Republic changes involved dramatic increases in categories 3-6 (citizenship, property, creation of client groups, and extraction), while leaving untouched or actually diminishing central state authority in categories 1, 2, and 7 (centralization, administrative competence, and the central state in the world system). On anti-religious measures and agitation, see especially Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State*, pp. 148-157 and the broader description of their origins and implications in his *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), pp. 85-113.

of the "local bullies" of China proper, using their connection to the colonization enterprise to make their private fortunes. Thus in Mongolia too, increase in state power over the persons, beliefs, and property of its subjects was accompanied by an actual decrease in the centralization and administrative capacity of the state.

The combination of the New Policies and the Republican Revolution which followed thus introduced into Inner Mongolia a new regime, one which began with the New Policies (1901), and ended with the Japanese occupation (1931-7). One historian of China has called this regime in China proper, the "Northern System." In a broad sense, this system prevailed in Inner Mongolia from 1901 to 1931, and was at its most typical from 1914 to 1924.[32] The distinctive feature of this era was that although the central government pushed to expand the functions performed by the local yamens, integrate the frontier regions into the Chinese heartland, and create an ideal of common citizenship, it worked through the same weak, financially paralyzed, decentralized, and aristocratic institutions established by the Qing. The decision of the dutongs and ambans to retain the banner institution in the short run certainly made sense. Since the New Policies were both shockingly new and very unpopular, there was obvious utility in implementing them through banner yamens that were both traditional and, at least in theory, totally despotic. In the long run, however, the decision to use the banner nobility to transmit to the Mongol people both the modernization of the New Policies and the republicanism of the post-1911 regime stripped that nobility both of its legitimacy and its effectiveness. The result was three decades of interregnum between the relatively effective traditional Qing government and the relatively effective modernizing Japanese government that began in 1931. During this interregnum, the political unraveling of Inner Mongolia continued, with some banners adapting more-or-less successfully to their new regime as rentiers living off Chinese labor, and in other banners new strongmen taking power to replace the old compromised and incompetent princes and dukes. Only the Japanese conquest of 1931-1937, by creating new and stronger autonomous institutions, financially sound and effectively independent of the old aristocracy, put an end to this prolonged crisis of decay.

Seen in this context, we can outline four possible Mongol responses to the New Policies and the Republican Revolution in Inner Mongolia. The two earlier responses were: 1) acquiescence to the fundamental lines of Beijing's modernizing agenda and its continued use of the banner

[32] See Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (Cambridge, 1995), especially pp. 11-34.

system, with attempts to make marginal improvements in its implementation, and 2) rejection of all or part of that same modernizing agenda, combined with a determination to preserve both the privileges of the traditional Mongolian aristocracy and the authority of the established Buddhist church. Given the direction of Beijing's policies, this response could only be carried out by means of secession. In 1911, the Outer Mongolian aristocracy, headed by the incarnate lama, the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu of Da Khüriye and relying on Russian aid, followed exactly this policy. Although they received the support of most of the Inner Mongolian nobility, the Yuan Shikai government was able to prevent them from unifying with the new theocratic state in Mongolia. In the northeast corner of Inner Mongolia, in Hulun Buir, however, the banner officials were able to successfully break away from the Republic of China and establish an autonomous regime that lasted until 1920.

With the option of conservative independence foreclosed for the rest of Inner Mongolia, and the aristocracy thoroughly compromised by their acquiescence to the new regime, there were only two remaining options left. One was a rejection of the new regime's state-building agenda, and rebellion against those traditional authorities who had been forced to cooperate with it. This option was particularly attractive to those areas where the educational and cultural aspects of the New Policies were still weak, and where communal self-defense against banditry had thrown up new vigilante organizations. The other possible response was to accept the state-building agenda, while adding the demand that commoner Mongols control that state-building in an independent or autonomous way. Following this last option led directly into the ideology of the national revolution, in which the dukes and princes were denounced both as remnants of "feudalism" and a betrayal of the Republic, but also as the tools of a warlord regime that was forcing Inner Mongolia economically into integration with China as a fragmented series of colonial peripheries. It was this last choice that defined the "Young Mongols."

Young Mongols Between Two Revolutions

Thus in the context of China's Northern System, the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement grew out of the opposition to the distorted remnants of the Qing system in Inner Mongolia, with its banners and nobility. That opposition, as we have seen, however, was not unitary but united two broad groups with two different tendencies in their relation to the historical trends of the Northern System as a whole: the Young Mongols and the vigilantes.

Culturally and intellectually, the Young Mongols were already embedded within the Chinese Northern System and implicitly saw the revolution not as a repudiation of the New Policies, but as a simultaneous extension and nativization of these policies. Supporting the strong range of new state functions already promised by the New Policies, they called for a completion of the state-building agenda by centralizing the Inner Mongolian state and increasing its administrative capacity by putting it in the hands of professional politicians not the existing banner upper class. Finally treating Mongolia (whether Inner Mongolia or Mongolia as a whole) as a national unit, they desired to strengthen the Mongols' position within China and the world system, as the Mongol government limited outside access to the Mongol market and citizenry.

To understand the position of the Young Mongols within the broader sphere of Inner Mongolian discontent, it is necessary to address the issue of ethnicity, or as they usually put it, the idea of "racial revival" (*ugsaga-ban madagulkhu*). It is not my purpose here to join the tangled debate about the ultimate origins of ethnicity, national consciousness, or nationalism, although I would situate my views closer to those who see modern ethno-national identities as linked to, but at the same time, powerfully transforming pre-modern identities, rather than those who see modern ethno-national identities as being purely the product of modernity and capitalism itself.[33] I have already briefly noted the existence of a certain level of pan-Mongol consciousness under the Qing, co-existing with other identities at both higher (pan-Qing) and lower (regional or banner) levels, all of which were available to be mobilized in conflict with different groups. For example, documents from Üüshin show people in conflict with Christian missionaries highlighting pan-Qing identities, those in conflict with Chinese farmers or hired hands highlighting their Mongol ethno-legal status, those in conflict with Mongol bureaucrats of Kharachin origin highlighting regional identities,

[33] See the detailed study of Inner Mongolian nationalism and ethnicity in my dissertation, *Revolutionary Nationalist Mobilization in Inner Mongolia, 1925-1929*, Indiana University, 1994, pp. 1-226. Works stressing a qualified continuity between pre-modern identities and modern national identities include John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1982); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); and Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*. Studies which see national identity as being purely an outgrowth of modernity include Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1991); and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality* (Cambridge, 1992).

and those fighting Otog vigilante "circles" highlighting their Üüshin Banner identity.

The point I wish to note here is the function of "racial-revival" thinking within the ideology of the Young Mongols, something which was inextricably linked to the idea of having a racial or national "awakening."[34] For the Young Mongols, "racial awakening" and "racial revival" was not something which everyone possessed simply by virtue of being Mongol. Rather the self-definition of Young Mongol was someone who had personally been awakened about who the Mongols were, where they came from, and where they were going. Revival thus meant not only someone who opposed non-Mongols—even the most benighted and primitive herdsman could do that—but someone who possessed a personal awareness liberated from both religious superstition and the irrational reverence of aristocratic rank.

Politically, the fact of being awakened, *and* the willingness to strive for the race formed the stock in trade for these members of Inner Mongolia's new intelligentsia. For them ethnicity was not a fact, or even an identity, but a calling. And the word calling has to be taken seriously in its sense as a job, as a way to make a living, as the way mediocre intellectuals, whose alternative career paths might otherwise dead-end behind a petty clerk's desk or a country teacher's blackboard, could become chairmen and commanders, supported by the mass of rural Mongols. But the word calling must also be understood in its full import as a quasi-religious cause, something to which they devoted their whole lives and that they pursued with systematic and zealous commitment.

Mostly coming from partly or completely sedentarized environments, and educated either in China proper or abroad, they viewed the ordinary herding Mongols, worshiping the Buddha and heaven, as people desperately in need of enlightened leadership. A Mongol from Hulun Buir, studying in Japan and writing around 1920 about the need for enlightenment and education in Inner Mongolia, illustrated the relations of distance and responsibility that obtained between the racially conscious "Young Mongols" and the ordinary people:

> Now to sketch the customs and popular sentiments of Mongolia, as well as the pressing business in Mongolian administration as an introduction: Mongolia simply has no culture to speak of (during the Manchu Qing

[34] Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, and Fitzgerald, *Awakening China* contain valuable and insightful discussions of the concept of "awakening," and its role both in teleological constructions of national history and in creating and in justifying "pedagogical politics" (Fitzgerald's phrase), discussions which have informed my discussion of these issues deeply.

> times, there were only some readers of Manchu[35]) and superstitious Buddhism mismanages life. They treat the lamas as the stand-ins for the Buddha, not daring to infringe their rights, and in all affairs of curing of disease or averting disaster whatsoever, they invite them to recite the scriptures and pay their respects to omens. So the people rely with implicit faith on them. The ordinary people follow the water and grass in their circling migrations and are still ruled by the herding life. In all cases, the cloths and silks for clothing, the rice and flour, salt and tea for food and drink, and the palaces and temples for people to live in all come from the hands of the Han people. As a result, their knowledge is still unenlightened, and they have not the least understanding of racial thinking (*zhongzu sixiang*), the national perspective (*guojia guannian*), and the truth of republicanism (*gonghe zhenli*). Thus as soon as the New Policies were proposed, they drew criticism at every juncture. The previous episode of Outer Mongolia's declaration of independence is in fact a proof of this.

After explaining his plan for 1) universal education, 2) vocational education, 3) training of educational specialists, and 4) the reform of the Mongols' nomadic way of life by settling them down to farming, he concludes:

> Now this fourth, if it be placed first, as soon as it takes place then the educational enterprises can also be expected to prosper and develop. To awaken (*juexing*) the Mongols and be able with both the national perspective and the truth of republicanism to thoroughly cleanse them is then the only policy to preserve the Mongols and the only strategy to unify China.[36]

The author was writing at a time just after the abolition of Outer Mongolian autonomy when political solutions to the Mongolian question seemed particularly fruitless, yet these sentiments remained alive even when revolution, not education, became the order of the day. To be racially conscious thus necessarily involved a certain degree of alienation from the still unconscious people and a willingness to buck their temporary resistance.

[35] This statement was true primarily for Hulun Buir but certainly not for the autonomous Mongolian banners, where Mongolian was the chief administrative language.

[36] Zhang Jiafan, ed., *Hulun Beir zhilue* (Shanghai, 1923), pp. 309, 311. The author, Guo Wenshang, is identified as a Hulun Buir Mongol, and his Chinese surname of Guo is the equivalent of the Daur clan name Gobol. The author seems to be Gobol Erkhimbatu who had studied in Japan and later was an important member of the PRPIM.

In this sense, the assertion that one was a racially conscious Mongol meant that as a leader one stood on the people's side even if the people did not yet understand that side; thus one resolution passed by the Inner Mongolian party in 1927 put the two attributes, "democratic views and a racial-revival consciousness" (*ardyn uzeltei bögööd ündes ugsaagaa manduulakh bodlogotoi*), together as the touchstone for proper leadership.[37] As I noted about the ideology of the national revolution, it diverted attention away from both the expansion of state-power and from the question of whom that expansion might eventually benefit. Yet given the controversial nature of the expanded yamen powers in Inner Mongolia, the Young Mongols could not sidestep the issue entirely. Once it was raised, explicitly or implicitly, the instrumental view of the state provided the reassuring reminder that the state was only a tool for particular social groups. If those social groups were reactionary, the state would be brutal, but if they were benign, then so would the state. A state run by youth with "democratic views and a racial-revival consciousness" would be inherently beneficial to the Mongol masses, and any limitations on its powers to transform society would be counter-productive. In this way, the revolutionary measures necessary to destroy the reactionaries and enlighten the people (that is, to build up the authority of the central state) were the concrete question, while ethnicity, like allegiance to the people's cause, was a way to guarantee the benignity of the state, or, to put it another way, to avoid the question of the uses to which revolutionary power could be put.

If being ethnically Mongol was the best guarantee that the revolutionary state, no matter how powerful, would never use that power against the real Mongol people, the question became even more urgent: what was the relation of the Inner Mongolian revolutionary to the new government in the former Outer Mongolia, newly remade as the Mongolian People's Republic? By 1924, Inner Mongolia was between two revolutions, and so, between two powerful, turbulent enterprises of state-building. To the south was the Republic of China. There the Northern System which had been created in the New Policies and pushed further after 1911, was now weakened by decentralization and the privatization of administrative power. Against it, the nascent Kuomintang government promised to use party ideology to recentralize

[37] See "Directives on State and Government," no. 1, note, in the Special Congress material in S. Rentsensonom, "Öwör Mongolyn teükhen anidral" (dated September 28, 1970) a typescript in the archives of the Oriental and International Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences: *fond* 2, *towyoog* 4, *khatgalamjiin negj* 4, pp. 53-64).

state power, rip it out of the hands of China's multifarious upper classes, and wall it off from the bourgeois world beyond China. To the north of Inner Mongolia was the Mongolian People's Republic, which having avoided the New Policies and the Northern System by a theocratic secession, was now, under Soviet patronage, building in one step the same kind of party state that the Kuomintang promised for China.

After the Khalkha Mongolian declaration of independence in 1911, the authorities there had formed a theocratic government headed by the incarnate lama (that is, a lama believed to be an emanation into this world of a Buddhist deity), the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu. While this government did initiate some programs of education and economic development, it used Russian patronage to avoid the dramatic change in government roles which Beijing had demanded. Although the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu had been declared emperor of an independent Mongolia (*Monggol ulus*), in 1915 the Russian government, in negotiation with China and Mongolia, demoted Mongolia back into an autonomous Outer Mongolian state under Russian protection and Chinese suzerainty. Tensions between the Khutugtu's clerical establishment and the secular nobility, the Russian revolution in 1917 and the turmoil of the resulting Civil War (1918-1920), and finally a more accommodating Chinese policy induced the Khalkha authorities to liquidate their own autonomous status in 1919, in return for a guarantee of the internal status quo.

Opposition to this revocation of autonomy, particularly upon the part of the autonomous state's petty officialdom who lost their jobs and social positions, appeared at once. Some appealed to the United States legation in Beijing, while others looked for help to Japan. By early 1920, however, the Soviet Red Army was racing eastward, disposing of the crumbling remnants of the anti-Communist Whites. By the end of that year, a fledgling Mongolian People's Party (*Monggol Arad-un Nam*) had sent a delegation to Soviet Russia for assistance. What followed was a confused period in which Baron Ungern-Sternberg led a White Russian army into war against the Chinese, and reestablished an independent Mongolia. The Soviet Red Army, supported by its own band of partisans from the Mongolian People's Party, invaded from the north, dispersing both the remnants of the Chinese forces and the White Russians, and proclaiming the reestablishment of Mongolia (*Monggol ulus*) with a constitutional government (*khemjiyetü zasag*). From 1921 to 1924, the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu remained the titular head of state, but a new People's Government (*Arad-un zasag*) and the People's Party held real power. With the death of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu in 1924, the new government under guidance from the Communist International proclaimed itself the Mongolian People's Republic.

From 1921 on, the new government proceeded to strengthen, cautiously but methodically, its authority in every sphere, helped by the grim memories of the Chinese and the White Russian occupations, by the defense umbrella of Soviet Russia, and by a period of substantial economic growth. The titles and administrative role of the nobility was abolished, the aimags and banners were put under officials appointed from the capital, and new cadres were slowly trained in state-established schools and appointed to the new organs of power. The slow extension of compulsory school attendance and the rather more rapid implementation of conscription brought more and more young people within the purview of the state and revolutionary party, while the creation of the state-sponsored youth league upset traditional patterns of deference and authority within the family and neighborhoods. Church and state were separated, and equality before the law enforced, while nascent measures of public hygiene, labor unions, and the rural cooperative movements took the first steps in regulating the national marketplace. The burgeoning rolls of government employees and state-funded students and the creation, after 1925, of a new state bank and a new currency interested a growing section of the people in the preservation of the regime, while taxing the nobility and the church, combined with the tariffs on Mongolia's foreign trade, which was expanding steadily in the 1920s, enabled the government to grow without enforcing unpopular direct taxation on the herders. The government also used these tariffs, discriminatory trade practices, and accusations of espionage to limit foreign access to the domestic market and to fund the build-up of a small, but well-trained army. All of these measures received the immediate and enthusiastic approbation of those Inner Mongols seeking a way out from under the increasingly meddlesome, yet abusive and corrupt state of the early Republic.

The rise of the Young Mongol nationalists in Inner Mongolia thus received its stamp from the confluence of these two revolutionary movements in the lands of the defunct Manchu empire: the Mongolian People's Party in Mongolia proper and the Chinese Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. By 1924, strong Soviet support, both military and financial, lay behind them both. The similarities that at least some of the leaders of both of these parties saw in each influenced the translation of these names into each others' languages. Although the Mongolian People's Party (*Monggol Arad-un Nam*) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Zhongguo Guomindang*) are usually translated into English with the middle word being "people" (*arad*) in one case and "nation"

(*guomin*) in the other, translators in this period rendered the Mongolian word *arad* "people" in Chinese as *guomin* "nation," while they treated Chinese *guomin* "nation" as identical to *arad* "people." Thus in their Chinese guise the two parties appeared both as nationalist parties—the Mongolian Nationalist Party (*Menggu Guomindang*) and the Chinese Nationalist Party—while in Mongolian, they both appeared as people's parties—the Mongolian People's Party and the Chinese People's Party (*Dumdadu ulus-un arad-un nam*). As the Chinese binome *guomin* "nation" combined the character for state (*guo*) and for common people (*min*), it is not surprising that people could see in this word *guomin* either the nation or the people or both together. The same translation appeared when Feng Yuxiang renamed his army the *Guominjun*, that is, the Army (*jun*) of the Realm's (*guo*) Commoners (*min*), or the Citizen Army, for short. This was rendered into Mongolian as the "Chinese People's Army" (*Khitad-un arad-un cherig*), making it only a dye-job away from Mongolia's own "People's Red Army" (*Monggol-un arad-un ulagan tserig*).[38]

The 1920s thus presented the Inner Mongols with a choice of two different revolutionary (that is, state-building) models, one to the south and one to the north. The story of Inner Mongolian nationalism in this period is to a large degree the story of their incessantly changing tactical and strategic decisions between these two alternative centers, further complicated by the presence of the Soviet Union behind both of them, lending them its funding, its modern expertise in popular campaigns, finance, and the military, and its international revolutionary prestige. In summary, however, two observations can be made. First, of the two patrons it was the Mongolian regime which was almost always the preferred one. Indeed by 1924, every active opponent of the Inner Mongolian status quo was explicitly advocating a pan-Mongolian unification of all the Mongol peoples. The Kuomintang's influence in Inner Mongolia suffered both from its members' purely perfunctory interest in Mongolia and the Mongols, and the continuing association of the party's agenda with the New Policies-early Republican one. At the same time, however, the Kuomintang benefitted from its older network of supporters and from Soviet assistance.

Second, the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries in this period, paralyzed by the specter of their own weakness, were not really so much interested in making an indigenous Inner Mongolian revolution and building a separate Inner Mongolian state, as they were in riding piggy-back on one or both of the revolutions going on around them. Living between revolutions, the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries were repeatedly diverted by attempts to jump on the bandwagon of the Chinese Nationalist or Mongolian revolutions. This most often took the form of hoping that the new regime in Mongolia would send its cavalry across the frontier to liberate the Inner Mongols, but it also took the form of relying on Marshal Feng's Citizen Army to destroy Zhang Zuolin's warlord regime and the Mongol nobility who clung to it "like bats to a cliff."

[38] See Sechin Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies* (Provo, Utah, 1988), p. 267, and Wu Xiangxiang, *Minguo bairen zhuan*, IV (Taipei, 1971), 170–171. Examples of the first usage in *Meng–Zang zhengce ji faling xuanji* (Taipei, 1966), p. 40, and Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu geming jun zongsiling Bai Yunti ji qi muliao renyuan," *Menggu wenhua tongxun*, no. 6 (1985), 10, and of the second in *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural: 1925 ony yesdügeer saryn 23-arawdugaar saryn 1. Delegerengüi tailan* (Ulaanbaatar, 1978), pp. 48-49 and Central Historical Archives of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (hereafter "Central Party Archives"), *fond* 7, *towyoog* 1, *khatgalamjiin negj* 20: 1-7 (Beijing Political Commission to MPRP CC). The Chinese party was still more commonly referred to as the *Dumdadu ulus-un Gomindang* as in Central Party Archives, 7-1-26:70, PRPIM CC to MPRP CC. For *Khitad-un arad-un cherig*, see Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 14-19 (Serendonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Jan. 2, 1927), and 7-1-27: 37-38 (PRPIM CC to MPRP CC [June] 9, [1927]).

The Frontier of Settlement and the Vigilantes

Not all of those Mongols who opposed Beijing's Northern System and the continued rule of the dukes and princes belonged to the group of Young Mongols who accepted the cultural modernization of the New Policies. Indeed, the Young Mongols, when seen in geographical context, appear as the outgrowth of a particular set of circumstances, ones which existed only in certain parts of Inner Mongolia. To understand their interaction with revolutionaries and insurrectionists in other parts of Inner Mongolia, some understanding of the region's physical and human geography is essential.[39]

After the period of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries when Chinese settlement expanded out into Inner Mongolia, the collapse

[39] On this section, see A. Kürelbagatur, "Odo üy-e-yin Dumdadu Ulus-un Monggolcud-un dörben soyol-un oron-u tuqai," *Öbör Monggol-un Bagsi-yin Yeke Surgaguli-yin erdem sinjiligen-ü sedkül*, no. 42 (1989:2), 56-70; Song Naigong, ed., *Zhongguo renkou (Nei Menggu fence)* (Beijing, 1987), pp. 6-62; and the maps in *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo dituji* (Beijing, 1984), especially plates 5, 10-14, 17-19, and 21. I have personally visited all of the major regions of Inner Mongolia except for the Chakhar area.

of the Ming dynasty's outer frontier after the Tumu incident of 1449 and the influx of Mongols led to many well-watered, traditionally agricultural areas being settled by pastoral Mongols. Over the succeeding centuries, a combination of Mongol sedentarization and Chinese immigration, driven by the Qing-period surge in population, worked together to push northward the frontier between predominantly farming and predominantly pastoral land-use. The colonization program of the New Policies revolutionized this process's political economy of and accelerated its pace, but was not responsible for its basic impetus.

This combined process of Mongol sedentarization and Chinese colonization was powerfully shaped by the mountains and plateaus which governed the rainfall and rivers of Inner Mongolia. The two governing mountain ranges in Inner Mongolian geography are the Khinggan Range which separate the Inner Mongolian plateau from the Manchurian plain to the east, and the Yinshan Mountains which border this plateau on the south, separating it from the Yellow River valley. North of the Yinshan (including its sub-branches, the Daqingshan Mountains, the Langshan Mountains, and the Helan Mountains) and west of the Khinggan, Inner Mongolia forms a high, sunny, and windy plateau that gradually slopes down to the Gobi desert separating Inner Mongolia from Mongolia proper. The annual rainfall on this plateau is less than 35 centimeters and its small rivers flowing north into the Gobi soon disappear in the sand and grass. Irrigation is practical only in a few favored spots.

This area is the high steppe of Inner Mongolia, which includes the Hulun Buir district, also known as Bargu from its largest Mongol aimag or sub-ethnic group, Shili-yin Gool League, famous (or notorious) as the most conservative area in Inner Mongolia, and the bulk of Ulaanchab League. (The dune-covered Alashan and Ejene Gool banners, west of the Helan Mountains, is, in physical geography, the northern desert extension of the Gansu Corridor Basin, but in cultural geography can be included in the high steppe region.) In all these areas, farming and Chinese settlement were virtually unknown in the 1920s, pastoralism was the main occupation, and almost everyone lived in Mongol *ger*s or yurts.

With the exception of Hulun Buir, which was distinctive both in its socio-cultural make-up and in having the Russian-dominated Chinese Eastern Railway cross its territory, these areas had been only lightly touched, if at all, by the changes of the New Policies and the Republican period. Focused on the Russian threat to Outer Mongolia and Hulun



Map i.2: Inner Mongolia: Physical Features

Buir to the north, and the possibility of colonization to the south and east, Beijing policy makers had virtually ignored the high steppe of Inner Mongolia, and as a result it lasted through World War II almost in a time-warp, as if the Qing dynasty had never fallen. Banner government was still carried without budgets and with at most only small land or salt-lake leases that provided revenue without upsetting the social or demographic structure. Common bannermen manned the post-roads, and, mobilized as militia, kept out the bandits that infested the areas of Chinese settlement. The lamas were revered, the princes faced no challenge to their rule, and the commoners wore the Qing-style ponytail or queue until the 1940s. These banners had supported the 1911 independence movement in Outer Mongolia, but after finding out that in practice the Chinese Republic had no plans for the transformation of their society and government, they settled back into a happy obscurity that the Young Mongol agitators could not disturb.

South and east of the Yinshan and Khinggan ranges bordering this plateau, either more rainfall, less powerful sunlight, and shelter from thewind leaves the soil moister and more suitable for rain agriculture, or else large rivers allow irrigation to make up for the dry soil. Here in the 1920s, agriculture and pastoralism competed as the dominant forms of land-use even as Chinese and Mongols competed for honor and a secure livelihood, and as Chinese *xian* or counties and Mongol banners competed for jurisdiction and leasing rights. Historically and geographically, these areas, intermediate in climate between the high steppe to the north and the wetter and warmer (in the summer, positively steamy) Chinese provinces surrounding them to the east, south, and southwest, can be divided into three broad areas: East Mongolia, Chakhar, and western Inner Mongolia.

In physical geography, East Mongolia is simply the western part of the Manchurian plain, sloping up from the fertile Liao, with its Shara Mören and Laoha tributaries, and the Songhua (Sungari), and the Nen (Naun Muren) River valleys into the foothills of the Khinggan range. In the flat south-central part of the region, the Liao River and its tributaries supplied water for irrigation in an area whose somewhat dry climate was exacerbated by a regional pocket of high sunlight and evaporation. The Mongols of East Mongolia belonged to three leagues: the Jirim League which occupied the eastern and northern part of the region, Juu Uda League which held the western part, and Josotu League inhabiting the southern fringe of the region.

In all three leagues, the Mongols had probably never been fully nomadic, and Chinese colonization and Mongol sedentarization had a history going back to the eighteenth century. The main farm crops

consisted of millet, gaoliang sorghum, corn, buckwheat and soybeans, together with broom corn millet and naked oats in the west. In the hilly southeast of this area, particularly in the area of Josotu League, along the valley of the smaller Daling River running into the Liaodong Gulf, rainfall increases to 40-50 centimeters annually, pastures disappear, and crops like sesame, tobacco, and even cotton make their appearance. The Mongols in the southern part of this region were already living in mud-brick houses by the nineteenth century; many of those in the center and north lived in permanently fixed ger villages.

Many branches of the nobility of these three leagues had allied themselves with the Manchu rulers very early on in their rise and as a result had unusually intimate relations with the Qing court in Beijing. It was this area which together with Hulun Buir formed the major cradle of the "Young Mongol" movement. The area of Jirim League was being divided up and placed under the jurisdiction of the neighboring Manchurian provinces—Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang—even before the Republic, but Juu Uda and Josotu formed the Rehe Special Region, whose dutong resided at Chengde, site of a summer palace of the Manchu emperors.

In western Inner Mongolia, the great "elbow" of the Yellow River or Huanghe (Mongolian, *Khatun Gool* "Queen River"), as it leaves the Tibetan plateau and swings north, then east, and then south again, dominates the landscape. In most of the region, this river and its tributaries provide enough water for irrigated farming even though Inner Mongolia grows steadily drier towards the west, eventually leading to the grim deserts of Alashan, west of the Helan Mountains. Around the city of Guisui (modern Höhhot, formerly the twin cities of Guihua and Suiyuan), annual rainfall of more than 40 centimeters, and tributaries of the Yellow River make the Tümed plain fertile by Inner Mongolian standards. Mongols and Chinese had been farming naked oats, linseed (Chinese *huma* "barbarian sesame"), rape, and potatoes there since the late sixteenth century. The Mongols of this region formed the special Tümed banner (called the Höhhot Tümeds to distinguish them from those of Josotu League), which had an appointed bureaucracy, not a hereditary nobility, and were not included in the leagues.

To the northwest, was the southern fringe of Ulaanchab League, one of whose six banners, Urad Right Duke Banner, was wholly within the Yellow River watershed. To the south, lay Yekhe Juu League, often called Ordos or "Palaces" after the tents and standards of Chinggis Khan still kept as the objects of cult there. Surrounded on three sides by Yellow River, the eastern half of the league was drained by the great river's tributaries, allowing a steadily advancing Chinese settlement,

Table i.2: Inner Mongolian Leagues, Aimags, and Banners, 1913-1928

Province or *Special Region*	Banners without hereditary nobility (banners per aimag)	Banners with hereditary nobility (banners per aimag)
Heilongjiang	Hulun Buir New Bargu (8) Old Bargu (2) Solon (6) Ööled (1) Butkha Yekhe Minggan—Ööled	Jirim League Dörbed, Rear Gorlos
Jilin		Jirim League Front Gorlos
Fengtian	Sürüg ("Pasture")	Jirim League Khorchin (6), Jalaid
Rehe	Shireetü Khüriye (ecclesiastical banner) Tanggud Khalkha	Josotu League Kharachin (3), Tümed (2)* Juu Uda League Aukhan, Naiman, Baarin (2), Jarud (2), Aru Khorchin, Ongni'ud (2), Kheshigten, Khalkha Left Wing
Chahar	Chakhar (8) Chakhar Pastures (4)	Shili-yin Gool League Üjümüchin (2), Khuuchid (2), Sönid (2), Abaga(nar) (4)
Suiyuan	Tümed	Ulaanchab League Dörben Kheükhed, Muu-minggan, Urad (3), Khalkha Right Wing (Darkhan) Yekhe Juu League Ordos (Wang, Otog, Khanggin, Dalad, Üüshin, Jüüngar, Jasag)
Gansu		Alashan—Ööled Ejene Gool—Torgud

Source: Namsarai, *Cing ulus-un üy-e-yin Monggol qosigu cigulgan.*
*While both banners are officially called Tümed, Tümed Left Banner is popularly called Monggoljin.

while the western half, except for the immediate banks of the Yellow River, formed a largely desert and landlocked plateau to where the Mongol shepherds from the leagues eastern banners retreated after the colonization of the plateau's eastern fringes. On or near the frontier of settlement, Mongols mostly lived in mud-brick houses, but gers and limited nomadization were still found in the interior of the league into the 1950s. The low-lying Yellow River valley separated the Yekhe Juu and Ulaanchab leagues, and a sudden and massive influx of Chinese farmers beginning in the mid-nineteenth century had brought virtually this entire valley under irrigation, growing wheat, linseed, and potatoes. The early Republic put Ulaanchab, Yekhe Juu, and the Tümed Special Banner under the Suiyuan Special Region, with its seat at Guisui.

In between western Inner Mongolia and East Mongolia, where the Khinggan and the Yinshan Mountains shrink to rounded hills, lay the Chakhar area, once the seat of the imperial descendants of Chinggis Khan. After a rebellion in the late seventeenth century, the Qing court deprived Chakhar of its aristocracy and gave the Chakhars a system much closer to that of the garrison Eight-Banners system. Like them, the Chakhar were divided into the eight banners (plain yellow, bordered yellow, plain white, and so on), but with the addition of four pasture banners that raised livestock for the imperial stud and table. Between the *Ba* or "Dike," the local name for the southern rim of the plateau, and the northern Hunshandake[40] dunes which separated it from the high steppe of Shili-yin Gool, Chakhar retained its primarily pastoral character until the eve of the twentieth century, when its relative lack of autonomy made it an easy target for New Policies colonization. The Chinese farmers streaming in established the same linseed, naked oats, and wheat culture that dominated the Tümed plain in western Inner Mongolia, although a population of pastoralists still held the northern and eastern areas, with their settlements so crowded they were "'like stallion's dung'" in the sniffy phrase of a Khalkha caravaneer, "because where one stallion drops his dung the next one does the same."[41] Chakhar, along with the high-steppe league of Shili-yin Gool, formed the Chahar Special Region, seated at the traditional Sino-Inner Asian trade emporium of Zhangjiakou. (The Chinese *Chahar*, or more exactly *Chaha'er*,

[40] Curiously, the name of this desert, well within the area of primarily Mongol set-tlement and obviously not Chinese in origin, has no consistent Mongolian rendering. Sometimes the Chinese Hunshandake is interpreted as Khündei-Shangda "Hollow Ground-Water" and other times as Önöchin-Daaga "Orphan Colt."

[41] Lattimore, *Mongol Journeys*, p. 321, quoting his guide and Khalkha refugee, Arash.

Table i.3: Population Estimates of Inner Mongolia, 1912

Administrative Unit	Households	Total Population
Hulun Buir area		
Hulun Buir banners		30,000
Han population		15,468
Jirim area		
Mongol banners		193,000
Han population		121,052
Rehe		
Mongolian banners	58,071	293,826
Chifeng County	72,050	403,473
Chahar		
Chakhar banners	13,074	45,783
Shili-yin Gool banners	13,606	65,037
Han population		(est.) 71,500
Suiyuan		
Tümed banner	6,419	30,683
Ulaanchab banners	6,812	32,561
Yekhe Juu bannners	35,914	171,669
Han population	207,150	1,010,954
Gansu		
Alashan Banner	1,522	7,275
Ejene Gool Banner	1,718	8,112

Note: Despite their exact appearance, the figures are very approximate estimates taken from local figures of varying and uncertain methodology. Where the household number is given, that number is primary and the total population figure is an estimate based on fixed averages of household size. I have estimated the Chahar Han population using the 1938 figure of 142,997 in Song's table no. 2-16. Since the Han population approximately doubled in both Rehe and Suiyuan from 1912 to 1938, I have halved the 1938 figure to estimate the Chahar Han population in 1912.

Source: Song Naigong, ed., *Zhongguo renkou (Nei Menggu fence)* (Beijing, 1987), tables 2-13 and 2-15.

comes from the Mongolian aimag name Chakhar, but to distinguish the Special Region, which included both areas of Chinese settlement and the Shili-yin Gool League as well as the Chakhar aimag, from the smaller Mongolian region, I have spelled the Special Region with a -h- and the Mongolian name with a -kh-.)

What the areas that produced Mongols sympathetic to cultural aspects of the New Policies and the Republican revolution—anti-clericalism, cutting off their queues and switching to Chinese dress, opposition to Qing political rituals, and support of voluntary marriage—had in common was a combination of traditional closer-than-normal political integration into the Qing system and modern economic integration.

Hulun Buir was economically a high steppe area, but had been treated throughout the Qing not as a part of Inner Mongolia, but as a remote provincial garrison of the Manchurian provinces. Chakhar and the Höhhot Tümeds had lost their hereditary Mongol nobility and were more closely supervised by the dutongs in Zhangjiakou and Guisui, respectively. All three, Hulun Buir, Chakhar, and Tümed, were divided into the eight banners of the Eight Banner system, all three used Manchu and Chinese with Mongolian as official languages (the autonomous banners used Mongolian and to a slight degree Manchu), and all three could send candidates to the imperial examinations (the autonomous Mongolian banners could not). Despite being part of the autonomous banner system (not the Eight Banner system) the rulers of Juu Uda, Jirim, and Josotu leagues had frequently intermarried with the Manchu imperial family, receiving influences not only from the princesses themselves, but the large number of Beijing servants they took with them into the Mongol banners.

By the early twentieth century, the Höhhot Tümed Banner and the Josotu and southern Juu Uda leagues were the most densely farmed areas in Inner Mongolia. Jirim, the western part of Chakhar, and other areas of Juu Uda had a more mixed agro-pastoral settlement pattern. Hulun Buir had virtually no agricultural settlement, but the small trading towns, the railway, and the traditionally sedentary lifestyle of the Daur group that formed the most prestigious part of the banner population created a distinctive alternative pattern of integration into the Chinese and world economy.

Missing from these patterns of close interaction was not only the high steppe, where revolutionary opposition to the Northern System never developed and which remained aloof from all-Inner Mongolian political activities until after 1930, but also autonomous Mongol banners south of the Yinshan Mountains. There, in Yekhe Juu or Ordos (the two terms are interchangeable), and in Ulaanchab League's Urad Right Duke Banner, developed peculiar patterns of rural resistance that rejected not only the corruption-prone implementation of the New Policies and the Republican reforms, but the very reformist aims themselves. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the commoners of the banners in Yekhe Juu League had gathered in *duguilang*s or "circles," vigilante groups formed to resist the banner yamens, and what they saw as their corrupt dealings with all manner of outsiders. The New Policies hit them with the same violent shock that it had hit the other Inner Mongolian banners that bordered

China proper, and the Republican regime there was, according to all informed observers, deeply unpopular.

In this situation, the leaders of the vigilante "circles" or *duguilang*s carried on a stubborn but increasingly hopeless effort to roll back both the modernizing agenda of the Northern System and the state-building that was necessary to implement it. By the early 1920s, the vigilantes and the banner yamens had come to a kind of exhausted truce. Each banner's situation differed, but in general both the yamen and the vigilante leaders had come to recognize that the banners needed some form of modern schooling, at least a semi-professional garrison force to protect against banditry, and a more rationalized financial administration. The only trouble was, neither side dared trust the other with the power that carrying through to completion the state-strengthening reforms of the early twentieth century would bring. Nor, given the legacy of bitterness and alienation toward China and its Northern System, did the vigilante leaders show any interest in the Kuomintang or other Chinese revolutionary parties.

For these vigilantes, who totally rejected the New Policies and its successors, but had come to feel their own weakness in the face of the changing world, the example of revolutionary Mongolia was absolutely vital. The Young Mongols were between two revolutions, but the vigilantes in Yekhe Juu and Urad never voluntarily looked anywhere but north for their patron. Mongolia offered the possibility of a state that was strong and efficient, capable of defending and educating the people, yet whose benevolence and truly Mongolian nature (as with the Young Mongols, these two things were inextricably linked for the vigilantes) was never in doubt. Only the example and patronage of People's Mongolia could give them an entry into the modern state that was utterly free of the stench of both the Chinese officials and their own dukes and princes.

To the Young Mongols, however, the duguilang vigilantes offered fascinating possibilities. They were an indigenous rural protest movement, a living demonstration that even the unconscious, rural Mongol masses, while not yet awakened in the full sense, were indeed shaking off the sleep of the Qing baubles and trinkets. The duguilang vigilantes primarily appealed to Mongolia, but the Young Mongols, with the help of the Communist International and the Mongolian party itself, were able to bring them into an all-Inner Mongolian alliance, based in theory on the ideas of the national revolution and in practice on a common rejection of the status quo, and a common admiration for the new People's Mongolia. From the Young Mongol point of view, however, the vigilante leaders had too local a perspective to be entrusted

with leadership; while they were indeed awakened to the need for a people's regime, they did not have either the secular viewpoint or the all-Mongol perspective that the race needed to create a unified government that could truly liberate the people.

As the sudden outbreak of fighting in 1928 between the local Ordos Mongols and the Kharachin agitators from the east revealed, this alliance was not a comfortable one for either of the participants. Again the story of the alliance between the Young Mongols and the Ordos vigilantes, as well as between various Young Mongol factions separated by their own regional origin and by generation, is the story of the party as a whole and will occupy the bulk of the pages that follow. In brief, however, it can be summarized as one of how the Young Mongols tried (and failed) to organize what they took to be backward but promising vigilantes into the building blocks for a pan-Inner Mongolian (that was the part the Young Mongols would add) regime. The party leaders, once they had brought the vigilantes into the party, raised them to a dramatically new level of local power by supplying them with hard-to-find repeating rifles, thus giving the previously almost disarmed duguilang "circles" the ability to raise for themselves a semi-professional garrison force, and become the dominant military power in their banners. In several banners in western Inner Mongolia, then, the party's activities created new military local regimes that were, for their time and place, unusually stable, unusually popular, and unusually powerful. Yet the vigilante leaders, having now become garrison commanders, repeatedly tried to reestablish direct links with Mongolia from which the rifles had come in the first place. From the point of view of the duguilangs, the various cliques of Chinese-educated Mongols who monopolized the party's central leadership were only middlemen between them and their real savior, the People's Republic itself, middlemen who were to be cut out of the deal as soon as possible. The vigilantes at most tried to use the Young Mongols as a channel for getting outside powers to deliver them the kind of aid that the vigilantes wanted on their own terms.

Despite their fascination with the duguilangs as a confirmation of their own sense that the unawakened Mongols were only waiting for the leadership of East Mongol intellectuals, and as a base for building a revolutionary state, the Young Mongols themselves preferred not to rely heavily on the vigilantes. Looking to Mongolia themselves, and to the various exponents of the Chinese national revolution for aid, and profoundly aware of Inner Mongolia's weakness, they did not trust the vigilantes to be a foundation for the new revolutionary state. Repeatedly in the history of the party the party center would open promising work among the rural Mongols, pass out to them weapons they had received

from Mongolia, and then suddenly abandon the area. The motives are not always explicitly stated, but the competing factors seems to have been both the sheer difficulty of building up a state from the ground up, and doubts about whether the rural Mongols of western Inner Mongolia were really fit material for that purpose. From the Young Mongol point of view, the backward and parochial vigilante leaders did not realize that defending and protecting their own banner was not an end in itself, but only a means to an all-Inner Mongolian state. So better then to seize power from above, from outside, and not have to depend on the vigilantes for security; the outsiders—Ulaanbaatar, the Communist International, Kuomintang, or Feng Yuxiang—were all so advanced, and so powerful.

Militarization and Rural State-Building

The dramatic changes which the supply of a few score rifles could make in the power structure in the western Inner Mongolian banners showed not only the extent of demilitarization, but also the degree to which state-building in the conditions of early Republican Inner Mongolia essentially amounted to army-building. Alongside the paradoxical development of local governments with more power over its citizens becoming more autonomous from the center and less autonomous from the local upper class, transpired a widespread trend of local militarization, a trend which took many different forms ranging from banditry, whether predatory or social, to mercenary troops and minor warlord commanders, to semi-professional garrisons, to organized banner militia, and popular vigilante groups, and every shade in between. For the Inner Mongolian party as for every revolutionary movement in China, the question of how to handle local military forces became the most inescapably concrete way in which the theoretical problem of revolution turned into the practical problem of state-building.

In practice, the abstract phrase "local militarization" links two separate developments: first the tendency for military units to receive their funding from tax revenues at levels ever lower down in the administrative hierarchy, and second, the increasing arming of civilian populations, whether as a bandits or as militia.[42] The first trend was

[42] On militarization in the Republic, see the fine descriptive studies of Diana Lary, *Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937* (Cambridge, 1985), and Phil Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China* (Stanford, 1988), and the more analytical approaches in Edward A. McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley, 1993), and Hsi-sheng Ch'i, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928* (Stanford, 1976).

clearly related to the general decentralization of government during the late Qing and the early Republic, but was accelerated by the increasingly common resort to civil war after 1911. As civilian figures repeatedly declared war on their enemies, the demand on, and hence leverage of, provincial and even sub-provincial military commanders increased proportionately, until they completely escaped control both of their nominal military superiors, and the local civilian authorities. As for the arming of civilians, this too was primarily the result of the increasing resort to war by the established authorities, whether domestic or foreign. In Inner Mongolia this militarization happened relatively early, in some areas even before the fall of the Qing. The number of guns in civilian hands shot up in the wake of the wars which passed over the territory of Inner Mongolia, particularly the Russian occupation of Manchuria in 1900 and the Russo-Japanese War in the east, and the Sino-Mongolian War of 1913 in the central and western parts of Inner Mongolia, in which the new theocratic government of Mongolia occupied much of Inner Mongolia, but then withdrew due to Russian opposition. In the latter two conflicts, foreign armies recruited in Inner Mongolia, armed their recruits, and then when retreating, abandoned them and their local soldiers in the field. These demobilized soldiers formed the core of bandit groups that would trouble the region for decades. In other areas of China, explosions of banditry did not occur until the warlord struggles after Yuan Shikai's death or even until the wars of the Northern Expedition which established the National Government in 1928.

Even before the intervention of outside powers, however, Qing policy and land colonization had made local self-defense an essential activity for the bannermen and the Chinese immigrants into Inner Mongolia. The bannermen had in theory been an armed militia from the beginning of the Qing rule, and although the original conception of a citizen-militia still existed only in the high steppe regions, everywhere the Mongol population was amenable to militarization. In Chakhar under the Republic, for example, new units with Chinese names were created to deal with banditry, but they were still based on the militia principle that every able-bodied man should keep himself in training to serve as a soldier. At the banner level, was a force of "irregulars" (Chinese *youjidui*, later the term adopted for "guerillas" or "partisans"), which was organized by the amban (equivalent of the ruling nobleman or jasag in Chakhar). Consisting of about 200 men, the irregulars were divided into three or four sections, only one of which was normally mobilized. The

banner provided barracks, horses and fodder, food, and some winter clothing, while the province provided uniforms, weapons, and ammunition. Service in the youjidui was a banner duty and not compensated. Some Chakhar banners, called pastures (Mongolian *sürüg*), maintained stud farms, first for the Qing court, and later for the Republican army. These pastures organized a mounted patrol (Chinese *maxundui*) which was a fifty-man unit on permanent mobilization to protect the horse herds. Since the horses were destined for the Chinese army, the Republic's Ministry of the Army supplied the mounted patrol's uniforms, arms, and ammunition, and also a subsidy which covered pay, food, clerical staff, and a salary for the amban, who also served as paymaster for the troops. Finally, at the sumu level, the captain commanded a group of twenty or thirty men called the "self-defense guard" (Chinese *ziweidui*) who used their own arms and horses, and were given no uniforms, and were chosen and called up by the sumu captain.[43] The Chakhar banners, however, were more fortunate than most others, which received neither subsidies nor weapons from the provincial governments. Particularly yamens in western Inner Mongolia often found it hard to secure even ten or twenty repeating rifles, and in some cases had to make arrangements with Mongol bandit leaders looking to settle down to garrison their banners.

Both the Qing and the Republic discouraged gun ownership among the Chinese, but the early Chinese immigrants found that once they passed the local frontier of thick Chinese settlement, they were on their own for internal justice and collective self-defense against Mongol vigilante attacks. Since during the nineteenth century there was a long gap virtually everywhere between the first settlement of significant Chinese communities and the establishment of formal government organizations, those areas whose settlement began before 1900 already had immigrant self-defense organizations. Private land developers usually took on the task of organizing self-defense, just as they secured title for the land from the Mongol yamens, borrowed the capital and hired the labor for initial improvements such as opening canals, and rounded up potential settlers to actually farm the land. The disintegration of law and order after the fall of the Qing and the death of Yuan Shikai led to a more intense scramble by Chinese landlords and farmers to arm themselves wherever possible in self-defense against bandits. In western Inner Mongolia, landlord-dominated mutual-aid organizations, like the

[43] Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration*, pp. 21-25, 40; cf. the Daur militia on pp. 87-88.

Gelaohui or "Elders and Brothers' Society," formed the governing core of local self-defense organizations.

Thus by the early Republic, an enormous variety of military forces existed. At the most formal, there were the garrison armies for the special regions, commanded by the dutongs and distributed into the major counties. In 1922, recognized military units operating in the three special regions included two central mixed brigades, one patrol attached to neighboring Zhili (modern Hebei) province, three provincial mixed brigades, two cavalry brigades, two military police units, three mounted patrol units, and a wide variety of "temporarily organized" (*zanbian*), "independent" (*duli*) and "supplementary" (*buchong*) regiments and battalions; all these phrases indicated former bandit or local militia forces given formal ranks in the provincial army.[44] The quality of most of the provincial or local garrison troops was generally low, and when Inner Mongolia became a frontier of warlord strife, national-level commanders such as Marshal Feng or Marshal Zhang introduced their own, much more professional, units into strategic areas. These new units followed their commanders in and out of provinces, but the local garrisons as a rule stayed put and when the provinces were traded among the warlords, served the new masters. Bandits, some of whom had strong ties to immigrants, or occasionally the banner communities, operated in significant numbers everywhere. Most Mongol banners also contained either a professional banner garrison or a militia, and often both, to patrol the banner frontiers. The Chinese farmers also had organizations affiliated with the Gelaohui or the Red Spears in Henan that defended the villages from either bandits or soldiers, at least when the latter came in small units.

The total number of these units may have been considerable. A 1924 survey of bandit gangs in China, counting only large, permanent, gangs, found fourteen in Inner Mongolia's three special regions, totaling 10,700 men and with the largest gang numbering 2,000.[45] A Chinese revolutionary in 1925, seeking to organize all but the most incorrigibly pro-Zhang Zuolin forces, numbered sympathetic "armed peasants, police, soldiers, and bandits" in Rehe at more than 26,500, which included at least 3,000 in formally organized army units, "more than 1000 military police," more than 2,500 bandits, and more than19,000 men who appear to be at least semi-civilian militia distributed over six counties. At the same time, Mongols estimated that there were about

[44] Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshi nian Zhongguo junshi shi* (1929; rpt. Taipei, 1971), I, *bian* 2, 145-47.

[45] Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China*, pp. 29-30.

10,000 local troops or militia in Rehe which could be recruited for the Mongols, presumably from Mongol banner garrisons. Such figures were certainly exaggerated—Soviet observers routinely discounted them by at least half—but give a general picture of the proportions between the various units.[46]

The state-of-the-art weapon of all of these forces was the bolt-action magazine rifle (Chinese *fuqiang* "repeating rifle," Mongolian *türgen* or *khurdun buu* "quick gun"), which could be loaded with a clip of five cartridges.[47] In Suiyuan, as one observer noted, the Mongol bannermen and Chinese farmers had specific names for all the major sorts of firearms available.[48] Foreign magazine rifle models circulated widely in Inner Mongolia, particularly the Russian Mosin 7.62 mm or "3-line" (Chinese *lianzhupao* "pearl string gun" rendered in Mongolian as *langjuu puu*), used by the Tsarist and Red Armies, and the Japanese Arisaka 6.5 mm, used by the Japanese Imperial Army (most of these rifles had been originally supplied by the Russian and Japanese armies to their local scouts and auxiliaries in Inner Mongolia). Revolvers, such as the Russian 7.62 mm Nagant and the U.S. Colt .45, were carried by officers but only for prestige. As a rule, only provincial-level and larger armies had access to the artillery and machine guns that produced the increasingly dug-in and bloody battles of the Chinese civil wars in the 1920s. Chinese arsenals had been producing repeating rifles, particularly local versions of the German Mauser rifle, since 1912, Mauser pistols since 1913, and machine guns since 1915. Single-shot breech-loading rifles, such as the Berdan No. 2, which was the military rifle of the Imperial Russian Army from 1870 to 1891, also circulated in Hulun Buir and Outer Mongolia. Although they cared for them as irreplaceable treasures, many soldiers and bandits had to make do with battered rifles

[46] See the translated Soviet embassy documents in *Soviet Plot in China* (Peking, 1928), pp. 111-12 and 114-15.

[47] On weapons and armaments in early Republican China, see Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, pp. 53-71. The reports of the Soviet advisers to Marshal Feng's Citizen Armies are also invaluable; see Julie Lien-ying How, "Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun, 1925-1926: A Documentary Study," *Chinese Studies in History*, 19, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter, 1985-6), 104-46, and 184-98. On the Berdan and Mosin rifles, see Bruce W. Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914* (Bloomington: 1992), pp. 31, 104; Heinrich Müller, *Guns, Pistols, Revolvers* (New York, 1981), p. 188; and W.H.B. Smith, *Small Arms of the World: The Basic Manual of Military Small Arms*, (Harrisburg, 1948), pp. 251-52, 472. On the Arisaka, see Smith, *Small Arms of the World*, pp. 222-24, 450-51.

[48] Henry Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part II," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 98 (1978), 17n.

that could hardly fire straight, and in places such as Ordos, which were far from sources of foreign supply, even flintlocks and other obsolete rifles could be found in the hands of Mongol militiamen.

The chronic shortage of rifles and ammunition relative to demand exercised a decisive influence on the mode of engagement, particularly between county or banner garrisons and bandits. Since most of the fighters were at least semi-professional, they were generally sparing of their own lives, and since ammunition was in constant shortage, they were also sparing of the lives of their enemies. Bandits fighting for their supper tended to back off and look for easier targets whenever any stiff resistance presented itself. Soldiers were all mounted for mobility but fought on foot; Soviet advisers found that Chinese cavalry, at least, had few real cavalry fighting skills and could not use their sabers and lances with any effect. Engagement was, if at all possible, at a distance, but even so there was virtually no discipline in the firing and marksmanship was generally poor, a problem exacerbated by the often battered weaponry.

With the exception of the rotating banner militia, armed men stayed with their unit indefinitely and regardless of its formal position. Whether it was a bandit gang, a regiment temporarily enrolled in the Citizen Army, or a local garrison, a military unit was referred to by the name of its commander, who was also responsible for its pay and supplies. Although the New Policies had introduced into the Chinese military a system of ranks comparable to those of European armies (general, colonel, major, captain, etc.), the independence of the units meant that a commander was almost always referred to by the size of the unit he commanded rather than by his rank. Thus the sources will refer to a military leader as a regiment commander (*tuanzhang*) or a company commander (*lianzhang*), rather than as a colonel or a captain (Chinese terms were used widely, even in Mongolian sources). Each unit thus derived its identity from the commander and the commander derived his status from the unit. This tendency of armies to act as a league of strongly coherent individual companies affected tactics even in large, relatively well-disciplined armies; Soviet observers noticed a distinct tendency for soldiers to clump together in companies, rather than mass forces for attack.

Another aspect of the unit's independence was that the commander usually handled himself the supply of the unit's necessary inputs (food, shelter, clothing, ammunition, and new recruits), something that often involved him in arrangements with the civilians of varying permanence. The most obvious, and least stable, was looting at gun-point, but others included protection-rackets (one-time payments by the banner or county

yamens in return for immunity from plunder), payment of local tax-moneys at the banner/county level, or else recruitment into the higher-level warlord armies which received provincial-level revenues, such as railway transportation charges and internal customs fees. For convenience and for unit cohesion, recruits mostly came from one locality, regardless of how peripatetic the unit was; even the commanders of warlord regiments, while following their supreme commanders all over China, generally recruited from the neighborhood of their home villages. Even the tightest-knit units, such as local garrisons, however, were always open to hiring soldiers of fortune newly arrived in the neighborhood. The key difference between rooted units and rootless ones, then, was not so much in the origin of the soldiers, but whether the unit served in the recruits' home area and received supplies from the recruits' home government. Those who did formed the vital part in what for many purposes could be seen as a semi-sovereign state.

For these militia, and those who attempted to work with them, the abstraction of "the state" thus dissolved like a mirage into a patchwork of revenue-army conglomerates, that is, bands of armed men, which somehow secured enough money and ammunition to stay in the field for a significant part of the year and which could afford some protection against rival military gangs, whether they be the garrison from the next banner or county, or else bandits. As we have seen with the case of the Chakhar, the same local government could pay for troops of several different descriptions. Opposed to these local revenue-army conglomerates were not only the bandits but also the professional armies of the national-level warlords, both of which lacked the commitment to a particular district that distinguished both the militia and many of the local garrisons. Thus for the civilians, and particularly the Mongol bannermen, the key that distinguished trustworthy military forces from the untrustworthy was that the trustworthy forces were committed to protecting a relatively small (county- or banner-size) population and thus received their pay from relatively predictable taxes from the county, while untrustworthy forces had no commitment to a particular community and no hesitation to finance themselves through either plunder or self-destructive, unsustainable taxation.

From this perspective, the conflict between the Young Mongols and the western Inner Mongolian vigilantes appears in a new light. Although several Inner Mongolian party leaders from eastern Inner Mongolia had emerged out of militia organizations, they all spent considerable time as expatriates in Beijing and elsewhere, and they all had pan-Mongolian ambitions which made them view the protection of particular banners as a parochial task, clearly secondary to the needs of the nation as a whole.

This was particularly true of the Kharachin Mongol politicians, who were all expatriates and never in the course of the party's history stood up for the defense of their own district's particular interests. These expatriates could appeal to Mongol banner militia and vigilantes with the language of racial revival, recovering banner resources, and defense against (largely Chinese) bandits, and could use their supply of rifles from the Soviet Union and Mongolia to entice the local vigilantes and garrisons into cooperation, yet in the final analysis, the local vigilante leaders put the party center, and the guards regiment that accompanied it, into the category of an untrustworthy force, that is a force without commitment to any particular locality, roaming the length of Inner Mongolia seeking its fortune in the Chinese civil wars. The local vigilantes, once armed, established local peace-zones and gave the party center a stable base area, yet the peace-zones belonged to the local vigilante leaders, not the party. The history of the party shows that none of them would ever put their new armies at the service of the trans-local ambitions of the racially-conscious politicians seeking to make a pan-Mongolian revolution. In this way, the Republican paradox of decentralized state-building became ensconced in the heart of the revolutionary activity, producing constant frustration for would-be unifiers of the race.

PART ONE

YOUNG MONGOLS AND VIGILANTES

And Gideon had threescore and ten sons of his body begotten: for he had many wives. And his concubine that was in Shechem, she also bare him a son, whose name he called Abimelech....And it came to pass, as soon as Gideon was dead, that the children of Israel turned again, and went a whoring after Baalim, and made Baal-berith their god....And Abimelech the son of Jerubbaal went to Shechem unto his mother's brethren, and communed with them, and with all the family of the house of his mother's father, saying, Speak, I pray you, in the ears of all the men of Shechem, whether is better for you, either that all the sons of Jerubbaal, which are threescore and ten persons, reign over you, or that one reign over you? Remember also that I am your bone and your flesh (Judges, 8:29-9:2).

CHAPTER ONE

MONGOLS IN THE KUOMINTANG, 1911-1923

From 1921, Inner Mongolian nationalism was nurtured by the alliance, however tenuous, of the Chinese Kuomintang with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Since this dual sponsorship of the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement influenced every aspect of its development, the early history of the Inner Mongolian nationalists can be told as two separate histories first of those Mongols who were oriented south, to the Chinese nationalists, and second, those who were oriented north to the Mongolian revolution. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the distinction, even before the two movements were formally merged in 1925, was one of broad tendencies only. Even those Mongols most loyal to Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist movement were powerfully inspired by the Mongolian revolution, and even those who always looked to Ulaanbaatar for leadership were deeply influenced by the successive waves of the Chinese revolution.

While the milieu out of which the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia grew is clear, the earliest steps in organization, particularly those before 1924 are hard to document. Few if any institutional arrangements were made before that year and the available information is based largely on recollection, usually vaguely dated, of social contacts. Later accounts based on interviews, particularly those with Bai Yunti (Mongolian alias, Serengdonrub), display the obvious signs of ex post facto exaggeration and glorification of the interviewee's own role. It should not be forgotten how very young most of the future leaders were. In 1924, most were still under 30.

At the same time, it is difficult and perhaps somewhat artificial to distinguish future revolutionaries from the ambient environment. Yet a certain distinct style and vocabulary of agitation can be seen that formed the root of the party style of organization. This style contrasted with the earlier pattern of reactive insurrection by respected family heads and social leaders, followed by communal migration to Mongolia proper. Instead unattached students and former students shuttled back and forth between urban centers of education, whether Neislel Khüriye (modern Ulaanbaatar), Beijing, Hailar, Moscow, or Canton, and created networks that inhabited that shadow world between pure friendship and political

networking. For these educated young Mongols, political networking began as a continuation of school ties by other means.

Regional Bases of Kuomintang Support

Heavily sinicized Tümed Mongols around Guisui (modern Höhhot in western Inner Mongolia) were the earliest Mongols to join the Chinese revolutionary movement. The works of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, as well as Sun Yat-sen's propaganda, are said to have inspired Yun Heng and Jing Quan, both born to poor families, to join Sun's Revolutionary Alliance (*Geming Tongmenghui*) in the last days of the Qing dynasty.[1] These two Tümeds did not, however, start a local tradition of looking to Sun Yat-sen for leadership. Rather, the Tümed Mongols seem to have been attracted to whatever movement lay on the cutting edge of Chinese radicalism, so that by the time of the Great Revolution, when the Kuomintang (KMT) had became a more centrist, nation-wide force, the politically active Tümed youth were overwhelmingly Communist in their sympathies.

In the long run, the Chinese Kuomintang made its biggest mark among the East Mongols of Inner Mongolia's Juu Uda, Jirim, and Josotu leagues. Under the Qing, all three leagues came under profound Manchu influence, and as the Manchus became more sinicized, they also acquired a considerable familiarity with Chinese culture. The Qing court frequently favored the nobility of these areas with the bestowal of imperial brides, and these brides came with dowries that included craftsmen and servants from the capital Beijing. Perhaps as a result of these influences, the civilian, informal dress of the Mongols of these areas was basically Manchu and not Mongolian.[2] This difference in dress was a major sign of the differing cultural orientation of the East Mongols, an orientation that had significant effects on their political life.

Chinese immigration also influenced these areas, but in differing ways. In Josotu League, in south-east Inner Mongolia, and especially in its three western banners of the Kharachin people, the Mongolian nobility and many of the common Mongols had taken advantage of this situation to become landlords of Chinese tenants. As a result, in their

[1] On Yun Heng and Jing Quan, see "Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi" bianxiezu, ed., *Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi* (Beijing, 1987), p. 515.

[2] See Christopher P. Atwood, review of *Mongol Jewelry* by Martha Boyer, in *Mongolian Studies*, 19 (1996), 101-08, and Henny Harald Hansen, *Mongol Costumes* (London, 1993), p. 238.

economy and material culture, they differed little from their Chinese neighbors.[3] In Jirim and Juu Uda, on the other hand, the more recent immigration had pushed Mongols out of the fertile regions, so that even where the Mongols had already taken up farming, they generally lived in pure Mongolian villages, and had a mixed agro-pastoral economy that still showed clearly Mongolian features.[4] The difference in population distribution was still clear in 1982: in the southern part of Chifeng Municipality, which contains part of the area of Josotu League, 53% of the rural townships (*xiang*) had a Mongol population over 1,000, but not a single township had an actual Mongolian majority. In the northern part of the municipality, which comprises old Juu Uda League, only 38% of the rural townships (*xiang*) or pastoral sumu units had a Mongolian population over 1,000, but of these 51% had absolute Mongolian majorities.[5] The present author found in visits to Fuxin Mongolian Autonomous County (the former Monggoljin Banner in Josotu League), and Khorchin Left Wing Middle (Darkhan) Banner in 1987-8 that the distinction between the fully agricultural areas of old Josotu League, and the semi-pastoral/semi-agricultural area of Jirim was still quite large.

At the same time, from the nineteenth century, the northern areas of Jirim and Juu Uda received heavy immigration from the southern Josotu League areas. Repeating the pattern of Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia, the land-poor farmers of the Josotu banners migrated to the open spaces of the more northern leagues to make their living either as tenants or by a wide variety of non-agricultural talents. This immigration strongly influenced the culture of the northern banners contributing to the formation of all East Mongolia into a single cultural area, influencing everything from food and agricultural practices to dialects and folk poetry. Inner Mongolian folklorists Oyungerel and B. Bayandüüreng, in

[3] E-tu Zen Sun, "Results of Culture Contact in Two Mongol-Chinese Communities," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 8 (1952), 185-186, 203-204; Hao Fan, *Nei Menggu Menggu minzu de shehuizhuyi guodu* (Höhhot, 1987), pp. 115-116; Owen Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria* (1934; rpt. New York, 1969), pp. 241, 247-249.

[4] Walther Heissig, "Mongol Farming," *Contemporary Manchuria*, vol. 3, no. 4 (1939), 79-96.

[5] Data from *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Chifeng shi fence* (n.p., 1987). This series, *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi*, is the fullest source on sub-county level population distribution in Inner Mongolia. Kharachin Banner, Chifeng and Ningcheng counties have 102 townships (*xiang*) of which 52 have a Mongol population over 1,000. None, however, has an absolute Mongolian majority. Kheshigten, Baarin Left and Right, Aru Khorchin, Ongni'ud, and Aukhan banners and Linxi County have 177 townships or sumus of which 68 have a Mongolian population over 1,000, and 35 sumus have an absolute Mongol majority.

noting the importance of a nineteenth-century minstrel from Josotu's easternmost banner, Monggoljin (officially called Tümed Left Banner), have described this immigration:

> In East Mongolia, there is a phenomenon called the "Northward Migration of Culture." The proverb current in Gorlos which speaks of "Monggoljin doctors and Kharachin *xianshengs*" [*Monggoljin-u emchi, Kharachin-u shiyanshéng*], speaks precisely of the development of Mongolian medicine in Monggoljin (present-day Fuxin County) and culture in Kharachin (mostly the area of Left Kharachin, Chaoyang, and Jiancheng). From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the majority of the people of the former Josotu League dwelling along the banks of the Dalinghe River all had a relatively high level of culture. Due to political troubles (the Jindanjiao sect affair) and hardships in their life, they migrated northwards to the areas along the watershed of the Shara Mören [Liao] and Tuur [Tao] rivers, and the Sungari [Songhua] and Nun [Nen] rivers. In this way, a progressive culture, and particularly folk literature, followed them and entered in to a great extent...In this "Northward Migration of Culture" there were two main channels, east and west. The three banners of Khorchin Left Wing and the two Gorlos banners are included in the east channel.[6]

While the emigrants from Monggoljin tended to dominate the more traditionally Mongol spheres of Mongolian medicine, minstrelsy, and monasticism, those from Kharachin made a name for themselves as *xianshengs*, that is, as school teachers in the Chinese mode. For them, as is implicit in this quotation, "culture" (*soyol*) meant above all the book-learning transmitted in Chinese schools. The activities of Kharachin's emigre politicians involved in current affairs all over Republican Inner Mongolia were in many ways just a more ambitious extension of the established role of Kharachins as mediators of Chinese culture to the less "progressive" areas of Inner Mongolia.

[6] Oyungerel and B. Bayandügüreng, "'Ayunggan Sandir Bagatur'—soyol-un erdeni-yin toli," introd. *Ayunggan Sandir Bagatur*, narrated by Sirabjamsu (Beijing, 1991), pp. 2-3. The "Jindanjiao Sect Affair" refers to a Chinese sectarian rebellion in 1891 that targeted both Christians (local and foreign) and the Mongols under the slogan of "sweep clean the north and destroy the barbarians." Many Mongols in the Josotu and southern Juu Uda area had to flee the area at the time. See Paul Hyer, "The Chin-tan-tao Movement: A Chinese Revolt in Mongolia (1891)," in *Altaica: Proceedings of the 19th Annual Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistics Conference*, ed. Juha Janhunen (Helsinki, 1977), pp. 105-12, and Xing Fuli, "Qing bing zhenya Zhuo Zhao liang meng Jindandao qiyi de jingguo," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 14 (1984), 208-17.

Prince Güng and the East Mongolian Educational Renaissance

As was noted in the introduction, the reformist New Policies from 1901-1909 touched every aspect of the Qing empire and few areas were so radically transformed as the Qing empire's educational system. Qing-Japanese cooperation, both in sending Chinese students to Japan and recruiting Japanese teachers to teach in China played a vital role in this transformation. At the same time, the New Policies also marked a dramatic shift away from the previous Qing policy of isolating the Mongol banners and towards a heavy-handed program of colonization and administrative integration of the empire's Mongolian lands with China proper.[7]

Under the regulations of the Court of Colonial Affairs that governed the autonomous Mongolian banners, Mongols were prohibited from either inviting teachers from China proper or from using Chinese language in public capacity. (This prohibition did not apply to those Mongols affiliated with the Eight Banners system, whether in the imperial garrisons or in Chakhar, Höhhot Tümed, and Hulun Buir banners.) The New Policies removed the rationale for these policies, which were formally revoked in 1910.[8] The concurrent break down of the social and economic barriers between the Mongolian banners and China proper created an emerging stratum of modern-trained Inner Mongolian intellectuals and officials, holding jobs in various Chinese, Japanese, or Russian organs that dealt with Inner Mongolia. Also the emergence of schools not tied to either the banner government or the Buddhist monasteries created a small but growing stratum of school teachers and rural intelligentsia.

The late Qing and the early years of the Republic saw many modern-style primary schools created in Inner Mongolia. Many of them failed, not so much because of the hostility of the ruling classes, but because of financial problems or flagging interest from the original founder. In 1925, party leaders accused the princes and dukes of so stifling education

[7] On Japanese influence, see Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, 1993), 41-110. On the New Policies in Inner Asia, see the Introduction, note 27.

[8] See the relevant edicts in "Nei Menggu jiaoyu zhi" bian weiyuanyui, ed., *Nei Menggu jiaoyu shizhi ziliao* (Höhhot, 1995), II, 117-18. The original edict prohibiting the invitation of teachers from China proper and the official use of Chinese language can also be found in the 1826 Mongolian version of the Court of Colonial Affairs code, §§1266, 1267, reprinted in Nayiraltu and Altan'orgil, ed., *Gadagadu Monggol-un törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u qauli jüil-ün bicig* (Hailar, 1989), II, 684-85.

that mere higher-level primary schools could be found only in Kharachin Right and Left banners of Josotu League, in Kheshigten Banner of Juu Uda League, and among the Chakhar eight banners.[9] Unless one limits the term schools to those teaching a certain type of curriculum, this charge is inaccurate—traditional banner-supported schools teaching clerical skills to the Mongols existed everywhere in Inner Mongolia—but it expressed the importance that modern-style schools with some exposure to Chinese had for Mongolian nationalist leaders and their sense that these schools were subversive of the old order.

Graduates of these schools seeking new jobs could attend schools in the Chinese cities around Inner Mongolia, such as Qiqihar, Harbin, Mukden (modern Shenyang), Chengde, Zhangjiakou, and Guisui, and especially Beijing. This educational integration did not generally result in upward mobility in the Chinese sphere, but rather led to employment in posts specifically related to Mongolian affairs. Thus while education in China proper gave the budding East Mongolian intelligentsia a certain identification with Chinese culture and politics, it simultaneously strengthened their feelings of Mongolian nationality. This nationalist sentiment involved both a rivalry with the Chinese and a sense of being the vanguard of a unified Mongolian nation, one that had to be viewed as a whole, not as a collection of isolated banners.[10]

Almost all of the initial leaders in the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia belonged to that first generation of Chinese-educated Mongols. Born in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, they came to manhood during the early years of the Chinese Republic. Sainbayar, a later leader of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, believed that the growth of modern schools in East Mongolia under the influence of Chinese modernization was the seminal event in the rise of the Mongolian revolutionary movement. In 1927, he told Anna Louise Strong that,

> The Mongols nearest to Chinese control, that is, in the Eastern Provinces, live like Chinese, tilling the soil and in settled habitations. Through the rest of Mongolia the tribes wander as nomads... In spite of their backward culture, there have been some brilliant students among them, in the eastern district, studying in schools that were started some fifty years ago. The pupils from these schools are now leaders of the Nationalist revolutionary party [that is, the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia] and allied with the Kuomintang of China.[11]

[9] Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev and S.D. Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrenniaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaiskikh ekspluatatorov," in *Istoriko-kul'turnye sviazi narodov Tsentral'noĭ Azii*, ed. Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev (Ulan-Ude, 1983), p. 131. In this passage, as often elsewhere, nationalist pamphleteers misrepresented the original prohibition on inviting Chinese language teachers as a blanket prohibition on education.

[10] On the significance of patterns of educational and vocational mobility or "pilgrimage" in the delineation of the horizon of modern nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), especially pp. 55-65, 109-20.

Sainbayar, like many East Mongols, felt that their education in the new culture gave them a rightful position as leaders of the Mongols.

A particularly active patron of this new schools movement was the prince of Kharachin Right Banner, Güngsangnorbu (1871-1931). Prince Güng (as his name was commonly abbreviated) played an important role both in establishing schools in his own banner, including the Chongzheng Academy, which was the alma mater of a large proportion of the Inner Mongolian literary and political leaders, and also in encouraging graduates to go on to study outside of Inner Mongolia.[12] Of course an important precondition for his reforms lay in the relatively less ruinous condition of the banner finances. Extensive income from leased property, the political clout to preserve banner rights over those leases, and a relatively competent system of accounting, gave Kharachin Right Banner as stronger financial base with which to set up New Policies-style institutions, such as modern schools with Japanese teachers, a new police force, and modern post and telegraph offices.[13] After the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war put his Josotu League firmly within

[11] Anna Louise Strong, *China's Millions* (New York, 1928), p. 319. Apart from her discussion with Sainbayar ("Mr. Pao," pp. 318-322), this work also includes valuable conversations with major figures in MPR history as well, such as Amagaev, Dambadorji, Batukhan, and so on (pp. 355ff).

[12] A major source on Güngsangnorbu and his reforms is the *Kalaqin zhuanji*, or "Special Issue on Kharachin" in *Chifeng shi wenshi ziliao xuanji* 4, (1986). Other biographies include Sechin Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, Provo, Utah, 1988, pp. 207-233, and Wu Enhe and Xing Fuli, "Gongsangnuorbu," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 1 (1962), 101-117. Special studies on aspects of his reforms include Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Chifengshi Weiyuanhui, ed., *Chifeng Fengqing (yuan Zhao Wuda)* (Chifeng, 1987), pp. 517-519, 520-521, 522, 523-524, Wang Zouyi, "Chongzheng xuetang," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 16 (1985), 224-227, and Nacinbatu, "Güngsangnorbu-yin surgan kümüjil-ün üjel sanag-a-yin tuqai," *Öbör Monggol-un Bagsi-yin Surgaguli-yin erdem sinjiligen-ü sedkül*, no. 33 (1987: 2), pp. 84-92. On the schools in Kharachin, see also "Nei Menggu jiaoyu zhi" bian weiyuanyui, ed., *Nei Menggu jiaoyu shizhi ziliao*, I.1, pp. 99, 99-100, II, pp. 269-283.

[13] See Nakami Tatsuo, trans. Zhao Lingzhi, "Guanyu Qingmo Nei Menggu de yibu shiliao—Wang Guojun zhi 'Nei Menggu jiwen'" in *Qingzhu Wang Zhonghan xiansheng bashi shouchen xueshu lunwenji*, ed. Chang Jiang (Shenyang, 1993), pp. 594-602.

the Japanese sphere of influence, Prince Güng used his connections with officers in the Japanese military to gain admission for some Kharachin students to study the secrets of modernization in Tokyo.

After the outbreak of the 1911 revolution and the proclamation of the new Republic of China in the south, Prince Güng rejected the idea of joining the new independent government in Khalkha (Outer) Mongolia, headed by the incarnate lama, the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu. Instead, through 1912, he sought for alternatives first in Qing loyalism and then in combined Manchurian-Mongolian independence.[14] Eventually, like the other East Mongolian princes he realized the only alternative to theocracy under the Khalkha was the Republic of China under Yuan Shikai. In September, 1912, he accepted office as director general of the Republic's Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau (renamed in 1914 the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department), charged with continuing the Qing's policy of controlling the Inner Asian aristocrats and clerics with finely tuned rewards and punishments.[15]

One of Prince Güng's earliest reforms was to consolidate Beijing's schools for training Mongols and Tibetans. Taking over the staff and some of the facilities of the School in the Palace of Universal Peace for bannermen, and the attached Mongol, Tanggud, and Todo schools of the Qing dynasty's Court of Colonial Affairs he founded the Mongolian and Tibetan School (*MengZang xuexiao*) as a public institution with free tuition financed and accredited by the Education Ministry. This initial reform, however, left the school's mission little changed. The headmaster, Dashou (b. 1870), was a Manchu from Plain Red Banner with a career in the Court of Colonial Affairs, and the school offered only supplementary and preparatory classes. In 1916, Dashou moved the school to a larger location at No. 8 Shihu Hutong ("Stone Lion Alley") in Beijing's Xidan neighborhood. In 1918, it was renamed the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School (*MengZang Zhuanmen Xuexiao*), offering a three-year middle school program with a special course of study in law and politics.[16]

[14] See Robert B. Valliant, "Inner Mongolia, 1912: The Failure of Independence," *Mongolian Studies*, 4 (1977), 56-92, where Prince Güng appears throughout as simply "Kharachin."

[15] Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqinian zhiguan nianbiao* (1966; rpt. Taipei, 1974), 110-31.

[16] Song Zhou, "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," *MengZang zhi you*, no. 38 (September 15, 1993), 23-30. On the Qing schools, see Preston M. Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662-1796* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 32, 38-39; Ning Chia, *The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty*, Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1991, pp. 253-59; H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, trans. A. Beltchenko and E.E. Moran, *Present-Day Political Organization of China* (1910; rpt. Taipei, n.d.), pp. 165-66.

Classes included Chinese or "the official language" (*guowen*), Mongolian, mathematics, history, geography, and natural science. One student later described the school's curriculum in 1923-5: "Its emphasis was still on inculcating the teachings of Confucius and Mencius; it was no different from any ordinary middle school."[17] Yet influences of the twentieth century still seeped in. Another student at that time vividly remembered one of his teachers, Yang Shoubi, a young female graduate of Peking University, who taught modern Chinese. She was only 25 years old or so, tall and attractive with delicate features, and only a few years older than the senior students. For her classes the older students and class leaders would order their younger classmates to the back rows and occupy the front seats themselves, sitting in their best clothes with slicked-down hair and creamy faces in rapt attention as she explained how the use of particles differed in modern and classical Chinese.[18] Within a few years, this old and new school became the nurturing ground for a whole cohort of young Mongol nationalists and revolutionaries.

The Kharachin Intelligentsia

The students nurtured by Prince Güng's efforts played a major role in the future of Inner Mongolia. As Andrew Nathan has observed, the generation of the 1880s grew up under very different conditions from those of the 1860s and the 1870s. For the older generation, the changes of the New Policies and the Republic were something they had come to late in life, after a long period of Confucian education and apprenticeship either as Qing officials or as local notables and without a period of foreign education. Those born in the 1880s, however, had seen the old examination system with its Confucian learning abolished before they ever had a chance to sit for it. Instead they entered a bureaucracy that had already been transformed by the New Policies' demand for technical expertise. Many (and most of the leaders) had some foreign education, the vast majority in Japan.[19] Although the Mongols of the 1880s were

[17] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu* (Beijing, 1989), p. 44.

[18] Song Zhou, "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 29.

[19] Andrew J. Nathan, *Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constituionalism* (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 8-13.

less well-educated than their Chinese colleagues, the same trends that transformed their career paths can be seen.

The five Kharachin students Prince Güng arranged to study in the Tokyo Military Academy in winter, 1906, formed a distinguished group. Engkhebürin (Chinese name, Wu Enhe, 1886-1954), served as a parliamentarian, educator, and, from 1924 to 1929, as president of the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School, respected alike by the students and the officials, while Temgetü (Chinese name, Wang Ruichang, 1887-1939), pioneered Mongolian-language publishing with movable type. Two other students, Nomunbilig and Dechin, instead turned to politics.[20]

Nomunbilig (Chinese name, Jin Yongchang, a.k.a. Altan, AltanOchir, b. 1884 or 1888) soon transferred out of the Tokyo Military Academy and graduated from the business department of the School of Agriculture and Forestry of Tokyo Imperial University. Returning to Beijing, he won election in 1913 to the first Chinese Parliament from Mongolia, running on the Kuomintang ticket. From 1914 to 1915, he interested himself in Outer Mongolian affairs and visited Kiakhta where the Sino-Russo-Mongolian negotiations were going on; from about this time on he began to use the Mongolian name Altan or AltanOchir. Given his broad experience, the party's Comintern adviser rightly said, "As a man of business, he is better educated."[21] Dechin (b. 1882) was the son of

[20] Wu Enhe and Xing Fuli, "Gongsangnuorbu," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 1 (1962), 108; "Gongsangnuorbu zhuan (xuan zi 'Shijie mingren zhuan')," trans. Nagushanfu, *Chifeng shi wenshi ziliao xuanji* 4, (1986), 9; Jia Yinsheng. "Chongzheng xuetang," *Chifeng shi wenshi ziliao xuanji* 4, (1986), 63; Wu Ziyun, "Chongzheng xuetang yange," trans. Wu Guanqing, *Chifeng shi wenshi ziliao xuanji* 4, (1986), 77. The fifth student at the Japanese military school was Yu Hengshan. Prince Güng also sent three female students to a women's school in Japan at the same time.

[21] *Soviet Plot in China* (Beijing, 1928), pp. 108-109; Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), "Nei Menggu chihua yundong de bianqian," trans. Jin Hai, ed. Pan Shixian, in *Nei Menggu jindai shi yi cong*, ed. Nei Menggu Daxue ZhongGong Nei Menggu Diqu Dang Shi Yanjiu Shi (Höhhot, 1986), p. 166; Wu Luoji, "Jinxie zai xianyan qiangao 'Xinhai geming shiqi de huiyi' zhi qian," *Menggu wenhua zhi tongxun*, no. 5 (July, 1989), p. 52n.; Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi de Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in, Zhongguo Menggu Shi Xuehui, ed., *Zhongguo Menggu shi xuehui chengli dahui jinian jikan* (Höhhot, 1979), p. 600; Li Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 512a, 513, 564b. The Nozu source is a Chinese translation of a report made for the Japanese intelligence service in Inner Mongolia, "Uchimôko ni okeru sekishoku undô no hensen," *Kôain chôsa geppô*, 3.10 (Oct., 1942), 1-65—see Edwin Pak-wah Leung, "Regional Autonomy versus Central Authority: the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the Chinese Response, 1925–1947," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 25 (1986), 60 n. 15. I have not been able to access a copy of the Japanese original, however.

"Yi Meiren," or Deputy Adjutant Yi, head of the banner yamen's militia, in the government of Kharachin Middle Banner. Although not from Kharachin Right Banner, Dechin also graduated from Prince Güng's Chongzheng Academy, and was sent with Nomunbilig (AltanOchir) and the others in the first class to study in the Tokyo Military Academy. Like AltanOchir, he subsequently graduated from the School of Agriculture and Forestry; on his return he taught at the Beijing Agricultural University.[22]

Only the cream of the new Kharachin intelligentsia, however, received their education in Japan; most graduated from Chinese schools. Buyantai, another Mongol from Prince Güng's banner, studied at Beijing's Army Academy for Princes and Nobles (*Lujun guizhou xuetang*), an exclusive school for the scions of the Qing nobility.[23] Mandaltu (1892-1945), from the same banner, graduated from the Mukden Border Pacification Academy, and worked as a reporter for the Mongolian language newspaper, *Monggol-un sonin bichig*, that the Russian administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway had set up in Harbin. He too, like AltanOchir, had served the Chinese government in Outer Mongolia, being the head of the Internal Affairs Department in the General Administrative Office at Kiakhta.[24] The most prominent of these Kharachin nationalists was still younger: Bai Yunti (1894-1980), from Kharachin Middle Banner in Josotu League. The second son of Husuntai,

[22] Yang Jialuo, *Minguo mingren tujian* (1937), II, section 9, 31; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 168; Huang Fensheng, *Bianjiang renwu zhi* (Zhengzhong Press, 1946), pp. 60-61; Wu Enhe and Xing Fuli, "Gongsangnuorbu," p. 108; "Gongsangnuorbu zhuan (xuan zi 'Shijie mingren zhuan')," p. 9; Jia Yinsheng, "Chongzheng xuetang," p. 63; Wu Ziyun, "Chongzheng xuetang yange," p. 77; Wu Luoji, "Jinxie zai xianyan qiangao 'Xinhai geming shiqi de huiyi' zhi qian," p. 52 n. 8; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 265. For information on Dechin's father, I am grateful to Sechin Jagchid, personal communication.

[23] Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 603; Jagchid, *Es-says in Mongolian Studies*, p. 265. On this school, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 254, 318-320, 321; examples of some students' anti-Qing mood given in "Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi" bianxiezu, ed., *Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi*, p. 512. A copy of the school's yearbook, *Lujun Guizhou Xuetang tongxue lu* (1906), is preserved in the Tôyô Bunko, Tokyo.

[24] Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," 601; Nozu "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," 168; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, 265. On the newspaper see Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911* (Leiden, 1989), 120-122, and refe-rences. Two issues of the newspaper have been reprinted by the Mongolia Society: *Two Old Mongolian Newspapers: Monggol-un Sonin Bicig* (Bloomington, 1969).

the banner adjutant in charge of official correspondence, his father sent him to Beijing for his education.[25] After a period spent studying Chinese language under Dashou at the Mongolian and Tibetan School, he entered the first class of the special law and politics course in the newly-expanded Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School in 1918 and became class president (*xuezhang*).[26] Sometime before his fortieth birthday, however, he acquired a most un-revolutionary opium habit.[27]

In a work dedicated to the history of the Inner Mongolian political movements in the 1920s, those members of this intelligentsia who involved themselves in politics naturally occupy the prime place. Yet it is important also to remember, that alongside the political nationalists and stemming from the same social *milieu* was a strong movement of what John Hutchinson has called "cultural nationalism," that is movements aiming at the moral and cultural renewal of the nation rather than political change.[28] East Mongolian cultural nationalists looked back for inspiration to many anti-clerical thinkers of the Qing dynasty, in

[25] See his biographies in Yang, *Minguo mingren*, II, section 8, 61; Huang, *Bianjiang renwu zhi*, pp. 57-58, Howard L. Boorman with Richard C. Howard, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, I (New York, 1967), s.v. Buyantai (upon which Wu Xiangxiang, *Minguo bairen zhuan*, pp. 169-173, and Yu Xiaolin, "Bai Yunti," in *Minguo renwu xiaozhuan*, ed. Liu Shaotang [Taipei, 1981], pp. 60-62 depend heavily), Chen Jiying, "Dao yidai juren de jushi: Mengzu guo zhi dalao Bai Yunti xiansheng zhi yisheng," *Zhongwai zazhi*, 28, no. 4, no. 164 (October 1980), 8-9, written by the son-in-law of one of Bai Yunti's close friends, Öljii, and Wu Yunpeng, "Monan haojie Bai Yunti," *Zhongwai zazhi* 28, no. 4, no. 164 (October 1980), 32-34, written by a Mongol from Aukhan Banner, and Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun zongsiling Bai Yunti ji qi muliao renyuan." *Menggu wenhua tongxun*, 6 (1985), 8, which draws indiscriminately from the above sources and adds further material from interviews with Bai. Other biographies in Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 165; Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 599.

[26] Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai, and others following him, put Bai Yunti's entrance to the preparatory school in 1911 and his entry into the law class in 1912. These dates are impossible and an example of the persistent glorification of Bai in that biography. The usually unreliable Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," p. 8, in this case correctly describes the school as Dashou's but keeps the impossible dates. Chen Jiying, "Dao yidai juren de jushi," pp. 8-9, gets the date and school name right but gives no other details. The usually reliable Song Zhou, "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 29, gives the information that he was class president in an early class of the special law and politics course (*zhuanke*).

[27] Sechin Jagchid, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902-1966* (Bellingham, 1999), p. 137.

[28] John Hutchinson, *Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish State* (London, 1987).

particular, Injannashi who completed his immensely influential biography of Chinggis Khan, the *Khökhe Sudur* ("Blue Chronicle"), in 1871. While Injannashi himself never formed a school or even printed his work in his lifetime, his strongly Confucian-tinged criticism of Buddhism, his at times savage satire of the hereditary nobility, and his call for Mongols to once again truly understand their own past and emulate their heroic ancestors became a vital formative influence on twentieth-century East Mongolian writers.[29]

The cultural nationalists, led by the above-mentioned Kharachin figures Temgetü and Engkhebürin, and younger educators like Sainbuyan (1899-1965) as well as others such as the Kharachin Lubsangchoidan (b. 1875), the Khorchin Kheshingge (1888-1950), the Kheshigten Rolgarjab (1889-1941), and others, followed up Injannashi's criticism of the isolation and parochialism of Mongol thought, and advocated a modern, scientific and enlightened education in the Mongolian language as the key to reforming the nationality. By the fall of the Qing, these writers had mostly come to accept that the Mongols were indeed part of China (*Dumdadu Ulus*, or Middle Country), but they believed deeply in the natural kinship and unity of the Mongol people. Fascinated by the legacy of Chinggis Khan, they turned for information on him not to the traditional Mongol chronicles, which linked his legacy with Buddhism and the nobility, but to Chinese and foreign works, and of course, the *Khökhe Sudur*. Seeing in Chinggis an exemplar of a figure at the forefront of history in his time, they felt a profound sense of alienation from what they saw as the succeeding centuries of stagnation, when the Manchus had almost destroyed the Mongols by a divide-and-rule policy, cultural isolation, and the encouragement of a grossly overgrown monastic establishment. Many of the cultural nationalists felt that religion was a vital part of human life, and that Buddhism still had a role in Mongolian culture, but they all felt that a reform of the monasteries and the abolition of its dominance of education was a vital necessity for the future well-being of the Mongol people. While the cultural nationalists stayed aloof from politics themselves, their ideas spread wherever modern schools were founded in Inner Mongolia, and played

[29] There is a massive literature on Injannashi. Important studies and collected pap-ers include: John Gombojab Hangin, *Köke Sudur (The Blue Chronicle): A Study of the First Mongolian Historical Novel by Injannasi* (Wiesbaden, 1973); A. Craig Clunas, "The Prefaces to *Nigen Dabqur Asar* and Their Chinese Antecedents," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 15 (1981), 139-89; Injannasi-yin tuqai suda'qu qural, ed., *Injannasi-yin tuqai sudululgan-u ögülel-ün tegübüri* (Höhhot, 1982); D. Tserensodnom, *Mongol uran zokhiol (XIII-XX zuuny ekh)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1987), 407-436; Liu Wenyan and Lai Bingwen, *Yinzhannaxi zhuan* (Shenyang, 1988).

a vital role in creating a coherent new class of intelligentsia, or "Young Mongols."[30]

Local Militarists

Those Mongols from Jirim and Juu Uda leagues who later led the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia were not nearly so well educated as the Kharachins. Instead they showed another side of Inner Mongolian political activity that would prove vital to the party—local militarization. Just as in the field of education, so here too the rise of a new leadership took place in large degree as a result of integration with China. The Qing rulers had organized the Mongolian peace-time administration as a militia system. The men of the outer Mongol banners, just like those of the inner Eight Banners garrisoning the strong points of the empire, were enrolled into the reserve force at age 18 and were liable to be called up to active service until age 60. They were thus, in theory at least, expect to keep and bear arms and train regularly in their use. The officers of peace-time administration and justice held titles and organizations explicitly military in character.[31] By contrast, the civilians of China during the heyday of the Qing were supposed to be unarmed and were normally prohibited from keeping weapons. Only in times of crisis, either large-scale rebellion or invasion, would civilians, and their natural leaders in the rural gentry, be officially permitted to arm and train to suppress local disorder. As Phillip Kuhn has pointed out, however, such crises dominated Qing history from the turn of the nineteenth century on. Still, however, there was the expectation that normal

[30] Scholars in modern Inner Mongolia have produced numerous anthologies of writings by the writers of this East Mongolian Enlightenment. See B. Gereltü, ed., *Monggol-un jokiyalcid-un sigümji ögülel, 1721-1945* (Tongliao, 1986); Erdenitogtaqu, ed., *Monggol ündüsüten-ü surgan kümüjil-ün bicig matériyal-un tegübüri* (Tongliao, 1983). On Lubsangchoidan, see Lubsangcoyidan, *Monggol-un jang agali-yin üilebüri*, ed. Qa. Dambijalsan (Höhhot, 1981).

[31] Jacques Legrand, *L'Administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie qalq-a* (Paris, 1976), pp. 124-132; Herbert Harold Vreeland III, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure* (New Haven, 1957), pp. 10-17. These sources describe the system as it was set out in Qing administrative documents. The militia-based rule at the grass roots was matched by the military career path of the high metropolitan officials sent to supervise the Mongols: J. Legrand, "Donées biographiques sur les functionnaires des Qing de Mongolie (1796-1820), *Études mongoles* 4 (1973), 75-119.

administration should have civilian leadership and that military-based leadership was an anomaly.[32]

During the Republic, however, the civilian politicians' repeated recourse to war and the recrudescence of banditry tipped the balance in many Chinese districts, particularly the poorer and more peripheral ones, to a heavily military brand of leadership, whether of bandit chiefs or of commanders of local garrisons.[33] At the same time, colonization in Inner Mongolia disrupted the Mongolian banner administration which was neither permitted nor competent to enforce law and order among the Chinese settlers. Thus, as the previous militia system fell into disuse in those banners in and around areas of Chinese colonization, the Mongol banners often followed the Chinese counties in turning over local security to professional fighters, the command of which formed a new avenue to power and influence for ambitious men. These armed bands ran the gamut from pure bandits hated by the banner population, to garrison units employed by the banner yamen, but viewed with suspicion by the people, to genuine civilian self-defense forces based on a rejuvenation of the Qing banner militia. In many banners, semi-professional troops employed by strongmen in the yamen co-existed uneasily with local militias or vigilante forces raised among the people.[34]

An early example of these semi-professional forces and the new opportunities they afforded to those Mongols not of noble blood is provided by Kheshigten Banner in Juu Uda League. There a commoner, Yue Shan (b. 1868), organized a 500-man "Peace Preservation Corps" in the last days of the Qing and from 1911 on effectively ruled the banner. His title was "Adjutant Yue" (Yue *jakhirugci*)—adjutant (*ja-khirugchi janggi*) was the highest title in the banner yamen open to commoners—but he had in reality reduced its titular noble-blooded ruler

[32] See Phillip Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).

[33] On the civil wars and the rise of warlordism, see Edward A. McCord, *The Pow-er of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley, 1993); on banditry, see Phil Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China* (Stanford, 1988).

[34] David Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration* (New Haven, 1953), 21-25, 40, 78-79, 81-82 87-88 describes differing local garrison troops in Chakhar and the Nenjiang valley. Owen Lattimore's *Mongols of Manchuria* contains numerous references to bandits (pp. 115-16, 118, 131, 206, 215, 279-80), and banner self-defense forces (pp. 197, 223, 252, 258, 266). Liu Yingyuan, ed., *Li Shouxin zishu* (Höhhot, 1985), a special issue (vol. 20) of the serial *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao* gives the "as told to" autobiography of one Mongol mercenary commander who went from bandit to general.

to a puppet. In 1912, Adjutant Yue opposed the Khalkha Mongolian declaration of independence and during the Sino-Mongolian War of 1912-1913 he and his son Yue Jingtao or Murungga (1880/1885-c.1940) took the part of the Chinese in operations against the invading Mongolian armies. In 1913, Adjutant Yue was elected to the lower house of the first Chinese Parliament on the ticket of the Kuomintang Party. Yue Shan returned to his banner when President Yuan Shikai dissolved parliament in November, 1913, and protected as much by the remoteness of his homeland as by his garrison unit, quietly ignored Yuan's dictatorship until Yuan's death in 1916.[35]

Yet just as in the case of militarization in China proper, one should not assume that the local garrison chiefs were purely or even primarily military figures. Rather commanding an armed force functioned for many simply as another, albeit very important, avenue of local advancement and self-protection for ambitious families in a society that expected its leaders to be generalists.[36] Thus the Yues in Kheshigten Banner were not only military leaders but also supported education; in 1915 Kheshigten's banner yamen founded Cuiying Lower Primary School, explicitly opening it to commoners as well as those of noble blood. Advanced students were sent to Beijing for further training and on their return employed in the banner administration.[37] The Comintern adviser to the Inner Mongolian nationalists, A.I. Oshirov, described Yue Shan's son Murungga (Yue Jingtao) as anything but a professional warrior: "He is a very good administrator but scarcely a real military leader. He speaks Chinese and Mongolian well, is sober-minded and of calculating disposition."[38]

Murungga saw his family's rise as a socio-political revolution, not a mere military reorganization. Writing in 1928, Murungga boasted "... I, Murungga, from the beginning, before the Inner Mongolian revolution

[35] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107; Yang, *Minguo mingren*, II, section 7, pp. 116-117; Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nien zhiguan nianbiao* (1966; rpt. Taipei, 1974), pp. 511b, 615a; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 117, 166; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 265. Oshirov's biographical note quoted in *Soviet Plot* confuses Murungga with his father Yue Shan, thus making Murungga the MP.

[36] Edward A. McCord, "Local Military Power and Elite Formation: The Liu Fam-ily of Xingyi County, Guizhou," in*Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, ed. Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 162-188.

[37] "Nei Menggu jiaoyu zhi" bian weiyuanhui, *Nei Menggu jiao shizhi ziliao*, II, 287; Chimitdorzhiev and Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrenniaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaiskikh ekspluatatorov," p. 131; Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 268-69.

[38] *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 107.

began, had accomplished some substantial revolutionary work in my own banner, and had from youth joined the party ranks and exerted myself in the work of the party and the revolution..."[39] The aim of this revolution in Kheshigten was not independence, but rather abolishing the privileges of the nobility. In this sense, he and Yue Shan fit in better with the Chinese republicans than with the clerical and aristocratic secessionists of Khalkha.

Sainbayar (1896-1939, Chinese name Bao Yueqing) came from an extended household of well-to-do farmers in the almost purely Mongolian village of Bayan Mangkha in Bo Wang or Khorchin Left Wing Rear Banner. His family had a solid position in the village; his father belonged to the *taiji* or noble estate and like many householders in the village disposed of the services of immigrant Mongol tenant farmers from the impoverished Monggoljin banner to the south.[40] The prince of Sainbayar's Khorchin Left Wing Rear Banner (Bo Wang Banner), Amurlinggui, followed Prince Güng's model as a Beijing politician and sponsor of education. In 1905, he funded a primary school in Rear Banner, and the three Khorchin Left Wing banners cooperated in setting up a higher-level primary school for all their children in the nearby Changtu County. Admission was restricted to those of noble ancestry.[41]

[39] Central Historical Archives of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (later "Central Party Archives"), *fond* 7, *towyoog* 1, *khatgalamjiin negj* 18: 50 (Murungga to Gelegsengge, March 17, 1928).

[40] The village where Sainbayar grew up is described in a series of articles written by his son, Pao Kuo-yi (Ünensecen): "Marriage Customs of a Khorchin Village," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 9 (1964), 29-59; "Family and Kinship Structure of Khorchin Mongols," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 9 (1964), pp. 277-311; "Child Birth and Child Training in a Khorchin Mongolian Village," *Monumenta Serica*, 25 (1966), 406-439; "The Lama Temple and Lamaism in Bayin Maŋ," *Monumenta Serica*, 29 (1970), 659-684; "The Life of a Mongol Woman in a Khorchin Mongol Village," *Mongolian Studies* 13 (1990), 133-145. Note especially "Family and Kinship Structure," pp. 278-9, which describes the growth and fission of the household of Sainbayar's grandfather and father. On the absence of Chinese and the presence of Monggoljin tenants, see "Marriage Customs," 35-36, 41-42. For a demographic study of a Han Eight Banner village in Liaoning similar to the sort of community from which Sainbayar (and most of the other East Mongol nationalists) originated, see James Lee and Cameron Campbell, *Fate and Fortune in Rural China: Social Organization and Population Behavior in Liaoning, 1774-1873* (Cambridge, 1997).

[41] "Nei Menggu jiaoyu zhi" bian weiyuanyui, *Nei Menggu jiaoyu shizhi ziliao*, I, part 1, 96-98, 99-100, II, 253-258. Prince Amurlinggui's parliamentary career is traced in Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 491, 511a, 514, 519, 521b, 523, 525, and 562a.

If Murungga was an unmilitary man from a militarily-involved family, Sainbayar was a soldier in the mold of the *Three Kingdoms* from a peaceful farming household. The Comintern adviser Oshirov described him in 1925: "He is energetic and determined and is very well known in Djerim-Seim [Jirim League]...As a man he is very sincere and active. I think that, in time, he will become one of the great social workers in the new organization in Mongolia." His family history, however, contained examples for Sainbayar's choice of occupations; Senggerinchin (1811-1865), a Mongol commander whose volunteer army had fought both the Taiping rebels and whose resistance to the British and French invaders had become matter of song in East Mongolia, was one of his senior departed relatives.[42]

Modern schooling played a relatively small part in his growing up. In keeping with his image as impatient and martially-inclined, Oshirov reported that Sainbayar entered "middle school" (probably the Khorchin Left Wing Three Banners Mongolian-Chinese Primary Academy near Changtu), but never graduated. He had been expelled from his banner for stirring up a rebellion against the rulers, but was still popular. Later, during the second Fengtian-Zhili war of 1924, he had organized a Mongol partisan detachment to fight for the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin against Wu Peifu, who dominated China proper. His real purpose, he later claimed, was eventually to turn the troops against the princes of his own league. Although his force grew to 1,500 men, he later had to disband it, due to disagreements with officers of the Fengtian Army, and broke with the Fengtian clique. Having then moved to Beijing, he opened his house to young Mongols there, making it a gathering place for discussion of Mongolian issues.[43]

[42] Owen Lattimore and Fujiko Isono, *The Diluv Khutagt: Memoirs and Autobiography of a Mongolian Buddhist Reincarnation in Religion and Revolution* (Wiesbaden, 1982), p. 4. On Senggerinchin, see Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)* (Washington, 1943), s.v. Sêng-ko-lin-ch'in, and Sing I Cén [Xing Yichen], *Senggerincin*, trans. Süngdei (Höhhot, 1986). The melody and lyrics of the song "Seng Wang" ("Prince Seng") are in Secenggowa, Örgön, and Öljeyisang, eds., *Qorcin arad-un daguu* (Hailar, 1987), 84-87.

[43] *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 108; Yang, *Minguo mingren*, II, section 9, pp. 54-55; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 117, 166; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 265; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," p. 18.

East Mongols and Khalkha Independence

The careers of these East Mongols show clearly that, no matter how nationalistic by their own lights they may have been, they did not consistently support Mongolian independence. Although none of them belonged to the hated 'Chakhars' of Xu Shuzheng's army of occupation in Outer Mongolia,[44] AltanOchir and Mandaltu had helped in the re-imposition of a Chinese presence there.[45] Murungga and his father followed a pro-Chinese policy in 1912-1913, which generated strong opposition within their Kheshigten Banner.[46] As the Comintern agent, Oshirov, reported in 1925, Murungga, Sainbayar, and AltanOchir did not look in their political activities outside the context of China until 1923 or even later; none acted for secession or even autonomy.[47] Both Murungga and Sainbayar took aim at the system of hereditary nobility, what under Soviet influence would soon be termed the 'feudals,' rather than at Chinese rule.

In refusing to support the new theocratic government in Khüriye in 1911-1912, the East Mongolian politicians like Yue Shan, AltanOchir, and Mandaltu were only following the lead taken by their most

[44] "Chakhar" was a general term in Khalkha for Inner Mongols. See Nicholaus Poppe, *Tsongol Folklore: Translation of the Language and Collective Farm Poetry of the Buriat Mongols of the Selenga Region* (Wiesbaden, 1978), p. 40. Baron Ungern-Sternberg's army also contained many such "Chakhars"; see Thomas E. Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911-1921* (Bloomington, 1980), p. 252.

[45] On the organization and personnel of the Chinese offices at Khiakhta and other cities in Outer Mongolia under the Republic, see Cheng Daode, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shi ziliao xuanbian* (Beijing, 1988), pp. 126-28, and Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 471-76. The role of Eight Banners and Inner Mongols in the implementation of Chinese policy in Khalkha Mongolia is an important, but little studied, subject. Sandô, for example, the last imperial resident in Outer Mongolia, and the villain of Mongolian nationalist histories, was actually of Mongol origin (from the Plain White Banner garrisoned in Hangzhou), and in his poetry shows a sensitive awareness of his own heritage. See Bayannamur and B. Temürbagan-a, *Dumdadu Ulus-un Monggol jokiyalci-yin namtar* (Höhhot, 1986), pp. 238-41 and Wang Shupan and Sun Yuzhen, *Gudai Menggu zu Hanwen shixuan* (Höhhot, 1984), pp. 402-23. Enhua, the chief Chinese official at Uliastai from 1917-1920 was an ethnic Mongol from the Zhenjiang banner garrison (Liu Shouyi, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 473-75, 577b).

[46] Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, pp. 34-35; *Mongolyn ard tümnii 1911 ony ündesnii erkh chölöö, tusgaar togtnolyn tölöö temtsel: Barimt bichgiin emkhtgel (1900-1914)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1982), p. 270.

[47] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107-09.

prominent mentor and colleague, Prince Güng.[48] While much controversy has surrounded this decision of the Prince to support Yuan Shikai and not the new government of the incarnate lama, Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, his decision must be seen in the light of the long anti-clerical tradition, widespread among the aristocracy in East Mongolia since the writings of Injannashi.[49] Thus Güngsangnorbu's disdain for the idea of a lama ruling the nation of Chinggis Khan stemmed not only from aristocratic class feeling, but also from a belief that the expansion of religious influence and prerogatives in Mongolian society would in the long run prove more harmful to Mongolian society than independence would prove helpful.

Thus their concentration on secular education and self-strengthening played a vital factor in the opposition of these young future nationalists to the clergy- and aristocratic-led Khalkha Mongolian independence movement of 1911-1914. They felt that although others might scorn them as sinicized, it was the East Mongols who had been the backbone of the independence movement. Although the Khalkhas in Outer Mongolia had the show of independence, the real but slow and hard work of transforming the Mongols into a modern nation, capable of standing on its own two feet, was not being done there but in East Mongolia. Sainbayar told Anna Louise Strong,

> We [Mongols] began to start a government of our own. We succeeded in gaining autonomy for Outer Mongolia though it was the soldiers of Inner Mongolia and their munitions that really did the fighting, for the people of Outer Mongolia are very backward. We defeated the soldiers of Yuan Shi Kai and might have had our own government for Inner Mongolia also, if Japan and Russia had not prevented it...They held a Three Power Conference with Japan and China [sic: this is the 1915 Kiakhta Conference of Mongolia, Russia, and China] and decided that Inner Mongolia must remain part of China; if we had not agreed to this the Czar's soldiers would have smashed the government of Outer Mongolia also. We [the Inner Mongols] had at that time 50,000 soldiers but they had to disband because of this conference.[50]

Even in the late 1920s, Inner Mongolian expatriates told visitors that virtually all the schools in the Mongolian People's Republic were run by Inner Mongols or Buriats.[51]

Opposition to the independence movement did not necessarily translate into passive acceptance of Chinese policies towards the Mongols. In Kheshigten, for example, Chinese colonization overran the southern part of the banner in the late Qing, leading to the establishment of Jingpeng County in 1914, but the stubborn opposition of the banner government stopped any further advance, preserving the northen part for the Mongols. In 1934, Owen Lattimore wrote, "The Kheshigten Mongols are considered by other Mongols to be among the most genuine, uncompromising and at the same time progressive in [Rehe]." The credit for these accomplishments belongs to Yue Shan and Murungga.[52]

Their biographies also show the importance of patronage links in achieving higher education and in political action. Prince Güng patronized AltanOchir and Dechin, and his schools would train Bai Yunti, and others. Later, Murungga's patronage would produce a crop of Kheshigten Banner activists. Thus, although active members of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia would come from all over the region, the activists were grouped into cliques, with a common origin, and tied to either an educator, like Prince Güng, or a garrison commander like Murungga. Of these cliques, the largest was the Kharachin Right Banner group, who all owed their education to the endeavors of Prince Güng. Even after study in Moscow or Ulaanbaatar, these regional distinctions remained important. In the winter of 1925-6,

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[48] See the contrasting views of Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, p. 18, Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, pp. 34, 40, Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 220-21; Sechin Jagchid, "Prince Gungsangnorbu: Forerunner of Inner Mongolian Nationalism," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 12 (1981), 150.

[49] On Injannashi's view of Buddhism, see Hangin, *Köke Sudur*, pp. 19-20, 50-51, 96-102 (but cf. pp. 52-53, 64-65, and 92-93) and his essays reprinted in Erdenitogtaqu, ed., *Orcin üy-e-yin Monggol-un aldartu jokiyalcid* (Höhhot, 1981), pp. 39-44. On later Kharachin anti-clericalism, see Ü. Colmon and Qa. Külüg, "Lubsangcoidan-u gün uqagan-u üjel sanag-a-yi ögülekü ni," in *Monggol ündüsüten-ü gün uqagan-u üjel sanagan-u teüke-yin ögülel-ün tegübüri*, ed. Ge. Möngke, Bagan-a, and Möngkebayar (Höhhot, 1985), pp. 676-694 (Chinese translation in Wu Guoji and Li Fengming, "Shilun Luobusangquedan de zhexue sixiang," in *Zhongguo shaoshuminzu zhexue sixiang shi lunji*, ed. Zhongguo Beifang Shaoshuminzu Zhexue ji Shehui Sixiang Shi Xuehui [Beijing, 1985], pp. 54-57), and Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 202, 234. Unfortunately these authors often do not sufficiently distinguish between anti-clericalism, that is, belief in the corruption and harmfulness of the clergy, and outright atheism or disbelief in the Buddha. The first is certain, the second is rather harder to find, if not impossible.

[50] Strong, *China's Millions*, p. 320; cf. Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 127-28.

[51] Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia*, trans. John de Francis (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 78-79.

[52] Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, 268-69. In 1982, the northern five sumus of Kheshigten Banner had a population of 18,696 of which 14,460 were Mongols, while the townships in the southern part had 205,728 inhabitants of whom merely 4,726 were Mongols. See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Chifeng shi fence*, 423-77.

the Inner Mongolian students at Mongolia's Sükhebaatur Military Academy in Ulaanbaatar split up into Kharachin and Kheshigten factions and even came to blows.[53]

Mongols in the Chinese Parliament

Despite some dissatisfaction with the Qing government among Mongolian students in Beijing and Mukden,[54] there was no contact between the East Mongols in Beijing and the Chinese Nationalists before the 1911 revolution. Even so, the Kuomintang was remarkably quick at finding Mongol supporters after the fall of the Qing, considering its background of "anti-Manchuism" (*pai-Man zhuyi*), an ideology which specifically included the Mongols as a target.[55] After the 1911 revolution, the party jettisoned the radical associations of the Revolutionary Alliance that before 1911 had attracted a few Tümed Mongols, and in August, 1912, Sun Yat-sen and Song Jiaoren included Güngsangnorbu among the seven members of its Governing Committee.[56] Although Prince Güng's role was only nominal, at least four Mongols in the newly elected parliament of 1913—three East Mongolian notables, Yue Shan, Ye Xianyang (from Josotu's Tümed Banner), and Zhang Shutong (b. 1867), and one representative of the younger generation, AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang)—won election to the lower house of Parliament on the Kuomintang ticket.

The first three avoided association with Yuan Shikai's ripening plans to restore the monarchy. Yue Shan went back home and Zhang Shutong went abroad to register their opposition. Mongolian members of the senate outside the Kuomintang, mostly high aristocrats such as the princes Amurlinggui, Nayantu, and Lhawangbürügjil, joined actively in Yuan's hand-picked legislatures.[57] Prince Güng and AltanOchir took a middle course, not publicly acclaiming Yuan, but continuing to be active in the executive arm of Chinese government, Prince Güng as director general of the Mongolian and Tibetan Department and AltanOchir in

[53] Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 1 (Office of Internal Security on Inner Mongolians in Mongolia, Nov., 15, 1932).

[54] See "Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi" bianxiezu, ed., *Zhongguo beifang minzu guanxi shi*, p. 512.

[55] Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton, 1990), pp. 163, 181-83.

[56] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 221, 263.

[57] Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 491, 511b, 513, 519-522; Yang, *Minguo mingren*, II, section 7, pp. 116, and I, section 5, p. 126.

negotiations at Kiakhta. After Yuan's death and Duan Qirui's restoration of the old Parliament, the Mongolian MPs, along with those from Eastern Tibet (Qinghai and Xikang regions), Shandong, and Zhili (modern Hebei), mostly belonged to the Constitutional Mutual Discussion Society, which formed a vacillating middle between the more radical clique associated with the old KMT and the more conservative MP's.[58]

The first close association of Mongols with Sun Yat-sen came when the Duan Qirui's Anfu warlord clique tried to dissolve the Parliament in 1917, and elect a more compliant one. 130 MPs sailed south to Canton in protest and there organized an opposition government under Sun Yat-sen's leadership. Members of this rump Parliament were to stay in the south for five years, returning only in the summer of 1922.[59] Those MP's who went south included Mongols such as Yue Shan, Zhang Shutong, and AltanOchir.[60]

Although these figures were active in the government of Canton and some were party members, it was the younger Mongols, such as Bai Yunti, who actively joined in Nationalist party work. Despite, or perhaps because of, the warning of his father and of Dashou at the Mongolian and Tibetan School, Bai Yunti had been fascinated by the romance of Sun's Revolutionary Party since his arrival in the capital. By the time he completed his education, the rising tide of anti-imperialist and anti-warlord feeling among the Beijing students was culminating in the May Fourth movement. While younger Tümed Mongolian students joined the May Fourth demonstrations, Bai Yunti and his classmate and fellow Kharachin, Öljii (d. 1931), instead went south in spring, 1919, to Shanghai to join Sun Yat-sen's struggle against the northern warlords. There two Mongolian MP's, Zhang Shutong and Yue Shan, introduced these "Twin Mongol Braves," as they were called by their Chinese comrades, into Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Party and they had a personal interview with the leader.[61]

[58] Harold Monk Vinacke, *Modern Constitutional Development in China* (Princeton, 1920), p. 225.

[59] On the Parliament during its exile in the south, see William L. Tung, *The Political Institutions of Modern China* (The Hague, 1968), 72-77.

[60] Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, 511; Yang, *Minguo mingren*, II, section 7, p. 116; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," pp. 8, 9; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 224, 232n. 76, 264-65; *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107-109. In the last source, Murungga is, as before, confused with his father, although the son may have accompanied his father to Canton.

[61] Huang, *Bianjiang renwu zhi*, p. 57; Chen Jiying, "Dao yidai juren de jushi," p. 8; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," p. 8. At this time Sun Yat-sen's

Another Mongol who had joined the Revolutionary Party in 1918 also went south to join Sun Yat-sen's forces at this time. Engkhebatu was both the third son and the younger brother of the amban or banner commandant of the Chakhar Left Wing Taipusi Herding Plain White Banner (modern Taipusi Banner). The Qing rulers tightly integrated the Chakhar Mongolian banners into the garrison Eight Banners system stationed in China proper, and replaced the hereditary rule of the Borjigid lineage, descended from Chinggis Khan, by a system of promotion based in theory on ability. As part of the inner Eight Banners system, the Chakhar banners, even more than the outer Mongol banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia, were steeped in the ideas of Qing loyalism.[62] Chakhars were also, unlike those from the autonomous banners like Josotu, eligible both to participate in the exam system and to serve as officials in banner garrisons in China proper. It is thus not surprising that they joined Kharachin and Kheshigten Mongols, as some of the first Inner Mongolian communities to establish modern publicly-funded primary schools.[63]

Despite the absence of a legally-privileged nobility, Taipusi Banner was typical of Chakhar banners in having the position of amban be dominated by a single family, in this case a family of the Khanggin lineage, occupying a large multi-family household in Üchi'oboo village (see figure 1.1). This family had supplied eleven *ambans* (banner heads) in seven generations, leading the anthropologist David Aberle to describe the accepted norm of nepotism as one of the most distinctive features of the Chakhar administration.[64]

The area immediately north of the Great Wall originally served as herd lands for the Manchu banners and the Imperial household; this buffer between Chakhar and China proper was settled by the Chinese in the course of the eighteenth century. After a pause in the early and middle nineteenth century, colonization on the edge of the land of

party was called the Revolutionary Party (*Gemingdang*, 1913-1920), not the Nationalist or Kuomintang Party (*Guomindang*, 1912-1913, 1920 on), but typically Chen and Harnuote confuse the Gemingdang with the earlier Revolutionary Alliance (*Geming Tongmenghui*, 1905-1912), and Harnuote thus explicitly misdates this introduction to 1912.

[62] Christopher P. Atwood, "'Worshiping Grace': The Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia," *Late Imperial China*, 21 (2000), 105-06.

[63] Many of the Qing dynasty ethnic Mongol poets in Chinese were Chakhar bannermen serving in China proper; see Jinbazhabu, ed., *Chahar Mengguzu shihua* (1989), pp. 388-91, 393-97. On schools, see Chimitdorzhiev and Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrenniaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaiskikh ekspluatatorov," p. 131.

[64] Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration*, p. 17.

Chakhar itself proceeded rapidly from 1870s on, mostly without plan and on the base of lease agreements made with the individual Mongol banners. Still by 1892, the progress of cultivation still left the frontier of settlement well south of the heartlands of all the Chakhar banners.[65]

State-sponsored Chinese colonization then hit Chakhar early and hard with the implementation of the New Policies in 1903; while this state-supported colonization bred immediate and massive resistance in more autonomous areas of western Inner Mongolia, it was implemented smoothly in the tightly-controlled Chakhar pastures.[66] Its effect was magnified by the beginning of the Beijing-Datong railway in 1907, which linked Zhangjiakou, the traditional center of Chakhar trade and residence of the dutong of the whole Chahar region, with Beijing and the port at Tianjin. By 1921 this railway was extended through western Chakhar territory to Suiyuan. Chinese patriots proudly pointed to this railroad, built entirely with domestic capital and expertise, as an achievement of Chinese know-how, and the railway put the capstone on the New Policies in Chakhar by integrating the western Chakhar area into the Chinese economy as another impoverished grain-exporting district. Within the frontier of settlement only small areas, usually associated either with the imperial stud or with monasteries were able to avoid settlement.[67]

The small Taipusi banners, for example, caring for herds owned first by the Qing court and then by the Chinese Republican state, had kept their steppe lands and pastoral occupation, although surrounded on all four sides by Chinese farmlands. They had supplied the imperial table with meat under the Qing and under the Republic the warlord armies with mounts, and Samdanlhünrüb, the amban from 1915 to 1929 had started a butter factory, selling the product in Tianjin. Still, the banner folk had sedentarized already by the early twentieth century.[68] Just as in

[65] On Chakhar in the Qing, see the pioneering studies of Henry Serruys, "A Study of Chinese Penetration into Čaqar Territory in the Eighteenth Century," *Monumenta Serica*, 35 (1981-1983), 485-544, and "The Čaqar Population During the Qing," *Journal of Asian History*, 12 (1978), 58-79, and the general survey in Jinbazhabu, ed., *Chaha'r Mengguzu shihua*, pp. 25-27.

[66] Lan Meihua, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce Elleman (Armonk, N.Y., 1999), p. 42.

[67] Lattimore, *Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 279-80.

[68] In 1956, the Left Wing Taipusi Banner was merged with Baochang County as Taipusi Banner, with a total area of 3,415 square kilometers and a 1982 population of 207,459 of whom only 4,294 (2%) are ethnic Mongols. The old Taipusi herd grounds, however, form the banner's Günbulag Sumu, which on its territory of 650

Figure 1.1: Genealogy of Part of the Khanggin clan of Üchi'oboo (Chakhar Left Wing, Taipusi Herding Banner, Plain White Banner)



Sources: Jinbazhabu, *Chahar Mengguzu shihua*, pp. 381, 400-401, 405, 412, 423; Vreeland, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, 142, pp. 146, 159; interview with Gegentana Baumann, March 27, 1999. Note in Vreeland, Gombojab is "informant," Fulehungge is "father," Samdanlhünrub is "grandfather," and Serengdongrub is "grandfather's brother."

Sainbayar's farming village, the extended family, and the pervasive privilege of older sons that the system entailed dominated the lives of those who would become young nationalists.[69] As the youngest son, Engkhebatu (1882-1944) was given to take vows in Beijing's prestigious Yonghegong Temple (Mong. *Nairaltu Nairamtagu Ordon*) at age 18. Living in Beijing, however, he came in contact with different currents of

square kilometers has only 3,741 persons, of whom 2,771 (74%) are Mongols. Üchi'oboo itself in 1982 had 183 persons of whom 139 (76%) are Mongol. The disparity in population density between the former Baochang areas and Günbulag Sumu (74 persons per square kilometer vs. 6 per square kilometer) is as striking as the ethnic difference. See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Xilinguole Meng fence* (1987), pp. 192, 204, and map in index, p. 62-63, and *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu disanci renkou pucha ziliao huibian* (Höhhot, 1983), p. 66.

[69] This village, the Khanggin family, and the careers of its officials are the focus of the accounts of Chakhar life in Vreeland, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, pp. 122-94, and Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration*, pp. 1-53.

thought and after joining the Revolutionary Party went south to Canton to fight the warlord government.[70]

What attracted these Mongols to what was already by 1919 a somewhat old-fashioned brand of opposition politics? Later claims that Bai Yunti and other Mongols admired Sun's stand on self-determination and autonomy are anachronistic; up until 1923, the Nationalists emphasized the equality of all races in China only in the context of integration and eventual assimilation. In his last general discussion of nationality policy before the alliance with the Soviet Union, in August, 1920, Sun Yat-sen still considered the American 'melting pot' to be the most appropriate model for China's quinque-racial republic. Even when he praised Wilson's "self-determination," he meant by this phrase the idea of friendly, voluntary assimilation under conditions of equal rights, not political independence for separate nationalities.[71] The Chinese Communist, Li Dazhao, in 1924 accurately summarized the evolution of the KMT's position on "nationalism" (*Minzu zhuyi*) before 1923:

> In the pre-revolutionary period (before 1911), so-called "nationalism" meant nothing more than the issue of the Han and Manchu nationalities. After the revolution (after 1911), so-called "nationalism" indicated unifying China's five nationalities of Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans, as one family; it did not mean much more than putting the Han nationality at the center.[72]

We can only speculate that for those in Inner Mongolia under the domination of hereditary privilege, whether as able commoners like Adjutant Yue or younger sons like Engkhebatu, the constitutionalist and republican promise of careers open to talent still retained its luster.[73]

[70] On Engkhebatu, see Jinbazhabu, *Chaha'r Mengguzu shihua*, pp. 381-82, and on the Khanggin family, see pp. 400-01, 405, 412, 423. The Mongolian name of the temple is from György Kara, personal communication, who heard it from Buyan'öljei, the Khambo Lama, or Abbot, of the temple in 1959 and in the 1980s.

[71] *MengZang zhengce ji faling xuanji* (Taipei, 1966), p. 3; Bruce A. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1927* (Armonk, N.Y., 1997), p. 62. Confusion over Sun Yat-sen's early viewpoint on China's Inner Asian nationalities has been abetted by various false dichotomies. Contrary to Leung's assertion in "Regional Autonomy versus Central Authority," p. 50, for example, there is no necessary contradiction between "Republican China's assimilation policy in Inner Mongolia," and "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's earlier pronouncements of racial equality." Equality for individuals regardless of ethnicity is quite compatible with encouraging eventual assimilation.

[72] Li Dazhao, *Li Dazhao wenji* (Beijing, 1984), II, 772.

[73] On constitutionalism's appeal, see Nathan, *Peking Politics*, pp. 4-26.

By the time Bai Yunti arrived in Shanghai, Sun's plan for a northern expedition had already begun to fall prey to the dissatisfaction of his warlord supporters at home. Many MP's, including Yue Shan and his son Murungga returned north in the winter of 1919-1920, after only two years in the south, although AltanOchir stayed longer.[74] In face of these defections, Sun and his allies turned to youthful supporters like Bai Yunti, Öljii, and Engkhebatu who were coming from the north, in place of the older politicians who were going back to Beijing.

In May, 1920, about a year after this first meeting, Bai Yunti received an appointment as the KMT's Special Appointee (*tepaiyuan*) for Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Inner Mongolian Party Affairs from Li Liejun, then chief of staff of the Canton military government. Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan were the three special regions that formed the central part of modern Inner Mongolia (Bai Yunti's native Kharachin Middle Banner was in the Rehe Special Region), while ethnic Mongols were to be dealt with under the rubric of Inner Mongolian affairs. This appointment had nothing to do with any Mongolian nationalist sentiment on the part of Bai Yunti. Rather it was apparently the beginning of a persistent dream of Sun Yat-sen's to use Soviet Russia's position in Siberia to complete China's revolution. During the Russian Red Army's drive to re-occupy Siberia in 1920, Sun Yat-sen and a certain Liu Zhang (a.k.a. Fëdorov) in the Russian Communist Party discussed together a Soviet invasion of northern China, via Eastern Turkestan or the Chinese Northeast, to link up with the secret societies and Sun's regime in the South and overthrow the warlords in Beijing.[75] Nothing came of this fantastic scheme, and in September, as the Parliament in Canton was having troubles with the local authorities, Bai accompanied Li Liejun as Li traveled to Yunnan to secure permission from the local warlord Tang Jiyao to relocate the government and its peripatetic Parliament there. Soon, however, Tang reneged on his agreement and Li Liejun shepherded the MP's first to Chongqing and then to Guizhou.[76]

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[74] Tung, *Political Institutions*, pp. 75-76; *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107-09.

[75] C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot* (New York, 1976), pp. 116, 152-53; James Pinckney Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1972*, (New York, 1972), p. 25.

[76] Huang, *Bianjiang renwu zhi*, p. 57; Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai; Chen Jiying, "Dao yidai juren de jushi," p. 8. Huang's claim that Bai Yunti had been elected as a representative is certainly false; at the time of the election in 1912 he was only nineteen, six years below the age limit (Tung, *Political Institutions*, p. 33). His words at a session of the Constitution-Protecting Parliament, probably that in Chongqing, are recorded in Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," p. 9; they may come from the records of these sessions

While on this mission Bai Yunti was co-opted into the Parliament. Already in 1918, in order to get a quorum, members who had not come south were disqualified, and replaced by hand-picked alternates. The Kharachin Bai Rui, for example, replaced the representative Lin Changmin, a Fuzhou man elected in 1913 as a representative for China's Mongols, and the Chakhar lama Engkhebatu replaced Jin Huan, another southern Chinese who had been a representative for the Mongols since 1913.[77] Now, in face of renewed defections, an imaginative new solution was adopted: young Mongolian supporters impersonated Mongolian MP's who had not come south, an imposture that no one in southern China would be likely to unmask. While Bai went with Li Liejun, Öljii stayed at Sun Yat-sen's side, bringing Mongols south to act their roles on the stage, gathering as many as 70 or 80. Thus, Bai Yunti attended the Parliament pretending to be Tserengdondub, a Khalkha nobleman and senator, while a young Kharachin Mongol Li Zhi'an took the name of Kheshingge (1888-1950), a Khorchin Left Wing schoolmaster, poet, and publisher, who as MP had come south but soon returned north.[78] Bai Yunti later estimated that MP's of Mongolian origin in Canton reached twenty-two (sixteen senators and six representatives).[79]

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preserved by Öljii's daughter (Chen, "Dao yidai juren de jushi," p. 8). The title Constitution-Protecting Parliament (*hufa guohui*) was used for the old Parliament in the south from June, 1918, to October, 1920. Before and after these dates the body lacked a quorum so its meetings were called Extraordinary Sessions.

[77] Tung, *Political Institutions*, p. 74; Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, p. 511. On Bai Rui, Lin Changmin, Engkhebatu, and Jin Huan, see Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, pp. 511, 544b, 560a, 577b, and 565a, and Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," p. 9.

[78] On Kheshingge, see Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao* pp. 511b, 550a; Erdenitogtaqu, *Monggol ündüsüten-ü surgan kümüjil-ün bicig matériyal-un emkidkel*, pp. 3-17; and Ü. Shugar-a and Do. Delgersang, *Erte ba orcin üy-e-yin Monggol jokiyalcid* (Hailar, 1985), pp. 291-312.

[79] Boyanmandu, "Wo canjia Nanjing 'Menggu huiyi' de huiyi," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 16 (1985), 150; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," pp. 8, 9; Chen Jiying, "Dao yidai juren de jushi," p. 8. The names of the impostures are not listed as MP's in Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, p. 511 unless they were elected to the Constitution-Protecting Parliament of 1917. On Tserengdondub, see Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao* pp. 549b-550b, 550a. Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 599 says that Tserengdondub was from Aukhan, which seems to be incorrect (see Liu above); the way Bai wrote this pseudonym in 1924, "Tserengdondub," confirms that a Khalkha original was in view. See Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:8-11 (Tserengdondub to MPRP CC, April 6, 1924). Buyanmandukhu (Boyanmandu) claims that the person posing as the hand-picked alternate, Engkhebatu, was actually a lama from Dolonnuur, which would be a double imposture! As noted above,

In fall, 1920, General Chen Jiongming drove out his rivals from Guangdong and invited Sun Yat-sen and his Parliament back, so in January, 1921, "Tserengdondub," along with the remaining parliamentary luminaries, genuine and imitation, reconvened in Canton. By now, so many MP's had gone back north that the Parliament no longer had a quorum, even including the bogus members; it had to be called an Extraordinary Session.[80] By August, 1922, Chen Jiongming himself turned hostile and the Beijing government invited the body back, so the old Parliament was reconvened in Beijing. A large body of new members were added in again; by now of the 54 MPs elected to represent Mongolia in 1913, only 22 were still the same. In the final scene of this comedy of the Parliament that would not die, we see AltanOchir, Zhang Shutong, and Yue Shan voting for a new constitution and for Cao Kun as president of the Republic in 1923.[81]

In this notoriously corrupt election the old constitutionalist program finally lost all power to convince the public. Bai Rui, Kheshingge (it is unclear whether the real one or the imposter), Zhang Shutong, Yue Shan and a few others of the MP's for Mongolia (mostly those who were non-Mongols) had sailed to Shanghai to boycott the session. Zhang Shutong and Yue Shan soon gave up and rejoined AltanOchir in Beijing to acquiesce in the inevitable and vote for Cao Kun. AltanOchir himself had passed through four parties or cliques at least since 1913 and was never the material of which die-hard opposition was made. This time the wider public saw the flight south as at best a futile gesture, and at worst as only an attempt by the old MP's to save their salaries.[82]

The Mongol delegation to the 1913 Parliament had never been a pure exponent of Mongolian interests—indeed 17 of the MP's for Mongolia were ethnically Chinese. But the participation of a substantial number of Mongols in the Constitution-Protecting Parliament shows that for the

however, the Engkhebatu in Canton was both a scion of a prominent Chakhar oligarch family and also a lama, so Buyanmandukhu's claim seems to be based on a misunderstanding.

[80] Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai; Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 599. Both sources have confused this Extraordinary Session with the first, convened in August, 1917, which likewise lacked a quorum. See Tung, *Political Institutions*, pp. 72-77; Zhang Xuanwen, *Zhonghua Minguo shigang* (Zhengzhou, 1985), pp. 150-51, 182.

[81] Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 600; Liu Chuxiang, *Guihai zhengbian ji* (1924; rpt. Taipei, 1967), pp. 235-36. On the count of MPs, see Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, 510-12.

[82] Liu Chuxiang, *Guihai zhengbian ji*, 94, 99-100; Nathan, *Peking Politics*, 201-20.

younger Mongols, who were alienated by Beijing's backing of the ruling nobility, the idea of constitutionalism had once had a strong appeal. By 1923, however, this appeal was dead. In a pamphlet issued by the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia in the winter of 1925-6, the Inner Mongolian nationalists satirized the Chinese Parliament in terms that betrayed the inside view of its corruption that several of the party's leaders had enjoyed:

> In the beginning when the Chinese Republic began, as the Mongolian race was made a definite part of the quinque-racial republic, in order to set up the Parliament to succeed the provisional senate of the first year of the Republic [1912], it was decided to elect four or so MP's from each league. The real people (*jingkhini arad*) over 20 years of age were allowed to elect and be elected, but even so, those reactionary (*ejerkheg türemkhei*)[83] dukes and princes consulted with the corrupt officials, and put up as their candidates either their own stupid and ignorant dependent sons and nephews, or else those who would be ashamed to stand under their own names. Since they sold the seats to the Chinese by giving them fake Mongol names, when there were elections in the leagues and banners, they needed to give the election to their own retainer, so they would first send the name to the banner office, and then one or two banner scribes would take over the ordinary peoples' electoral rights and regardless of the fatigue would rush day and night to manufacture fake voter's rolls. Now they would write down the name of the person indicated on the ballot to be dropped into the ballot box, and after they had dropped them all in, they would forward the box to the league office, and at the league office also, in the same way, they would put one or two scribes to the headache of working on it. On the set day, when they opened the chest, the league chairman, acting in ignorance of their tricks, would make the various officials involved stand off to the right and left, and open the chest. Reading off the names one by one, he would cry out in a great voice who had received how many ballots.
>
> Those elected in Beijing elected MP's of the first national Parliament in the second year of the republic [1913]. At that time those dukes and princes and corrupt officials flattered Yuan Shikai by saying he should be enthroned as emperor, and begged him for ten or so seats for Mongolian representatives [in Yuan's new Political Conference]. When the announcement was made that they would be elected by the Mongolian and Tibetan Department in Beijing, they kept it completely secret from our true-hearted Mongol brethren (*man-u Monggol-u ching jorigtu akha*

[83] This term (*ejerkheg türmekhei*) is the usual translation for the external enemy, or "imperialists," but here is clearly being used for the internal enemy, or "reactionaries" (normally *ejerkheg khargis*), and I have translated accordingly throughout.

degüü nar), and the corrupt lower officials in that Department made up fake voters rolls and arranged to write up fake names on the ballots to be dropped in the ballot box. They secretly set a day, and then gathered up their servants, their rickshaw pullers, and porters, and gave them each a made-up Mongolian name such as was already written on the roll and had them memorize it. Then they went to the Chinese officials, called out the fake names, and gave each name the written-out ballot, to drop into the ballot box. After voting, they gave the rickshaw pullers and porters a silver dollar each and sent them away. After the first election of the M.P.'s, whenever a by-election happened, it has been executed in the same way up to the present.

Our earnest and sincere Mongol people (*man-u ünen jorigtu Monggol khümüs*) who hope to strive sincerely for the race, not only have no hope to be elected, they don't even have any right to elect others. And if the commoners of the banners even hear of who has become our leagues' MP, they are amazed, not even knowing how he got to be elected. With those reactionary dukes and princes and corrupt officials doing their crimes of trickery, internal struggles over so-called "truly impartial," and "bogus impartial," and "Bai Rui, Bai Tuan" have started many times, with lawsuits and intrigues. So many years have passed without end to the struggles and even today they have clearly not finished.

After the ignorant sons of those dukes and princes and the illiterate retainers of the corrupt officials got the position of MP, they remain totally ignorant of what business is to be considered in Parliament and so if others stand up, then they too imitate them and stand up themselves, if others raise their hand, then they imitate the others and raise their hand. When the Parliament recesses and they come out, if people with a heart for the Mongols ask them "What issue did you consider today?" they will say, "I couldn't tell exactly what issue we were debating about." Ask another and he will give you the same answer.

As soon as they leave the hall, they go straight to the brothels, repeatedly demand that the rickshaw pullers hurry, until they are almost flying through the streets. If they meet each other, they consult together about which prostitute is best or which singing girl is nice—words about how Mongolia can be improved or how policies can be better developed are never heard from them. They sell the position of Mongol MP to the Chinese for $10,000 to $15,000 silver a seat. Not only are the Chinese who buy them all bootlickers of the reactionaries and ones who tried to enthrone Yuan Shikai as emperor, but they are actually people whose business it is to seize the legitimate interests of the Mongols. They were the ones who brought about the elimination of our Inner Mongols' name of "Inner Mongolia" and its division among the Chinese authorities. The evils and sufferings which our Mongol race has repeatedly tasted were all started by the reactionary dukes and princes and corrupt officials selling out the Mongols' legitimate interests. Even if one or two people among the Mongol MP's remember their nationality, have a brief idea of decency, and think that they would like to start to fight to protect the interests of the Mongols, they follow the majority and retreat in embarrassment, because the one or two people's influence is just not enough.[84]

Perhaps the most surprising thing is how hard these "true-hearted Mongol brethren," like Yue Shan and AltanOchir, tried to get into the parliaments, even those of Yuan Shikai, and long and how bitter was their disillusionment.

The Coup in Khüriye and Kuomintang Nationalism

To both the north and south of Beijing, the revival of Soviet Russian power in East Asia, however, suggested a new way out for young Mongols from the bankruptcy of constitutionalism. The victory of the Soviet Red Army, with its Mongolian clients, the Mongolian People's Party, in Outer Mongolia dramatically changed the situation all over the Mongolian plateau. During the struggle for independence, and even after the proclamation of an independent and constitutional government in Neislel Khüriye (Urga) on July 11, 1921, the new regime did not follow the approach adopted by the theocratic regime in 1911 and immediately concentrate on uniting Mongolia. Instead it emphasized the re-building of the former Outer Mongolian autonomous government on a more effective basis, as the immediate task, and Mongolian unity one for the future. The first party program, promulgated in March 1921, stated that, "Thus, the Mongolian People's Party hopes and strives to eventually unite the entire Mongolian nation into one country. Now in the immediate future, it aims to re-establish the autonomous Outer Mongolian regime which having escaped from the reactionary [or 'vicious'] Chinese rule, had recently fallen..." It also envisioned the possibility of Mongolia joining a federal China, in which Mongolia, North China, South China, Tibet, Manchuria, and so on would all be equal components, but only after each region had established a genuinely progressive government.[85] In 1922, the new government sent an open

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[84] Chimitdorzhiev and Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrenniaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaĭskikh ekspluatatorov," pp. 132-33. My translation is from the (unpaginated) Mongolian original appended to this text, not the Russian translation.

[85] Coyibalsang, Losol, and Demid, *Monggol arad-un ündüsün-ü qubisqal-un ang-q-a egüscü bayigulugdagsan tobci teüke* (Ulaanbaatar, 1934), II, p. 29; cf. the

letter asking not for unification, but for the Inner Mongolian princes and officials to intercede on its behalf with Beijing and open a channel for negotiation.

We have few details of the distribution or influence of such letters, or of other news about the new regime in Mongolia. An article in a missionary paper recorded on August 15, 1921, stated that "The fall of Urga is being discussed among the Ordos tribes; the Mongols say that Genghis Khan is resurrected and is on his way to Ordos at the head of a great army."[86] Henry Serruys considered that this "fall of Urga" must mean that in February, when the White Russian leader Baron Ungern-Sternberg conquered the city, but it is possible that the Soviet Russian and People's Party conquest may have also raised discussion. At least a few Mongols responded promptly to the 1922 letters, writing replies and soon traveling to Neislel Khüriye to study the secrets of the new people's government's success. Young Mongols from Hulun Buir in Inner Mongolia's far northeast had been in contact with Buriat Mongolian nationalists in Russia since 1918 and by 1923 the new regime in Neislel Khüriye had rebuilt a network of clandestine supporters there. Those further away from Mongolia, not inclined to credit stories of Chinggis Khan's resurrection and oriented towards modern reforms in China and Japan, remained more cautious. The Comintern representative wrote in 1925 that Murungga remained politically pro-Chinese until 1923, and AltanOchir remained pro-Japanese until around the same period.[87]

In the long run, even those East Mongols who had hitherto channeled all of their political activity into the Chinese republican government were profoundly influenced by the independent new government in Neislel Khüriye. The most obvious influence was to supply living proof that clerical and aristocratic privilege could be overthrown in Mongolia, and a system based on democratic equality be instituted without causing widespread revolt. This demonstration thus

Cyrillic reprint, Kh. Choibalsan, D. Losol, and G. Demid, *Mongol ardyn ündesnii khuwisgalyn ankh üüsej baiguulagdsan towch tüükh* (Ulaanbaatar, 1979), p. 151. Thomas E. Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil?*, pp. 236-43 (cf. pp. 178, 190), discusses the adoption of this program. See also the first article of the party vow reproduced in the original Uygur script in "MAN-yn zokhion baiguulakh khural chukham khediid bolson be?" *Ünen*, no. 150 (June 25, 1990), which shows clearly that the People's Party initially saw itself not as an all-Mongolian party, but only one for Outer Mongolia.

[86] Henry Serruys, "Mongol Letters from Otoγ (Ordos) 1920-1923 Regarding a Number of Murder Cases," *Annali (Instituto Orientale di Napoli)*, 40, no. 3 (1980), 461 n. 47.

[87] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107-08.

negated the claims made by Mongolian aristocrats and clerics since the time of Yuan Shikai, that only preservation of the status quo could assure law and order. Nor was the significance of this demonstration limited to Mongolia. Sun Yat-sen himself would claim in his 1924 lectures on democracy that Mongolia's revolution proved that the time of theocracy was passed, and hence the days of Tibet's theocratic regime in Lhasa were numbered.[88] The same point obviously applied double to Buddhism in Inner Mongolia.

At the same time, the reconstitution of the Russian Empire into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in 1918, and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from December, 1922, to January, 1924, gave the Mongols what the Russians hoped would be an influential example of federal unity under Bolshevik patronage.[89] Thus, Sainbayar pinpointed the year 1922 as the real beginning of the new revolutionary movement in Inner Mongolia.[90] A 1925 letter to the Mongolian party leadership emphasized how the new government in the north had revived Inner Mongols who had almost begun to despair of ever achieving their aims:

> Thus among the Inner Mongols, among those whose hearts ached for the masses and who hoped to bring them all together to move as one, but who, for the insufficiency of their powers and lack of any timely assistance, had finally lain down in despair after running to and fro for almost ten years, some of them got up and rode again and took action, while there were also those who continued just to stand by and watch.[91]

This influence from the north was all the stronger as the revolution in Mongolia, along with the growing Soviet influence on the Nationalist party, also provoked a rethinking of the Chinese party's ethnic policy.

Works on Sino-Soviet relations have generally emphasized the hostility that all Chinese felt towards any Russian interference on China's frontiers. As early as 1913, however, Sun Yat-sen had been willing, if necessary, to sacrifice Chinese interests in the Northeast to further his own aims for control in China south of the wall. He had told

[88] Sun Wen, *Guofu quanshu*, ed. Zhang Qiyun (Taipei, 1960), p. 222; *Meng Zang zhengce*, p. 8. At the same time, however, Sun issued the cautious disclaimer that the sudden institution of a secular government in Tibet would be resisted by the people (*Guofu quanshu*, p. 218; *MengZang zhengce*, p. 8).

[89] See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), especially 242-93.

[90] Strong, *China's Millions*, 320-21.

[91] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 29 (Buyangerel, Altan, and Erkhimbatu to MP-RP CC, May 13, 1925).

the American consul-general that the prospect of losing Manchuria to Japan or Mongolia to Russia would not deter him from fighting against Yuan Shikai; after these powers took their share, what remained was the true China.[92] Similarly resolute opposition to Mongolian secession did not necessarily mean opposition to a Soviet-supported sphere of influence, particularly if the Soviets were willing to support him. Sun Yat-sen, far from the scene of Soviet Russia's conflicts with the Beijing government in Mongolia and Northeast China, found disputes about the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Mongolia not nearly so pressing as his own conflicts with the northern warlords threatening him in central China.[93]

Thus it was not at all certain that Sun Yat-sen would prove ultimately irreconcilable on the Mongolian situation. Indeed, during the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East held in Moscow, in January, 1922, the Nationalist delegate denied that anyone in the KMT wished to reclaim Mongolia.[94] He must have been speaking on his own authority, for as late as June, 1922, Sun Yat-sen, in talks with Soviet representatives, still vehemently rejected the idea of political self-determination for Outer Mongolia, and in the 1923 New Year's Day Manifesto of the Nationalist Party, referred to founding a "great Chinese nation" (*da Zhonghua minzu*), a phrase which had earlier designated the product of the assimilation of all the nationalities of China. At the same time, however, Soviet military incursions into Mongolia or Manchuria were seen as far less objectionable than nationality-based secession.[95]

The Red Army's Siberian advance in 1920 had encouraged Sun Yat-sen's idea of linking up with the Soviet forces in Outer Mongolia, even before the intervention in Mongolia. The coup in Khüriye further encouraged his hope of outflanking the Beijing government. In

[92] Edward Friedman, *Backward toward Revolution: The Chinese Revolutionary Party* (Berkeley, 1974), 54-55; C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 81-2. After the Japanese conquest of the Northeast, and the creation of a independent Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek similarly claimed that the area was not the heartland of the Chinese revolution, and hence its loss was not an essential one for the Nationalist revolution. See Ma Zhonglian, *"Jiu-yiba" dao "Qi-qi"* (Beijing, 1985), p. 168. The Communists, however, from the beginning excluded the Manchus or Manchuria from any claim of self-determination or autonomy; see Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *The Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952; rpt. New York, 1966), pp. 64 and 223 (cf. 221).

[93] Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, pp. 63-66; Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (1953; rpt. Stanford, 1968), pp. 80-81, 203, 214.

[94] Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, pp. 80-81.

[95] Sow-Theng Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926*, (Honolulu, 1976), pp. 231-33; *MengZang zhengce*, p. 3.

December, 1922, Sun Yat-sen sent a letter to Adolf Joffe in Beijing, not only criticizing the Russians for seeking recognition from Beijing and not from Sun Yat-sen himself, but also proposing a plan in which the KMT could lead its army through Sichuan to Outer Mongolia, where it could easily be armed and trained by the Red Army. In reply, Joffe defended the Soviet negotiations with the Beijing warlords on the grounds of expediency and flatly rejected the plan to move the KMT's base to Outer Mongolia.[96] Apart from its military absurdity, Sun's plan obviously involved a cavalier disregard for the new Soviet-supported regime in Mongolia. If the Soviet side was adamant on keeping its client regime in Outer Mongolia, however, Sun would not let that stand in the way of receiving support from Russia. In the Sun-Joffe declaration of January 26, 1923, Sun Yat-sen told his compatriots that Soviet occupation of Mongolia was not imperialism and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops was not in China's interests.[97] As a result, when he returned in triumph to Canton in February of the same year, he was committed to both an alliance with Soviet Russia and a benign view of the new regime in Mongolia.

[96] Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 152, 132, 334 n. 35.

[97] Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, pp. 63-64; C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 60-62; Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*, pp. 233-4; Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, p. 203; Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *Documentary History*, pp. 70-71.

CHAPTER TWO

DAURS AND PAN-MONGOLISM, 1911-1923

Sometime in the first half of 1923, as Sun Yat-sen began to deepen his interest in using the Soviet position in Mongolia, Bai Yunti, with Altan-Ochir and Murungga, began to associate with Mersé, a Daur Mongol from the far northeast of Inner Mongolia, to form the core of what would be the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. Mersé was the most prominent of a cohort of pan-Mongolists from the ethnically diverse pastoral region of Hulun Buir (also known as Bargu, from the largest of the ethnic groups there).[1] Although they shared the same anti-aristocratic and anti-clerical ethos, the Hulun Buir nationalists, unlike the Mongols from southeast Inner Mongolia, did not have a history of searching in the institutions of republican China for allies in reforming Inner Mongolia. Bordering on both Khalkha Mongolia to the west and Russian Buriatia in the northwest, and itself firmly in the Russian sphere of influence, Hulun Buir always looked outside Beijing's warlord republic for inspiration.

This fertile steppe region was settled by more than 25,000 Mongolic and Manchu-Tungus speaking peoples all serving in the Eight Banner system.[2] Bargu and Ööled Mongols, Solon Ewenkis, and Daurs lived

[1] The name Hulun Buir dates from the Qing and derives from the names of the two large lakes in the area, Hulun Nuur (now named Dalai Nuur) and Buir Nuur. In Mongolian the correct writing of the first is Khölön, but I have used the Manchu form of Hulun both in recognition of the strong role of Manchu in the area, and because of its greater familiarity in English. This is true also of the main city Hailar, which would be Khailar in a more consistent Mongolian transcription. Bargu is often spelled *Barga* from the Russian and modern Cyrillic-script Mongolian forms; I have here kept to a consistent spelling based on the vertical-script Mongolian. The Russian *Bargut* comes from the plural *Bargu-ud* (Cyrillic *Barguud*) "Bargus."

[2] Local figures in 1922 put the banner population at 27,662 (Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue* [Shanghai, 1923], pp. 198-99), a figure which by 1933 had not increased. Figure for that year placed Hulun Buir's entire native population (including Bargu Mongols, Solon Ewenkis and Daurs) at 27,100. See Xing'an zongshu diaocha ke, "Xinxing de Xing'an sheng de gaiguan," trans. Xu Tonggong, in *Nei Menggu shizhi ziliao xuanbian* (no publication data), V, 14, table 2. The number of able-bodied militiamen recruited in the banners was little more than 2,800; see Altan'orgil, ed., *Monggol teüke-yin surbulji bicig yisün jüil* (Höhhot, 1983), pp. 63-66, 74-76; Guo Daofu, *Hulun Beir wenti* (Shanghai, 1931), p. 12. Much larger estimates, however, were not uncommon; local Russians estimated the

together and intermarried while maintaining their separate identities. All the people belonging to the banners of Hulun Buir, whether Ewenkis, speaking distinct Manchu-Tungusic languages, Daurs speaking a distinct language of the Mongolic family, or the Bargus and Buriats, speaking less distinct dialects of Mongolian, were considered Manchus during the Qing dynasty. During the late Qing, as the Manchus became more sinicized and as Chinese immigration increased, the native peoples in the area all tended to assume a Mongolian identity, one that was formalized under the Japanese occupation (1932-1945).[3] Before that time, neither the Qing nor the Republic considered Hulun Buir as part of Inner Mongolia; rather it was a special region within Heilongjiang. Thus when the Republican provisional constitution made provision for Mongolian representatives in Parliament and a Mongolian and Tibetan Department to represent and supervise the Mongolian race, Hulun Buir's banners were not included.

Like the Chakhar Mongols, the Hulun Buir peoples were all part of the inner Eight Banner garrison banner system, so that Manchu and Mongolian were both official language; Manchu was dominant and literacy in both languages was universal among the educated.[4] The officials were not, in theory at least, hereditary and no one in the area traced his descent to Chinggis Khan. Although a certain number of bannermen received hereditary privileges for their descendants, such privileges did not grant automatic succession even to them, and in any

Hulun Buir population at 40,000 (U.S. State Dept. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, reel 67, 893.00/10221—Consul G.C.Hanson to chargé d'affaires M.F. Perkins, Aug. 31, 1928) and Mersé, in 1923, estimated the population of Hulun Buir and the Butkha region as 160,000—see Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti* (1923), p. 16.

[3] In the 1950s the P.R.C. government finally defined the Solon (or Ewenkis), the Orochen, and the Daurs as separate nationalities, while the Bargus and Buryats were kept as Mongols. On the reasoning behind the decision on the Daurs, see Fei Hsiao Tung, *Toward a People's Anthropology* (Beijing, 1981), pp. 69-71.

[4] Altan'orgil, *Monggol teüke-yin surbulji bicig yisün jüil*, pp. 63-64, 74; Paul Hyer and Sechin Jagchid, *A Mongolian Living Buddha: Biography of the Kanjurwa Khutughtu* (Albany, 1983), pp. 126-27. Hulun Buir's Buriat refugees, when organized into a banner in 1922, had to receive a special dispensation to conduct their administration in Mongolian, not Manchu; see Bodonggud Abida, *Buriyad Monggol-un tobci teüke* (Hailar, 1982), p. 67. Of the 27 historical figures from Hulun Buir in the period 1911-1949 listed in J. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), who were educated in the region and whose language competencies are known, all mastered both Manchu and Mongolian (pp. 23-111). I would like to thank Tabuchi Yoko for making available to me a copy of this important local-historical compilation.

case operated only at the sumu or company level and below.[5] The largest ethnic groups, the New Bargus, the Solons, and the Old Bargu were each divided into banners following the Eight Banner pattern (plain yellow, bordered yellow, and so on). In religion, the New Bargus to the west, on the border with Khalkha, adhered to the "Yellow Faith" (*shara shashin*, or dGe-lugs-pa Buddhism), but the Ewenkis, Daurs, and Old Bargus to the east were only marginally influenced by Buddhism, if at all.[6] Thus the two pillars of Mongolian feudal society, the Borjigid nobility and the dGe-lugs-pa church, were either absent or weak in Hulun Buir.

Another result of the differing banner structure was a much greater unity within the region as a whole. In theory, the banners of Hulun Buir, lacking the privilege of autonomy held by the princely banners of Inner Mongolia, should have been more tightly controlled by the governor in Qiqihar. In practice, however, the Hulun Buir region's geographic and administrative unity gave its own political weight. In the six Inner Mongolian leagues, each banner acted as a separate little kingdom, thus diminishing their collective influence. Hulun Buir's ten banners were controlled in policy, finance, and personnel by the yamen of the fudutong, or "Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor" (Mongolian *mei-ren-ü janggi*), situated in the city of Hailar (see figure 2.1 and table 2.1). Throughout the Republic, the fudutong's yamen gave the region, despite its ethnic diversity, a political unity unique in Inner Mongolia. Hulun Buir's isolation from Heilongjiang by the sparsely inhabited forests of the Khinggan range added to its geographical coherence.

The political unity of the fudutong yamen was solidified by a unified ruling class. High positions in the banner and fudutong's office were dominated by three Daur clans (*khala*), the Gobol, the Aula, and the Merden. The Gobol and the Aula migrated from the forested Nen (Naun Muren) River basin, east of the Khinggan Range, west to the Hulun Buir steppe by imperial command in 1732, along with the Solon Ewenkis with whom they had been living for centuries in a stable ethnic symbiosis.

The Daurs found it hard to adjust to the cold steppe environment, however, and in 1742 most were allowed to return east to the Nen River basin. Only Kuisu from the Manna lineage (*mokon*) of the Gobol clan and Fan Qiabu from the Denteke lineage of the Aula clan stayed behind.

[5] The extension under the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu's rule (1912-1915) of Khalkha's hereditary official privileges to the New Bargu officials caused dissatisfaction. See Urgunge Onon, ed. and trans., *Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1976), pp. 93-95.

[6] On Daur religion and interaction with Buddhism, see Caroline Humphrey with Urgunge Onon, *Shamans and Elders: Experience, Knowledge, and Power among the Daur Mongols* (Oxford, 1996), especially pp. 47-49, 126, 209-11.

and were enrolled as the No. 1 sumus of the Solon Left Wing Bordered Yellow and Plain White Banners, respectively. Distributed in the villages of Mekhertü Ail ("village with the *mekher* roots," modern Bayanchagan Sumu in the Ewenki Autonomous Banner)[7] to the southwest of Hailar and Nantun or Ömnö Ail ("south village"), directly south of the city, these two were the most numerous clans of Daurs in the early twentieth century.

Subsequently, a Naun Muren Daur, Ishingga (Zhu Shan), of the "Arkechang" lineage of the Merden clan, after serving as a banner commandant-general in Hulun Buir, was assigned to stay in the area and allowed to invite his brother, Minshingga, from the Nenjiang valley. They were enrolled in Solon Right Wing's Plain Yellow Banner's No. 1 Sumu, settled in Nantun. The descendants of these three founders formed the local lineages—the Aula's Denteke lineage, the Gobol's Manna lineage, and the Merden's Arkechang lineage—that had the most people and the highest prestige. Subsequently three households of the Aula clan's Kwilchaina lineage and four of the Onon clan's Boskochaina lineage moved west into Hulun Buir and were enrolled in Plain Yellow Banner's No. 2 Sumu, but they never matched the numbers or prestige of their predecessors.[8] The three large exogamous Daur clans, living in the two nearby villages of Mekhertü Ail and Nantun, frequently intermarried to produce a tight-knit cousinage that dominated both the fudutong yamen's personnel and the ranks of the "Young Mongols."

If agricultural colonization determined the pace of economic integration of the Mongol banners with the wider world elsewhere in Inner Mongolia, then the Chinese Eastern Railway dominated this process in Hulun Buir. Built by the Russians in 1900 with French capital, the Chinese Eastern Railway came under the White Russian administration in 1917, then under an Allied administration as part of the Siberian intervention, and finally under the control of China's Fengtian faction.

[7] *Mekher* (Cyrillic *mekheer*) was an edible root often collected by the Mongols and eaten alone or as an ingredient in meat soups. See Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan of the Bārin in the *Yüan shih*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 19 (1956), 261-62 n. 689.

[8] "Dawor zu jianshi" bianxiezu, comp., *Dawor zu jianshi* (Höhhot, 1986), pp. 51-52; Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, pp. 183-84; Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria: An Ethnic History* (Helsinki, 1996), pp. 83-84, 106-08; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 93. On the Daurs in the Nenjiang area (in West Butkha/Morin-Dawaa, and Qiqihar) see Vreeland, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure*, pp. 194-276, Aberle, *Chahar and Dagor Mongol Bureaucratic Administration*, pp. 73-103, and Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*.

Figure 2.1: Territorial Organization of Hulun Buir, 1920-1931

At Hailar: Fudutong Yamen (Chinese)
Meiren Janggi-yin Yamun (Mongolian; *also Amban Yamun*, *Said-un Yamun*)

Fudutong (Chinese)
Meiren-ü Janggi (Mongolian, also called *Amban*)

Orolan Shigidkhegchi

Right Section Chief or Secretary
You Tingzhang or *Zhengtang*
Baragun Tingkhim-un Daruga

Left Section Chief or Sectretary
Zuo Tingzhang or *Zhengtang*
Jegün tingkhim-un daruga

Assistant Secretary or *Futang*

Assistant Secretary or *Futang*

staff: 4 right and 4 left scribes, 4 Mongolian translators, 4 Manchu translators, 6 right and 6 left *dagau* scribes, one scribal trainer

Jebele Gala Solon Right (at Nantun)	*Daskhûwan Gala* Solon Left, Old Bargu (at Xitun)	*Jebele Gala* New Bargu Right (at Altan'emeel)	*Daskhûwan Gala* New Bargu Left (at Amugulang)
ukheri da (*bügüde-yin daruga*) and 10 scribes	*ukheri da* (*bügüde-yin daruga*) and 10 scribes	*ukheri da* (*bügüde-yin daruga*) and 10 scribes	*ukheri da* (*bügüde-yin daruga*) and 10 scribes
Banners:	Banners:	Banners:	Banners:
galai da 1. Plain Yellow 2. Plain Red	*galai da* (Solon Left) 1. Bordered Yellow 2. Plain White	*galai da* 1. Plain Yellow 2. Plain Red	*galai da* 1. Bordered Yellow 2. Plain White
galai da 3. Bordered Red 4. Bordered Blue	*galai da* (Old Bargu) 1. Bordered White 2. Plain Blue	*galai da* 3. Bordered Red 4. Bordered Blue	*galai da* 3. Bordered White 4. Plain Blue

Hulun Buir also included an independent Bordered Yellow Banner (renamed Ööled Banner in 1928) with an *ukheri da*, a staff of ten and two sumus, and the Buriat Banner with a *bügüde-yin daruga* and a *ded bügüde-yin daruga*.
Note: Each *galai da* (*ded bügüde-yin daruga*) commanded two banners, and each numbered banner had 3 sumus or companies.

Sources: Altan'orgil, *Monggol teüke-yin surbulji bicig yisün jüil*, pp. 63-65, 74-76; Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 198-99; Galjud Tübsinnim-a, *Bargucud-un teüken irelte*, pp. 87-88, 94-96; *Ewenkezu zizhiqi gaikuang*, pp. 26-27, 36; Bodonggud Abida, *Buriyad Monggol-un tobci teüke*, p. 66.

Table 2.1: Official Ranks in Hulun Buir's Solon and New Bargu Banners, on the Eve of the New Policies

Number in Hulun Buir	Salary	Manchu title	Mongolian title	Chinese title	English translation
1	155 taels (700 taels bonus)	meiren-i janggi	meiren-ü janggi	fudutong	Military Deputy Lieutenant Governor
4	65 taels	ukheri da	bügüde-yin daruga	zongguan	commandant-general
8	52 taels	galai da	ded bügüde-yin daruga	fu zongguan	lieutenant-commandant
48	52 taels & 30 taels	niru janggin & khafan	sumun-u janggi & orulan khögegchi	zuoling & xiao qi xiao	captain & lieutenant
192	24 taels	boshokû	khögegchi	lingcui	corporal
32	24 taels		gabshigai		vanguards
1,480 (Solon) 864 (New Bargu)	12 taels	ukesen	khuyag	majia	private first class
not fixed	no salary		sula	xiansan	bannerman-at-large

Hulun Buir also contained one Ööled banner with 1 commandant-general, 2 captains and lieutenants, 4 corporals, 26 vanguard soldiers, and 136 privates, and two Orochen sumus with two captains and lieutenants, 2 corporals, and 117 privates. In 1922, a Buriat banner was created from Buriat refugees with their own commandant-general and lieutenant commandant. Officers and militiamen in the Ööled banners received double pay over those in the Solon and Bargu banners.

Source: Altan'orgil, *Monggol teüke-yin surbulji bicig yisün jüil*, pp. 63-65, 74-76.

In 1924 with the recognition of the Soviet Union by China, the railway was put under what was supposed to be joint Sino-Soviet administration but was in reality Soviet control. Thus Hulun Buir developments had an international dimension unique in Inner Mongolia—it was the only area of Inner Mongolia, for example, to have foreign consulates (Japanese and Russian consulates in Manchuria Station and Hailar).[9]

Since the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the attendant development of the garrisons of Manchuria Station (modern Manzhouli) and Hailar into market towns, Chinese and Russian workers migrated into the area. In 1908, as part of the New Policies' reorganization of its Manchurian banner domains into regular civilian provinces, the imperial court abolished Hailar's fudutong's office and transferred his duties to the new civilian (and Han Chinese) daoyin or circuit intendant in Hailar.[10] From 1908 to 1912, the Qing encouraged colonization and created four counties in the area. By 1922, however, the area's total Chinese population was still only 15,000, concentrated along the railway and in a few mining and forestry concessions in the north.[11] Hulun Buir was cold, with a short growing season, and very remote, and only small numbers of farmers, Russian and Chinese, attempted to plow up its virgin steppe. Thus the railroads drew the Mongols into the world economy, not as another impoverished grain-exporting district, but as a specialist animal-products producing area (see tables 2.2 and 2.3). Socially and politically, the railroad towns and the Mongol steppe remained different worlds.

As elsewhere in Inner Mongolia, the New Policies brought violent resistance. In Hulun Buir this resistance was delayed, but more effective.In January, 1912, after the revolutions against the Qing in both Wuchang and Da Khüriye (Russian "Urga"),[12] the banner officials in the

[9] On the controversies and negotiations associated with the Chinese Eastern Rail-way see Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception*, pp. 115-42, Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*, pp. 3-59, 93-115, 281-85, and George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises, 1924-1935* (Tallahassee, 1974).

[10] Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *Present-Day Political Organization of China*, pp. 384-86; Robert H.G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 138-81.

[11] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 197.

[12] The Mongolian capital's origin from the monastery of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, is reflected in its names. Known before 1911 as Da Khüriye or Yekhe Khüriye "Great Monastery," after the 1911 revolution it was renamed Neislel Khüriye "Capital Monastery." In 1924, it was renamed Ulaanbaatar "Red Hero." The Russian name "Urga" comes from the Mongolian word *örgöö* "Palace Tent," which was used for the great lama's (still nomadic) camp for a brief period in the eighteenth

steppe, led by an Ööled Mongol official Shengfu, revolted against the New Policies, seized the sub-prefectural headquarters in Hailar, and brought the whole area over to the independent government of theocratic Mongolia. For more than three years it was an integral part of the new Mongolian state but Russia preferred eventual annexation of the area itself to incorporation in Mongolia, and in 1915 the region was separated from Outer Mongolia and granted an autonomous status guaranteed by a Russo-Chinese treaty of 1915.[13] When the government was abolished by the Chinese in 1920, nationalists in Hulun Buir, as in Khalkha, had a concrete demand, "revive the defunct autonomous government," and a readily understandable grievance against the Chinese government. Moreover the almost four years of union with Khalkha had created a core of Hulun Buir officials who had lived in Mongolia's capital Neislel Khüriye, and were thoroughly familiar with the political environment of Khalkha Mongolia. Many had received titles of nobility from the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, and even after 1920, they constituted a strong core of support for secession both in the countryside banners and in the fudutong's office in Hailar.[14]

Educated Youth in Hulun Buir

In Hulun Buir, unlike in Outer Mongolia, however, the secession and autonomy of Hulun Buir did not totally reorient educational opportunities away from China and towards Russia. As members of inner garrison banners, the Hulun Buir Mongols had never been subject to the Qing ban on inviting teachers from China, or publicly using the Chinese language. As early as 1877, the Daur notables in Nantun, the center for the Solon Right Wing banners, invited a Chinese-language teacher from Qiqihar city to teach in a new privately-funded school with instruction

century.

[13] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 327-39; David J. Dallin, *The Rise of Russia in Asia* (New Haven, 1949), pp. 143-45; Onon and Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution*, pp. 23-30, 114-16. The text of the 1915 Russo-Chinese treaty on Hulun Buir is in Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 328-29 and Cheng Daode, *Zhonghua Minguo waijiao shi ziliao xuanbian*, I, pp. 128-29.

[14] The most famous of these officials in the service of the Jébdzundamba was Damdinsürüng (1871-1920); see Onon, *Mongolian Heroes*, pp. 77-104. The leaders of the revolt were the Daur Shengfu and Chehezha; see *Daworzu jianshi*, pp. 90-91. Others who served under Neislel Khüriye include Duke Tsengde, "Fat" Ölzei, Gaikhasu, Pungtsugrabdan, Duke Sergüleng, Pungtsug, Dashingja, Duke Mengde, and Lingsheng (Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 23-53, 63-67, 88-89, and 93-101).

*Table 2.2. Animal Products Brought by Mongols into Hailar, 1922**

Raw Material	Total Quantity Sold		Unit Price (in yuan)†	Total Sales (in yuan)‡
Horses (live)	(head)	4,000	30	120,000
Horned Cattle (live)	"	2,000	30	60,000
Sheep (live)	"	80,000	3	240,000
Fox skins	(pieces)	1,000	14	140,000
Wolf skins	"	1,000	16	160,000
Squirrel skins	"	20,000	1.5	30,000
Horse hides	"	2,000	2	4,000
Cattle hides	"	3,000	2	6,000
Sheep skins	"	80,000	0.4	32,000
Sheep's wool	(poods)§	60,000	4	240,000

Source: Zhang Jiafan, ed., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 235-36.

*Exports by Han merchants into the Mongol banners were primarily *mi* grain (rice and/or millet), flour, tea, liquor, and tobacco, and secondarily cloth and silk.

†Goods usually sold by barter, here valued in silver dollars.

‡Values in actual silver dollars (*xian da yang*).

§ One pood equals 36.11 pounds.

Table 2.3. Livestock, Skins, and Wool Shipped by Train at Hailar and Manchuria Station, 1922

Station	Item	Amount	
Hailar	Horses and Foals	(head)	5,884
	Adult horned cattle	"	6,136
	Sheep and goats	"	31,551
	Sheep's wool	(poods)*	84,530
	Untanned skins and hides (various)	"	11,700
	Untanned sheep skin	"	12,992
Manchuria Station	Horses and Foals	(head)	1,197
	Adult horned cattle	"	3,136
	Sheep and goats	"	1,260
	Sheep's wool	(poods)*	65,449
	Untanned skins and hides (various)	"	28,990
	Untanned sheep skin	"	10,282

*One pood equals 36.11 pounds

Source: Zhang Jiafan, ed., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 236-37.

in Chinese and Manchu. With the New Policies, new-style education was expanded and several new primary schools were organized with arrangements for successful students to enter Heilongjiang's No. 1 Provincial High School in the province capital of Qiqihar.

With the insurrection of 1912, the Daur authorities abolished these new schools and returned to the system of schooling centered on preparing clerks for the yamen. Apparently deprived of funding, those students from Hulun Buir enrolled in Qiqihar mostly withdrew.[15] Yet some of Hulun Buir's students continued to study in Chinese cities, and Chinese language continued to play a role in the curriculum. Of these Chinese-educated students, Fumingtai (1898-1938, Chinese name Ao Mintai, Mongolian alias Buyangerel) and Mersé (1894-1934?, Chinese name Guo Moxi, styled Daofu, childhood name Guo Junhuang), both scions of wealthy ruling-class Daur families, became two of the most important nationalist leaders in Inner Mongolia.

Fumingtai and his brother Hualintai (c. 1900-1936) were scions of the Denteke lineage of the Aula clan (see figure 2.2), and his kinsmen had been intimately involved in the earlier secession movement.[16] His great-uncle, Debu (family name Babüdai), was a prosperous herdsman in the Mekhertü Ail area, who had his children tutored at home in Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese. Debu's nephew, Tsengji (Chinese name, Chengzhi), also had his sons, Hualintai and Fumingtai, tutored in these three languages. Hualintai learned both English and Japanese and entered Waseda University in Tokyo in 1923; he apparently did not graduate. Fumingtai studied first at the No. 1 Provincial High School in Qiqihar and then perhaps in Beijing. The United States consul in Harbin, George C. Hanson, who had met Fumingtai several times and dined with him in Hailar, believed that Fumingtai had studied in Japan and knew Chinese, Mongolian, English, Japanese, and Russian, but since Japanese sources

[15] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 227.

[16] On the brothers, see A. Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," *Dawor zu yanjiu*, 1 (1987), 163; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 83, 74, 77; U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 67, 893.00/10205 (U.S. Consul G.C. Hanson to Minister J.V.A. MacMurray, Aug. 17, 1928). Hao Weimin, "Diyi'er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 600, gives Fumingtai's year of birth as 1896, but Ölzii's date, derived from archival sources in Moscow pertaining to Fumingtai's arrest and execution, is likely to be correct. Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai and other sources claim, based on interviews with Bai Yunti, that he became acquainted with Fumingtai and Mersé as classmates at the Mongolan and Tibetan school. Presumably both Daurs studied in Beijing at the time, but we know that Mersé was actually at the Russian Language school (see below), so it seems uncertain which school Fumingtai actually attended.

know nothing of his stay in their country, it seems Mr. Hanson confused him with Hualintai.

Debu's own son, Tsengde (1875-1935, a.k.a Longben, Luo Jindan), Fumingtai's paternal uncle once removed, also played an important role as a sponsor of the Young Mongols.[17] Before the New Policies, he had risen through the ranks, as a scribe and concurrent sumu captain in his Plain White Banner. He was married to Huangshaul, of the Gobol clan, sister of another wealthy Daur official, Minggu, and so the paternal aunt of Minggu's son, Mersé. In 1911-1912, he became one of the chief conspirators in Shengfu's rebellion against the tottering Qing dynasty, and in 1913 he moved to Neislel Khüriye as a scribe and took a Khalkha second wife, Dondog. Tsengde served in the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu's campaigns in Inner Mongolia, received the title of Thoughtful Hero Duke (*Bodolgatu Bagatur Güng*), and in 1915 helped represent the Mongolian side at the Sino-Russo-Mongolian negotiations at Kiakhta. He was subsequently promoted to deputy foreign minister of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, and representative of Hulun Buir to the Outer Mongolian government. From 1917 on, however, his main interest lay in translating into modern Mongolian Ye Dehui's newly published Chinese version of the *Secret History of the Mongols*.[18]

He seemed to have settled permanently in Neislel Khüriye, but in 1917 came news of disaster in Hailar. Since the Russo-Japanese war, a Monggoljin (that is, Josotu League's Tümed Left Banner) bandit, Babujab, had been living off the land in eastern Inner Mongolia. After the 1912 abdication, the Qing loyalists in Northeast China hired him to try to restore the dynasty. He was killed in battle in 1916 but his second-in-command, Sébjingge, continued moving north, and occupied Hailar in 1917, terrorizing the populace. Duke Tsengde returned immediately

[17] Biographical data on Duke Tsengde in: A. Enkebatu, "Zhenguo Gong Chengde luezhuan," *Dawor zu yanjiu*, 1 (1987), 153-154; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 43, 83, 74, 93; Ts. Khandsüren, "Etseg Tsendiin tukhai minii ekh Renchingiin Dondog (1899 ond törsön) dursan yarisan ni," in *Mongoru kenkyû*, 12 (1989), 194-196; interview with Ardajab, August 16, 1997; interview with Ts. Khandsüren, April 7, 1992.

[18] On Duke Tsengde's scholarly activities, see B. Tsend,"Mongolyn nuuts towchoo," ed. Ts. Khandsüren, *Mongoru kenkyû*, 12 (1989), 151-193, Ardajab, "Cengde Güng-ün 'Yuwan ulus-un niguca teüke' gedeg bicimel noorag-i ungsigsan dürügdel," *Öbör Monggol-un neyigem-ün sinjilekü uqagan*, no. 44 (1990:1), pp. 43-50. Ts. Khandsüren's articles on Tsengde Güng were reprinted with a somewhat fuzzy reproduction of the text of his transcription of the *Secret History of the Mongols* in Tsendiin Khandsüren, *Tsend Gün ba Mongolyn Nuuts Towchoo* (Ulaanbaatar, 1997).

Figure 2.2: Genealogy of Part of the Denteke Lineage, Aula clan, of Mekhertü Ail (Solon Left Wing, Plain White Banner, No. 1 Sumu)



Note: Square brackets denote clan name or origin of in-marrying wives. Sources: Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 43, 83, 74-75, 93; interview with Ardajab, August 16, 1997; letter from Ardajab, dated August 2, 1999; interview with Ts. Khandsüren, April 7, 1992; Ts. Khandsüren, "Etseg Tsendiin tukhai minii ekh Renchingiin Dondog (1899 ond törsön) dursan yarisan ni," in *Mongoru kenkyû* 12 (1989), 194-96.

upon hearing the news but was captured himself, and had to be ransomed by his family with livestock and $15 silver. His two-month captivity in which his tormentors hung him up by his thumbs gave him pains that stopped his writing and took years to cure. Shengfu, as head of the autonomous government, sought aid from the Heilongjiang provincial government, from Beijing, from the Russian railway troops, and from the Russian authorities in Chita. Duke Tsengde was sent back to Neislel Khüriye to seek aid from Outer Mongolia. All these missions proved fruitless and Hulun Buir's banner militiamen had to do the job themselves, driving the bandits out on October 1.[19] After this victory, Duke Tsengde stayed on to help in the reconstruction of Hulun Buir, commuting between Neislel Khüriye and Hailar until 1925, when he returned permanently to the Hailar region.

After 1920, Hulun Buir's Russian-guaranteed autonomy was abolished, but the Heilongjiang provincial government wisely allowed the fudutong's yamen to continue administering the banner population. Duke Tsengde served under the new fudutong, Guifu (fl. 1912-1932, of the Merden clan and son-in-law of his predecessor Shengfu), as the Left, or junior, Section Head (*tingzhang*) a post primarily responsible for economic affairs. Both Guifu and the Right, or senior, Section Chief, Bagabadi, were weak personalities, weaknesses that increased as they aged. Hence Tsengde, whose pro-Russian sympathies continued through the October Revolution, emerged as the most active official in Hulun Buir and the primary advocate for a pro-Russian, pro-Khalkha line.[20] As such he was well-known not only in Hulun Buir but also to the foreign diplomatic community along the Chinese Eastern Railway; he had lunched with Consul Hanson at the United States consulate in Harbin, for example.[21] The duke's behind the scenes funding and encouragement of the next generation's revolutionary activities was of essential importance to the Young Mongol movement.

[19] On Sébjingge's occupation of Hailar, see A. Engkebatu, "Sébjingge-yin bülüg Qayilar-tu türimekeyilen orogsan-u egüsül ba tegüsül," *Kölön Buyir-un soyol teüke-yin matériyal*, 2 (1985), 139-59.

[20] Nozu Akira "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 159. Although Nozu's Chinese translator rendered the Japanese as "Pakepaqi," the correct Chinese version is "Bagabadi" (see "Dawor zu jianshi" bianxiezu, *Dawor zu jianshi*, p. 92), which is presumably a rendering of the Sanskrit "Bhagavatī" (György Kara, personal communication.) Note also that while in Chinese governance, the left members of paired offices held authority over the right members, in Mongolia the opposite was true.

[21] U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 67, 893.00/10205 (U.S. Consul G.C. Hanson to Minister J.V.A. MacMurray, Aug. 17, 1928).

During these years, Duke Tsengde lived in a large brick compound called the "red house" (*ulagan ger*; see figure 2.3).[22] On the south side of Hailar, it was the last building that a traveler from Nantun, the seat of the Solon Right Wing Banners and a major Daur settlement, met before coming to the gates of Hailar. Guests from Nantun often stayed with the Duke in a kang (heated sleeping platform) in the kitchen building. By the 1930s, as his grandson Ardajab remembered it, the Duke lived in the main building (*zhu fang/gool ger*). He slept with his Khalkha wife Dondog, while his Daur wife Huangshaul and her three married sons, Jingxingtai (1902-1985, home name Jicha), Eldengtai (1908-1981), and Ergintai (b. 1911) had separate rooms in the main building. Dondog's children were still young, and her second son Bodisüren liked to ride around the compound on a bicycle. While the plan of the building was Chinese, the style and much of the furnishings were Russian. The large stoves in the main room resembled those in the Hermitage in Leningrad, and the courtyard gate and the iron roof of the main house were all made in Russian style. In addition to the written Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese he had been taught in his father's house, Duke Tsengde could speak Russian (as well as Solon Ewenki and Orochen, and his native Daur) but never learned to read it. Huangshaul's second son, Eldengtai and her only daughter Songxian (b. 1904, Mongolian name Subud) would learn Russian in a school set up by Mersé and go to the Soviet Union for higher education.

Mersé's father Minggu (d. 1947, a.k.a. Ronglu), like his brother-in-law Tsengde, also served as a behind-the-scenes promoter of childrens', nieces', and nephews' educational and revolutionary schemes (see figure 2.4). Minggu's father had served as secretary to the Left Section of the Fudutong's yamen, and Minggu himself rose in the banner ranks first as sumu captain and then became the *galai da* or lieutenant-commandant for his Plain White Banner. His real talent, however, was for making money. He had risen from poverty to become a major herder in the new commercialized animal-products market developing along the Chinese Eastern Railway. Famous as a *caizhu* or "moneybags," his household was very rich, both in livestock and cash, and he was an investor in the Jinxing Hao Firm, which was headquartered in Hailar's Chinese town, Donggai, and one of the eight big Chinese firms involved in the

[22] Interview with Ardajab, August 16, 1997; Ardajab, letter, dated August 2, 1999. At present the left building, and the left side of the main house have been torn down to make way for the new Hailar highway, but the remaining parts of the compound are still standing and may be protected as a historical site (Ardajab, letter, Nov. 30, 1998).

flourishing trade of Chinese consumer goods for Hulun Buir's animal products. A non-smoker and teetotaler, Minggu avoided taking meals in the yamen, and in spring and fall wore a shabby sleeveless jacket, instead of the woolen or satin jackets worn by other officials. He adopted the same thrifty attitude toward the natural resources of the area, and stationed a detachment of the Hulun Buir banner cavalry at Mekhertü Ail to prevent people from going into the mountains to cut wood, stake out hay fields, rent pastures, or erect houses without permission.[23]

His eldest son Mersé[24] learned Mongolian and Manchu at the Eight Banners School in Hailar, and some basic Chinese from the Hailar daoyin, Zhai Wen. In 1910, Minggu sent him to No. 1 High School in Qiqihar, the same school at which Fumingtai later studied. Despite ridicule at first for his broken Chinese, Mersé learned quickly and graduated in 1914, first in his class. The next year he entered the Russian Language Institute (*Ewen Zhuanxiuguan*) attached to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing. Here he first came in contact with other future members of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, notably Bai Yunti and AltanOchir. Despite many later political conflicts, Bai Yunti kept recollections of a close friendship with Mersé and Fumingtai that dated to their days as students in Beijing. At the moment, however, Mersé had other changes on his mind. He was studying the Bible with Xu Baoqian, Executive Secretary of the Beijing YMCA, and early in 1917, Mersé was baptized into the Christian faith at the Chinese Christian Church (*Zhonghua jidu jiaohui*) in Beijing.[25]

Secondary accounts stress both Mersé's rebellious youth and his family's close connection to the shamanism of his Daur family. When he was only 14, Mersé startled his father with ten rules for the elimination of unnecessary expenses in the household, including those of superstitious rituals. On his return home after graduating No. 1 High School in Qiqihar, he sported a trimmed haircut and no queue, that symbol of all the old Qing rituals, and gave his father advice about

[23] A. Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," p. 159 and "Ronglu de weiren ji qi er san shi," *Daworzu yanjiu*, 4 (1989), 118-21; interviews with Yadmasürengiin Shariibuu, April 12 and 15, and May 15, 1992. On Jinxing Hao and other firms in Hailar, see He Dequan, "Xiri Hailar de 'Ba Da Jia,'" *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 33 (1988), 153-59.

[24] His home name was Mérséntei, pronounced as Mərθəntii in Daur, but in public he went by Mérsé. See Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," 159; "Dawor zu jianshi" bianxiezu, *Dawor zu jianshi*, p. 99 n. 1; Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, p. 268.

[25] Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 167; Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 308.

herding and loaned his animals to the poor without asking for repayment. Nor could Mersé expect his family to approve his rejection of the ancestral religion. His paternal cousin, Huangge was one of the most prominent shamanesses (*yadgan*) among the Daurs of Hulun Buir, whose power came from the ancestral spirits (*hojoor*) that she had taken from her native Gobol clan.[26] We might combine these two threads in Mersé's biography, and read his Christian conversion as a rebellious reaction against his family upbringing.

A closer look at both Mersé's attraction to Christianity and his instances of supposed rebellion shows, however, that he was in many ways still very much the son of his father. Although Minggu probably did not appreciate his son's lectures, the boy's aim of frugality was something his notoriously thrifty father could appreciate. Mersé's conversion also gave him a standpoint from which to fire the same modernizing, anti-aristocratic, and anti-Buddhist salvos that had become commonplaces in eastern Inner Mongolia. As seen in his Christian writings, Mersé believed in Christianity primarily as an agent of social change and progress.[27] Xu Baoqian commented that "After [Mersé] believed, he immediately took the deliverance of the Mongolian nation as his personal duty," and to him and his liberal Christian mentors the end of this deliverance was as much or more social and moral uplift as it was the rejection of false religion. Mersé described the Mongolian youth as disgusted with Mongolian Buddhism and fascinated with the Gospel's power to propel social reform:

> Christianity serves as the universal world religion. All Christians and knowledgeable people recognize its ability to reform the world and change society. Also, it is in everybody's ears and before their eyes, that it even more can loosen the heavy yoke of slavery, poverty, ignorance, sickness, and sin...Also the new youth embrace, totally uncritically, the free choice to strive for progress and reform, and are very unsatisfied with Lamaism. All have the tendency to start a thorough reform and to chose to walk a new road. They exclaim with praise about Christianity's ability to serve society and transform character. This is a once-in-a-millennium opportunity to disseminate the Christian gospel in Mongolia.[28]

[26] Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 159-60; Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, pp. 343-44, 267-69.

[27] Mersé's fund-raising speech to Christian organizations, with a brief additional note by Xu Baoqian, is reproduced in its entirety in Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 304-09.

[28] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 306, 307.

Figure 2.3: Duke Tsengde's "Red House," South of Hailar



Rooms
1. Place for vegetables.
2. Cattle and horse stables.
3. Area where a person stayed.
4. Place for hiding things (Daur, *hash ger*), used to hide steamers of dumplings (*buuz*) at New Year's, etc.
5. Cart storage and holding.
6. Paved pathways (*lu*).
7. Flowers.
8. Duke and Dondog's room.
9. Huangshaul's room.
10. Jingxingtai's room.
11. Eldengtai's room.
12. Ergintai's room
13. Large guest room
14. Heater for kangs
15. Stoves
16. Privies (presumably accessible through an unmarked postern gate in the compound wall)

Gates and Buildings: I. Great Gate (*da men*); II. Second Gate (*er men*); III. Main House (*zhu fang/gool ger*); IV. West House (*xi xiang fang* or *xi ze xiang/baragun ger*—distant kin lived here); V. East House (*dong xiang fang/jegün ger*—kitchen; short-term guests stayed here on the kang); VI. Gazebo (*tingzi*).
Source: Second gate (II), main House front (III), and gazebo (VI) sketched by Ardajab. Plan redrawn after two sketches by Ardajab (interview, August 17, 1997).

Figure 2.4: Genealogy of Part of the Manna Lineage, Gobol clan, of Mekhertii Ail.



Sources: Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, fig. 6.2; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 67-68, 73, 74, 80; V.S. Parfenov, "Zakliuchenie v otnoshenii Merse on zhe Go-Daofu po materialam ugolovnogo dela (ark , N-9180)"; A. Enhebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de de Guo Daofu," pp. 159-182 and "Ronglu de weiren ji qi ersan shi," pp. 118-121; Rintchen, *Folklore mongol*, IV, 176-183. Ages of Mersé's children given according to Parfenov with the assumption that the dates there refer to ages in *sui* as of 1931.

His criticisms of Buddhism and Mongolian social mores—that the lamas encouraged people to exhaust their savings in fruitless pilgrimages and rituals, that they only pretended to cure diseases but without effect, that chastity was not respected and hence family life was corrupted, and that bodies were thrown out on the steppe without burial in a twisted expression of pity to animals—were all the sorts of criticisms which Daurs from the point of view of their own shamanist and Confucian upbringing could and had made before.[29] Similarly his criticism of the ignorance and superstition of the aristocracy and its hostility to education was not something that would necessarily strike his father and his colleagues as an attack on them; *they* at least had never prohibited education in Chinese, or any other language. Thus although his particular solution to Mongolia's problems was not one other Mongols would follow, his analysis of Mongolia's needs and their relief fit the common lines of the East Mongolian critique of Mongolian society.

The same events that recalled Duke Tsengde to Hailar also brought Mersé home in summer, 1917. Sébjingge's occupation of Hailar hit the Minggu household particularly hard; Minggu's wife and his brother's wife were both killed, and the family finances were damaged so that Mersé could no longer attend the Russian Language Institute. Thus he was unable to complete his degree and instead desired to revive the new schools enterprise in Hailar that had been interrupted by the reaction against the New Policies. In the spring of 1918 with Fumingtai, he founded the Hulun School (*Hulun xuexiao*), using Chinese textbooks, and meeting in his own house in Hailar. He claimed to have helped fund it himself but undoubtedly his father put up most of the money. Soon he and Fumingtai were borrowing rooms in the fudutong's office, and in spring, 1919, the school received official recognition from the fudutong's yamen as the Mongolian Banners Public School (*Mengqi guanli xuexiao*), with Mersé as the headmaster, Fumingtai as his deputy, and a permanent use of the fudutong's west office.

Another major change occurred in Mersé's life when he married for the first time. In 1918 Mersé had the first of his many children, and throughout his busy career in Beijing, Ulaanbaatar, the steppes and deserts of Ordos and Alashan, and finally Mukden city, his wife and children lived with their father-in-law in Mekhertü Ail. I have no published information about his main wife, Sulde (Xujie), but from her

[29] Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, pp. 133-37. Humphrey takes this mockery of Buddhism to expresse a shamanist point of view, but it follows the standard tropes of Confucian anti-Buddhist polemic.

dual Mongol-Chinese name she was certainly a Daur and it seems certain that Mersé's children were not raised as Christians; indeed his younger cousin, the shamaness Huangge, played a larger role in their upbringing than he did.[30] Thus in his family life as well Mersé showed himself more a dutiful son than his revolutionary colleague, Bai Yunti, who took the shocking step of marrying a Chinese woman.

As far as we know, Mersé never convinced any of his young Mongol friends in Hulun Buir of the truth of Christianity. That, however, did not stop him from evangelizing them about the need for education. In the winter of 1917 Mersé and Fumingtai gathered more than thirty people who had been educated outside the region to discuss education and the reform of local politics; these young Mongols formed the Hulun Buir Students Association (*Hulun Beir xuesheng hui*), an organization that would become the core of the Hulun Buir revolutionary movement.[31] Despite this support, funding the school was a difficult task; as Mersé later wrote, "I also flapped my jaws until my mouth hurt with rich Russian merchants to raise donations to provide items like student uniforms and the books that a school needs." Thus it was a tremendous blow when in the summer of 1919, an epidemic of plague struck Hailar, the students scattered, and Mersé himself had to return to Mekhertü to nurse his stricken father and younger brother. After the plague abated that fall, Mersé abandoned his newly-founded school and turned to another project.[32]

[30] V.S. Parfenov, "Zakliuchenie v otnoshenii Merse on zhe Go-Daofu po materialam ugolovnogo dela (arkh., N-9180)," dated May 19, 1989; interview with Yadamsürengiin Shaariibuu, April 12 and 15, and May 15, 1992; Humphrey, *Shamans and Elders*, pp. 268, 176-177, 348; Ardajab, personal letter, August 3, 1999.

[31] The number in the organization comes from Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 227, and the organization name from Guo Daofu [Mersé], *Hulun Beir wenti*, p. 25, and Zhaqi Seqin [Jagchid, Sechin], *Menggu zhi jinxi* (Taibei, 1955), p. 255. Jagchid Sechin's claim that the organization was a response to the abolition of Hulun Buir's autonomy, is a chronological impossibility, since it certainly existed in 1918.

[32] On the Hulun school, see Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 227-28, 308, and Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," p. 161.

Hulun Buir Youth and the Buriats

Just when Mersé and Fumingtai were trying to create a new Mongolia through education, the Russian Revolution was casting Hulun Buir's great neighbor, and the guarantor of its autonomy, into chaos. Due to their position within the Russian sphere of influence, the Hulun Buir Daurs were the first of the Inner Mongolia's "Young Mongols" to be drawn into this turbulent movement. The influence of the Russian Revolution on the young Daurs, however, was purely indirect; there is no evidence that Bolshevik activities either among Russian workers on the Chinese Eastern Railway or in Siberia itself had any influence before 1921. Instead the Hulun Buir Daurs turned their eyes along the railway east to the Buriats, estranged but now reunited cousins of their Bargu neighbors. During the "White Party"'s (*Bai Dang*—Mersé's term) occupation of Siberia, from summer, 1918, to January, 1920, Mersé, Fumingtai, and other young Hulun Buir Mongols became intimately involved in the movements for autonomy among their Buriat Mongolian cousins in Russia.

In 1917, the Buriats had taken advantage of the overthrow of Tsarist rule to establish a Buriat National Committee (Burnatskom), that functioned as a provisional local government for the Buriat districts, and tried to revive Buriat culture and protect their land rights. This committee did not support the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Petrograd, and joined the anti-Communist coalition in Siberia. Yet the White Guard coalition's supreme leader, Admiral Kolchak, like almost all the Russian Whites, fought first and foremost for a unitary Russia. He thus gave no support to Buriat autonomy.[33]

A few White Russian military commanders were more flexible in their position. From summer, 1917, to the summer of 1918, Grigorii Mikhailovich Semënov, ataman or commander of the Buriats enrolled in the Transbaikal Cossack troops and himself half-Buriat, fought from bases along the Chinese Eastern Railway to drive the Bolsheviks out of the Transbaikal region. When the White Guards finally gained control

[33] For brief narratives of the civil war period in Buriatia, focusing on political events, see James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581-1990* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 271-76, and Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, 1964), pp. 129-36. A more extensive narrative, focusing on the cultural activities of the Buriat National Committee is in Robert Walker Montgomery, *Buriat Language Policy, 19th c.-1928: A Case Study in Tsarist and Soviet Nationality Practices* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1994), pp. 163-217.

over Siberia, Ataman Semënov, with Japanese backing, began pursuing a dream of pan-Mongolian unification, attracting support from Buriat nationalists, despite the ataman's violent unpredictability.

The Burnatskom had from the beginning called for a Buriat National or People's Duma (*Buriyad ulus-un chigulgan*), and in November, 1918, Ataman Semënov assembled his supporters in the Burnatskom at a meeting under this name in Verkhneudinsk. Buriats actively involved included Dashi Sampilon (d. 1937),[34] and the Buriat Cossack, Tseden-Ishi,[35] but the most prominent leader of the Buriat nationalists was Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino (1888-1938, pen-name Alamzhi Mergen), a Barguzin Buriat and a member of the Social Revolutionary Party, who had dominated the Burnatskom since early in 1918.[36] All three were to become closely involved in Hulun Buir affairs.

Ataman Semënov's year in Hulun Buir along the railway undoubtedly played an important role in turning his program from one of Buriat autonomy to that of pan-Mongolian unification. Up until the emergence of Semënov as an independent force in Buriat politics, the Buriats had usually looked to Khalkha Mongolia, not their coethnics in Hulun Buir, for possible allies. At the People's Duma in November, however, Mersé attended with another Hailar Daur, Sülfangga, apparently at the invitation of the Buriats. Mersé represented the Hulun Buir Students Association and later claimed that the topic of this Buriat congress was only education and industrialization as a method of reforming the political

[34] On Dashi Sampilon see Serge M. Wolff, "Mongol Delegations in Western Europe, 1925-1929," *Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society*, 32, (1945), 289-298, plate I. He was executed in 1937 (Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, p. 163).

[35] There are two biographies of Tseden-Ishi Dashepylov (or Dashpilon, a.k.a. Gochitskii) in *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural: 1924 ony naimyesdügeer sar. Delgerengüi temdeglel* (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 264-65 and Ch. Dashdawaa and V.P. Kozlov, ed. *Komintérn ba Mongol (barimtyn emkhtgel)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), p. 428, and references also in B. Tseden, ed., *Mongol-Zöwlöltiin khariltsaa, 1921-1974: barimt bichig, matérialyn emkhtgel*, I, *1921-1940* (Ulaanbaatar, 1976), 90, 93, 581, 587. Tseden-Ishi ("the head of Montsenkoop") is described as a Buriat Cossack in Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, p. 201. In accounts of the Dauriia Station movement, and in one contemporary report from Hulun Buir, his surname is given as Tsedypov, or "Tsidipoff" (Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, p. 136; U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, reel 51, 893.00/7321 [Consul G.C. Hanson to Secretary of State, March 18, 1926]), but it is certainly the same person who is meant. The variety of surnames is a mystery to me.

[36] On Rinchino, see *Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino: Dokumenty, Stat'i, Pis'mo* (Ulan-Ude, 1994).

situation.[37] Other sources record, however, that the main aim of the meeting was to discuss the future and particularly unification of the Mongolian nation. Mersé first made his mark by proposing a united Mongolian state composed of Buriatia, Bargu, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and based on the principle of self-determination in Wilson's Fourteen Points. Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino strongly disagreed and instead proposed a "Federal Republic of Mongolia on democratic principles" (that is, upon the right of the people to seize their own rights without approval from the international community). The delegates split the difference and approved the goal of a unified Mongolian state based on democratic principles.[38]

The meeting at Verkhneudinsk led to a second duma at Chita, held on February 25, 1919, which three days later reconvened at Dauriia Station on the border of Russia and Hulun Buir, and officially inaugurated a pan-Mongolian government. Since the movement proclaimed its desire to make Hailar its capital, the Hulun Buir autonomous government viewed it with deep concern. An additional reason for concern was the fact that the remnants of Sébjingge's dangerous bandits, under a Kharachin, Fushengge, formed the bulk of the movement's military support. Shengfu, the fudutong, did not officially support the movement, but desired to know what was going on. Thus five men, all well-connected but only one with high rank, were allowed to represent Hulun Buir: 1) Lingsheng (1886-1936, a.k.a. Fuxiang, of the Merden clan), who was the commandant-general of the Solon Right banners and both Shengfu's maternal grandson and the elder son of Shengfu's heir apparent, Guifu, 2) Erkhimbatu, a sumu captain in the New Bargu Left Wing banners, 3) Mersé, 4) Fumingtai, and probably 5) Sülfangga.[39] The new government followed Mersé's original proposal at Verkhneudinsk and in April sent

[37] Guo Daofu [Mersé], *Hulun Beir wenti*, p. 25; Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, p. 9. Mersé refers to this "Buriat-Mongolian Conference" (*Buliayate mengren huiyi*) or "Buriat-Mongolian National Congress" (*Buliyate-Menggu de minzu dahui*) as occurring in winter, 1918. On the Buriat People's Duma, see James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia*, p. 273, and Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*, p. 80.

[38] S. Battogtokh, *Nuuts khuiwaldaanaas nugalaa zawkhrald* (Ulaanbaatar, 1991), pp. 19-20.

[39] *ZhongE guanxi shiliao*, I, *Wai Menggu, Zhonghua Minguo liu nianzhi ba nian* (Taipei, 1959), pp. 451-452; Zhaqi Seqin, *Menggu zhi jinxi*, p. 255; Owen Lattimore and Fujiko Isono, *The Diluv Khutagt: Memoirs and Autobiography of a Mongolian Buddhist Incarnation in Religion and Revolution* (Wiesbaden, 1982), p. 3. No source mentions the name of the fifth delegate, but since Sülfangga accompanied Mersé to the Buriat People's Duma in Verkhneudinsk, he was likely at Dauriia Station as well.

delegates to the Paris Peace Conference to argue for Mongolian self-determination, but the delegates were prevented from boarding ship at Tokyo. This rebuff (which Mersé blamed on Semënov, but was really the result of the Japanese retreat from the Siberian adventure) together with Outer Mongolia's absolute refusal to participate, discouraged the participants. The movement finally disintegrated in fall, 1919, when Fushengge and his bandit-troops changed their slogans to reviving the Qing and were bloodily suppressed by Ataman Semënov's artillery.[40]

As the Dauriia Station movement reached a dead end, the Red Army's advance was sweeping away both Ataman Semënov and the Special Region government in Hailar. By rendering Russia unable to perform its treaty roles in its sphere of influence on the Mongolian plateau, the Russian Revolution had already encouraged the Chinese government to unilaterally abolish the autonomous states established by the Kiakhta treaty in Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia in September and November, 1919.[41] The Bolshevik Red Army's conquest of Irkutsk on January 5, 1920 added urgency to the Chinese need to settle affairs on its northern frontier. On January 10, 1920, as Kolchak's White Russian government collapsed in Siberia, Ataman Semënov declared himself commander of all White Russians, including those along the Chinese Eastern Railway. The possibility of another occupation of Hailar by the bandit troops of this notoriously cruel and unpredictable Cossack, or by the as yet-unknown Bolsheviks, was more frightening even than renewed Chinese control. On January 28, 1920, at the request of the government of Hulun Buir itself, including Duke Tsengde, the Beijing government abrogated the five-year old autonomy of the Hulun Buir Special Region, and ordered the Governor of Heilongjiang to occupy Hailar with a large garrison.[42]

For the moment, the danger of further turbulence from Russia was contained. Although the Russian Communists in Siberia soon made use

[40] Guo Daofu [Mersé], *Menggu wenti*, p. 10. See also Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil*, pp. 117-28, Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*, pp. 80-82, Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 135-36, Battogtokh, *Nuuts khuiwaldaanaas nugalaa zawkhrald*, pp. 15-19, and Boyanmandu, "Dawuli Zhan fan Menggu duli yundong," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 1 (1962), 56-61. Translations of the Battogtokh and Boyanmandu/Buyanmandukhu sources (among others) appear in Uradyn E. Bulag and Caroline Humphrey, "Some Diverse Representations of the Pan-Mongolian Movement in Dauria," *Inner Asia: Occasional Papers of the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit* 1, no. 1 (1996), 1-23.

[41] Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil*, pp. 113-15, 129-58.

[42] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 330-35.

of the Buriat former supporters of the Dauriia Station government, like Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino, who had become disaffected with the Dauriia movement in April, they did not immediately follow up their contacts with Mersé or the Hulun Buir Student Association. Mersé regarded the meeting of the Khalkha revolutionary, Bodô, with the Communists in Irkutsk in August, 1920, as the earliest link between the Mongols and the Russian Communists, which indicates that neither he nor the other Hulun Buir attendees had contact with the Bolsheviks at the time of the Dauriia Station movement.[43] Far from inspiring the Young Mongols, the initial Bolshevik advance in Siberia had destroyed the growing ties between a Hulun Buir and a Buriatia both seeking greater autonomy. For two years after the expulsion of the Whites, the Bolsheviks remained very cautious about Japan, maintaining the buffer "Far Eastern Republic" in the Buriat and Russian areas that bordered on Hulun Buir. During the civil war and before, the Communist Party had had virtually no support among the Buriats and local Communist opinion ran strongly to assimilation of the Buriats by the more pro-Bolshevik Russian population. Thus in 1920 and early 1921, the Bolshevik victory seemed to mark the end of both Buriat autonomy and of Soviet influence in Mongolia.

The Chinese Interlude

By February, 1920, the period of crisis in Hulun Buir brought on by the New Policies had come full circle; the region was once again an integral part of Heilongjiang province. The intervening decade, however, had worn off some of the assimilating zeal of the new Chinese government. The fudutong's office was confirmed in its authority over the Mongolian banners and, thanks in large part to the members of the Hulun Buir Students Association, the Mongols had gained the initiative in using education as a means for a self-directed modernization, and not simply as an engine of sinicization. Nor did wise observers regard Russian influence in Mongolia as entirely disposed of by the renunciation of the 1915 treaty structure. As Mersé observed at the time, "Now although [Russia] is in chaos internally and has trouble even taking care of itself, nevertheless its influence in Mongolia has already become deep-rooted and firmly based, and is certainly not something which can be turned back within only a few years time."[44] The fact, however, remained:

[43] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, p. 11.

[44] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 305.

Hulun Buir was once again part of China, and the possibility of action outside of that framework was for the moment foreclosed.

As reported by foreign observers, public sentiment in Hulun Buir during the 1920s, despite internal ethnic resentments, still supported reunification with Mongolia. Certainly this was the case for the Daur oligarchy in Hailar. The U.S. consul in Harbin observed after a visit in December, 1925, that while the yamen had some "monarchists," or adherents of the old Qing system, the generality of yamen officials were "longing" for the annexation of Bargu to Mongolia. Such sentiment was not as widespread on the steppe, however. A White Russian informant told the U.S. consul in Harbin that "the Barguts [that is, New and Old Bargu bannermen] are anti-Bolshevik, the majority, and monarchic in sentiment, while the minority Daurs are very much in sympathy with the Bolsheviks. Solons and Chahars follow those that pay the most."[45] Even so, however, Chinese observers admitted that while there was discontent among the Bargu and Solon peoples with the dominance of the Daur oligarchy, such internal strife was minor compared with the feeling against the foreigners, Russian and Chinese, in Hulun Buir.[46]

Mersé's own attitude on Mongolian independence was never hard and fast. Unlike Fumingtai, who after 1922 would never compromise in his support for total independence from China, Mersé turned his back on secessionism and independence in 1928. In his speeches and writings both before and after he became involved in the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, Mersé showed no hesitation about calling on the Han Chinese to aid the Mongols as "countrymen" (*tongbao*), and expressed deep skepticism about both Russian and Japanese ambitions in Mongolia. The fact that Minggu had kept him in school in Qiqihar through 1914 shows that his father too was by no means convinced that Chinese power in Hulun Buir was a thing of the past and that he did not totally disagree with the New Policies.

Mersé expressed a similar qualified approval of these policies, as expressions of modernization, however clumsily applied:

> The Mongols are not enlightened in knowledge, and have not the slightest comprehension of the truths of republicanism, so that in bringing

[45] U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, reel 51, 893.00/7321 (U.S. Consul G.C. Hanson to Secretary of State, March 18, 1926). "Chahars" refers to the small number of non-native Inner Mongols who were living and working as immigrants in Hulun Buir.

[46] U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, reel 67, 893.00/10229 ("What the Barga Insurgents were driving at," Kung Pao, August 28, 1928, translation enclosed in U.S. Consul G.C. Hanson to Minister J.V.A. MacMurray, Sept. 11, 1928).

> forth the New Policies, misunderstandings [between Han and Mongol] arose at every step, often becoming a hindrance to a meeting of minds of the two peoples.

The benefits of republicanism and democracy were something the Mongols could receive from the Chinese Republic, if only it could overcome the Mongols' conservatism by proper policies: "Right now, although the Republic of China has taken democracy (*minquan*) as the base, if you look closely, Mongolia has a very special situation. The people's level is not up to it and therefore it has preserved its ancient system. Thus although the five million Mongol countrymen today are in name citizens of a republic, in reality they are slaves under despotism."[47] Opposition to this despotism made it easier for him to turn back to the Republic of China and the liberal ideals it professed, and seek its aid for his regeneration of the Mongols.

Back at the Buriat People's Duma in Verkhneudinsk, Mersé had shown his faith in the new liberal order enunciated by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points. Now he returned again to this position. His new plan called for a model Mongolian public school to be set up in Mekhertü Ail, his father's home village, with 30 buildings and a guiding Christian spirit. He (that is, his father) put up $1,000 silver and ten head of cattle, and sought again for further contributions. This time he turned not to Russian merchants, but to the Chinese Christian community in Tianjin and Beijing. He journeyed there sometime in 1920, in hopes of drumming up support to train young Mongol disciples and to build the 30 lecture halls, offices, dormitories, printing facilities, kitchens and wash rooms that he deemed necessary for his vision.

Mersé spoke at a variety of venues affiliated with the mainline Protestant wing of Chinese Christianity: the Tianjin Congregational Church, the Beijing Methodist Church, the Chinese Christian Church (where Mersé had been baptized), the Peking Union Medical College, and the Yenching University YMCA. He also met privately with Chinese and foreign Christians such as Cheng Jingyi (1881-1939), a leader in inter-denominational cooperation, Zhang Boling (1876-1951), founder of Tianjin's Nankai University, David Z.T. Yui (1882-1936), General Secretary of the YMCA in China, and J. Leighton Stuart (1876-1962), president of Yenching University, among others. All of these leaders' careers had something to say to Mersé. Cheng was a Manchu and his "China for Christ Movement," then sponsoring missionary activity among minorities in Yunnan, had inspired Mersé. Zhang Boling's

[47] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 305.

Nankai University in Tianjin, founded only a year before, could serve as a superlative model for Mersé's plan to use education to save Mongolia. David Yui (Yu Richang)'s slogan of "saving China through character development" (*renge jiuguo*), and his conviction that organizations like the YMCA were only a means to the end of rebuilding China expressed perfectly the brand of Christianity that Mersé espoused. J. Leighton Stuart likewise saw Yenching University's mission as "character building" and would soon abandon his Southern Presbyterian affiliation rather than respond to charges stemming from his pragmatic and modernist views.[48]

Mersé's speeches on these occasions marked the first appearance of the several themes that would dominate his published works from this year to his disappearance in 1931. Most important of these themes was a visionary faith that Mongolia was, for better or for worse, at the center of the coming century. Since there was no other area in the world so rich in resources but so open and undeveloped, the powers were certain to fight over Mongolia which was thus bound to become the next Balkans of the Far East, starting the next world war. Only concerted action to relieve Mongolia's backwardness and spiritual darkness, which he sketched in the most pathetic terms, could avert this coming disaster. He appealed to Chinese Christians to take responsibility for averting disaster, assist Mongolia, and "accomplish the heavenly calling of saving the world, saving souls, and saving the nation." Practically, he hoped both for $3,000 silver to fund his school, and for Christian organizations in the Tianjin-Beijing area to invite young Mongols to receive training. Mersé's friend, Xu Baolian, as Executive Secretary of the Beijing YMCA, endorsed his message and set up a Correspondence Office to collect information and direct inquirers about evangelizing Mongolia.[49] No source describes the response to these appeals, but the very lack of evidence suggests that it fell far short of what Mersé desired.

[48] On Cheng, Zhang, and Yui, see Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, I, s.v. Ch'eng Ching-i, Chang Po-ling, and IV, s.v. Yü Jih-chang. On J. Leighton Stuart, see Yu-ming Shaw, *An American Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

[49] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 304-09. The date of the speech here is not given in the text, but the references to the abolition of autonomy, and to ripening Japanese moves in Outer Mongolia, would seem to put the date during the lead-up to Baron Ungern-Sternberg's advances on Mongolia, that is, in late 1920.

First Contacts with Soviet Buriatia and Mongolia

In a few years, moreover, a new and different potential patron for remaking Mongolia had appeared: Soviet Russia. By 1923, both Buriatia and Outer Mongolia had new Bolshevik regimes loudly proclaiming Moscow's support for national self-determination. In April, 1921, the Far Eastern Republic included provisions for a Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Region in its constitution. In January, 1922, the western Buriats in Russia proper received a Mongol-Buriat [*sic*] Autonomous Region. With the abolition of the Far Eastern Republic in October, 1922, all the Buriat-Mongolian lands came under the rule of Soviet Russia, and the Moscow authorities emphasized that a relatively high level of autonomy for the Buriats could "be an exceptional factor to strengthen the sympathies of the Far Eastern peoples towards Soviet Russia." Thus on May 30, 1923, the two autonomous regions, east and west, were united and the Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic came into being as an autonomous component of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Part and parcel of setting up these regimes was the active recruitment of Buriats formerly associated with the Whites. In January, 1921, a Central Committee of the Buriat-Mongols of East Siberia was organized, under chairman Mikhei Nikolaevich Erbanov (1889-1938) and his deputy, Matvei Innokent'evich Amagaev (1897-1944), both long-standing Bolshevik Buriats. Recent converts to the Bolshevik cause on the Committee included Tsyben Zhamtsarano (1881-1942), and Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino. Rinchino in particular, who had been a major figure in the Dauriia Station movement, carried with him into the Bolshevik apparat his knowledge of and experience with the Hulun Buir youth.[50]

Even more significant to Hulun Buir was the Soviet advance into Outer Mongolia. From the winter of 1920, one of Semënov's officers, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, led his motley forces into Khalkha Mongolia and eventually set up a new independent regime there, under the titular authority of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu. In July, 1921, the Red Army moved south from Buriatia and drove out both the White Russian and Chinese armies and established a constitutional regime under the

[50] Boris Chichlo, "Histoire de la formation des territoires autonomes chez les peuples turco-mongols de Sibérie," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 28 (1987), 370; Christopher P. Atwood, "A.I. Oshirov (c. 1901-1931): A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia," in *Opuscula Altaica*, ed. Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt (Belllingham, 1994), pp. 51-53. On Erbanov, see G.D. Basaev, and S. Ia. Erbanova, *M.N. Erbanov* (Ulan-Ude, 1989).

Mongolian People's Party. Soviet and Buriat advisers such as Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino, Tsyben Zhamtsarano, Dashi Sampilon, and Tseden-Ishi Tsedypov, acquired a vital role in the new government. To the Hulun Buir Mongols, who had only recently lost their own autonomy, the establishment of a new Mongolian government in Neislel Khüriye revived hopes for a similar restoration of autonomy for Hulun Buir. As was noted in the previous chapter, however, the new government in Neislel Khüriye was much more cautious about pan-Mongolian adventures than the previous theocratic regime had been, and waited almost a year to address potential supporters in Inner Mongolia or Hulun Buir.[51]

By 1922, Mersé had accomplished something of his plan for a school in Mekhertü Ail. Support came not from the Chinese Christians but rather from the yamen, who assigned more than $600 silver a year to the new school. The yamen apparently did not see the need to simply duplicate Mersé's previous Mongolian Banners Public School, which had been revived under a new headmaster, so his new school opened with a different mission, as the Mekhertü Ail Girls School (*Mohertu tun nüxue*). Others in Mekhertü Ail also contributed to the school: Mersé's father Minggu, Fumingtai and his brother Hualintai, as well as Yünja, Oto, and other wealthy ranchers of the Aula clan.[52] The yamen officials were proud of Mersé's developing reputation in Beijing as an essayist and speaker who could describe the Mongolian question in the racy journalistic idiom created by Liang Qichao.

Around this time, Mersé also created a new script for the Daur language. Hitherto, Daur students had always learned standard Mongolian and Manchu which, with a few differences, shared a script, but were both significantly different from Daur in language. Daurs had been writing their language in the Manchu script, but Mersé preferred to use the Latin script, reflecting his continued international orientation. He tried the script out first with the older students in the Mongolian Banners

[51] Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai, claims that Mersé and Fumingtai joined the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in early 1921, which is certainly wrong. Major sources on the 1921 revolution, such as Choibalsang, Losol, and Demid's exhaustive history, *Monggol arad-un ündüsün-ü qubisqal angqa egüscü bayigulugdagsan tobci teüke*, or the three volumes of *Mongol Ardyn juramt tsergiin durtgaluud* contain no mention of Fumingtai, Mersé, or any Hulun Buir Mongols at all.

[52] Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, pp. 227-28; Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 161-62; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 68.

Public School in Hailar, where it proved relatively easy to use. From there it spread to Daur circles in Hailar, Nantun, and Mekhertü Ail, being used to record folk songs, tales, and for correspondance. Mersé himself, however, does not seem to have used it to write any of his own works.[53]

The most significant decision of the Mekhertü Ail Girls School for the Young Mongol movement was the choice of instructors to teach Russian. Since 1918 or so, Duke Tsengde had taken on a Buriat tutor named Sonia for his older daughter Songxian (Mongolian name, Subud) and his niece Mengxian (Mongolian name Saran, Fumingtai's sister) and his family compound's western building had been converted into a school room with a world map hung on the wall. The Duke arranged for her to go to the new school, and his own children to enroll among the 11 students in the first class. Two other teachers were also a Russian woman from Buriatia, Lena, and another Buriat, Budadari. While Buriats had the advantage of fluency in both Mongolian (the Buriat dialect was close to that of the Bargu Mongols, although not to Daur) and Russian languages, political factors were also at work. Sonia was the sister of Mariia Mikhailovna Sakh'ianova (1896-1981), a Buriat Communist who, after spending the civil war in Moscow, had returned to Buriatia in 1921, and would soon become party secretary of the Buriat Party Committee. All three of the teachers took it as part of their job to propagandize discretely among the students.[54] Tsengde's recommendation thus opened the links of Hulun Buir's Young Mongols to Soviet Buriatia.

On May 3, 1922, the new Mongolian government addressed letters to all the office-holding nobility in Inner Mongolia, outlining the reasons that lead to the establishment of a people's government, and asking them to use their influence to moderate Beijing's policy. On the situation of Inner Mongolia, they wrote "If the Chinese government should once again revive the autonomy of Hulun Buir that has previously been so unreasonably abolished, and once again give our Inner Mongolian

[53] Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 163-64. A photograph of samples of Daur writing in Manchu script and in Mersé's Latin script is in Louis Ligeti, *Rapport préliminaire d'un voyage d'exploration fait en Mongolie chinoise, 1928-1931* (Budapest, 1977), pl. IX.

[54] Khandsüren, "Etseg Tsendiin tukhai," p. 195; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 68, 78-80, 85. Exactly how Sonia came to be the tutor for Duke Tsende's family is obscure. Khandsüren, based on her mother, Rinchin's, story, says she entered the family in 1918 and was a former partisan and on assignment for the Comintern. The Comintern was certainly not sending agents to Inner Mongolia in 1918, or even 1922, and if she had really been at Tsengde's compound since 1918, her partisan career must have been brief. On Mariia Sakh'ianova, see B.B. Batuev, *Mariia Mikhaïlovna Sakh'ianova: Stranitsy politicheskoï biografii* (Ulan-Ude, 1992).

countrymen the opportunity of autonomy to develop the culture of our race, then it is not impossible that our government might send representatives to undertake direct negotiations with it."[55] The reference to Hulun Buir offered hope that just as in 1912, the Khalkhas could aid the Bargu Mongols to establish a new regime, this time not feudal but republican and enlightened.

The response from Hulun Buir's Young Mongols seems to have been quick. On May 9, 1922, young Mongols, probably from Hulun Buir, sent a letter to the Central Committee of the People's Party and the new People's Government, congratulating them on their success and expressing hope for a unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia.[56] At the same time, Mersé composed what he called a "Soul-Stirring Song of the Mongolian Youth" in which he encouraged and warned the revolutionaries in Neislel Khüriye. The revival of Mongolian independence and Buriat autonomy inspired Mersé, but he worried that the Mongolian youth of those lands were allowing themselves to be carried away by Marx and Lenin's nostrums, ones alien to the true genius of the Mongolian people.

Mersé himself was turning away from his previous Christian remedies for Mongolia's problems. Instead he called for the Mongols to follow other peoples around the world in using their ancestral virtues to solve the problems set by the age. His song, reprinted in Mersé's subsequent Chinese book *Menggu wenti* ("The Mongolian Question"), demonstrated the Daur nationalist's entry into the dialectic of colonial nationalism that anthropologist Clifford Geertz has characterized by the terms "epochalism" and "essentialism." These two currents, one focused on the "spirit of the age" and the other on the "the indigenous way of life," formed the poles around which the intense social tensions created by colonialization and the formation of new, anti-colonial, states gathered.[57]

[55] *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 11 nian (1922)* (Taipei, 1982), I, 749-50.

[56] *BNKhAU-yn Öwör Mongolyn öörtöö zasakh oron* (Ulaanbaatar, 1981), p. 28; *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn ankhdugaar ikh khural: 1924 ony XI saryn 8-28. Delgerengüi tailan* (Ulaanbaatar, 1984), 320 n. 14. Neither source gives the name or any other information about the author, nor was the letter accessible during my period of archival research in Mongolia. Since only the Daur nationalists in Hailar had any recorded contact with the new government in Neislel Khüriye before 1924, and since the date is so close to that of the Mersé's song, it seems likely the two are related.

[57] See the 1971 essay "After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States," reprinted in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), pp. 234-54. Quotation on p. 252. Mary Matossian's earlier "tension between

For all but a small minority, both strains were necessary for the continued existence of the nation as a focus of loyalty and desire. To abandon the essentialist strain was to admit that the history of the nation has nothing to contribute to its future, ironically delivering a crippling blow to the self-confidence necessary to adapt to the future. To abandon the epochalist strain was to admit defeat in the competition with other nations of the world, thus humiliating the national heritage. Thus, Mersé's entry into this dialectical construction of the Mongolian nation as both old and new, both rooted in the past and advancing to the future, marked also a turn to a concern with building the honor and self-definition of the Mongolian nation as a people equal to that of any other in the world.

> Get up! Get up! High minded youth of our same nation! The trend of world reform is flowing over the whole globe, the revolution in humanity's thinking has smashed the universe and awakened us. The fearless god of war is morning and evening ringing his vast bell and beating his great drum uninterruptedly. Get up! Get up!
>
> Return! Return! High-minded youth of our same nation! The great red cosmopolitanism is something we ought to think over, something we ought to do. But this Mongolian nation in darkness is something we should pity and reform. Look at Europe, at America, at China, at Japan! They all have their own red fighters ready to die! Return! Return!
>
> Be independent! Be independent! High-minded youth of our same nation! Are we puppets? Are we puppets? Are we the errand-boys of Lenin and Trotsky? Are we the slaves of Marx and Bakunin? We have our own soul and mind and we have our own strengths and abilities. Why do we have to follow the ideas of other people? Why rely on spent glories of other people? Look at India where they still have their modern saints Tagore and Gandhi, and at the black race which still has its great Booker T. Washington and Rene Maran. It is hard to believe we cannot give play to our own culture and honor our own peculiar nature. Be independent! Be independent!
>
> Have courage! Have courage! High-minded youth of the same nation! In the progressive historical movement of modern humanity, who can deny that the Latin nation rose first, then it was continued by the Teutonic nation, and that the final arrival is considered to be the Slavic nation. And now the most ancient Hindu and Han nations, with the most degraded black and red races are struggling to carry away the last prize. Is it only our Mongolia, representative of the yellow race, that is to be considered as forever sunk into an unwakening slumber? Look at the waters of Lake Baikal—are there not already dark clouds over them? In the air of the Khentii Mountains is not a violent wind already blowing? Do you say it is hard to believe our ancestors did not do any great deeds? Do you think it is hard to believe that our soil will not bring upon us the greed of the powers at a new opportunity? Ah, what other person in the five thousand years of world history had such military might as our Chinggis Khan who unified the continent of Eurasia? Could there be another person in this present situation of narrow-minded nation-states who would have such tolerance like our Khubilai Khan, who majestically linked Oriental and Occidental cultures? Whether it be cosmopolitanism or the spirit of struggle, have not our ancestors tried them both alike? Ah, if we can resolutely follow the trends of the age, and become again a nation seeking the complete happiness of mankind, we can not only revive our old aims and reputation, but even be like the favorite son who was born last but comes out first. Have courage! Have courage! May 19, 1922.[58]

archaism and futurism" refers to a similar dynamic; see "Ideologies of 'Delayed Industrialization': Some Tensions and Ambiguities," in *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. J.H. Kautsky (New York, 1962), pp. 254-264.

The response of the Mongolian government to this fevered appeal is not recorded. Ironically, despite for this ringing call for the Mongols to rely on their own genius, the language and ideas reflected in powerful form the typologies of racial Darwinism that pervaded Chinese journalism of the times.[59]

The call to return to the Mongols' ancestral traditions reflected Mersé's own abandonment of Christianity and his return to his Daur roots. By the late 1920s, after he had turned his back on the Red revolution, Mersé had become a *bagchi*, that is an older man skilled in prayers and rituals directed to the ancestral spirits of the patrilineage. He himself possessed an *onggor* or patrilineal ancestor spirit that would on occasion come over him and make him unable to teach, but able to foretell the future. He was skilled in helping women in childbirth with prayers, and used *tarni*, or spells, for divination. Although after his

[58] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, pp. 17-18. The exact date on this song and Mersé's quotation of it as an independent source, indicate that it was written for a specific occasion. The language, however, is certainly his. The use of "Mengguliya" once and the European dating suggest that the original may have been written in Russian, not Chinese. Rene Maran (1871-1960) was an Afro-Carribean author, born in Martinique and educated in France. His *Batouala: Veritable roman negre* (1921), set in French colonial Africa, had caused a great stir with its criticism of the French colonial service. I would like to thank Ellen McGill for securing a xerocopy of this work from the volume kept in the Tôyô Bunko in Tokyo.

[59] Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford, 1992), pp. 145-62.

youth, he stopped making sacrifices himself he regularly attended the clan sacrifices at the Gobols' *oboo* or cairn. At some point, he also took as second wife, Soujie, a clan sister of his first wife Xujie (Sulde), clearly repudiating Christian family norms.[60] At this distance it is impossible to say how or whether Mersé reconciled these different facets of his life, but it seems that his revolutionary political views, with their emphasis on Mongolian nationalism, had led him back to the Daur traditions and the religion of his family.

Hailar's Mongolian Cooperative

Alongside these cultural and ethnic issues, the developing integration of the Mongolian economy with the world market created steadily greater financial opportunities for those who could tap into the market. Of all the areas in Inner Mongolia, Hulun Buir had the best combination of rich steppes and convenient transportation to take advantage of these opportunities (see tables 2.2 and 2.3). In Mongolia in the 1920s the government actively set about taking advantage of this flow of money both by raising tariffs, sales taxes, and by using cooperatives to get hold of a growing portion of the profit of this trade and plow it into educational and other state-building ventures. Although internal tolls or *lijin* played a major role in funding local government, the unequal treaties signed by the foreign powers with China in the nineteenth century prohibited the levying of *lijin* on goods destined for international markets.[61] Thus, as more and more of the Mongolian plateau's animal products found markets outside of China, the local Inner Mongolian governments ironically found the revenues of this trade increasingly beyond their reach. For Inner Mongolian nationalists, then, the growing trade in skins and wool to the United States and Japan represented a potential bonanza that could only be realized through a decisive break with the Chinese trade system.

Before 1870, Russia was the major foreign (that is, outside the Qing empire) customer for Mongolian wool. Being of low quality, Mongolian wool was mostly used in Russia for padding clothes. In 1870, the United States also began importing sheep's wool from China, principally for the shawl trade, and by 1890, exports of wool from Tianjin to United States and Great Britain had become an important part of Qing exports. In the

[60] Ardajab, letter, August 2, 1999.

[61] On the *lijin* or *likin*, see Edwin George Beal, *The Origin of Likin, 1853-1864*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

years before World War I, Russia and Japan replaced Britain as the major secondary markets, but United States was buying more Chinese wool than all other countries put together. Wool from Tianjin was also used in the carpet trade, but up to 1914 was not used for clothing.

World War I brought several significant changes to the wool trade from China. First, the high demand for wool for uniforms and the wartime disruption of trade brought the best grades of Chinese wool into demand for clothing, a situation which continued after the war's end.[62] Significant changes also occurred in the countries of destination. Germany, Russia, and Great Britain all sooner or later stopped importing Chinese wool, and with the exception of brief surges directly after the war did not rejoin the market for Chinese wool. Japanese wool imports surged during the war, and although they fell considerably in the post-war period, they remained much larger than they had been before World War I. Thus by 1923, the United States and (on a much lower scale) Japan became the only significant markets for Mongolian and Chinese wool.

Tianjin was the main export center for Chinese wool, accounting for 91% of China's total wool exports in 1925-6. Of this wool, half came from the Tibetan plateau via Gansu and Qinghai, while fifteen percent came from Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces, and presumably originated in the area of western Inner Mongolia. Twenty-five percent came from what the source calls "the rest of Mongolia" apparently including all areas including Outer Mongolia (or Mongolia proper) and central Inner Mongolia that sold their wool at Zhangjiakou.[63] Much of Bargu wool and animal products reached the world market by moving south to the ports along the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea, particularly the Japanese concession, Dalian, and the rival Chinese port, Niuzhuang. A significant amount of these raw materials were shipped to Tianjin or Shanghai from Niuzhuang, as those cities had the best processing facilities. In Tianjin, by 1923, seven firms, all British, had hydraulic presses for wool, cotton, and skin packing. These same firms also handled wool cleaning and washing.[64] The other way for Mongolian and Bargu goods to reach the market was by going north into Siberia and from there to Vladivostok and the American market. Since Russia itself after 1915 had little

[62] *The China Year Book 1921-22*, ed. H.G.W. Woodhead (Tianjin), pp. 138-39.

[63] *The China Year Book 1925-6*, p. 489.

[64] The China Year Book *1923*, p. 517.

demand for Mongol animal products, most of its purchases in Mongolia and Hulun Buir were for resale to the United States.[65]

While World War I and the ensuing civil war had taken Russia out of the ranks of major importers of animal products, the civil war ironically gave the pro-Russian Duke Tsengde the first opportunity to tap for the yamen and himself some of the revenue from the trade. In the years up to 1915, exports of animal products to Russia had been a major part of the income of the herdsmen in Hulun Buir and herdsmen in the area held significant amounts of Russian currency. Similarly, in Mongolia proper, the new theocratic government declared the Russian gold ruble notes or *tsel'kov* (pronounced *tsölikhöw*) legal tender on December 15, 1913, fixing its value fixed at .72 taels silver. With the devaluation of Russian currency after the beginning of World War I, the *tsel'kov* was officially devalued to .5 taels in November, 1915. The 1917 revolution further damaged confidence in this Tsarist-era currency and it was circulating in Khüree at only .02 taels in late 1919 before disappearing from use. Through 1918, however, the Communist government in Moscow had continued to use and print the bills of the 1917 provisional government, named *kerenki*s after Kerensky who was head of that government. In December, 1918, however, Admiral Kolchak's White regime in Tomsk introduced a new currency, soon called the *sibirki*. The *sibirki*, however, never achieved public confidence and Chinese speculators in Harbin and Qiqihar repeatedly engineered speculative attacks on the new bills' value. In May, 1919, banking on a successful final offensive against the Reds, the Tomsk government decreed the withdrawal of the *kerenki* and the sole circulation of the *sibirki*. Unfortunately the implementation of this decision occurred just when the White offensive collapsed. As a result, the *sibirki* itself soon entered an inflationary spiral.[66]

Since many herdsmen in Hulun Buir held these currencies, they faced the possibility of all of their money becoming useless. The *kerenki* was in legal limbo, although it was still traded by speculators. The *sibirki* was backed by a government clearly in trouble. In May, 1918, Duke Tsengde had proposed a "Board of Directors" (*Dongshihui*) to promote economic

[65] See the comments of Tseden-Ishi in his report on the Mongolian cooperatives and their trade in *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn ankhdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 237, 238.

[66] G. Tserendorj, *Niislel Khüreenii Mongol khudaldaany toim* (Ulaanbaatar, 1961), pp. 27-28; Jonathan D. Smele, *Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 401-13. A one-ruble *sibirki* is pictured on p. 233 of N.L. Zhukovskaia, gen. ed., *Istoriko-kul'turnyi atlas Buriatii* (Moscow, 2001).

development. By spring, 1919, the yamen followed the example of other local governments in China and set up a Hulun Buir Mongolian Banners' Official Currency Bureau (*Hulunbeir Mengqi guanqianju*) with three managers under the Duke as superintendant to attempt to manage and profit from the constantly changing currency situation. The bureau collected the supposedly worthless Russian bills from the residents and then sold them to currency traders in Qiqihar and Harbin for $160,000 silver's worth in currently accepted bank notes issued from Harbin, Tianjin and elsewhere. This resulting enormous sum was not, however, returned to the herdsmen but rather held by the Currency Bureau as a fund to finance projects of economic development, issuing a paper currency called the "Hulun Buir Mongolian Banners' Official Currency Bureau Notes" or "Mongolian money" for short. The Currency Bureau became in effect an official bank, and was commonly called the Yamen Bank. The bank invested $68,000 silver of its capital in real estate and construction, building about three hundred single story brick and wood buildings along the main east-west avenues of Hailar.

In this same year, the bureau organized a "Mongolian Banners' Hide and Wool Company" (*Mengqi pimao gongsi*, generally known to Mongols and foreigners alike as the Pimao Gongsi), with a basic capital fund of $40,000 silver supplied from the currency bureau's holdings. In Hulun Buir, as has been noted, the Chinese Eastern Railway allowed Bargu animal-products—wool, meat, skins, as well as furs of wild animals—to be brought quickly to the world market. American and British firms, often employing White Russians as local buyers, played a large role in this wool trade which centered on the fair at Ganjuur Temple in New Bargu territory and drew in buyers from the eastern part of Khalkha Mongolia as well, which led to frequent visits by Hulun Buir officials and foreign businessmen to Bayantümen (modern Choibalsan city) in Mongolia proper. Now the yamen would get directly involved in this trade. The Pimao Gongsi, to which the Currency Bureau's Executive Committee appointed Duke Tsengde as chairman, functioned as a middleman, buying and selling wool and skins from the herdsmen and consumer goods from the Chinese. Thus it would compete for profit directly with the existing firms.[67]

[67] Enkebatu, "Zhenguo Gong Chengde luezhuan," pp. 154-55; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 46; Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 60 (Solon Party Committee, report to comrades, undated). On such local currency bureaus and the situation of bills in China in the early twentieth century, see Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China: A Short History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 69-70.

Duke Tsengde's new bank and trading company set a pattern that other Inner Mongolian nationalists followed as soon as they secured a piece of governmental power. While loudly proclaiming their desire to deliver the herdsmen from oppressive outsiders money already extracted from the herdsmen was never returned but instead kept in reserve to strengthen the meager financial capacities of the local government. While the institution of the Pimao Gongsi was supposedly to improve the terms of trade for the impoverished herdsmen and so relieve their economic distress, an analysis of the actual prices paid by the company compared to those offered by Chinese, British, or American firms in the 1920s does not support this contention. The real problem was not the poverty of the herdsmen, but the financial paralysis of the yamen and the reformers' aim was not so much relieving the economic distress of the people as of strengthening the capacity of the state to police and educate them. As was happening throughout China from the New Policies through to World War II, the weakening of central control coexisted with a slow but steady increase in the financial muscle of county and provincial-level governments, an increase which funded primarily an increase in police and public schooling.[68] Thus the Hulun Buir population was being squeezed to support a stronger yamen, with the ultimate aim, at least on Duke Tsengde's part, of making it more able to secure its independence.

The People's Government in Mongolia followed a similar policy. In 1921, the new government in Neislel Khüriye had set up the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperatives (*Khariltsan tusalaltsakhu khorshiya*), chaired by Tseden-Ishi, a Buriat alumnus of both the Dauriia Station movement and the early organization of the Mongolian People's Party. The stated mission of this cooperative, like the Pimao Gongsi was to displace supposedly exploitative foreign traders in Mongolian animal products, whether Chinese or Anglo-American. At first, the Mongolian Co-op sold its Mongolian exports primarily to the Russian state trade organs who would then export them from Vladivostok to the world market. By the third year of its operations, the cooperative which at first was only a small player in the large Mongolian animal products trade, was able to expand its operations both in Mongolia and abroad.

Direct relations between Khüriye and Zhangjiakou had been broken off by the events of 1921, which the currency crisis generated by the

[68] Philip C.C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (Stanford, 1985), 275-91; Roxann Prazniak, *Of Camel Kings and Other Things: Rural Rebels Against Modernity in Late Imperial China* (Lanham, Md., 1999).

successive destruction of several Russian currencies along with the *piaozi* ("bills"), which had been issued by "Little" Xu's Northwest Border Bank, only exacerbated. On May 20, 1921, under the rule of Baron Ungern-Sternberg, the Mongolian Finance Ministry was reduced to issuing as paper currency *baga boljogatu temdeg* (Cyrillic, *baga boljoot temdeg* "little securities") backed by reserves of livestock. According to the official rules, a ten-note equaled a sheep, a twenty-five-note a cow, a fifty note a horse, and a hundred-note a camel. With the restoration of order under the People's Government in 1921, conditions for commerce improved. The Khüriye-Zhangjiakou trade was restored in spring, 1923, and a branch of the co-op set up in the Chinese town in the autumn of 1923. By the end of 1923 the Khüriye-Zhangjiakou trade was again flourishing and in 1924 the cooperative set up another office in Tianjin to make direct contacts with the British trading firms there.[69]

The other co-op branch was in Hailar, where the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperative opened a branch in autumn, 1923. At the same time Duke Tsengde organized a local cooperative, known as the "Mongolian Banners' Consumers' Cooperative" (*Mengqi xiaofei hezuoshe*) in Chinese or Hulun Buir People's Cooperative (*Khölön Buir olan arad-un khorshiya*) in Mongolian. Although Duke Tsengde appointed a local, Shirnen, to chair the Hulun Buir cooperative, the Mongolian co-op representative Tseden-Ishi was as one of its committee members along with Wangchug and Nairaltu (Gobol clan). In fact, Tseden-Ishi was the mainspring behind both organizations. His wife was a doctor whose Russian medical training also proved sorely needed in Hulun Buir.[70]

From the beginning the cooperative, like the Mekhertü Ail school, formed a cover organization for clandestine activities. Once the co-op got running, by 1925, Young Mongols would use it to convene congresses, set up training courses that mixed technical information with ideological instruction about the new Mongolia, and, not least, fund their

[69] Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn ankhdugaar ikh khural: 1924 ony XI saryn 8-28. Delgerengüi tailan (Ulaanbaatar, 1984), pp. 232-39; *China Year Book 1926-7*, pp. 670, 222; Tserendorj, *Niislel Khüreenii Mongol khudaldaany toim*, pp. 28-29.

[70] *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn ankhdugaar ikh khural*, p. 235; A. Enkebatu, "Zhenguo Gong Chengde luezhuan," p. 156; A. Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 161, 164-65; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 46; A. Enkebatu and Xiao Yun, "Nailertu deng ren de fan-Man kang-Ri dixia huodong," *Dawor zu yanjiu*, 4 (1989), 138. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 85, says the chairman was named Boshukhu—this may be a different name for Shirnen, or they may be different persons. In any case neither seems to have challenged Tsedn-Ishi's real dominance over the organization.

activities. Recruiting among their target populations of masses, youth, and rural officials, the party under the cover of the cooperatives also managed to prepare a fair number of members either for education in Mongolia or the Soviet Union or for espionage. Tseden-Ishi, for example, cultivated and sponsored Nairaltu in his recruitment as an informant for Soviet military intelligence. Even the most conservative yamen officials however could see the co-op's benefits in preserving lines of communication with Mongolia.[71] Contrary to the accusations of their younger kinsfolk, these officials had no desire to be in the Chinese pocket, nor did they scorn good relations with the new Mongolia.

At the same time, however, it would be inaccurate to see the cooperative as purely a front for espionage or revolutionary activities. From the outbreak of World War I, the market for Mongolian animal products had expanded steadily, and for the first time, the generally low-quality Mongolian wool received a welcome from the woolen clothing manufacturers. During the early 1920s, this growth in the demand for wool was also matched by a sudden fashion in marmot skins, whose exports from Hulun Buir sky-rocketed in both price and volume.[72] This sudden increase in value of Hulun Buir and Mongolian exports undoubtedly encouraged Mersé's vision of Mongolia's vital world role:

> Now with the growing density of population, the [world's] waste land is being daily opened up and the pasture is daily diminishing. Thus the output of animal husbandry must follow the same trend, just as when the daily extraction of minerals increases, then the total amount left daily diminishes. Thus since the animal husbandry in the Americas and Australia will gradually enter into a decline, then one day the supply of meat and milk, tallow and grease, leather and hides, hair and wool, and so on, that humanity needs will be absent or insufficient. Thus Mongolian husbandry, when it is a little improved, will certainly become the whole world's supplier of these goods. All of the Chinese and foreign industrialists cannot but have a clear picture of this in their mind.[73]

[71] L. Jamsran, "MAKhN, Öwör Mongold ardyn khuwisgalt nam üüsch bekhjikhed tusalsan ni," *Dornodkhiny sudlal*, 1991, no. 1 (24), p. 12. Central Party Archives 7-1-20: 42 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925); 7-1-29: 27 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

[72] On wool, see *China Year Book, 1921-2*, pp. 138-39, *China Year Book, 1923*, p. 210, and *China Year Book, 1924-5*, pp. 523-24; on marmot skins, see *China Year Book, 1925-6*, p. 493; *China Year Book, 1926-7*, p. 673; *China Year Book, 1928*, p. 833; *China Year Book, 1929-30*, p. 1050.

[73] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, p. 15. This theme had been sounded briefly in his earlier Christian lecture: Zhang Jiafan, et. al., *Hulun Beir zhilue*, p. 305.

Thus to Mersé and the other members of the coop, the boom in animal product exports from Hulun Buir played a crucial part in resisting the Chinese officials' assumption that Mongolian land was useless until colonized. Instead it created a vision of a steadily growing income for the yamen that, with the right arrangements, could be used to fund independence—if only the co-op could acquire a monopoly on the trade.

Young Mongols Organize in Beijing and Bargu

Duke Tsengde's high position and Mersé's prominent role as Hulun Buir's premier educator undoubtedly screened from hostile eyes their overtures to revolutionary Buriatia and Mongolia. Local fame could not, however, protect them forever from the authorities in Qiqihar who since 1920 had held ultimate power and these authorities would certainly not allow a reply of Hulun Buir's previous intrigues with Mongolia and Russia. Probably in summer, 1922, the Governor of Heilongjiang issued an order to seize Mersé, Fumingtai and to suppress the student organization.[74] Mersé and Fumingtai had to flee from Hulun Buir, but Duke Tsengde stayed put, as did the three Buriat teachers in the Mekhertü Ail school. The local governments in Hulun Buir, both Chinese and Mongolian, showed their opinion of this attack on a noteworthy local boy by including his essay among the samples of Hulun Buir's literary accomplishments in the official "Hulun Buir Gazetteer" (*Hulun Buir zhilue*, 1923).

Fumingtai and maybe a few others fled west to Mongolia, apparently arriving in Neislel Khüriye in the summer or fall of 1922.[75] Exactly how and with what introductions he got there is something of a mystery as no

[74] Jagchid, *Menggu zhi jinxi*, p. 255; Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 164-66. While neither source is particularly clear in their dating of this event, they both place it after Mersé and Fumingtai had gotten in contact with Mongolia, which would put it after the May, 1922, letter. Since the first date given for Mersé's presence in Beijing is August, 1922 (Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 167), it should be before then, but that date is by no means free of doubt. Enkebatu and Erhenbayar say Mersé arrived in Beijing early in 1923, which cannot be really excluded on present evidence.

[75] Jamsran, "MAKhN, Öwör Mongold ardyn khuwisgalt nam üüsch bekhjikhed tusalsan ni," p. 11; *BNKhAU-yn Öwör Mongolyn öörtöö zasakh oron*, p. 28. These sources say Fumingtai and Mersé went to Khüriye in 1922, information which derives from an article in the 1925 party journal *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un sedkhül*, a copy of which is I have not been able to access. Other sources, however, state that Fumingtai went to Khüriye first and Mersé did not go there until 1923.

source details Fumingtai's activities between 1919 and 1923, but, it is clear that with this move Fumingtai began his long-term role as the most dedicated supporter of the Moscow-Ulaanbaatar tendency in the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement. In July, 1923, he delivered a congratulatory address to the First Congress of the Mongolian People's Party, on behalf of the Hulun Buir Students Association.[76] His arrival was not part of any active Outer Mongolian initiative; it would be more than a year before the Mongolian government responded to his visit with a plan to organize and assist the nationalist movement in Hulun Buir. Still, the arrival of Fumingtai re-established on a youth basis the ties between Mongolia and Hulun Buir that had been so active on an aristocratic basis in the 1910s.

Mersé on the other hand slipped off to Beijing with some young comrades. As his "Soul-Stirring Song of the Mongolian Youth" indicated, he still had many doubts about the new regime in Mongolia. Once in the Chinese capital, Mersé kept busy working on an extended presentation of the Mongolian issue to the Chinese public: *Menggu wenti* "The Mongolian Question," which he completed in February, 1923. This work, like his earlier lectures to Christian organizations, combined a summary of the Mongolian situation, now updated with accounts of the White and Red Russian adventures in Mongolia, with an appeal for support for Mersé's program for an all-around cultural renewal of the Mongols. "The Mongolian Question," however, closed the Christian phase in Mersé's political life. The book breathed not a word about the spiritual darkness which had seemed so terrible to him in 1920, and made no appeal to Chinese Christians.

Despite this major reversal, Mersé's idea's still had much continuity. Indeed large parts of *Menggu wenti* are simply expansions of the lectures he gave on the Mongolian question to Christian audiences. He remained firm as ever in his conviction that Mongolia, and the Powers' fights over it, was the real "Yellow Peril" (*huang huo*) of the twentieth century, and that education, specifically a Mongol-Han University (*Meng-Han daxue*), was the proper way to conduct this renewal. Instead of appealing to the Chinese church for aid on Christian principles, he appealed to the Chinese public to realize that the qinque-racial republic was in its final

[76] *Mongol Ardyn Namyn khoyordugaar ikh khural (barimt bichgüüd). 1923 ony doloo-naimdugaar sar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1974), p. 12. At the time, this congress was called the First Congress. Sometime in 1923-4, however, it was decided that the meeting on March 1-3, 1921, was the party's First Congress, and so that of 1923 was renumbered as the Second Congress after the fact. I have kept here with the original numbering.

crisis, and that unless the Chinese leaders reform their policies to secure the voluntary adherence of the Mongols, they would lose Mongolia for ever.

Just as significant as his new arguments about Mongolia's needs and their relief were his new associates. Xu Baolian, and other persons in the Chinese Christian community disappeared from his life and instead Mersé began to associate with Mongol KMT members and parliamentarians. *Menggu wenti*'s two prefaces, one by the famous Chinese journalist, politician, and public figure Liang Qichao, and the second by Bai Yunti, publicized his new friendships. The prefaces pointed the reader to the themes of "awakening" and of racial survival that formed two of the most prominent preoccupations of the Chinese political intelligentsia in the early twentieth century.[77]

Liang Qichao's preface, written in April, 1923, called on the Chinese public to pay attention to Mersé's book. Liang was the perfect man to introduce Mersé to a Chinese audience. Unlike Sun Yat-sen, who rooted the Chinese nation firmly in primordial ties of kinship and a racial typology, Liang saw the nation as a community of awakened citizens. The awakening process itself carried the citizen beyond narrow ethnicity into broad nationalism.[78] In the preface, Liang argued that not only must the Mongols be awakened to modern culture, but the Han race also must be thoroughly awakened to the Mongols' need for help to become ready for self-rule under the five-colored flag of the Republic of China. Liang confessed himself to be unawakened in this regard and called on Mersé, as one of the first awakened ones, to enlighten the others in China about the importance of the Mongolian issue.

Mersé had been acquainted with Bai Yunti and AltanOchir during his student days, but A.I. Oshirov, the later Comintern representative to the party, put 1923 as the main year when the future leaders of the party began to coalesce into a discrete group. In that year, he reported, AltanOchir turned away from his pro-Japanese stance and Murungga turned away from his pro-Chinese stance to join Bai Yunti and Mersé.[79] Mandaltu was also probably associated with them at this time; later he joined Bai, AltanOchir, and Murungga in claiming that "we had at first

[77] See John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996) and Frank Dikötter, *Discourse of Race in Modern China*.

[78] Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, pp. 86-87.

[79] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 107, 109.

strove to create the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia."[80] A 1927 article on the party in Beijing's *Chen bao* ("Morning Post") also put 1923 as the year when radical youth bred by the KMT began creating an organized national movement desiring aid from both their own party and from Outer Mongolia.[81] No formal party organization came into being at this point, however; instead, the Mongol KMT formed a social circle that met regularly to discuss the issues of Mongolia at the Fuquanguan restaurant on Beijing's Longfusi Temple Street.[82]

Formal organization, though, was certainly on Bai Yunti's mind. His preface called for a specifically Mongolian organization to fight against the nobility and bring the Mongols fully into the bright promise of republican rule. Like Mersé he saw the chief evil of the Mongols' situation not to lie in being part of the Chinese Republic, but rather in being deprived of its benefits:

> Most of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) has broken away from dictatorship and enjoys equality and happiness. Only the more than five million Mongols have up till now not ascended into the ranks of equality and are still oppressed under the class dictatorship. The rights of private persons have all been stripped away and we often have no place to dwell or way to live. The rights of citizens have been entirely sold off and we never have any chance to participate in government. Despite the name of the Republic we are really like black slaves. The princes' and dukes' brutality is like that of [the ancient tyrants] Jie and Zhou. The miserable hardship of the Mongolian people is like that in Korea.

Bai Yunti explained the heretofore passivity of the Mongols both by their lack of organization and by their lack of awareness:

> The common Mongolian people lack organization, awareness, and the spirit of self-determination. If they had an organization, and if they could wake up and enter the spirit of national self-determination, and in an enthusiasm of independence were to rise up to struggle through fire and flood, gladly suffering in a just cause, only afraid of falling behind, then when our Mongolian nation struggled for freedom, for equality, for human dignity, and fought to leave behind the pernicious vestiges of dictatorship, would it not be as easy as turning over one's hand?[83]

[80] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 52 (Serengdonrub, Mandaltu, AltanOchir, and Murungga to MPRP CC, Sept. 27, 1927).

[81] "San qian li wai zhi chi guo," *Chen bao*, January 31, 1927.

[82] *A Regional Handbook for the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region* (New Haven, 1956), pp. 49, 72; Sechin Jagchid, personal communication, undated (summer, 1993). The July 26, 1925, meeting of the PRPIM presidium was held at this restaurant (see photograph), which served as a meeting place for Mongols in Beijing well into the 1930s.

Bai Yunti expressed the common fear that if such an organization did not happen, then the stagnation of the past years would be replaced by a rapid extinction of the Mongols in the current conditions of "survival of the fittest." His comparison of the Mongols to "black slaves" (*hei nu*) recalled the repeated warnings of Chinese pamphleteers that the brown, red, and black races were destined for extinction and only the yellow race would remain to contest the "white peril."[84] Through a racial awakening, the Mongols would have to own up to their "yellow" destiny and take charge of their fate.

Clearly, although Mersé and Bai Yunti were not advocating complete separation from China, they were calling for Mongolian self-determination. Given the rhetorical context of awakening, however, it is important not to understand this idea primarily in terms of formal institutions of autonomy or guarantees of minority rights. In the Chinese rhetorical context, "self-determination" for the Mongols meant Mongols making historically conscious decisions for themselves. The basic precondition for such consciousness was Mongolian awakening, that is a new individual reality of independence from the old traditions of subservience to the nobility and blind faith in Buddhism. Once this awakening occurred then self-determination was almost an automatic result—"as easy as turning over one's hand." Just as with Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang, the emphasis on an awakened vanguard waking up the nation turned attention away from institutional guarantees of rights towards the transforming power of the pedagogical state once placed in the hands of the vanguard tutors. The vital step was not strategies for seizing power, although that would follow, but the conversion of hearts and the formation of a principled and committed core of activists.[85]

Mersé's new friends were helpful not only in advertising his works, but also in finding him employment. Mersé held a position, some sources say as a dean, at the Mongolian and Tibetan School, and had an offer from the pioneering Mongolian publisher, Temgetü, in Beijing to manage a branch in Mukden, but none of these jobs really matched Mersé's ambitions. An introduction from AltanOchir, however, got him an interview with the Chinese diplomat, C.T. Wang (Wang Zhengting,

[83] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, p. 3.

[84] Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, pp. 156, 162-63, cf. pp. 112, 68-69, 147-49.

[85] Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, esp. pp. 34-39.

1882-1961). Having listened to Mersé's views on the national minority question, Wang chose Mersé as a consultant and Russian translator for the Sino-Russian Relations Office, the ad hoc office set up in March-April, 1923, to handle Beijing's coming negotiations on diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. Wang had been the predecessor of David Yui as General Secretary of the YMCA in China, and Mersé's selection may also have been a last gift of his Christian connections.[86]

The most important perk of his new job was the opportunity to travel to Mongolia proper. Mersé was uncertain of the direction of Russian policy, but at the same time, however, was certain that Mongolian independence could not be reduced to Russia's machinations:

> But from now on what policy Red Russia will advance toward the Mongolian question, or whether it will allow others to have a finger in the pie, or if it regards Mongolia as a present to be exchanged on certain conditions is a truly fascinating mystery...[Yet] the ten years of the Mongolian independence movement—how can they be blotted out and seen as simply being hoodwinked by others?"[87]

Ascertaining the real facts on the ground was crucial not only to Wang's office, but even more to Mersé personally. In spring or early summer, 1923, Mersé set off on a fact finding mission to Outer Mongolia, with permission from the Directorate of Sino-Russian Negotiations for a four month visit and $600 silver traveling expenses. Once he had spent a few months in Mongolia's capital of Neislel Khüriye, though, he decided to widen his horizons and, with no authorization from Wang, visited Moscow. He returned east in early August, having crossed Siberia in the suite of Lev Karakhan's mission to China, and stayed in Buriatia, meeting Maria Sakh'ianova and seeing Lake Baikal before returning to Hailar. He spoke to the students at Mekhertü Ail School on his trip to Mongolia and the Soviet Union and received a great welcome.

When Mersé returned to Beijing, C.T. Wang promptly fired him, as much for his evident red sympathies as for his gross violation of instructions. The order for his arrest was evidently not very serious since he returned to the north area again to use his new Russian connections.

[86] Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 167; Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," p. 166. Nozu puts the interview with AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang) in August, 1922, which seems rather early, since the office wasn't even envisioned until March, 1923. On C.T. Wang, see his biography in Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, III, s.v. Wang Cheng-t'ing. On this office, see Leong *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations*, p. 241

[87] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti*, pp. 12, 19.

There he secured employment with the Chinese Superintendent of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Zhu Qinglan, but Wang quickly sent a letter explaining that Mersé was an unreliable Red, and got him fired again.[88]

By the time of this visit, if not before, the members of the Hulun Buir Students Association reorganized themselves as the Eastern Border People's Party (*Doronadu khijagar-un arad-un nam*), the first, and for several years the only, ethnic Mongol party based on Inner Mongolian soil.[89] Fumingtai at the Mongolian People's Party congress had only claimed to represent the Students Association, but now the Hulun Buir youth organized a formal political party that, from its name, clearly saw itself as a branch of Mongolia's People's Party. It is uncertain exactly what role Mersé and Fumingtai played in its initial organization, since neither was able to stay for long in the region but it is likely that when Mersé and Fumingtai met again in Neislel Khüriye bringing the Hulun Buir youth together in a more formal organization was one of their topics of conversation. In any case, they, along with the Buriat Tseden-Ishi and Fumingtai's elder brother Hualintai, formed the new party'sleadership core, officially designated the "Committee" (*khoriyan*) or "General

[88] Nozu, "Nozu chihua yundong," p. 167; Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," pp. 166-67. Nozu's account of Mersé's trip to Russia, while plausible and circumstantial, contains some chronological problems. He claims that Mersé left Beijing in July, stayed in Neislel Khüriye three months, then left for Moscow, where he also stayed for three months, returned to the East with Karakhan, and then stayed in Khüriye another half year. Karakhan's mission to China, however set out from Moscow on August 2 and arrived in Harbin nine days later (see Whiting, *Soviet Policies*, 208-210 and Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations* 248-9). Thus Mersé probably left in the spring, soon after C.T. Wang's office was created (March, 1923). On Zhu Qinglan, see Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China 1911-1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Ideal* (Stanford, 1977), pp. 77, 110.

[89] Mersé in *Hulun Beir wenti*, pp. 25-26, implies the date of the party's founding as 1923-4, which is followed by Zhaqi Siqin [Jagchid Sechin], in *Menggu zhi jinxi*, p. 255. A somewhat earlier date is suggested by a letter from August 1925 which explicitly says the EBPP has been in existence for three years, while two other letters from 1925 mention the EBPP as having been formed "several years" ago; see (Central Party Archives 7-1-29:26 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925); 7-1-20: 42-43 (Bochiroo, and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925); 7-1-29:13 (Mersé to MPRP CC, Sept. 13, 1925). In any case Fumingtai went from representing the Students Association to being a party representative between the First Congress (July, 1923) and Third Congresses (August, 1924) of the MPP, and this brackets the dates for the change. L. Jamsran, "MAKhN, Öwör Mongold," p. 11, and *BNKhAU-yn Öwör Mongolyn öörtöö zasakh oron*, p. 28, seems to have misread Sechin Jagchid's "between year 12-13 of the Republic" (that is, between 1923-4) as meaning winter, 1922-3.

Figure 2.5: The Front Cover of Mersé's Menggu wenti *(1923)*

Committee" (*yerüngkhei khoriyan*). Duke Tsengde's son Eldengtai and a little-known figure, Adiyabazar, served at various times as the committee's secretaries.[90]

The organization of this party also involved the Mongolian People's Party in Neislel Khüriye. The party's Central Committee founded, sometime between its First and Third Congresses (July, 1923 and August, 1924), an Eastern Department (*Doronadu kheltes*), which seems to have been simply another name for the Eastern Border People's Party; in any case, Fumingtai was this department's representative in the capital.[91] Most likely at this time, the Mongolian authorities issued a seal to the Eastern Border People's Party (EBPP). This seal had a large swastika as a symbol of the Buddhist religion and the inscription: "Seal of the Committee of the Eastern Border People's Party."[92] Issuing it was both an official act of recognition on the part of the Mongolian government, and a way for the chosen recipients to back up their own claim to have support in the prestigious new Mongolian government.

The major impetus behind this official recognition of the Young Mongols in Bargu probably came from Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino, who must have known Fumingtai and Mersé from the Dauriia Station movement, and who from 1920 on was, like Tseden-Ishi and other veterans of the pan-Mongolist movement, being used by the Siberian Communist Party and the Communist International to direct the Mongolian People's Party. From the First Congress through the spring of 1925, Rinchino was at the peak of his influence, serving on the presidium of the Mongolian People's Party and as chairman of the party's powerful Military Council.[93] Fumingtai had kept silent at the First Congress, but by the Third Congress, he was clearly a close follower of Rinchino. The Buriat's ideology of pan-Mongolism and social revolution was very close to the opinions Fumingtai expressed at

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[90] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29:16-17 (Mersé and Eldengtai to MPRP CC, Dec. 15, 1924); 7-1-29:26 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925)

[91] *Mongol Ardyn namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 41, 58; *Mongolia: Yesterday and Today* (Tianjin, n.d.), p. 20.

[92] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 14 (Mersé to MPRP CC, Sept. 13, 1925) mentions the issuing of the seal, of which an example is stamped on 7-1-29: 17 (Mersé and Eldengtai to MPRP CC, Dec. 15, 1924).

[93] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 265; *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, p. 265.

least from 1924 on and the young Daur always strongly supported him in the Third Congress's violent debates.[94]

While the contacts made in the Dauriia Station movement and the close ethnic connections between the Bargu Mongols and the Eastern Buriats like Rinchino, Tseden-Ishi, and Dashi Sampilon laid the basis for these friendly relations, Soviet cooperation was necessary for Mongolia to pursue connections beyond its borders. Up through 1924, this cooperation seems to have been forthcoming only for ties in Hulun Buir, due to Soviet interests in keeping the Chinese Eastern Railway in friendly hands. Throughout this period, both Mongolia and Soviet Russia treated Bargu as a separate case distinct from the larger issue of Inner Mongolia.

The new party eagerly promoted itself as a useful instrument for the security of the new Mongolian government in Neislel Khüriye. In 1925, Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden-Ishi, and secretary Adiyabazar reminded the Mongolian authorities that their support for Hulun Buir's revolutionaries was not purely altruistic. This support was based on the belief that correctly handling Bargu Mongols and the eastern border was a crucial policy and that bringing the local people there into the new ideas (*shine surtal*) and strengthening the links between the Khalkha and the Bargus would fortify the frontier against the alien enemies, that is, the Chinese.[95]

As with the early networks in Beijing, the level of formal organization should not be exaggerated. The new party proved typical of many later Bargu organizations not only in their domination by Hailar Daurs and in their close relation, almost symbiosis, with the leading Daur families, but also in their loose and shifting character. Although the party enrolled names, no party cards were ever issued.[96] Since central party organs were expected to number their documents consecutively, the pace of numbering gives some idea of the amount of formal activity in the party. Up until December 14, 1924, the EBPP's Committee had issued only 10 documents and by September, the next year it was only

[94] *Mongol Ardyn namyn gurawdugaar ikh Khural*, pp. 60, 64, 101; *Mongolia: Yesterday and Today*, pp. 33, 40. Fumingtai's harsh criticism of military discipline in particular (p. 101) helped Rinchino in his bitter feud with General Danzin, who was the army's commander-in-chief.

[95] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 26 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925).

[96] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:42-43 (Bochiroo, and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925).

on number 18.[97] Thus whatever activity there was, must have been very informal. Nor did the party seem to hold any formal convocation before late 1924.

The party leaders explained their difficulties as due to oppression by the ruling powers. Opposition by the "officials" and the "rich," that is those of the Daur elite who opposed secession, and particularly the "reactionary Chinese," that is the Chinese authorities in the provincial government, forced the party to remain secret. As a result, "it is ever harder to conduct the aims and ideals of the party's new thinking in an open and comprehensive way..."[98] Yet the rhetoric about "officials" and the "rich" cannot be taken at face value. Whatever the differences between the sons and nephews of Duke Tsengde or Minggu and those of Guifu or Shengfu, it was not wealth or official position, since all were alike members of the region's wealthy herd-owning elite. Given this fact, the party's loose organization can be explained as well by the availability of many channels of interaction between party members, formal or informal, as by the limitations imposed by secrecy. If party propaganda and recruitment could be carried on in the Mekhertü Ail School or in the cooperative meetings, what need was there for a tightly organized party?

The new party enrolled members almost entirely in Hulun Buir. Of the fourteen persons of known origin who were active in the party, eleven hailed from the Bargu area. Of the three others, one, Tseden-Ishi, was a Buriat from Russia and two hailed from the Butkha or Naun Muren Daurs in the area east of the Khinggan range.[99] As one might

[97] See Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 17 (Mersé and Eldengtai to MPRP CC, Dec. 15, 1924), 7-1-29: 26 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925), and 7-1-29: 14 (Mersé to MPRP CC, Sept. 13, 1925).

[98] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29:27 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925).

[99] Soyoltai is identified as a Qiqihar Daur in Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 2 (Office of Internal Security, report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932). Bochiroo is described as simply a Bargu in Rintchen, *Folklore Mongol*, IV, 174, and identifies himself as a "Heilongjiang Bargu" (*Khara Mören-ü Bargu*) in Central Party Archives 7-1-20: 42-43 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925). While there are no ethnic Bargus in the Naun Muren area, the point of the word Heilongjiang is to contrast those Bargus from the Hulun Buir area from those of the Naun Muren area to the east of the Khinggan. As Ts. Khandsüren has pointed out in an interview, at that time, Khalkha Mongols called all those from Hulun Buir, whether Daur, Bargu, or Solon, as Bargus (interview, April 7, 1992). Hence Bochiroo seems to be a Daur from the Butkha area. His name may be derived from the Daur word *bojroo* "ovary," or else *bojroo*<*bijroo* "rash, measles, macula" (see Enhebatu, *Da-Han xiao cidian* [Höhhot, 1983]).

expect the leading positions in the new party fell completely to the Hailar Daur elite. Of the seven men named as leaders or other responsible members of the party in documents, five are Hailar Daurs of either the Gobol clan or the Aula clan, and one was the Buriat Tseden-Ishi mentioned above. Only one member, Purba, is definitely known to have not been a Daur; he was a Chibchin Bargu from Arshaan Shüngülen in Old Bargu.

After himself turning away from the Mongolian model, Mersé later recalled that the students who had been influenced by the Outer Mongolian revolution, "established ties with the Outer Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and completely adopted their proposals and methods."[100] More contemporary Mongolian documentary sources show the same profession of loyalty to Mongolia and the Mongolian People's Party:

> Previously we members praised and revered the principles of your People's Party and followed its teachings implicitly. We began party activity in this eastern land of Bargu with a sincere intent to accomplish the great task: to lead the masses, repressed by the tortures of the reactionaries onto the road of freedom and civilization and to unify our people.[101]

Other documents stated that the party was formed because the members had faith (*süsüglejü*) in the liberation of the Mongolian race (*ugsagatan*) from the hands of aliens.[102] The religious overtones in the language derived from the language of loyalty and devotion that governed the emotional life of the Qing imperial officials toward their emperor and found its popular expression in the popular and officially-approved *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*.[103] These young nationalists, virtually all from families in the office-holding ruling class of Bargu, had evidently transferred the tradition of rhetorical devotion to the emperor to the new regime in Neislel Khüriye.

This new commitment was above that of any other tie. One group of young Bargu nationalists, in defending their determination to strive for the eternal cause of the Mongolian race without stinting their lives

[100] Guo Daofu, *Hulun Beir wenti*, p. 26.

[101] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 26 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925).

[102] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 42-43 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925).

[103] See Christopher P. Atwood, "'Worshiping Grace': The Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia," *Late Imperial China* 21 (2000), pp. 86-139.

and abandoning parents and brothers, quoted the Confucian classics, "In ancient works it was said, 'For the great principle, even kin may be destroyed.'"[104] Implicit in this placing of loyalty to the Mongolian cause even above that of kinship was a glorification of the principled band of brothers, who had recognized this call of principle. If the loyalty to Mongolia recalled the officially-approved *Three Kingdoms*, this fraternal tie recalled that extolled in the somewhat subversive *Outlaws of the Marsh*. Thus Fumingtai in his personal correspondence would religiously start a new line elevated above the rest whenever he used the word "principled comrades" (*jirum-un nökhöd*) just as the Mongols had before elevated the title of the emperor.[105] Just as striking as the retention of old forms of devotion, is the re-application of this ritual devotion from the authority-figure to the fraternity.

This transferred devotion to the new government in Ulaanbaatar was the crux that linked the party's progressivism with its pan-Mongolism. The first had been part of the New Policies and the second part of the reaction against them in 1912, but now the two could be pursued together. The importance of the modernizing ideological element was underlined by Mersé and others when they referred to "the new thinking and the party's aims" (*shine üjel nam-un jorilta*) as one package.[106] In this sense, going to Mongolia to pursue the opportunity for a technical education became an act of high courage and purpose. The group of students already cited who had expressed their determination to sacrifice life and kin for the cause of Mongolia saw "training themselves in civilization to the extent of their capacity for education" as their chief means of helping the cause.[107]

Since the new Mongolian government was abolishing the old Manchu feudal system and committing itself to a complete transformation of the government, to spread the "new thinking" in Bargu would, the party members hoped, naturally lead to unification with Outer Mongolia. This connection was made by Mersé who claimed that the new party had already done a lot in introducing the "new thinking" to the Bargu masses, youth, and rural officials, and that hence they were showing a

[104] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 42 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925).

[105] See, for example, Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 46 (Buyangerel to Gombo, Feb. 5, 1928).

[106] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 27 (Hualintai, Mersé, Tseden'ishi, and Adiyabazar to MPRP CC, Aug. 1, 1925).

[107] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 42 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925).

warm loyalty to Mongolia. Despite Bargu's semi-autonomy, Mersé asserted, the area's high and middle officials took the Chinese side, "so we have tried every way possible to escape from the Chinese side and bring Bargu affairs closer to Outer Mongolia."[108] Other young party members proclaimed how they saw that their Mongolian brothers had already come out from under oppression and freed themselves and so hoped every day to come to the land of the Khalkha Mongols.[109] In the subsequent history of the party, the Bargu leaders' sense that Hulun Buir was unique both in its strategic importance to Outer Mongolia and in its ripeness for secession repeatedly disrupted the more comprehensively Inner Mongolian strategies pursued by the Comintern and the Kharachin circle.

[108] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 13 (Mersé to MPRP CC, Sept. 13, 1925).
[109] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 42-43 (Bochiroo and others to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1925).

CHAPTER THREE

CANTON AND KHÜRIYE, DECEMBER, 1923-SEPTEMBER, 1924

The Daurs and Inner Mongols were not the only ones whom the Soviet intervention in Mongolia had set to thinking. As we have seen, using the Soviet position in Mongolia to the advantage of the Chinese Revolution had long been a tantalizing possibility to Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen refused to give up his plan, despite Joffe's flat rejection in 1922. Although it has not been highlighted in general histories, Sun Yat-sen in the fall of 1923 was once again seriously considering relocating his main base to China's northern border regions.

Sun Yat-sen's Northern Dream

On September 9, 1923, while Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen's erratic former chief of staff, was touring the Soviet Union, he proposed to his interlocutors in the Red Army his mentor's new plan. He argued that since the imperialists, who supported the Zhili warlord coalition in Central China headed by Marshal Wu Peifu, would never allow his Kuomintang to win, and Canton was too near to Hong Kong, a total reorientation of strategy was necessary. In Shaanxi province, a KMT party member Yu Youren (1879-1964) had organized local military leaders into an irregular force, the Jingguojun or "Reverence-the-Republic Army." In Inner Mongolia and in western Manchuria another guerilla force of ethnic Chinese was being created on the model of the Red Army. (Although Chiang discretely left it vague, this force was actually being recruited under Zhang Zuolin, the "Old Marshal" of Manchuria and one of Moscow's prime bogeymen.) Finally bandits were active in Central China. Through Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen proposed to bring all these forces together for a crushing blow from the north against the Zhili coalition's troops. On September 17, Sun secretly informed the Soviet envoy to China, Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan (1889-1937), that, "Chiang is to take up with your government and military experts a proposal for

which seemed to encourage the Chinese commercial firms to reestablish their dominance in Mongolia.[47]

In the end, the assembly ended inconclusively, voting criticisms of both General Danzin and Rinchino. The whole question of pan-Mongolian unification and Bai Yunti's proposal got lost in the fireworks between the two Danzins and Rinchino. At the close of the meeting, Tserindorji, Mongolia's prime minister and a respected senior official, came and spoke to Danzin, getting him to back down, and admit to Elbek-Dorzhi that he had been in error on many points.[48] The consequence of this temporary healing of the feud was that Bai Yunti's appeal went unanswered. Since the appeal was intimately associated with General Danzin's cause, Danzin's retreat left Rinchino's policy of dealing only with the Hulun Buir Daurs unchallenged. Thus, the Central Committee in Neislel Khüriye made no reply to either of Bai's two proposals, and issued him no seal. There is no information on exactly when Bai Yunti left Mongolia, but at the party's Third Congress (August 4-September 1, 1924), Fumingtai again was Inner Mongolia's sole representative, and the party leaders' answers to inquiries about the Danzin mission to Canton revealed only that "we have taken steps towards a harmonious cooperation with the Kuomintang."[49] Due to the controversies in Neislel Khüriye, Bai's bid to make himself Mongolia's man in Inner Mongolia had failed for the moment. It would bear fruit later.

[47] *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 168-69.

[48] *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 169-70.

[49] *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, p. 32; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 265.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ORDOS VIGILANTES, 1913-1924

Bai Yunti's desire to secure a seal, and so a monopoly of approval, from the Mongolian People's Party was very timely. Over the course of 1924, travel between Mongolia and China became much more frequent, a development assisted by the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Soviet Russia in May 30, 1924, and by the rebirth of the wool and skin trade from Mongolia through to Zhangjiakou and Tianjin. Khalkha Mongols began to travel again to Beijing in 1924 for various purposes, scholarly, commercial, and political, and the mutual visits between northern China and independent Mongolia continued through 1928.[1] This new social interaction between China and Mongolia, inevitably also opened the way for Mongols from a wide variety of places in Inner Mongolia to make the same pilgrimage to Neislel Khüriye that the Bargu Mongols had done before. Of those who came in touch with Mongolia many were very different in history and world-view from either the Kuomintang-aligned East Mongols or the Bargu

[1] The visits of Mongolian leaders, such as Danzin, Sosordawa, Amur, Buyannemekhü, Dambadorji, and Nasunbatu, to Beijing and Zhangjiakou on political business will be dealt in various places in the narrative. But interchange between Mongolia and China was also taking place in cultural/scholarly and commercial fields. Visitors for scholarly purposes included Tsyben Zhamtsarano and Shagja: *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, p. 207; Robert A. Rupen, "Cyben Zamcaranovic Zamcarano (1880-?1940)," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 19 (1956), 136, 138; Naguyisayinküü and Naringolküü, *Temgetü-yin namtar* (Chifeng, 1989), pp. 85, 87; Ts. Damdinsüren, *Namtryn khuudsaas (namtar, dursamj, temdeglel, turshlaga)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1989), p. 70. Mongols in China to promote trade included Ba. Danzin, Dobchin, and the former Minister of Finance Dorji *Meiren* (Deputy Adjutant Dorji); see Dashdawaa and Kozlov, *Komintérn ba Mongol*, pp. 441, 453; *Mongol Ardyn Namyn Gurawdugaar ikh khural*, p. 260; Damdinsüren, *Namtryn khuudsaas*, p. 65; and Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen-ü matériyal-un emkidkel*, II (1982), pp. 246-247. When the Panchen Lama came to Beijing a certain amount of pilgrimage to see him seems also to have taken place, although the Mongolian government, worried about the Panchen Lama's political purposes, discouraged it; see Lattimore and Isono, *Diluv Khutagt*, pp. 131, 177. Chinese and Inner Mongolians were also traveling to Ulaanbaatar; the former were treated with deep suspicion, as can be seen throughout in Ma, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia*.

Mongols. Hailing from southeast Inner Mongolia, they represented another regionally-based current within the growing circle of revolution-minded Inner Mongols.

The Duguilang Movement in Ordos

The Ordos plateau, surrounded by the great bend of the Yellow River, and hence known in Chinese as the Hetao, occupied the southeast part of the Suiyuan Special Region. To the south it bordered on Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces, and to the west on Gansu province. Although the area was one of the driest and poorest areas in Mongolia, contemporaries estimated the Mongol population at about 100,000 persons. Surrounded on virtually all four sides by Chinese farming counties, Ordos was economically not a single unit, with the economy of its banners dependent on trade with neighboring county seats, such as Baotou and Guisui (modern Höhhot) in Suiyuan to the north, Yulin in Shaanxi to the south, and Ningxia in Gansu to the west.[2] Although this trade was local and hence little documented, it probably resembled the rest of Mongolia in the exchange of animal products, especially skins, meat, and live animals, for grain and processed consumer goods. Unlike in either Hulun Buir or Khalkha Mongolia, foreign firms played no part; this small-scale trade was monopolized entirely by Chinese merchants. One unique feature of Ordos, related to its desert climate, was the large number of salt and soda lakes which supplied most of these counties' needs.

Politically, Ordos was divided into seven banners, which were united into the Yekhe Juu League, one of Inner Mongolia's traditional six leagues. Jüüngar, Dalad, Wang and Jasag banners in the northeast were all rather small and by 1920 had been heavily colonized by Chinese farmers. Üüshin in the southeast, Khanggin in the northwest and Otog in the southwest were much larger in area, and although all had lost substantial tracts of territory along their edges to Chinese cultivation, they still retained vast areas of open desert and steppe, where Mongols were (and at present still are) the bulk of the population. Similar to Innner Mongolia's other autonomous banners, each Ordos banner had a ruler with a titled rank, usually prince (*wang*) or grand-duke (*beile or beise*), out of whom Beijing would chose two by seniority to be league captain-general (*chigulgan-u da*) and deputy captain-general (*ded da*).

[2] In this description, I have followed the account given by A.I. Oshirov, the Comintern adviser, in his 1926 report translated in *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian* (Beijing, 1928), IV, *San*..., 3a-b.

for an indefinite period. The league system, however, did not secure the political unity that stronger yamen system gave Hulun Buir. The Comintern agent from Buriatia, A.I. Oshirov, commented on the political weakness of Yekhe Juu:

> The weakness of Ordos is the disorderliness and lack of solidarity of the banners. Even further we can say it is the weakness of all Inner Mongolia—each banner has no connection with each other and they have feuds between themselves. Each one practices its own foreign policy. The princes each protect their own individual interests, and with the active aid of the neighboring [Chinese] regions' garrisons.[3]

Apart from the league's captain-general, the other, almost equally weak, organ of central rule was the office of the dutong or military governor of Suiyuan, which directly controlled the counties in the northern part of the plateau and also served as an intermediary between the banner rulers and the Mongolian and Tibetan Department in Beijing. The amount of supervision from the dutong was very slight, however, and the counties along the southern and eastern borders as part of Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu provinces also had a supervisory role over the Chinese population in the neighboring banners, thus creating endless opportunities for litigation and conflict.[4]

By 1925, the banner yamens of Ordos for almost thirty or forty years had been sunk in a chronic financial crisis which led to just as chronic strife with the populace. As the populace saw it, the tyrannical rulers (*ejerkheg jasag*) oppressed the people with enormous taxes, which were collected unfairly, so that, for example, one tael of silver would be counted as only two or three *qian* (a *qian* was 1/10 of a tael). Chinese traders sold goods at high prices, but when the princes and nobility paid of their own private debts through collecting animals from the bannermen and selling them to the Chinese, the animals were valued at a low price. All the ranks and higher titles desired by the nobles had to

[3] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 3b. The decades-long border dispute between Üüshin and Otog banners was a notorious example of this internecine conflict. See Joseph Van Hecken, "Une dispute entre deux bannières mongoles et le rôle joué par les missionaires catholiques," *Monumenta Serica*, 19 (1960), 276-305, and Henry Serruys, "A Question of Land and Landmarks between the Banners Otoγ and Üüsin (Ordos), 1904-1906," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 13 (1979), 213-37.

[4] Joseph Van Hecken, *Les reductions catholiques du pays des Ordos: Une méthode d'apostolat des missionaires de Scheut* (Schöneck/Beckenried, Switz., 1957), pp. 13-15; Henry Serruys, "A Collective Letter of Protest by the Mongol Princes of Ordos, 1920," *Oriens Extremus*, 23 (1976), 213-24.

be bought with bribes from the authorities in Guisui and Beijing (the office of league chairman was especially coveted), and these were also paid for by collecting special taxes from the bannermen. Even worse than this cheating by the Mongol nobles and the officials working with the Chinese merchants was how the nobles were step-by-step selling off the most profitable parts of the banner lands to Chinese land developers. Needless to say, when they sold off lands and salt-lakes to the Chinese, the ruler's yamen officials would receive bribes and kickbacks. This oppression in turn led to popular gatherings of *duguilang*s, literally 'circles' in Mongolian, to present with one voice the demands of those outside the yamen and to resist all the authorities (*aliba alba-yin eteged-yi esergüchen*). By 1925, the resulting situation had reached one of stalemate in which further land sales were politically difficult, if not impossible, for the yamens.[5]

The already colonized land, however, was lost forever to the Mongolian population and the Mongols of severly affected Ordos banners had emigrated to other banners and even outside the league altogether. These duguilangs were particularly numerous in the large southern banners of Üüshin and Otog, where the occupation of large stretches of land by the Catholic Scheut mission orders supplied an additional grievance. The number of people involved in these two banners' duguilangs reached into the tens of thousands, and the yamens, finding themselves unable to secure order, turned for assistance to the neighboring Chinese counties of Yulin and Ningxia.[6]

The name duguilang came from the members' custom of sitting circles. Despite the seemingly spontaneous character of the duguilangs, by the 1920s the meetings had fixed procedures, with detailed rules and regulations. The duguilang meetings took place at distinct spots and were called by leaders, who had risen to influence through their ability to successfully lead the duguilangs to victory over the banner yamens. The number of people involved in the duguilangs in any one banner could rise to 5,000 or even 10,000; participants in any one meeting numbered in the hundreds, sitting in concentric circles. When banner or league decisions were being made the duguilangs would summon the officials.

[5] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 38 (Möngkhe'öljei's report to the PRPIM Special Congress [1927]); 7-1-26:56 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]). Both writers were duguilang leaders in Üüshin Banner.

[6] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 4b-5a, 5b. The report also mentions a third county, Baichao, which does not exist. Obviously either Oshirov or the anonymous translator has made a mistake.

put them in the center of the circle and demand that they answer the questions put by the duguilang leaders.

No source gives a detailed description of the kind of fixed rituals that took place. One letter from two duguilang members to Mongolia gives a brief description of a founding ritual that took place in 1913. After describing the various woes of the people under the tyranny of the nobles and officials, the letters states that Öljeijirgal called on them to gather together and consult as the only way to restore their rights, redeem the people, cut off the enemies' robbery, land reclamation, unlimited taxes, and the rules of the *gaming*s (that is, the Chinese Republican authorities from Chinese *geming* "revolution"). The people then all resolved "even if we die we shall have one soul, and even if we are frightened we shall suffer one verdict together" (*ükhebechü sünesü nige ürgebechü tokhos nige*). They mixed the blood of an ox with that of their ring fingers (*idam khurugu*, literally "protector-deity finger") and used the blood to hold a *khanggal*, that is, a solemn oblation made to the fierce (*dogshid*) protector deities of Tibetan-rite Buddhism. It is unclear if this ritual was done only once to found a particular duguilang, or if it was repeated at each meeting. The same text described the oath-bound aims of the duguilangs so founded as fourfold: 1) resist the tyranny (*ejerkheg yosu*) of the nobles, 2) grant the people freedom, 3) strengthen the root of the Buddhist religion and the state (*törö*) of Chinggis Khan, and develop education in civil and military arts, and 4) protect our land from the enemy. The participants, called the "seventy sworn brothers" (*dalan anda*), also seemed to have been committed to the leadership of Öljeijirgal.[7]

By defending the root of religion and state, the duguilangs cast themselves as the defenders, not the opponents, of the traditional "two customs" theory of the state: that the sacred emperor and the Buddhist clergy mutually protected each other and promoted the well-being of the people in this life and the next. The addition of civil and military arts also made a clear allusion to the traditional Chinese division of ruling skills into *wen* (civil or literary), and *wu* (martial), and suggested that the fundamental structures of Qing official epistemology were still valid for the duguilang vigilantes. Of course a key precondition of strengthening the two customs was an actual Mongol population living on its own

[7] Central Party Archives, 7-1-32: 7 (Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu to MPP CC, 29th day of the 4th moon, blue mouse year [June 1, 1924]). The historical background of this incident is given in the biography of Shinelama Öljeijirgal, *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu* (1985), pp. 61-62, but typically this secondary account secularizes the ritual, eliminating any reference to the *khanggal*.

territory and possessing a separate and at least partially sovereign government. As the history of the Kharachin showed, even under the most favorable conditions, the transformation of the Mongols into a rentier class living off the rents paid by Chinese tenants, led to political and ideological changes that distorted this Mongolian theory of rule beyond recovery.

Yet a fundamental principle of the state founded by Chinggis Khan, at least as it had developed by the sixteenth century, was the restriction of this sovereignty to his descendants alone, the nobility. It is thus ironic that in aiming to strengthen the system's roots, they also changed its nature by injecting the first means of popular response into what had been a purely authoritarian system of rule. As the Comintern agent, Oshirov, would emphasize, the duguilangs were the only regular institution in Yekhe Juu League (and indeed in all of Inner Mongolia) whereby those not in government could convene to resist policies pursued by the banner rulers or the Chinese officials. The idea of such popular input into policy making was unheard of in Inner Mongolia.[8] Where they could not openly oppose the duguilangs, however, the nobility and the officials would temporize, wait for the duguilangs to disperse, and then try to ambush and arrest the leaders. The early generation of leaders was assassinated time and again, reported Oshirov, although the record indicates that torture, whippings, and/or periods in the cangue were more common than execution.[9]

As one might expect, the duguilangs as an organization have been a favorite topic for Communist historiography both in Russia and Mongolia (where a similar duguilang movement existed also in western

[8] Owen Lattimore has frequently asserted that even under the Qing the Mongols retained the idea of a collective tribal sovereignty, under which a ruler who persistently misused his power could be overthrown; see *Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 110-112, his 1936 essay "The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism," reprinted in Owen Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 450, and *Mongol Journeys* (New York, 1941), pp. 316-18. Like many of Lattimore's ideas, however, this one came from Mersé (something more or less explicitly suggested in *Mongol Journeys*) and represented a mixing of Mersé's own Daur upbringing with the hopes and dreams of the Young Mongol program. The assertion is, in other words, political not historical and although it has found its way into much secondary literature, the idea that the Mongol people in the Qing period still expected that unpopular rulers would be replaced from below has no evidence to support it.

[9] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 5a-5b.

Khalkha),[10] and in Inner Mongolia.[11] These historians see the movement as genuinely revolutionary, that is, seeking to overthrow the old order and its ruling class and replace it with a new one. The Soviet and Mongolian historians have also emphasized how within the ranks of the duguilangs class divisions can be seen coming more and more to the fore. The duguilangs are thus sewn into a narrative teleology as a not-fully-conscious, native antecedent for the party-led revolutionary/Communist movements that bring their work of insurrection to conclusion.[12] This creation of a direct narrative link between the duguilangs and the Mongolian Revolution was not something created by academic historians. Instead it began in the 1920s when Ordos duguilang members began to go to Mongolia and receive education in the Mongolian party school. Two duguilang members from Üüshin who had studied in

[10] The ground-breaking historical works on the duguilangs were S.D. Dylykov, *Demokraticheskoe dvizhenie mongol'skogo naroda v Kitae: ocherk istoriia* (Moscow, 1953) and Sh. Natsagdorj, *Ar Mongold garsan ardyn khödölgöön (tüükhen nairuulal)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1956). (The latter's main chapter on the duguilangs is translated in Onon, *Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 1-42.)

[11] From 1950 on, a large-scale investigation of the duguilang movement took place in Inner Mongolia. The main genres of works produced seem to be narrative histories, exemplary biographies of good (duguilang leaders) and evil (nobles and "local bully") figures, and document collections. The narratives and biographies contain much important information, although of very uneven quality, while the document collections are of course very valuable. The main narrative history of the movement is Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen-ü matériyal-un emkidkel*, II (1982). All of these works were produced as parts of local history compilation in Ordos in affiliation with the local People's Political Consultative Conference (on the process of this compilation see Søren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen, *The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin* [Armonk, 1995], pp. 199-217). As a result there is often no clear authorship and considerable verbatim repetition between the various sources. The most flagrant case of plagiarism seems to be the virtual verbatim reproduction of Buyan, Altanbagan-a and Edünkesig's work under the name of Sa. Narasun in *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen* (Höhhot, 1989); the original work was published in Ordos locally in an internal circulation volume and not widely available, whereas Narasun's book was published for general circulation by Inner Mongolia People's Press. The main document collections are Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, ed., *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen-ü matériyal-un emkidkel*, I (1981) and Altan'orgil, ed. *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, (Hailar, 1989) III, *Anggi-yin qaricag-a*. Although there is considerable overlap between the two collections, both contain material omitted from the other.

[12] See the similar moves made in narrating the history of the "secret societies" in the 1911 revolution: Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), pp. 115-46.

Ulaanbaatar for two years described Ordos as being under the oppression of the brutal dukes and princes and exploited by the reactionary (or "vicious," *khargis*) Chinese officials and the merciless Chinese bourgeoisie (*khörönggeten*). In response the lower-class proletarian masses (*dooradu ügegüü arad olan*) to protect their interests, guard their territory, and liquidate the harsh bullying and damage from the Chinese farmers, set up a people's league, called the "proletarian circles" (*ügegüü-yin duguilang*).[13] Marxist-sounding terminology has been added in a thoroughly superficial way to the common account of the duguilangs' grievances.

Despite the frequent assertion that over the course of the duguilangs' activities class interests steadily came to the fore, I have found in the primary sources no indication either that class splits within the "popular" ranks emerged, or that there was any consciousness that political conflict was the result of underlying differences in property-holding. Even where this sort of rhetoric appears after 1926, the underlying issue is still one of those holding governmental power, regardless of income or property, against those who did not hold government power, again regardless of income or property.[14] Thus, as in Hulun Buir, rhetoric about rich confronting the poor was not the result of class analysis, but rather a trick of language, common in China's Great Revolution, that defined the opponents of the revolutionary party as by definition rich and exploiters and its supporters as by definition poor and proletarian. Political loyalty was primary and ascribed class position a secondary reflex of it.[15] Before 1927, moreover, the duguilangs never attempted to eliminate the yamen, even when they had the power. Rather they organized themselves in response to specific abuses, which the officials in the banner yamen were either perpetrating, such as arbitrary taxation, sale of banner land, abuse of the banner population, or else not responding to effectively, such as bandit attacks, misdeeds of Chinese settlers, or alteration of borders by neighboring banners. Thus their role in the system was not as a new revolutionary alternative government, but as an organ for the people to resist unpopular decisions of the acknowledged officials.

A key weakness of the duguilangs in their struggle with the yamen was the local basis of their organization. With a few relatively brief

[13] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927).

[14] Roxann Prazniak has concluded the same of anti-New Policies movements in China proper; see *Of Camel Kings and Other Things: Rural Rebels Against Modernity in Late Imperial China* (Lanham, Md., 1999), p. 39.

[15] See Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, pp. 15-16.

exceptions, the duguilangs operated on the basis of direct democracy, thus limiting the size of any given assembly. Since participation was direct, not through representatives, the banners, particularly the large ones such as Otog and Üüshin would come to have a number of local duguilangs each meeting in a particular place. In the late Qing, Üüshin had twelve and Otog had eight. In the early Republic, Otog retained the same eight, but the Üüshin had dissolved and when they were revived in 1913, the number had dropped to eleven.[16] As a result, experienced rulers and officials could increase their maneuvering room by seeking to set the various duguilangs against each other. In Üüshin, where the banner was divided into a northern and a southern part, within each of which the duguilangs were relatively united, this was not so successful, but in Otog, whose eight duguilangs operated almost completely independently, the duguilangs were never able to unite against the yamen.

At the same time, there is no basis for picturing the duguilang movement as "non-violent" and as repulsed by the "drastic actions" taken by duguilang leaders affiliated with the PRPIM, particularly Öljeijirgal.[17] While the duguilangs before 1927 never crossed the line separating the nobles and officials from the people and so never took over the ruling power, they frequently used the most extreme forms of torture to punish and intimidate abusive officials. Since actual killing by private persons would inevitably provoke action by the authorities outside the banner, non-fatal torture was the most effective way to intimidate officials without leading to excessive complications. These corporal punishments became know as "the cruel law of the duguilangs" (*duguilang-un jerlig khauli*). Among the more ordinary tortures employed by the duguilang assemblies, which the populace referred to by various jocular nicknames, was "counting the rosary" (*mani togola-*), or pricking the victim with darts, "feeding [the victim] bread" (*mantuu idegül-*), or beating him with fists, and "making him ride a slender isabella mount" *(narin sharga unagul-*), or putting him astride a thick stick, preferably a knotty stick of a gnarled bush, and parading him around with the stick carried by two men.[18]

[16] J. van Hecken, C.I.C.M. *Les missions chez les Mongols aux temps modernes* (Beiping, 1949), p. 174; Hecken, *Reductions catholiques du pays des Ordos*, pp. 24-25; *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 30-36.

[17] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 270-71.

[18] Antoine Mostaert, *Dictionnaire ordos* (1941; rpt. New York, 1968), s.v. *Dug̣ᵘ̈la ŋ*.

Joseph Van Hecken gives the description of a 1922 duguilang meeting held in Otog Banner to punish an official Ligshadjamsu, who under the title of banner defense battalion commander had been terrorizing and plundering commoners in parts of the banner. Ligshadjamsu and eleven of his henchmen had been captured in an ambush and the duguilang insisted that officials from the banner yamen come and be educated by the witness of their punishment:

> A great assembly was held at Moγaitu-yin süme. One evening, in the middle of the plain in front of the süme [temple], seats were provided for the *tusala γči* [administrator] Uuba, for one *meyiren* [deputy adjutant], for two *yamen* officials, and for Čoγ-dügüreng and Šaraldai [who were mediating on behalf of the Scheut mission station]. A little distance away stood the 500 *duγuyilang* members pressed together in a half circle. Between the officials and the crowd lay the twelve prisoners shackled, and waiting to be tortured. As a rule such judicial meetings are whipping parties. The *duγuyilang*'s, full of hatred for the prisoners, were determined to extract a full confession by any means, or rather to torture them to death then and there.
>
> Upon a prearranged signal, twelve *duγuyilang*'s stepped forward, each one holding the terrible "black whip." Two more men came forward towards each of the prisoners: these were stripped of their trousers, and the prisoners lying face down on the ground, a man sat down on their backs and another on their legs. The twelve "black whips" rose in the air and fell back on their naked thighs, the torturers hitting as hard as they possibly could. The howls of the victims sounded lugubriously in the quiet night. But no mercy was shown: the populace was too much bent on revenge.
>
> As soon as the first shift of torturers got tired, a second shift took over. The whipping was so terrible that blood flowed onto the ground, and two of the victims went out of their minds. Thereupon this first session came to an end and further interrogation was set for the following day.
>
> Being a clever and experienced fellow, Ligšad understood all too well the intentions of the people, and he began looking for a means to save his own life. The officials who had had enough of these scenes of torture were afraid to antagonize the people with a suggestion of a milder solution. The delegates of the Church also wanted to see the cruelties come to an end.[19]

[19] From a letter of Joseph Van Hecken cited in Henry Serruys, "A Socio-political Document from Ordos: The *Dürim* of Otoγ from 1923," *Monumenta Serica*, 30 (1972/3), 542-43.

In the end Ligshadjamsu managed to bribe the officials of the church, who then worked on the duguilang members' fear of possible trouble from Ligshadjamsu's father, Badarakhu, who was the banner adjutant, should he actually die under torture. Just like the Qing law code, which routinely used torture for interrogation and whipping for punishment, and like the yamen officials who hung shackles and whips outside the entrance to their compound, the duguilangs viewed theatrical violence as an essential part of political life.[20] Although their leaders suffered from this judicial torture, the duguilangs never showed any unease with the use of it themselves.

Financial Paralysis and the "Great Fear" in Ordos

The emergence of the duguilangs was intimately tied to the chronic financial crisis of the Ordos banners.[21] Banner finances had been originally designed to minimize administrative complication by the linkage of specific sources of revenue to specific expenditures. In addition there was essentially no separation of personal from official expenses, from the ruler, whose purse and the yamen treasury were one and the same, down to the clerks and petty officers who on rotation served without pay and paid their own expenses. By 1900, the lack of a any form of uniform banner budget and the pervasive siphoning off of revenues inherent in the use of unpaid labor, whether it be of nobles serving as administrators or sergeants collecting taxes, made the banners completely unable to take advantage of the dramatically changing structure of the resources. The financial thinking of the yamen, and indeed all the Mongols under the banner system, was dominated by a rentier-mentality, which sought to solve emergent fiscal problems, such as debts or military modernization or new schools, through the renting

[20] See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in Imperial China, Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from* Hsing-an hui-lan*) with Historical, Social, and Juridical Commentaries* (Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 97-98, 126, 76-78, 80-81, 95-97. Oshirov noted that the ruler of Otog hung shackles and whips outside the yamen office (*Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 8a), but this was a standard ritual expression of the nature of government under the Qing; see Rebecca Redwood French, *The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet* (Ithaca, 1995), pp. 295, 300-02, 321-25, pl. 57.

[21] The following description of banner finances is based primarily on the penetrating comments in Antoine Mostaert, "Matériaux ethnographiques relatifs aux Mongols ordos," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 2 (1956), 254-56, amplified by the material in Serruys, "A Socio-Political Document from Ordos."

out of specific plots of land, to the ever-willing Chinese land developers, and assigning the rent to specific tasks at hand. Salt and soda lakes, and medicinal roots, were also rentable resources; Chinese traders would supply all the capital and assume all the risk.[22] Even pasture could be turned into a resource to gather taxes from outsiders: Muslim caravaneers were charged a pasture tax on the camels which they pastured in banners near Gansu, and out-of-banner Mongol refugees were charged a hearth-tax, to cover their use of grass and water. Thus the renting out of resources to outsiders constituted the preferred source of revenue.

Compared to these sources, the taxes collected from the Mongol populace and assessed on the number of sheep were both hard to collect, and subject to tremendous abuse by the yamen clerks and militia petty officers who requisitioned far more than they ever forwarded to the yamens. Even so, turning over exploitation of resources like soda lakes or medicinal roots to Chinese had an unpopular side since the people traditionally had had free access to these resources, and resented the monopolies which outside factors often demanded. The process of renting out of the banners' natural resources was, moreover, pervaded by corruption of all sorts, and this corruption, once done, led to the permanent loss of the money sources. Yet while the character of particular rulers and officials did make a difference, as is proved by the far healthier state of banners like Khanggin, which had two able rulers, Arbinbayar and Altanwachir, compared to Otog or Üüshin, the need for new sources of revenue was real, and one which the reactive influence of the duguilangs did not help to resolve. The problem with renting out farm land in particular was, of course, that the payment of rent could only be enforced as long as the banner kept administrative control over the land, yet the extension of Chinese settlement naturally led to the extension of neighboring Chinese county jurisdictions, and so eventually the end of banner revenues. Thus while the yamen officials sought both a resolution of immediate financial problems and personal enrichment through the renting out of the banner's natural resources, the duguilangs

[22] On salt and soda lakes, see also Henry Serruys, "Five Documents Regarding Salt Production in Ordos," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 40 (1977), 338-53; "More about the Otoγ Salt Lakes," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 42 (1979), 61-65; Liu Yingyuan, "Zhang Wenxian tongzhi Etuoke Qi ershi nian," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 14 (1984), 172-76. On medicinal roots, see Yin Ziheng with Yan Bingqian, "Jiefang qian yuan Suiyuan sheng gancao he gancao xingye de gaikuang," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 2 (1963), 194-212.

fought to preserve the banner residents' open access to its natural resources and resisted the often-abusive collection of direct taxes. The result was continuing governmental paralysis.

This governmental paralysis was all the more costly as some kind of expansion of state power was clearly necessary in the sphere of defense. The rise of banditry from 1913 on stemmed from many causes: the influx of guns and demobilized soldiers, both Mongol and Chinese, after the Sino-Mongolian War of 1913, the Chinese settlers in the Hetao region who without a regular county administration to defend them armed themselves to fight off attacks by embittered Mongol herdsmen, and the "robbing Hui" Chinese, *Zei Hui[zi]*, and in Ordos Sino-Mongolian *dzei khuidza*, or *dzîxhui*) who with the involvement of Hui merchants in the animal trade in Ordos were familiar with the pickings available for plunder there.

One of the major complaints of the duguilangs was that the banner rulers, far from defending their people against these outside menaces, in fact conspired with them. Increasing the effectiveness of banner defense would necessitate paying for a regular patrol and the replacement of the flintlock and matchlock rifles held by the existing forces and their replacement by the repeating rifles, whether Russian Mosins, Japanese Arisakas, or Chinese-built Mausers, which the forces of disorder were beginning to possess in abundance.[23] The standoff between the duguilangs and the yamen meant, however, that either side acquiring modern weapons and setting up a regular garrison would be seen as a threat by the other. At first the duguilangs were armed only with cudgels and other non-firearm weapons, but later they acquired some firearms, which made the nobles and the officials give way, at least temporarily.[24] By 1920, in Üüshin, for example, the ruler had through clever handling

[23] In the 1927-1929 fighting between the duguilang regime and the exiled banner prince with his supporters in Yulin, the Mongol yamen soldiers carried both flintlocks (*khairchag buu*, literally "box guns"), and Mosin repeating rifles (*liyanju buu*, from Chinese *lianzhu pao*, literally "pearl string rifles"). See Altan'orgil, ed., *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 548; cf. Henry Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part II," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 98 (1978), 17 n. 333. On the rapid military modernization taking place in Chinese armies in the early 1920s see Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 53-71, esp. pp. 56-57.

[24] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 5b.

of his own small force, managed to confiscate the rifles of the duguilangs, carefully keeping the weapons for his own troops' use.[25]

This constant struggle over control of the few precious firearms exemplified how the confrontation of the yamen and the duguilangs prevented the building of a strong local government capable of preserving the peace. In 1925, Üüshin's duguilang leader, Öljeijirgal, reported that the ruler was collecting animals for taxes and selling them in Ningxia in order to buy several hundred repeating rifles (*khurdun buu*), while he also planned to give out more land to Chinese farmers in order to support an army to be recruited among the commoners. At the same time, he planned to select children for schools and was getting ready to take down their names and ages in a record book.[26] Öljiejirgal presented these plans as a nefarious plot of the "tyrannical nobles" (*ejerkheg noyad*), but something like it was necessary for the banner residents to free themselves from the ever-present threat of banditry. The educational program was also necessary if the Ordos Mongols were to relieve the ignorance of the world which the duguilang leaders themselves considered the root of their own inability to find a good life.

Indeed the irony of these charges against the "tyrannical" rulers, was that within two years, Öljeijirgal himself would be commanding a standing army of 300, with 100 or so repeating rifles, apparently paid for mostly by land rents, and eagerly hoping to send students off to study. The difference of course was that the duguilangs controlled the army and the rifles and that the students would go to the "land of salvation," the Great Northern Mongolia. Öljeijirgal and the grand duke actually had remarkably similar plans to relieve Üüshin's troubles, but with neither side trusting the other, each insisted on have sole control of the stronger local government they both agreed they would have to built. As a result of the standoff, Ordos, compared to most areas of Inner Mongolia, was virtually disarmed and subject to a "Great Fear" that lasted into the 1940s.[27] Simon Schama's comments about the Great Fear on the eve of the French Revolution are *mutatis mutandis* very applicable to the roots and consequences of the Fear in Ordos:

> The real significance of the Great Fear was the vacuum of authority it exposed at the heart of the French government. Although it created, by default, a France of a myriad of communes, this armed decentralization

[25] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 54 (Tripartite treaty of Üüshin Banner, Oct. 1, 1926).

[26] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 13 (Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, July 20, 1925).

[27] See, for example, Lattimore, *Mongol Journeys*, pp. 14-18, 24-25.

> was not at all what most of the people wanted. On the contrary as the *cahiers* [petitions] had shown, over and over again, what was wanted was more, not less, policing...The popular violence of 1789—at least outside Paris—was not meant to be in the service of innovation, but protection.[28]

Just as Schama observes for France on the eve of the revolution, this constant terror of banditry served as a vital ground for the duguilangs' vigilante activities. The great fear fed directly into a fear of imminent extinction. While this invocation of imminent extermination functioned partly as a conventionally pathetic formula in the petitions, it was doubtless often in earnest. As has been argued by Paul Cohen with regard to the Boxer charges against the Christian missionaries and their converts, the circulation of such charges was in turn a justification for any sort of pre-emptive violence against the agents of the on-coming destruction.[29] To this extent, the extreme charges flung by duguilang leaders at the enemies of their movement cannot be divorced from the projection of their own belief that the humiliation, or even destruction, of those outsiders who lived in the banner was a necessary prerequisite for the return to the abundance of the past.[30] The economic reflection of the duguilangs' fear was their sense that while the natural resources of the banner were limited, the banner rulers made no effort to exclude outsiders who had no rights to them. Nativism, that is the demand by the banner members for the exclusion of non-members from use of the banner's resources on any but the most discriminatory terms, was a vital part of the duguilang program. This fear of more and more mouths coming to feed on a shrinking pie was not focused only on the Chinese farmers, or the Scheut missionaries and their Christian converts, the bandits, and the Hui, but even on Mongols from outside the banner. Oshirov found the rivalries between banners to be the weakness of the duguilangs, but such rivalries can not be separated from their agenda of self-defense, any more than fighting the nobles or the Chinese authorities. Thus they invoked the protection of the graves of the banner's ancestors and the belief that the violation of these graves would

[28] Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York, 1989), pp. 434-35.

[29] Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York, 1997), esp. pp. 146-208.

[30] On fear of extinction and its relation to projection of a desire for extermination, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 175-81.

cause drought against Mongols from outside the banner and Chinese farmers alike.[31]

Two petitions to the Mongolian government for assistance, one written by Doodongündüb from Jasag and Chunaijamsu of Üüshin ostensibly on behalf of all the duguilangs of Ordos, and the other by Sodnamdongrub (b. 1875, Chinese name Jing Shanfu) of Üüshin graphically illustrated this sense of a pervasive outside menace, in which the outsiders sought, through a twofold assault on the banner members' livelihood and on the sacred things which defined their community, to annihilate the natives.[32] What made this threat all the more dangerous was that those enemies outside had inside friends: non-members of Üüshin who were residents in the banner. Sodnamdongrub, for example, emphasized how the roaming *duu lii* (Chinese *duli* "independent") bandits[33] plundered not only his peoples' goods, their livestock, inheritance, and even their lives, but even the sacred things of the "icon of our lineage the beneficial Buddhist faith": temples, stupas, and dedicated goods. These *duu lii* bandits formed secret gangs with the "robbing Hui" (*dzei khuidza*) who had settled in the banner, sharing their loot as comrades, while the settlers give the *duu lii*'s the banner land as a present. The two celebrate their friendships in big feasts."[34]

Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu also denounced the outside enemies: "vicious Chinese" who were taking away their land and water and *duu lii* bandits who took livestock, looted temples, and plundered

[31] Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part II," pp. 2-3, 4-5; "A Question of Land and Landmarks Between the Banners Otoγ and Üüsin," pp. 228-29; Hecken, *Missions chez les Mongols aux temps modernes*, pp. 169-170; "Une dispute entre deux bannières mongoles," pp. 291-92, 298, 300; "Documents mongols (Ordos) II," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 4 (1970), 331; "Documents mongols (Ordos) IV," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 6 (1972), 412, 415. On the cult offered at the graves of Sagang Sechen and Khutugtai Sechen in southern Üüshin, see Antoine Mostaert, "Sur le culte de Saγang Sečen et de son bisaieul Qutuγtai Sečen chez les Ordos," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 20 (1957), 534-66.

[32] See Central Party Archives, 7-1-32: 7 (Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu to MPP CC, 29th day of the 4th moon, blue mouse year [June 1, 1924]); 7-1-26: 56 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]).

[33] *Duli* "independents" was a term used for the bandit groups who had their origin, ironically enough, as auxiliaries in the Mongolian invasion of Inner Mongolia during the Sino-Mongolian War of 1913-1915.

[34] During the great Hui rebellion of 1862-1874, Hui raiders had plundered both Ordos Buddhist temples and the shrine of Chinggis Khan. This produced a strong legacy of distrust between the Mongols and the Hui.

both the married women's jewelry and the sacred books of the monks. But just as in Sodanmdongrub's petition, what made these outsiders all the more dangerous was their cooperation with treacherous insiders settled in the banner itself. Mongols of other banners, living inside Üüshin in the several hundreds, turned traitor and conspired with the soldiers and ministers and the "robbing Hui" (*dzîkhui*) and Chinese in the banner's rented farm lands.[35] These outlander Mongols kidnaped Üüshin adults and children and turned them over to the Hui bandits, who held them for ransom, and "however much we pay it is never enough and if we don't pay they will torture and kill them."[36]

Against this ring of enemies, the authorities to whom the banner natives might have turned for a defense of their privileges and an exclusion of the malicious outsiders gave no defense, but only collusion. The Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu petition gives the common litany of woes: the nobles (*noyad*) took unreasonable taxes to pay off their debts to the Chinese with notes of indebtedness from the banner treasury, using the banner members as collateral. "They give the best land and the salt and soda lakes to any Chinese who comes along. While we taste the sufferings of hell, the nobles and ministers hanker after the empty titles and bogus benefits of the Republic. They...take the evil Chinaman (*khara khitad*) with his opium joys as a Buddha." Even the keepers of the sacrifices to Chinggis Khan, the Darkhads of Wang Banner, who maintained the sanctuary to the Mongols' "highest Kamchun [great Yuan] icon (*shitügen*), Holy Chinggis" in Wang Banner, planned to sell the strip of uncultivated land around the sanctuary. The nobles "have completely forgotten to protect and treasure their lineages' protector Holy Chinggis, and his descendants, their own people."

What made the situation unbearable was not only the material injury, but the greater love and care that the Mongols' own rulers, descendants of the Holy Chinggis, showed to Chinese and Hui, rather than to their

[35] "Rented farmlands" is *tabin-u tariyalang* in Mongolia, or "farm fields of the fifties." The *tabin* "fifty" was an official in charge of handling lawsuits and collecting bottom-soil rents on behalf of the banner. These officials were called *juun* "hundred" (that is, controlled one hundred households) and *tabin* "fifty" (that is, controlled fifty households) in Wang and Dalad banners, and (*jakha-yin*) *jarguchi* in Otog; the use here indicates that in Üüshin the terminology followed Wang and Dalad. See Mostaert, *Dictionnaire ordos*, s.v. *t'awin*, *dʒūn*, and *dʒargu'tš'i*. Certain villages of rented land along the Gansu provincial frontier with Otog had high populations of Hui, up to 30% of the total; see Sa. Narasun, *Ordos-un jang agali* (Höhhot, 1989), p. 999.

[36] On kidnaping as a most lucrative practice of Chinese bandits, see Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China*, pp. 163-77.

own people, descendants of Chinggis's soldiers. The authorities were taking away the good land, giving it to the Chinese, and driving the bannermen who had been dwelling there out to wander. Sodnamdongrub accused the nobility of being in love with the "robbing Hui" (*dzei khui dza*) and the Chinese who live in Üüshin, and shooting down ordinary Mongols on the pretext that they would riot against the outsiders. Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu agreed that the rulers and officials used the conflicts arising over debts between Mongols and Chinese to pit them against each other and create the basis for disturbances. The officials' charge, attested elsewhere, that duguilang vigilantes sometimes initiated mob action against the resident Chinese was unquestionably true. To the duguilang members, however, their yamen's opposition to their justified anger at the outsiders showed only how the nobility loved the corrupt and bullying outsiders more than their own people.

The authors of the petition had no doubt that the extermination of the Mongols was this policy's true aim and that the Ordos Mongols were totally unequipped to deal with it. The rhetoric of duguilang petitions presented goodness as tied with humility and ignorance, while evil was characterized by restless ambition and deep cunning. The Mongols were good, but such goodness was no match for their enemies' sophistication:

> Our Mongolian race has from its origins been a powerful force in China (*Dumdadu ulus*). Since the Qing dynasty was founded, it put the Mongolian tribe (*aimag*) under great suspicion, not letting news of any events near or far penetrate. They have kept us bound and blind-folded while unlettered we spent all our time on the desolate (*aglag*) wide pastures. Having gotten us to ignore learning, civil or military, in the end we were brought to the point of forgetting even how to make a living. It is almost as if we have eyes but do not pay attention or ears but do not listen. And now, although the so-called Republic (*arad ulus*) talks about the Five Races living together in harmony, the real aim is to make the Mongols completely powerless and by showing them empty, bogus favors, step by step deprive us of our authority, rule, lands, and goods...Then when it has made us abandon our religious teachings and the sacrifices to Holy Chinggis, then even the name 'Mongol' and the Buddhist faith can inexorably no longer endure.[37]

[37] While this charge shows some similarity to, and perhaps indirect influence from, the common Young Mongol accusation that the Qing promoted Buddhism and prohibited education in Chinese in order to stupefy the Mongols, legends current in Ordos claimed that the Emperor in Beijing made the Ordos Mongols stupid and unlucky, not through honoring Buddhism, but through desecrating Buddhist scriptures in the grave of Sagang Sechen. See the chapter, "Sanang Setšen dans la legende," in Antoine Mostaert's "Ordosica." *Bulletin of the Catholic University of Peking*, No. 9 (Nov. 1934), pp. 67-72.

The image of humble and quiet people being exploited by clever and ambitious outsiders was not drawn only in the struggle of Mongols and Chinese. In the conflict of Otog and Üüshin, the same contrast was seen between "the population of Üüshin [which] was turbulent, active and greedy for riches and enjoyment while that of Otog was more peaceful, calm, and content in its possessions."[38] Otog was the largest, least densely populated banner in Ordos, with the richest supply of rentable salt and soda resources, while Üüshin was much more densely populated and had few resources that could be used to lighten the tax burden on the bannermen. Thus, the image of the contented and quiet people being exploited by aggressive and astute dealers functioned as a rallying point of those with relative greater resources against the demand to share those resources with the impoverished and desperate outsiders.

Rise and Fall of the Duguilang Movement

In the interpretation of the movement offered here, the duguilangs or vigilante groups in Ordos bore a close resemblance both to the Boxer movement against Christianity (which found considerable support in Ordos, among both Han and Mongols)[39] and to the widespread but uncoordinated rural resistance to the New Policies which had broken out in China in the early 1900s. The *duguilang*s like the anti-New Policies resisters, fought against local yamens that were simultaneously increasing the amount of money they extracted from their subjects in taxes and attacking the traditional religious structures of legitimation and replacing them with a new legitimation of modernization that put coastal cities and foreign ways at the center. Resistance to taxation was intensified by the illegitimate uses to which the money gathered was being put. The activities of outsiders in the heart of the community

[38] Hecken, "Une dispute entre deux bannières mongoles," p. 279. The author, one of the missionaries in the Borobalgasu Station, writes here as a vigorous partisan for the Otog cause in this banner dispute, since Borobalgasu held title from the Otog yamen to the part of the disputed land, and the triumph of Üüshin would have voided a significant part of its land titles.

[39] Hecken, *Missions chez les Mongols aux temps modernes*, pp. 143-56, 161-63, 167-69; Henry Serruys, "Mongol Texts Regarding an Anti-Christian Conspiracy in 1903," *Mongolian Studies*, 4 (1977), 39-55.

created a climate of fear in which striking first was the only way to assure survival.[40]

Like these resistance movements in North China, the Guangxu (Mongolian, Badaragultu Törö) period (1875-1907) was the period when the popular movements first became widespread. From 1900, the banner ruler Chagdursering (r. 1883-1913, d. 1916), encouraged duguilangs to be organized to attack Christian converts in the south of the banner. Already in 1901, however, these duguilangs came in conflict with the yamen, when the ruler sold land to pay for a birthday present to the Empress Dowager Cixi, then taking refuge in Xi'an from the Eight Power army's suppression of the Boxer movement. (The birthday present was primarily intended as a bribe to make Chagdursering Yekhe Juu's next deputy captain-general.) In 1902, the disagreements became more severe when the Qing government's representative in Suiyuan insisted on opening virtually all of Üüshin, Wang, Jasag, and Jüüngar banners to Chinese settlement and colonization. Chagdursering became league captain-general by offering the authorities in Suiyuan a large part of land for cultivation (see table 4.1), but as late as 1907, he kept peace among the duguilangs by promising to use his influence in Guisui to cease further colonization. Border conflicts with Otog and its supporters in the Scheut Catholic missionary station at Boro-Balagasu also kept the duguilangs occupied until 1906. In 1907, however, the evident failure of his promises made the duguilangs petition the Suiyuan authorities for redress. Within a year, Chagdursering's patrons in Suiyuan were dismissed due to political shifts in Beijing, and he himself lost his position as league captain-general. Despite this victory, however, the twelve duguilangs of Üüshin were suppressed in 1909.[41]

These events in Üüshin threw into prominence Wangdanima (1872?-1926), a high incarnate lama who would later be crucial in leading the duguilang vigilantes into alliance first with the new Mongolian government in Khüriye, and then with the Young Mongols in the PRPIM. Although the Qing had previously commanded incarnations to be found only in Tibet, to prevent the formation of clerical-lay aristocratic alliances, this policy had fallen into abeyance in Ordos by the late nineteenth century. Wangdanima was the son of Tümenbayar, one of the two deputy adjutants (*meiren-ü janggi*) in the Wang Banner yamen. At

[40] The interpretation of the New Policies resistance here follows that developed in Roxann Prazniak, *Of Camel Kings and Other Things*.

[41] Henry Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part I," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 97 (1977), 492-498, 500-506.

age seven, Wangdanima was discovered as the next incarnation of the lineage of the Bandida Gegen, in the temple in neighboring Jasag Banner. (Today, Wang and Jasag banners have been merged to form the Ejen Khoroo Banner.) The lineage founder had first received his title of Bandida Gegen "Learned Incarnation" from the Panchen Lama in the mid-eighteenth century. (Bandida is the Mongolian equivalent of the Sanskrit title *pandita* "learned man.") He traveled to Tibet in his youth, and after study there was known as Bandida *bagshi* (Bandida Master). Wangdanima's younger sister, Khangraijab, married the ruler of Jasag Banner Shagdurjab (b. 1873, r. 1897-1945), and in the early years the prince and the lama exemplified the "two customs" of church and state supporting each other. Shagdurjab's son, Ochirkhuyagtu, received his name and blessing from Wangdanima.[42]

During the New Policies period, however, this close relationship became strained. Shagdurjab hoped to gain favor by supporting the New Policies' colonization and subsequently Jasag Banner was devastated by Chinese settlement during this period. Many of the Jasag Banner Mongols, patrons of Wangdanima's temple, migrated south and west to Üüshin and Otog banners, where the locals disliked them as competitors for scarce resources. When Shagdurjab first opened up Jasag to colonization, the incarnate lama formed the people and lamas of Jasag into a duguilang, ridiculing his brother-in-law as being "not the right material for a jasag." Shagdurjab in turn reproached Wangdanima for meddling in activities outside his temple. Even before, the two had quarrelled. During a horse race, the Bandida Gegen's horse pushed passed Shagdurjab's, and as the two began to quarrel it, Wangdanima dragged up the controversy over Shagdurjab's ascension to the throne, and allegations that he had murdered banner clerks. Shagdurjab was frightened of the incarnate lama's prestige and after banner officials patched up the quarrel, Wangdanima sent Shagdurjab a religious robe and ivory rosary together worth 1,000 taels of silver. The new conflict

[42] Peng Pingyang, ed., "Zheng hai feng yun wushi nian—Shakedurzhabu shengping shuyao," in *Nei Menggu jinxiandai wanggong lu xubian*, special issue of *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 35 (1989), 1-4. On Tümenbayar, see also Henry Serruys, "Two Complaints from Wang Banner, Ordos, Regarding Banner Administration and Chinese Colonization (1905)," *Monumenta Serica*, 34 (1979/80), 494; "A Mongol Banner Pays Its Debt," *Monumenta Serica*, 36 (1984/5), 526, 534. The standard Inner Mongolian biography of Wangdanima, Baoyintu, "Wangdannima Shilue," *Nei Menggu wenshiziliao*, 19 (1985), 36-43, follows the stereotypical description of a popular hero's upbringing by describing Tümenbayar as a poor man.

Table 4.1: Captains-General of Yekhe Juu League, During the Late Qing and Republic

Captain-General & Deputy	Reign	Rank before Promotion	Home Banner
Badarkhu	1874-1883*	grand duke (beise)	Üüshin
Janagardi Rashijamsu	1884-1901*	grand duke (beile)	Jüüngar
Rashijamsu Arbinbayar	1901-1902*	grand duke (beile)	Otog
Arbinbayar Chagdursering	1902-1904	grand duke (beile)	Khanggin
Chagdursering Shagdurjab	1904-1908 (d. 1916)	grand duke (beise)	Üüshin
Arbinbayar	1908-1915 (d. 1917)	prince (giyün wang)	Khanggin
Tegüs'altan-khuyagtu	1915-1918*	prince (giyün wang)	Wang
Sümbürbatu Shagdurjab	1918-1924*	grand duke (beile)	Dalad
Shagdurjab	1924-1945*	grand duke (beile)	Jasag
Tübshinjirgal	1945-1949*		Wang

Note: By Qing regulations all league captains-general held the rank of prince (either first or second class, chin wang or giyün wang) *ex officio*. Ranks, however, were abolished in 1928.
*Died while holding captaincy-general.

Sources: Joseph Van Hecken, "Les Princes Borjigid des Ordos," pp. 132-155; Henry Serruys, "A Document from 1904 Dismissing an Ordos Prince," pp. 206-210; *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 13 nian*, I, 704.

over colonization shredded this superficial reconciliation and Wangdanima eventually followed his lay patrons into Üüshin.

As noted above Grand Duke Chagdursering too, like Shagdurjab, was angling for a higher position by offering the land of his own banners as a test-ground for the New Policies colonization. Wangdanima, in his early years in Üüshin, adopted a very different position from that he had followed in his home banner, entering the grand duke's entourage and becoming a land commissioner for the Chinese authorities in Guisui. At the same time, however, he won the confidence of the duguilangs by his promise to them that his real intent was to preserve the banner land. Whether his promise was sincere or not, Wangdanima could not deliver, and soon the Üüshin duguilangs denounced him as a meddling outsider, a clever wheeler-deeler who secretly profited from land sales, and a fraudulent incarnation who would even commit murder to satisfy his appetite for money and women.[43]

Despite this inauspicious beginning, within a few years Wangdanima was generating great support even among the Üüshin duguilangs. By the time of the 1911 revolution, Wangdanima was no longer in Üüshin but in Hetao, a name which originally referred to all of Ordos, but later came to refer particularly to the northwestern part of the league, where the Yellow River valley widens out into a broad basin, and the river sends branches meandering across the flat plain. This area, belonging to Dalad and Khanggin banners, by the middle of the nineteenth century had become a prime spot for Chinese land-speculators, some of whom, like Wang Tongchun, became legends for their canal-designing skills, business acumen, and mastery of flattering and intimidating the Mongols.[44]

With the 1911 Mongolian declaration of independence and the new theocratic government's appeal to Inner Mongolia, Wangdanima suddenly changed his program to enthusiastic support for the theocratic regime. Wangdanima brought Shagdurjab over to his side, but also won the support of the chastened duguilangs of Üüshin. The leader of the

[43] Hecken, *Reductions catholiques du pays des Ordos*, p. 25; Henry Serruys, "Letter of Apology from a Troublesome Lama," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 24 (1980), 117-128; "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part I," pp. 497-98, 503. As Serruys notes in the last article mentioned, the correct spelling of his name, composed of the two Tibeto-Mongolian elements Wangdan and Nima should be "Wangdannima." In contemporary sources, however, the name is almost always spelled "Wangdanima," particularly in Wangdanima's own autograph, so I have followed it here.

[44] Hecken, *Reducations catholiques du pays des Ordos*, pp. 35-63.

Üüshin duguilangs against the Republic, Öljiejirgal, wrote later that in 1912, "we people have all gathered together in deliberative council and decided with all our force not to enter into any of the dangers like fire and flood of the unjust reactionaries and the *gamings* [Mongolian term for the Republic, from Chinese *geming* "revolution"] and while...living in peace and security not allow our Buddhist religion or our nation to be cut off." They tried to indicate this support to Neislel Khüriye but were unable to do so.[45]

For a while, the possibility of joining the new Mongolian state seemed to draw the fractured Ordos society together. The 1911 revolution threatened both the nobility with the specter of republicanism, and the duguilangs with the nightmare of the New Policies finally made irreversible. The Sino-Mongolian *gaming* in Ordos as well as in Khalkha, became a term of abuse that meant little more than bandit and profiteer. The lunar calendar and the sixty-year color-and-animal dating system became symbols of resistance to the new Republic which had adopted the calendar of the foreign *shi yang-ud* (from Ch. *xiyang*, "west ocean," "Europeans") and the reign title of years of the Republic.

In this conflict, the duguilangs and at least some of the Ordos rulers, including Üüshin's Chagdursering and Shagdurjab of Wangdanima's Jasag Banner, came out on the same side.[46] Among the Üüshin duguilangs, the old abuse of Wangdanima was replaced with reverence as the Üüshin leaders hoped to follow the Bandida Gegen *bagshi* ("teacher" or "master") and find a land of salvation and sympathetic comrades. As later rhetoric would have it, Wangdanima had become a defender of the local banners' proletarian people (*ügegüü arad*). In 1913, however, this new possibility to break out of the old stalemate collapsed

[45] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 13 (Öljeijirgal to MPP CC, extra tenth moon, 1924).

[46] Of the seven banners in Yekhe Juu League, five sent letters at one time or another to the new Mongolian government expressing support; see Dindub, *A Brief History of Mongolia in the Autonomous Period*, p. 55. Historians in Mongolia have published two letters, one from Sümbürbatu of Dalad, and one from the captain-general, Arbinbayar of Khanggin. Both letters date from 1913, express support for the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu's declaration of independence, and explain that their public declarations in favor of the Republic that year had been extorted from them by force by the Suiyuan dutong; see *Mongolyn ard tümnii 1911 ony ündesnii erkh chölöö, tusgaar togtnolyn tölöö temtsel*, pp. 282-85. Prince Shagdurjab of Jasag and Grand-Duke Chagdursering of Üüshin also strongly supported the theocratic regime; see *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 97, and pp. 42-45, 64-67, 76-80, respectively.

when Wangdanima was ambushed by the dutong of Suiyuan, and deported to Beijing.[47]

Originally the dutong wished to execute Wangdanima but the president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai, pardoned him. He was an incarnate lama, with the title Bandida Gegen, and a brother-in-law of Shagdurjab, the prince of Jasag Banner, and in a moment of delicately coaxing the Mongols into loyalty to the new Republic, his execution would only cause unnecessary friction. Wangdanima was, however, required to live in Beijing's Yonghegong Temple (where Engkhebatu was also a lama), receiving a salary from a sinecure as advisor first to Duan Qirui, and then to Cao Kun.[48]

Duguilang leaders dated the beginning of severe repression by the banner and Chinese authorities to the capture of Wangdanima. In 1913 also, Öljeijirgal (1866-1929, Chinese name Wen Wenlao), a former banner clerk and lama, swore his "seventy sworn brothers" (*dalan anda*) together to form a new duguilang movement at the blood ritual mentioned above, and so became leader of the Üüshin duguilangs. Öljeijirgal, a native of Üüshin Banner, was described by Oshirov in 1926 as an experienced leader who had been imprisoned by the authorities more than ten times, but was still unyielding in his personality and with great strength of character. By the time he became involved with the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement he was already over fifty years old, almost twice the age of the other party leaders.[49]

Subsequent biographies describe Öljeijirgal as a younger son in the household of Wachir, a commoner who lived by farming supplemented by a small herd of stock in a land whose agricultural potential was indicated by its name, Khoolaitu-yin Jalga Chaidam "Salt Marsh of the Ravine Mouth" (now Haolaitu Township in Yulin County). Despite the family's poverty—Wachir had to rent agricultural implements from his wealthier neighbors, his wife looked after the herds of their taiji Baskhaloroi, and latter his daughter, and Öljeijirgal hired himself out from age seven—the sumu or squadron captain chose Öljeijirgal to be the son-in-law for a wealthy commoner's family at age thirteen. His new bride died childless, however, and Öljeijirgal returned to his birth family. He must have been a valuable son-in-law for within a short time he was

[47] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 56 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]); 7-1-20: 15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927). On his capture, see Serruys, "Letter of Apology from a Troublesome Lama," p. 128.

[48] Baoyintu, "Wangdannima shilue," pp. 39-41.

[49] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 6a.

married to the only daughter of another neighboring Mongol family, and when his new wife died, his father-in-law, rather than lose his services, brought in another female relative, Wangchinmétug, to be his new wife.

At age fifteen, Öljeijirgal received his sumu captain's order to do duty as a servant in the compound of Üüshin's grand duke. Over the course of his service, however, he practiced reading and writing and was discovered writing complaints about his life in the compound. Far from being angry at the complaints, the yamen officials were impressed by his self-taught literacy and made him a clerk in the yamen, perhaps around 1889. Although modern hagiographies create an impression of Öljeijirgal as a revolutionary from youth, he was a yamen clerk and, at most, no more than a discreet sympathizer with the duguilangs until 1909. Indeed in 1901, after the death of Janagardi, the league chairman from Jüüngar, Grand Duke Chagdursering trusted him, along with two other officials, with a mission to Empress Dowager Cixi, then in Xi'an, to secure Grand Duke Cha's succession to the deceased nobleman's position. Although this mission failed, Öljeijirgal continued at his post until 1909, a year after Grand Duke Cha was removed as league captain-general and the twelve duguilangs disbanded. In that year, when the yamen sought to appoint him as militia colonel (*jalan-u janggi*), he balked for reasons which remain unclear. Ordinarily, such assignments could not be refused, however, and he joined the monastery and took the tonsure as a monk in order to be legally free from secular duties. For the next three or four years, Öljeijirgal played no role in the banners' politics. Not until after the overthrow of the Qing, in 1912-1913, did this "New Lama" (*Shine-lama*), as he was called, emerge as a significant duguilang leader.

Although Grand Duke Cha and the new duguilangs both hated the *gaming* Republic, and both seem to have supported Wangdanima and the theocratic government in Mongolia, the yamen-duguilang stalemate again broke up the promise of social peace. Grand Duke Cha and his wife, the "slut duchess" (*shira khatun*), the "fox sprite" (*ünegen shulum*), Narangerel, who played the same role in the bannermen's popular opinion that the evil seductress Daji played in the fall of the Shang dynasty, as portrayed in magical novels like *Fengshen yanyi* ("The Creationof the Gods"), linked their allegiance to the new Mongolian government with a request for an army to suppress the duguilangs. In turn, despite their professed yearning for the independent Mongolian regime, Öljeijirgal and his seventy sworn brothers had no compunctions about using the grand duke and duchess's treasonous activities to make trouble for them with the new Republican authorities in Guisui. In 1913, Öljeijirgal led the duguilangs, mobbed the couple, and forced Narangerel

to affix her thumbprint (presumably she was illiterate) to a list of 43 delicts the most inflammatory of which were that she enjoyed sexual intimacies with their son-in-law, the palace steward Erdenisang, that Chagdursering had sent messengers to Mongolia, and that he planned to bring the Ordos Mongols' supreme icon, Chinggis Khan's banners (*sülde*) then kept in Wang Banner, north to Neislel Khüriye. As a result, the league authorities could not help but act. Chagdursering was ordered to divorce Narangerel, and the Guisui authorities dismissed him as banner ruler, giving the seal temporarily to the charge of Administrator Chogtuwachir, the highest ranking noble official in the yamen.[50]

From the perspective of a local history written in 1930, when a duguilang-supported military regime, after allying with the PRPIM, became the new rulers, this period around 1913 was the height of popular power and a precedent for the later seizure of power in 1927. The duguilangs had arrested and sentenced some of the nobility and officials, and frightened the others, thus "taking over the government for the public" (*jasag-un erkhe-yi olan-dagan abchu*). For a brief period, the duguilangs in Üüshin set a central body, electing responsible people who gathered at Khali'utu Temple for the *Gonghui* "public assembly," which for several years "exercised all powers of administration, adjudication, and decision" (*khamug jakhirchu tushiyakhu, shigükhü, tusalakhu khereg-i yabagulju*). Only after several years in which the Gonghui shared power with the yamen in Üüshin was the regular succession of grand dukes reestablished.[51] Passed over in this account is the fact that due to this internal strife in Üüshin and other banners, the early Republic had reaffirmed its control over Suiyuan in 1913.

After a three year interregnum, the Republican government let Chagdursering's son, Grand Duke Tegüs'amugulang (r. 1916-1939), ascend the throne. Chagdursering and Narangerel who had been roaming the banner, came to the yamen and Chagdursering intimidated his son into giving him back the banner seal. They joined the brigands of Lu Zhankui, just then engaged in supporting a Qing pretender, and planned

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[50] The major biographies of Öljeijirgal are Juu Siyang Bi [Zhao Xiangbi], "Sin-e Lam-a-yin üile yabudal-un tobci," in, *Monggol-un teüketü kümüs-un tuqai ögülel-üd*, ed. Bürin, trans. Ciyüwe [Qi Yue] and Togtaqu (Hailar, 1984), pp. 284–320, Yi-Meng zheng-xie wen-shi wei, "Xini Lama ji qi suo lingdao de duguilong yundong," *Nei Menggu wenshiziliao*, 19 (1985), 1-35, and *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*. The third is the only one that shows any understanding either of the surrounding events or even of basic chronology, and I have followed it throughout; see *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 1-75.

[51] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 538-39.

again to go north to Mongolia, but the brigands was attacked by a rival troop and the former grand duke and duchess took refuge in a herding household. Spreading the rumor that the duchess had been killed by the bandits, and sensing that the yamen officials would not regret a disappearance of this unhappy woman, a picked band of Öljeijirgal's duguilangs ambushed their now defenseless former ruler, and made the "slut duchess" "ride a slender isabella mount" to her death. Although the attackers did not lay hands on their former ruler, the assault sent him into a shock that killed him.[52]

In a few years, the duguilangs' victory against the fox sprite proved pyrrhic, as the balance tipped against them. Tegüs'amugulang was not deceived by the rumors of bandits killing her and was determined not to allow his mother's murderers to escape without punishment; the Republican authorities too were determined to pacify the area. To the duguilang members, Tegüs'amugulang presented the face of a classic tyrant who conspiring with evil taijis and commoners: "close to the corrupt and flatterers and held the honest and good far from him." Descriptions of the resulting period of repression undoubtedly telescope events of several years, but the most severe repression, which finally broke the back of the movement, was in 1919-1920. Crucial to the restoration of yamen power was Tegüs'amugulang's appeal to the authorities outside the banner. He pleaded with the league captain-general, Sümbürbatu, the ruler of Dalad Banner, for assistance, and troops and officials were sent in to suppress the duguilangs.[53]

The ruler and his henchmen openly boasted that, "not only will we sell land we will even sell you slave commoners." Given the dependence of the banner finances on rents and taxes paid primarily by outsiders, this bombastic threat contained a hard kernel of financial plausibility. Duguilang leaders were tried and sentenced harshly; one letter described the various tortures, which, however lurid, do not seem to have been out of line with the standard Qing dynasty judicial procedures followed in the Mongolian banners: people were hung on hooks from high trees, beaten, burnt with fire, whipped hundreds and thousands of times, fined hundreds and thousands of taels of silver, and had their horses, household goods, and livestock taken. The booty gathered in a months-

[52] *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 76-82; Juu Siyang Bi, "Sin-e Lam-a-yin üile yabudal-un tobči," p. 299, Yi-Meng zheng-xie wen-shi wei, "Xini Lama," pp. 16-17. On the Lu Zhankui royalist escapade, see Henry Serruys, "An Imperial Restoration in Ordos, 1916-1917," *Études mongoles et sibériennes*, 16 (1985), 51-59.

[53] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 539.

long series of sweeps was all shared out by the "officials, nobles, yamen clerks, and bootlickers."

The crackdown in Üüshin was only part of a broader crackdown on popular vigilante activity all over Yekhe Juu League. The authorities in Guisui and Ningxia sent commissioners and special envoys to limit or break-up the duguilangs in Üüshin and elsewhere, but as Oshirov claimed sardonically, "the special envoys in fact were special only in robbing the Mongolian people."[54] In 1913, the Republic had promulgated an edict that completely prohibited popular assemblies and thus "manifesting the important rule of lord and slave" (*noyad bogol-un khündü jirum-i ilerkheilegsen*).[55]

The major plank of the new regime was a blanket prohibition on assembly; to get together in groups of five or ten, and even, one letter complains, sitting together in two or threes, was strictly prohibited. "If you organize a party you will be instantly shot," threatened the authorities. Another main plank was the prohibition on owning weapons and the confiscation of all firearms kept by the duguilangs; these were carefully hoarded by the yamen. The third plank was the creation of a standing armed garrison force, which in 1926 was about forty strong, commanded by a taiji, Dandar, and loyal to the banner ruler. The final plank was an attempt to pay off some of the banner debts so that the yamen could become financially independent. Not daring to risk an open levy of extraordinary taxes, the yamen collected choice food, liquor, and opium from the bannermen for offerings to the Holy Lord Chinggis, but instead used the goods to pay of debts to the Chinese merchants.[56]

The prohibition on assembly and on ownership of fire-arms left the Ordos Mongols defenseless against bandits, a problem which thus grew to far greater proportions there than it did in other areas of the Mongol steppe, such as Hulun Buir, where the Mongols retained both arms and militia organization. The standing garrison forces established on the

[54] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 5b.

[55] Henry Serruys, "Documents from Ordos on the 'Revolutionary Circles'. Part II," pp. 10-12. This order seems to be the 'ten rules' of the *gamings* (that is, Republican authorities) denounced by later petitions writers; see Central Party Archives, 7-1-32: 7 (Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu to MPP CC, 29th day of the 4th moon, blue mouse year [June 1, 1924]); 7-1-26: 57 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]).

[56] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 539; Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 56 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]); Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 54 (Tripartite treaty of Üüshin Banner, Oct. 1, 1926).

ruins of the militia system either could not or would not protect the banner populations from bandits, who thus flourished in Suiyuan on a scale greater than any other Mongol region.

Öljeijirgal, like other duguilang leaders, was jailed in 1920, but his surviving supporters made a deal with some bandits and they sprang him from prison. He first went to Jasag Banner, whose ruler Shagdurjab apparently welcomed him and suggested he go see Wangdanima in Beijing. There he went to meet the Bandida Gegen Wangdanima at Yonghegong Temple, hoping apparently that Wangdanima might know of some outside protector.[57] The suppression of the duguilangs, which in every Yekhe Juu banner but Otog had become only shadows of their former influence, did not put the people in submission to either the yamens or the Chinese. Nor was Wangdanima's reputation diminished by his arrest. Instead, while the lay duguilang movements suffered, Wangdanima acquired a widespread network of secret supporters particularly among the lamas.

The growing presence of clerics in the opposition to the yamen rulers in the early Republic seems to have stemmed from several factors. The long association of Mongolian and particularly Ordos Mongolian identity with both the cult of the Holy Chinggis and with the Buddhist religion, made it virtually inevitable that any nativist movement would cast the defense of the community in terms of the defense of its religious articles. In the late Qing, however, this defense of the community's objects of worship (*shitügen*) was generally not carried out by lamas but by laymen. Yet, in the early Republic, Oshirov reports, lamas began to join the movement.[58] Perhaps the theocratic character of the Mongolian independence movement encouraged their participation. Another reason was the personal influence of Wangdanima, both in his own banner and elsewhere. After his arrest, his lady Oyuntodo (c. 1894-1966), an illiterate Üüshin girl of nineteen, led his group of armed supporters who dominated the small population of Jasag.[59] Finally a third reason may lie in the long-term effect of the abandoning of the previous Qing policy of separating clerical and lay leadership. Under the Qing regulations, incarnate lamas had to be sought on the Tibetan plateau, but by the late nineteenth century, these rules fell into disuse, and the Republic never revived them. Thus there seems to be a trend for the younger incarnate

[57] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 539.

[58] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 6b.

[59] Mitarevsky, *World-Wide Soviet Plots*, 102; interview with O. Khosbayar (Ulaanbaatar), July 16, 1992. Khosbayar was Oyuntodo and Wangdanima's youngest son.

lamas in Ordos, like Wangdanima himself, to be found in Ordos itself, something which probably increased the likelihood of their involvement in local politics.

A.I. Oshirov, however, saw the most important reason to be the differential impact of colonization on the clergy and on the secular nobility. When land was sold, the nobility (including both the ruler, his major officials, and others of Chinggisid blood) could, if they were careful, maintain their rights to bottom-soil rents that assured them a continuing income, either in their own name, or through the yamen treasury. Since the lamas, however, depended on alms from Mongolian believers (they apparently never appealed to the Chinese immigrants), the influx of Chinese settlers and the mass emigration of their patrons had a disastrous effect on the monasteries along the farming frontier.

The situation in Wangdanima's own Jasag and the neighboring Wang banners was an extreme illustration of these trends. Wangdanima's monastery, Bagshi Temple, was originally founded in 1729 in a place in Jasag Banner called Khökhe Usu (Chinese, Huhu Wusu). The founder, Sang-Jaltsan, received the title of Galab Bandida ("Scholar of the Era") from the Panchen Lama and started the line of which Wangdanima was the sixth. In the late Qing, however, the temple had to be moved from its original site which had been incorporated in Shaanxi's Yulin County and lost its Mongolian population. It had five service halls, a pagoda, and more than one 100 cells, housing 65 resident monks.[60] When A.I. Oshirov visited Jasag Banner in 1926, about 90% of the land had been colonized, and most of the population had left for neighboring banners like Üüshin, so that of the original 1,000 banner households, Oshirov estimated (probably exaggerating) only 30 were left. The ruler and the yamen were still there but the Mongol populace they were supposed to administer was almost all gone. The reserved zones (*jagarig* or *khorigul*) around the temples, which it was sacrilegious to plow, had formed the only areas of open pasture and so much of the remaining Mongol population clustered around the former temples. Many temples had fallen into ruins but there were, Oshirov believed, still several hundred lamas left, all *shabinar* "disciples" of Wangdanima. None of the people respected or listened to the ruler, Prince Shagdurjab, and all the ordinary

[60] *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu diming zhi: Yike Zhao fence* (Höhhot, 1986), p. 474. The temple's Tibetan name, given in Chinese as "Gesen Liansuge," cannot be easily reconstructed. It was entirely razed during the Cultural Revolution and no longer exists. The area around the temple in the district Dugang-un Oboo "Assembly Hall's Cairn" still has a substantial Mongolian population (30-40% of the population), much of which I guess may be laicized monks and their descendants (p. 210).

bannermen who had migrated out had a deep aversion to him. In the neighboring Wang Banner to the north, the ruler had learned from Jasag's experience and tried to restrict Chinese settlement with some success. Even there, however, by 1926 all power was in the hands of the wealthy and intelligent banner administrator (*tusalagchi*), Erdenigerel, who had been a fighting comrade of Wangdanima's.[61]

The growing role of lamas in resistance to the yamen eventually influenced even the strongly lay leadership of the Üüshin Banner duguilangs. When Öljiejirgal escaped to Beijing he made himself a disciple of the Bandida Gegen. Although Öljeijirgal had grown to adulthood as a layman, he had taken the tonsure, mostly to avoid being recruited as a militia colonel. Öljeijirgal thus acquired his nickname Shinelama, or "New Lama," by which he was often later known. Most lamas in Mongolia had been dedicated by their parents and "new lama" was the usual term for those rare persons who became lamas in adulthood. Such a decision was often in response to difficulty either in making a living or with the law, and "new lamas" had a reputation for turbulence and unwillingness to submit to discipline. The irascible brawler Wu Song, in the Chinese novel *Outlaws of the Marsh*, furnished a popular model for this sort of character.[62]

It seems, however Öljeijirgal's Buddhist affiliation was not a matter of mere convenience. Oshirov, who knew them both, states clearly that Öljeijirgal was a disciple of Wangdanima, and explained Öljeijirgal's title of Shinelama from his physical resemblance to the Bandida Gegen.[63] Öljeijirgal's parents gave both his older and younger brothers to the monasteries, and Öjeijirgal himself made at least two of his sons lamas, indicating a more than nominal commitment to the established church.[64] It is also true that Öljeijirgal, like Wangdanima, took a consort, but this was not unusual for lamas in Mongolia. Another married lama who

[61] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 4b.

[62] Virtually all Mongolian lamas seem to have been dedicated as children; see Aleksei M. Pozdneyev, *Religion and Ritual in Society: Lamaist Buddhism in Late 19th Century Mongolia*, trans. Alo Raun and Linda Raun (Bloomington, Ind., 1978), pp. 176-215. While the same has been said of Chinese Buddhism, closer research lead Holmes Welch to conclude: "It would appear that the *most* monks joined in maturity, but the *best* monks—or most of the best—joined in their teens" (emphasis in original). See *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism, 1900-1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 254.

[63] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 6a, 6b.

[64] On Öljeijirgal's brothers, see *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 102 and Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 396; on his sons, see *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 95, 102.

became an activist in the PRPIM, Loroisambuu, wrote a very popular poem in thirty-eight stanzas which was a fine example of the traditional genre of Buddhist didactic poetry, the *surgal shilüg*, or sermon poem. The ideology expressed in the work was the purest Buddhism, although he modernized an old metaphor by saying that even with a steamship one cannot escape the sea of samsara without faith.[65]

Ordos Vigilantes and the Young Mongols

Öljeijirgal and Wangdanima lived in Beijing's Yonghegong for several more years. Wangdanima stayed in the room of a Kharachin lama, Dorjiningbu, in Yonghegong temple, but eventually his lady Oyuntodo joined him in Beijing and she gave birth to another son in 1923. Öljeijirgal too stayed in Yonghegong and acted as the Wangdanima's secretary.[66] The Chakhar party member Engkhebatu was another resident of Yonghegong during Wangdanima's time, as was "Bai Lama" (Bai Yunting, religious name, Ishijalsan,), a clansman of Bai Yunti, and these three probably knew each other.[67] Wangdanima, who had learned Mongolian and Tibetan as a youth, also knew Chinese and eventually developed a close political affiliation with the later PRPIM leaders. Öljeijirgal, however, seems to have been rather more skeptical of them, and even Wangdanima, for all his experience, was never brought into the core group of Inner Mongolian nationalists.

In Yonghegong and Beijing, Wangdanima and Öljeijirgal moved in a world dominated by Mongols from the three eastern leagues: Jirim, Juu Uda, and especially Josotu and its Kharachins. As we have seen, these East Mongols monopolized both the Mongolian parliamentary delegation and the bureaucracy of the Mongolian and Tibetan Department, leaving the Ordos nobility, who all resided in their own banners, feeling shut out from influence. The Ordos Mongols had had occasion to protest to Beijing that statements were being made about what "the Mongol banners" wanted that really referred only to the East Mongols, and only the Rehe Mongols (meaning Kharachins) at that. On the rare occasion

[65] *Ordos-un soyol-un öb*, I (Baotou, 1984), 222.

[66] Interview with O. Khosbayar, July 16, 1992; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 247; *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 100.

[67] On Bai Yunting, see Henry Serruys, "Mongol Letters from Otoγ (Ordos), 1920-1923 Regarding a Number of Murder Cases," *Annali (Instituto Orientali di Napoli)*, 40 (new series, vol. 30), no. 3 (1980), 425.

when the Mongolian and Tibetan Department sent representatives to Ordos, they would be East Mongols; "Bai Lama" was sent to review the handling of a murder case in Otog in 1921.[68]

The difference of regional origin was only one of many reasons for the distance between the duguilang vigilantes and the nationalist Young Mongols. The duguilang leaders were far older; Öljeijirgal was of the generation of Murungga's father Yue Shan, and Wangdanima of the age of Duke Tsengde. What gave political significance to this difference in generation was the watershed role of the New Policies. Those Mongols in eastern Inner Mongolia who actively joined the party were almost all born in the 1890s or later, and saw the New Policies as basically a positive thing, despite the problems in their application. The Ordos leaders, however, stood for the stubborn resistance to the restructurings of Chinese national and local government that took place after 1901. In Hulun Buir and Khalkha Mongolia, the traditional aristocratic authorities, both lay and clerical, had led resistance to the New Policies. Except for the brief attempt at a new orientation around 1913, the duguilang vigilantes had to fight against, not alongside, their own nobles if they wished to resist Beijing's new ideas on government. Yet the populist, insurrectionary direction of their activities could not remove the reek of "dark," "unenlightened" old Mongolia that the Young Mongols of Rehe and Hulun Buir smelled on these shaven-head veterans of popular struggle.

Nowhere was this difference in attitude more clear than in the attitude toward Buddhism. The East Mongols had inherited the strongly anti-clerical, Confucian, animus of writers like Injannashi and Lubsangchoidan, while the Daurs had never been Buddhist. Even after 1926, when the duguilang movement fell heavily under the influence of the PRPIM, and the Mongolian People's Republic, the number and influence of lamas in the party and the movement in Ordos did not decline. Instead, as military events pushed the party's base west and the duguilang faction played a larger and larger role in grass roots agitation, the party leadership muffled its hostility to the clerical stratum, directing its attacks at the secular nobility alone.

A comparison of a letter Öljeijirgal sent back to Üüshin in 1925, after going to Mongolia, with Fumingtai's address to the Mongolian People's Party's Third Congress (August, 1924) furnishes us a revealing look at

[68] Henry Serruys, "A Letter of Protest from Ordos Against the Creation of Provinces, 1923," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 21 (1977), 251-258; ""Mongol Letters from Otoγ (Ordos), 1920-1923," 425.

the differing mentalities of the two men, differences which were fairly representative of the differences between the duguilang vigilantes and the Young Mongols as a whole.[69] Many of their positions on issues were identical: both gave their loyalty directly to Mongolia's new government, rather than to Bai Yunti's idea of an Inner Mongolian revolutionary party, and both admired the new regime's reforms. In discussing the achievements of the people's government, Öljeijirgal laid stress free and widespread education, and official careers open to talent, and Fumingtai as well pointed to popular education and enlightenment as major achievement of the new regime.

Both detested the Chinese—every single mention of them in both pieces is associated with the word *khargis* originally meaning "vicious" but now being used to translate "reactionary"—and both of them emphasized the tremendous sufferings that the Chinese and their lackeys had brought about in Inner Mongolia. It is hard to discern to what degree their loathing of Chinese was properly ideological and confined to the exploiting classes, or whether it embraced the Chinese people as a whole but the very doubtfulness of this point indicates that they, like many others, found it hard not to treat all the members of the nation which was oppressing them as enemies. In foreign policy, both Fumingtai and Öljeijirgal readily accepted the Comintern's view of Japan as by far the most dangerous imperialist country in the East.

Thus if we simply list their positions: ardent pan-Mongolists, supportive of Mongolia's modernizing reforms, especially in education, friendly to the Soviet Union, and virulently hostile to both the Chinese and the Japanese, the two men seem to be essentially unanimous on all major points. This similarity on simple pro- and con- issues, though, masked a tremendous difference both in how they arrived at their positions and how they intended to go about fulfilling them. Öljeijirgal was thirty years older than the Daur, and from a region which had neither

[69] The text of Fumingtai's address, delivered to the Third Congress of the Mongolian People's Party on August 4, 1924, is given in *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, p. 24, and in English translation (via a Russian translation) in *Mongolia: Yesterday and Today*, p. 20. Excerpts from another translation from the Russian appear in Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, p. 187. The original Russian translation appears to have been very loose, and sentences are not necessarily in the same order as in the Mongolian original. The letter from Öljeijirgal is in Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg–a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 283-7 (reprinted in Öbör Monggol-un Öbertegen Jasaqu Oron-u Sinjilekü Uqagan-u Küriyeleng, ed., *Monggol ündüsüten–ü gün uqagan*, [Chifeng, 1988], IV, 545–9). The version in *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 108–111, has different readings at many points; I do not know which is more accurate.

the modern schools nor the significant contact with the world economy that made Hulun Buir distinctive. Thus, even though their positions on many issues were identical, the differences of time and place produced a great difference in their political epistemology. This difference in political epistemology exemplified the general difference between the cultural progressivism of the Young Mongols and the conservatism of the vigilantes.

The difference in education and general knowledge of the world outside Mongolia shows up very clearly in their comments on foreign policy. Öljeijirgal does not seem to have had any actual information about Japan's evil plans apart from exaggerated rumors and propaganda; he accepted it as known by everyone that in Korea there are no males left, every last one of them having been killed or driven away by the Japanese.[70] Fumingtai however refers to several actual plans—Zhang Zuolin's training of troops in Jirim's Darkhan Wang Banner, Japanese plans to build a railroad to Solon, and the Japanese invitation to educate Hulun Buir youth—and although some of them, like the training of troops to reconquer Mongolia had already failed, and others were never accomplished, his knowledge of Japanese plans in eastern Inner Mongolia was fairly detailed and realistic. Even the terminology they used showed Fumingtai's independent knowledge of Japanese activities (after all, his brother Huạlintai had studied in Japan), while Öljeijirgal knew only what his Comintern instructors told him; Fumingtai used the traditional Mongolian word for the country, *Ji Bin*, which was used in both Inner and Outer Mongolia at the time, while Öljeijirgal used the Russian-derived *Yapon*, which was only rarely used in Mongolia then. (Given the activities of the Catholic missionaries, Öljeijirgal was, however, already familiar with the European countries and refered to them by the Sino-Mongolian term *shi yang-ud* "west ocean people.") Even in speaking of Mongolian affairs outside of Ordos, Öljeijirgal delivered himself of the most astounding errors; he seems to have thought that Outer Mongolia was leading the Buriat Mongols in Russia, a peculiar misunderstanding that if anything was the opposite of the truth. He wrote, "just as previously Buriatia followed Russia, so now it follows Neislel Khüriye."

[70] Antagonism to Japan based on its treatment of the Koreans was widespread in Mongolia. See Paul Hyer, "Mongolian Stereotypes and Images: Some Introductory Observations," in *Aspects of Altaic Civilization II*, ed. Larry V. Clark and Paul Alexander Draghi (Bloomington, 1978), pp. 74; and Sechin Jagchid, "Inner Mongolia under Japanese Occupation, 1935-1945: An Eyewitness Report," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 20 (1987), 143.

But more significant than any particular errors, was the Buddhist frame of analysis that Öljeijirgal used to evaluate the foreign policy of the neighboring powers. In this he was typical of the duguilang vigilantes, for whom Buddhism was an integral part of the Mongol interests and identity threatened by the New Policies and their Republican continuation. He, like others, had to respond to rumors, widespread in Inner Mongolia, that Buddhism had been abolished in Khalkha Mongolia since the revolution.[71] He then explained that Japan was "obviously opposed" (*ilerkhei kharshitai*) to that religion, while Russia and Outer Mongolia, while leading the Buriats, allowed Buddhism to exist. Thus the governments of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia while perhaps not Buddhist themselves, were tolerant of it, so that it would be "a little better" (*jigakhan degere*) to ally with one of those two than with Japan. Thus the interests of Buddhism formed the basic framework of his foreign policy views. He asked his duguilang comrades to stop paying dues to Yonghegong or Dolonnuur temples, but these were far away from Üüshin to the east, and the objection was probably based on objections to sending banner funds out of the banner, and not on opposition to an established church as such. Banner yamens also paid for offerings within the banner, such as to the local oboos (cairns), and required the service of monastic scholars, physicians, and sacristans, but Öljeijirgal expressed no objection to these payments.[72]

As we have seen, though, Fumingtai and the Young Mongols' educational agenda had been based upon the necessity to replace religion with modern science in the schools, and his foreign policy was certainly not determined by Buddhism. For him, Japan was the "imperialist country of the Orient," a phrase then widely used in Soviet propaganda, which implied that imperialism was an international phenomenon not tied to any particular culture, let alone to the worship of Buddhism. While we cannot say how much Fumingtai understood contemporary Leninist theory, he had mastered the vocabulary of Communist anti-imperialism as well as any one in Mongolia.

Economic policy was also an area of great difference. For Öljeijirgal, coming out of the duguilang opposition to the New Policies' expansion of local taxes and the banner tradition of financing by leases, the best

[71] See e.g. *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, p. 58; *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 8a.

[72] On Otog Banner's payments to Dolonnuur and Yonghegong, as well as for local sacrifices at the oboos and salt lakes, and regular attendance of certain lamas at the grand duke's court, see Henry Serruys, "Socio-political Document from Ordos," pp. 592, 602-03, 609.

financial policy was one that took the burden of taxes off the domestic populace and put it on foreign trade. Thus he praised the Mongolian government for having no domestic taxes, and financing itself entirely from customs receipts. He also held up the Mongolian government as a model for how the exploitation of natural resources had been made beneficial to the people and the government. For Fumingtai, however, as a Young Mongol raised under the post-New Policies local government, taxes were essentially a non-issue; nowhere does he (or other Young Mongol writers) make mention of the burden of direct taxation that seemed so intolerable to the duguilang members.

Another great difference, and one that bore major implications for the party's future strategy in Inner Mongolia, was that while Fumingtai and the Young Mongols thought in terms of the Mongolian nation as a whole, for Öljeijirgal and the Ordos vigilantes, the basic unit was the banner, and at most the neighboring banners of Ordos. For Fumingtai, Mongolia in 1924 was divided into three large units: Outer Mongolia which was free, and Bargu and South (that is, Inner) Mongolia which were still enslaved to China. The solution to this problem was simple: as Mongols were all brothers, and one family, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia had to rescue the Bargus and South Mongols by direct action. He called on the Khalkha to prepare to turn a defensive war against the provocations of Zhang Zuolin and the Japanese into an offensive war for Mongolian unity. The implication was that as the Mongols were one nation, direct liberation of Inner Mongolia and Bargu by Mongolia's armed forces was the optimal solution to their crisis of division. In 1926 and 1928, Fumingtai and Mersé would try to follow exactly that program with ultimately disastrous results.

Öljeijirgal, too, hoped for aid from the Mongolian government, but for him this aid would be limited to supplying arms and instructors to the local forces of Üüshin. Although Buriatia was being led (*dagaju*) by Khalkha, Öljeijirgal planned only to "be friendly with and rely on" (*edeluge nairamdaju tüshig kholbogatai bolbasu*) the Mongolian and Soviet governments. Khalkha had defended itself from China with weapons, and now it was up to Üüshin to do the same. Thus, he emphasized the importance of creating an armed and trained force that could defend the homeland against Chinese invaders, not of direct military intervention from outside Inner Mongolia.

The seizure of power in Mongolia had made a similar seizure of power in Ordos a possibility. He planned to take the existing banner organization, minus the nobility, as the basis for the development of the democracy or "people's government" (*arad-un jasag*) in Üüshin. Thus

he stressed the organization of duguilangs and party cells, along with the abolition of the hereditary estates (that is the distinction of the Chinggisid nobility, titled and untitled, and the commoners), but within the people assumed the continuation of the existing non-hereditary distinctions, thus asking the people to bring yamen runners, secretaries, messengers, and militia corporals (*boshukhu khögegchi*) into the duguilang movement, and in the same breath, asking them to choose a leader. The phrasing implied that Öljeijirgal would not have been unhappy, and indeed, may well have expected that these lower ranked officials, among whom he and most of the duguilang leaders of Ordos were numbered, would take the leadership position. Absent, though, is any idea of forming either an Inner Mongolian or a pan-Mongolian government above the local government. As for other areas of Inner Mongolia, the only ones he concerned himself with, it seems, were the neighboring banners of Otog, Jasag, and Wang, and even there he seemed to think only of alliance, not union. In short, Öljeijirgal's aim seems to have simply been to make an independent country out of Üüshin Banner, and both his friends and foes later accused him of seeking just that.[73]

Given the differences, what eventually brought these two groups, so different in background and point of view, together? The key seems to have been paradox built into the New Policies' and Chinese Republic's use of the traditional Qing institutions to implement its modernizing policies. While the duguilang members held obstinately to many of the fundamental ideas of the Qing order, their political activity drove them into ever-more open defiance of the authority of their Chinggisid rulers. This open defiance, and the brutal reaction it inspired, destroyed the lay pillar of the Qing order, and indicated to the duguilang leaders that the past could not be recovered and that some kind of education about the frightening world around them was essential for their survival. Their progress was in many ways very similar to that of the early Republican rebel Bai Lang who began as a violent opponent of the New Policies: "[His] principal targets were missionary property and the institutions set up under the universally unpopular New Policies: post and telegraph offices, Western-style schools, local self-government premises, and so on." In 1912 he allied with the Qing loyalist party, resisting Yuan Shikai in the name of restoring the Qing and its patriarchal sway, but by 1913 he eventually accepted the aid of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionaries, also

[73] Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 590; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 354-5.

fighting Yuan Shikai. Soon he was denouncing Yuan Shikai not for having overthrown the Qing but for hijacking the revolution against despotism.[74] In the case of both Bai Lang and the duguilang leaders, we find one constant—resistance to the coercive cultural change and arbitrary power which the New Policies granted the local officials—and a great flexibility in the search for allies against that power. For both Bai Lang and the duguilangs, their eventual allies—the Revolutionary Party for Bai Lang, and the Mongolian People's Government for the duguilang—were far-off saviors who offered the fighters aid and advice, but not control, in their contest against the local bullies. The Daurs and Kuomintang had high-level ties with Mongolia and so formed an important middleman for the duguilangs' ties with Mongolia. Some, like Wangdanima, seem to have also desired the Young Mongols as allies in the struggle against the Beijing regime, but for others they were never more than middlemen.

The Duguilang Leaders Turn to Mongolia

On 29th day of the fourth moon of the male blue mouse year (around June 1, 1924—the document, like all early duguilang petitions, uses the lunar calendar only), two duguilang leaders, Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu, addressed a letter to the "Central Committee of the Supreme Mongolian People's Party." Doodongündüb was from Jasag, and Chunaijamsu was from Üüshin, and the two petitioners seemed to be speaking on behalf of the duguilangs, but also of the league as a whole. They referred to Öljeijirgal as the founder of the duguilangs, and although it did not mention him by name, the Jasag origin of Doodongündüb makes it likely they were associated with Wangdanima. One of Wangdanima's assistants, Dobdon of Jasag Banner, was in Mongolia in November of 1924 and addressed the Great Khural (Congress) of the Mongolian People's Republic. "Doodongündüb" is possibly a variant version of Dobdon's name; if that were the case, it cannot be doubted that Wangdanima was ultimately behind the June 1 petition.[75] In any case, the two duguilang

[74] See Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China*, pp. 55-61 and 242-50; quotation from p. 55. Billingsley's account supersedes that of Friedman, *Backwards Toward Revolution*, pp. 121-28 and 144-64.

[75] Dobdon is Tibetan sTobs-ldan "complete force" and Gündüb, while unattested as a Tibeto-Mongolian personal name, is easily analyzed as Kun-grub "all-accomplishing," which makes perfect sense along with sTobs-ldan. The spelling "Doodon" for the first element could be a variant spelling based either on a labialization of the

members' arrival in Mongolia marked the first contact of the duguilangs with the new People's Government in Mongolia.

After describing the terrible sufferings of the people of Ordos, the writers described their sudden hope:

> When we investigated where we could find a good support, it was said that the
> Great Northern Mongolian People's Party has been founded; it has mastered civil and military arts equally and is merciful, repairing all in the world with wisdom and means like the sun and moon. We heard your fame spread to the sky like the cry of a dragon and we worshiped you from afar.

So they sent a group, but as the land was chaotic and the *gamings* near, only two would go.

> We two foolish people came with a deep faith in entering happiness, and not knowing how to write an official petition, we have presented this to you the Central Committee of the Supreme Mongolian People's Party. We request that you consider this and rescue the people of our league from the tyrannical government and rescue them.[76]

While this letter, even more than the early letters from the Young Mongols of Bargu and of Bai Yunti, aimed to express a profound loyalty to the new government, the language used was not imperial but religious; Buddhist imagery of "wisdom and means," and the "cry of the dragon" usually said of a Buddha's preaching, and the "worship" and "deep faith," showed the Mongolian government, with its consideration for the poor people, as a true religious icon. Even the elevation of the name "Great Northern Mongolian People's Party" was not necessarily borrowed directly from imperial practice; it was common in Mongolian literature of the early modern period to elevate the name of the Buddha or of incarnate lamas in this way.

In a few months, Wangdanima followed up this appeal by dispatching Öljeijirgal in person with a delegation of Üüshin Mongols. Two events in 1924 may have assisted Wangdanima in making plans for his appeal to Mongolia: the increasing presence of Soviet and Mongolian citizens in Beijing noted above, and a change in rulership over Yekhe Juu League. During his last years in Beijing, Wangdanima and Oyuntodo

-b- in Mongolian, or the dropping of the -b- in some Tibetan dialects.

[76] Central Party Archives, 7-1-32: 7 (Doodongündüb and Chunaijamsu to MPP CC, 29th day of the 4th moon, blue mouse year [June 1, 1924]). In the text, "Great Northern Mongolian People's Party" is raised above the other lines.

came to know Khalkha Mongolians working in Beijing, such as Deputy Adjutant Dorji (Dorji *Meiren)* and Dobchin, both in China for work with the cooperatives and other financial issues, and a woman, Chuluun. Wangdanima's acquaintances may have also included those at the new Soviet embassy, as well as Bai Yunti.[77] As noted above, Bai's clansman was a fellow lama in Yonghegong, and the early letters from both Doodongündüb and those from Öljeijirgal mimic Bai Yunti's fondness for attaching superlatives like "All-Mongolian" (*bükhü Monggol*) or "Supreme" (*degedü*) to the titles of the party and central committee. In any case, the two lamas somehow acquired a little familiarity with the terminology of revolution, using phrases like "reactionaries" *ejerkheg khargis* and "imperialist" *ejerkheg türimekhei*, that contrasted strangely with their Buddhist vocabulary. Finally, the fact that letters the two lamas sent to Mongolia were all addressed to the People's Party, and not to the People's Government, would indicate that Wangdanima was aware that the Mongolian government was at present only interested in party-level links with opponents of Beijing, not government ones. The most likely source of these new terms and information would be Bai Yunti.

A chance mortality in Ordos also gave Wangdanima the chance to give a broad sponsorship to his appeal to Mongolia. The previous league chairman, Sümbürbatu, prince of Dalad Banner, had always been a strong opponent of pan-Mongolian unification. When Sümbürbatu died, the officials of Dalad had tried to hide his death and retain the seal, but the minister of Wang Banner, Erdenigerel, went personally to the seat of Dalad Banner, confiscated the chairman's seal, and then delivered it to Shagdurjab, who was both ruler of Jasag Banner and deputy chairman of the league and so the rightful successor to the seal.[78] Prince Sha, as he

[77] Interview with O. Khosbayar, July 16, 1992; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 246-248; *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 100. These published sources list two Soviets, Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov and "Ledogorov," and two Khalkha Mongols, Nasunbatu (1891-1937) and Dobchin as acquaintances of Wangdanima and Öljeijirgal in these years. The first three acquaintances, however, may well have been made later—Oshirov, Ledogorov, and Nasunbatu were all active in the party's Ordos campaign in 1926. Dobchin, however, had no subsequent activity in Ordos. The name "Ledogorov," is found in Mongolian transcription in these sources as Lidékarw and Létayarfu. In *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, II, *Mi...*, 84a, the name is found transcribed from Russian to Chinese as "Lieduoguoruofu," which should go back to Russian Ledogorov "Ice-burger." On Dorji *Meiren*, see Damdinsüren, *Namtryn khuudsaas*, pp. 65-66.

[78] On Shagdurjab, see Huang Fensheng, *Bianjiang renwu zhi*, pp. 50-54; Peng Pingyang, "Zheng hai feng yun wushi nian—Shakedurzhabu shengping shuyao," pp. 1-12.

was now called, was particularly grateful to Erdenigerel for securing his title. Since Erdenigerel was a supporter of Wangdanima, the lama returned to something of his former influence over the titular ruler of all Ordos.[79] Wangdanima had kept closely in touch with Prince Sha via his messenger Lhunrub since his exile, and Wangdanima now sent letters to all his comrades, and especially Erdenigerel, in Ordos about the new turn of events in Mongolia.[80]

Secondary accounts then imply that Wangdanima and Öljeijirgal planned to appeal for aid to the Mongolian government in the name of the official league hierarchy. Öljeijirgal supposedly asked the sympathetic Prince Sha to send him some blank pieces of paper with the stamp of the league office, in order to "get in touch with some people."[81] The implication is that he used these blank sheets to compose a request for aid in the name of the league captain-general, Prince Sha. Although there are many petitions from duguilang members in the archives of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, I have found no such letter stamped with the league seal. Wangdanima certainly sent along with Öljeijirgal a letter addressed to the party center in Mongolia; this letter too is not in the archives, and may be the one written on the blank sheets with the league seal. Finally, Öljeijirgal, when he arrived in Mongolia, claimed to represent not only the duguilangs, but also Yekhe Juu League, a claim that would be more plausible if he bore a letter from Prince Sha's stamp.[82]

In any case, as noted above, Wangdanima sent messages to the various banners telling them the good news that the people of Yekhe Juu

[79] *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 13 nian*, I, 704; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 313-5.

[80] Baoyintu, "Wangdannima shilue," p. 41; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 313; *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp. 98-99.

[81] *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 101.

[82] See Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 13 (Öljeijirgal to MPP CC, extra tenth moon, 1924), *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, 108-110, Altan-orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 532, and Edünkesig, Buyan and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 250, 370. This request bears a striking similarity to the mentality of the Mongolian People's Party, which while requesting aid to the party from the Soviet Union in 1920, felt the need to get legal sanction for its plea in the form of a letter bearing the seal of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu. See Ewing, *Hammer and the Anvil?*, pp. 179-80, 183-85; Coyibalsang, Losol, and Demid, I, 141-57; Choibalsan, Losol, and Demid, pp. 71-77.

had a new defender in Mongolia. A young Üüshin duguilang member recalled the receipt of this message and the people's response:

> A secret message came from Wangdanima saying, '[In] the land of Outer Mongolia has been born the People's Revolutionary Party. It has exterminated all the foreign and domestic reactionaries, established a democratic regime (*arad-un erkhetü jasag törö*) and made the great Mongolian state rise again. Commoners of the duguilangs! Go there now, to link up with them, to receive aid and instruction and claim the freedom you have been striving for.' Following this we duguilang commoners all at the same time suddenly began to have faith in the northern direction. Truly we rejoiced tremendously as if it was like the red sun lighting up this golden world and the red sun was liberating us people from all our manifold heavy pains.[83]

This appeal was typical of petitions from Ordos vigilantes educated in Beijing or Mongolia in its mixture of revolutionary phrases ("foreign and domestic reactionaries," etc.), with the Buddhist language of "having faith in the northern direction," and the "red sun lighting up the golden world." The latter image was taken from Buddhist histories where the first transmission of the Buddhist dharma from Tibet was often compared to a sun rising over the dark land of Mongolia.

Despite the rejoicing, the Üüshin Mongols would certainly need someone to guide them if they wished to make connections with Mongolia. Wangdanima thus deputed Öljeijirgal to go back to Üüshin and collect duguilang members in Üüshin to go north and learn the civil and military arts which the People's Government was so ardently promoting. The arrival of Öljeijirgal came at a moment when the duguilang organization was on the point of despair and disintegration; as Öljeijirgal was still a fugitive, he had to hide out in the dunes and willow groves of his native banner by day, and visit his and other homes by night. The various Mongols from Üüshin and other Yekhe Juu banners met secretly to discuss Wangdanima's letter and Öljeijirgal's arrival.[84]

Eventually fifteen young Ordos Mongols were selected to go with Öljeijirgal to Mongolia, leaving around August 4, 1924.[85] To judge from

[83] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927).

[84] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 57 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]).

[85] The story of Öljeijirgal's trip to Mongolia was one of the major "story cycles" collected about the duguilang hero. It is found, with little variation, in Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 250; Yi-Meng zheng-xie wen-shi wei, "Xini Lama," p. 23, and *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, pp.

the language of the petitions, the aim of these Mongols was not so much a political one of putting their district under the new government in Mongolia or becoming citizens of it, but a religious one of seeking an initiation into power through venerating this new government and receiving its teaching. Sodnamdongrub, a senior leader of Üüshin's duguilangs who stayed behind, wrote that Öljiejirgal with his more than ten comrades, "went in hopes of worshiping at the standard of the land of salvation and of the compassionate comrades, and find salvation to let us live again. We could not stand our native tyrants, and the *duu lii* bandits, the *dzei khuidza* ["robbing Hui"] leaders, and how the *gaming*s always demanded that we observe their regulations."[86] The names of those fifteen chosen to go were long remembered in Üüshin; secondary sources say they were Öljeijirgal's son Gungganingbu, Saishingga, Sarbujab, Baldan, Nimarinchin, Saringgawa (female), Sambuu, Tegüsjirgalang, Tübshin(bayar), Lhamujab, Sungnai, Darima (female), Mandukhudalai, Chogtu, and Dandzan, all but the last four of whom are confirmed in archival records.[87]

Although one would have expected the pilgrims to have been chosen so as to make the most of their experience in Mongolia, many of them got little out of it. Whereas the Young Mongols from Hulun Buir and East Mongolia who went to Mongolia were, by and large, of school age, with some financial support from home, and well prepared both for higher education and city life, those of Ordos were older, poor, often

102-104, and repeated in general sources, such as *Ke'ai de Erduosi* (Höhhot, 1985), pp. 56-57 (Mongolian translation, *Qayir-a-yi Tatagsan Ordos* [Höhhot, 1985], p. 190). Although the cycle includes exact lunar dates for the departure and arrival of the party, they are about a month later than those found in contemporary archival sources, putting the departure in the middle of the eighth moon, not early in the seventh moon.

[86] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 57 (Sodnamdongrub to MPRP CC, 4th moon, 27th day, female blue ox year, [=June 17, 1925]); cf. 7-1-26: 38 (Möngkhe'öljei's speech to the Special Congress).

[87] Lhamujab and Sungnai are mentioned in a letter from Öljeijirgal in Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg–a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 285 and 286; Saishingga, Sambuu, Serbujab, Tübshin(bayar), and Gungganingbu in Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 14 (Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, Sept. 16, 1925); Baldan and Saringgawa in Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927); and Saishingga again and Tegüsjirgalang in 7-1-26: 38 (Möngkhe'öljei's speech to the Special Congress). Nimarinchin is found as an active participant of the duguilang activities in Üüshin after Öljeijirgal returned, and there is no reason to doubt that he did go to Mongolia. Möngkhe'öljei's speech to the PRPIM's 1927 Special Congress (7-1-26: 38), also mentions one Togtakhu as having been among the pilgrims, a name not found in the "canonical" list.

virtually illiterate, and ill-adapted to city life. When Öljeijirgal requested for the Ordos Mongols to be returned home to make revolution in their homeland, he specifically singled out Sambuu and Sarbujab, who had not been able to study, Saishingga who was too old to study well and on leave from the army post he had been given, and Tübshin(bayar) and Öljeijirgal himself, who had been very sick. Gungganingbu, Öljeijirgal's son was only fourteen at the time and followed his father back to Inner Mongolia after only a year in Mongolia.[88] A survey of Inner Mongols in Ulaanbaatar in 1932 gives further details on Tübshinbayar as age 37 in 1932 (and so 31 in 1924), badly literate, and originally a destitute commoner. In 1931, he was sent to Khowd in the far west of Mongolia, as a nurse (*subilagchi*).[89] Tübshinbayar and Öljeijirgal's illnesses may have been connected to their stay in Mongolia; once they got back to Inner Mongolia, they took on heavy tasks that demanded good health. Although the lack of preparation of some of the pilgrims made their stay in Mongolia less productive, it did make their determination in going to Mongolia all the more impressive, and their value as representatives of the common banner folk, young and old, male and female, all the greater.

According to two participants, Baldan and Saringgawa, the journey took more than four months: they were arrested by local bullies in some places, and had to brave the winter cold with no fur coats, exhausting their horses as they plowed through knee-high snow. Although it was almost as bad as being naked and on foot, they said, the sixteen didn't loose hope and all finally arrived in the end. Originally the duguilangs sent off the representatives with sixteen camels and $1,000 silver as an offering for the land of salvation, but the cash had apparently been seized by the local bullies.[90]

They arrived finally in Neislel Khüriye on the 26th day of the extra tenth moon of winter (around December 21, 1924), and before the moon had turned new Öljeijirgal presented to the party leaders a letter from Wangdanima, the Bandida Bagshi Gegen, addressed directly to the Central Committee of the "All-Mongolian People's Party," as well as a letter from himself and the Ordos people's tribute (*dagar-a orugsan beleg*) of sixteen camels. The $1,000 silver, lost on the way, was pro-

[88] Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 250.

[89] Central Party Archives 7-1-20: 14 (Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, Sept. 16, 1925); Central Party Archives 7-1-73: 5 (Office of Internal Security, report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932).

[90] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927); 7-1-20: 13 (Öljeijirgal to MPP CC, extra tenth moon, 1924).

mised for later. The duguilangs of all seven banners in Yekhe Juu League, he stated, were under the oppression of "internal and external reactionary imperialists" (*gadana dotona-yin ejerkheg khargis türimekhei*) and after discussion had delegated him, "a foolish old man," to speak on their behalf. Like the other letters cited so far, yet even more extravagantly, he spoke of the great People's Party's victory rising like the sun and the moon, and calling with the voice of thousands of dragons and tigers. Their ultimate aims were to drive out the "reactionaries" and *gamings* (that is, the tyrannical yamen nobility and the Chinese Republican authorities), develop the People's Party and let their people live in peace, and finally to continue to preserve their Buddhist lineage without a break. For this reason, "we were sent to Neislel Khüriye to submit to its merciful culture, to make known our determination to serve it like horses and dogs [a cliche of imperial loyalty], and to congratulate you on developing the All-People's Party, and creating a great Mongolian State." More particularly, the Ordos pilgrims hoped that they would receive instruction from the new state to relieve their deeply felt sense of ignorance and isolation: "We have been suffering..., without our learning any arts or sciences, we have merely been guarding the shrine of our Holy Lord Chinggis Khan...We hope to become People's Party members and to learn whatever instructions we can."[91]

By the time they arrived, the Mongolian government and party was still groping towards a policy on Inner Mongolia. Although the new arrivals did not know it, having been out of touch with events for months, the situation in China had undergone a dramatic change and numerous other Inner Mongols began arriving in Mongolia. The pilgrims received a kindly welcome, but no immediate aid in liberating Ordos. They were allowed to present their petition for aid to the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Party, but received no response for several months.[92] The pilgrims were then assigned to party and

[91] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 13 (Öljeijirgal to MPP CC, extra tenth moon, 1924); Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 286. I have seen neither the letter from Wangdanima in the archives, nor any mention of it in the secondary literature on the topic in Mongolia. Presumably it was lost or forwarded elsewhere early on. I have converted Öljeijirgal's date of arrival according to the Tibetan 'Phag-pa calendar, which did have an extra intercalary tenth moon in 1924 (the Chinese and Mongolian lunar calendars did not). See Appendix E on calendars and dating.

[92] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927); 7-1-20: 13; Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 532; Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 250.

military schools: Öljeijirgal's teenage son, Gungganingbu, at the Central Party School, and Saishingga, Mandukhudalai, Serbujab, Tübshinbayar, and probably two others at the Sükhebaatur Military Academy. Öljeijirgal suffered a poor health after his arrival and was given a job in the National Library. As I have noted, these new students were often not very successful at their studies, and already by April, Öljeijirgal seemed impatient for them to return. Öljiejirgal thought two of the students Sambuu and Sarbujab simply lacked the aptitude while Saichingga was too old and Tübshinbayar and himself were sickly.[93] Whether it was useful or not, however, the Ordos vigilantes would have to be content to study. They, like the other newly arrived students from Inner Mongolia were waiting until the authorities in Uaanbaatar worked out how they could relieve the miseries of their devoted supporters under Chinese rule.

[93] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927); 7-1-20: 14 (Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, Sept. 16, 1925); Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 5 (Office of Internal Security, report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932). Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 34 (Serengdonrub to MPRP CC, September 3, 1925) records that six Ordos students had completed their basic training at the "officers academy." The secondary hagiographies of Shinelama all say that Gungga attended "Sükhebaatur School," but Saishingga, Mandukhudalai, and Sarbujab attended the military school (Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 251; Yi-Meng zheng-xie, "Xini Lama," p. 23; *Gilaljagsan nigen nasu*, p. 105-6). The problem is, however, that Sükhebaatur school *is* the military school. Since Baldan and Saringgawa say the students were distributed to party and military schools, and the former had many Inner Mongolian students, I have assumed that Gungga's "Sükhebaatur School" was actually the party school, and that a secondary editor erroneously attached the name of Sükhebaatur to it. The party and military schools were just then in the process of renaming and expansion. I have given their names as they were after March-April, 1925; see Sh. Nacugdorji, ed., *Bügüde Nayiramdaqu Monggol Arad Ulus-un soyol-un teüke (1921-1940)* (Hailar, 1988), pp. 169-173. This book is a Mongolian-script version of *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn soyolyn tüükh (1921-1940)*, published in Ulaanbaatar in 1981.

CHAPTER FIVE

TURNING POINT, AUGUST, 1924-JANUARY, 1925.

In May, 1924, the eighth and last Jébdzundamba Khutugtu displayed the impermanence of this world, and the new government faced the problem of the new state's ultimate constitutional form. From 1921 to 1924, it had been a "constitutional government," with the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu as head of state, but with all real power in the hands of the People's Government and People's Party. The death of the head of state forced a decision and the Mongolian politicians, under pressure from both the Communist International and their own ambitions which found the clerical head of state an unnecessary complication, declared the nation would be a republic. In November of that same year, at the First Congress (Great Khural) of the Mongolian People's Republic, a new constitution on the Soviet model was adopted and the country was named the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), while the capital, Neislel Khüriye, was renamed Ulaanbaatar Khot, "Red Hero's City." Back in 1921, at the party's founding, there had been a debate on whether to call the party a "people's party" or a "people's revolutionary party." Worries over the reaction of conservative Mongols led to the first name being chosen, although "revolutionary" was still commonly added to the Russian version. In March, 1925, a plenary session of the Central Committee renamed the party the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The final issue, of whether and where a new Jébzundamba Khutugtu would be found to head Mongolia's church was referred to a committee, with instructions to delay it indefinitely.

As part of the new leftward turn, the ruling party increased its participation in the activities of the Communist International or Comintern, the international league of Communist and other pro-Moscow parties founded by Lenin in 1919. The Mongolian People's Party was not yet a member, but was hoping to become one and sent a delegation to the Comintern's Fifth World Congress in July, 1924. Although many of the early Buriat members of the People's Party had been delegated to the party in the name of the Comintern, their operations in Mongolia were in fact under the control of the Siberian party boss, B.Z. Shumiatskii, and not at all under Moscow. The MPRP's participation in the world congress, however, opened up the Mongolian party to direct advice and supervision from the Comintern's central

CHAPTER SIX

THE YOUNGEST MONGOLS, 1923-1925

At the end of 1924, as we have seen, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing first displayed its substantial influence among the youngest generation of Inner Mongols studying in Beijing. Although many Mongols in the generation of the 1880s and 1890s turned to the Nationalists, the first generation of Inner Mongols born in the twentieth century, those who had spent their formative adolescent years under the Republican regime, were actively and successfully courted by the Communists. The initial responsibility for this success went to a Rehe-born Communist, Han Linfu, but the long-term success of Han's work depended ultimately on the practical skills of those Inner Mongols he recruited. Of these the two most important were the Höhhot Tümed, Rong Yaoxian (1901-1927), the first ethnic Mongol and first student at the Mongolian and Tibetan School to join the Communist Party, and the Kharachin, Wu Wenxian, who in December, 1924, was the other Mongol assigned along with Bai Yunti to organize Inner Mongolia.

Those Mongols cultivated by Han Linfu formed a distinct group among the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries. Already by late 1923, they were in violent conflict with the older Mongol politicians, driving the Kharachin MP AltanOchir out as president of the Mongolian and Tibetan Institute with demonstrations. This attitude did not change over the course of the next few years. A Khalkha Mongolian observer wrote in August, 1925, that these youth were unfriendly to Bai Yunti's party and "have a principle of independent action" (*dang gagtsakhar yabukhu zorilga bui*). The youth explained their hostility by the fact that Bai Yunti's faction admitted the rich and the nobles.[1] Bai Yunti in his later interviews with Sechin Jagchid recalled a matching suspicion among the older Mongols toward the youth's calls for class warfare. Sometime after Feng Yuxiang's Beijing coup d'état he visited Prince Güng. Prince Güng was already coming under fire from conservative clerics such as the Janggiya Khutugtu (1891-1958),[2] as well as fellow banner rulers like

[1] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, Aug. 22, 1925).

[2] Often written Jangjia, from the Chinese transcription "Zhangjia," but in Mongolian the name is written "Janggiya" (Tibetan, Lcang-skya) as can be seen for example in Janggiy-a Isidambiromé, *Merged garqu oron/Dag-yig mkhas-pa'i*

Table 6.1: Regional Distribution of Youth Party Membership, July 1925

Special Region	League and Banner	Branch Committees
Rehe	Josotu	
	Kharachin Right	12 branches
	Kharachin Middle	6 branches
	Kharachin Left ("Front")	1 branch
	Juu Uda	
	Ongni'ud	3 branches
	Aukhan	4 branches
	Naiman	6 branches
	Kheshigten	4 branches
Suiyuan	Tümed Special Banner	9 branches

Note: Each branch had, on paper, at least 30 members.

Source: Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 52-3 (Inner Mongolian Youth Party leaders to MPRP CC, July, 1925).

Lhawangbürügjil of Alashan, for having spawned radicalism among the Mongolian youth with his school and also from the radical youth itself which saw in him an epitome of the feudal official and servant of Japanese imperialism. Prince Güng told Bai Yunti that he had done his best to protect the rights of the Mongols but that, from then on, this fight was the responsibility of the younger generation. He also warned Bai Yunti that if the Mongolian people fight among themselves, it would endanger their survival, and in particular, class warfare would only weaken the Mongols and hinder their struggle against outside enemies. Bai Yunti later told Sechin Jagchid that this warning against allowing

'byung-gnas, ed. Jamyantübdan and Jorigtu (1741; rpt. Beijing, 1989). This Sixth or Seventh Janggiya (the counts differ) later fled to Taiwan and died there; see Zhang Yuxin, *Qingdai sida huofo* (Beijing, 1989), pp. 145-46, where he is called Baldandambiromé (Tibetan dPal-ldan bsTan-pa'i sGron-me); Janggiy-a, *Merged garqu oron*, pp. 1523-24, where he is called Choiyangyishidorji (Tib. Chos-dbyings Ye-shes rDo-rje); and Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 148-49, 235, and Huang, *Bianjiang renwu zhi*, pp. 40-42, where he is called Sangjaijab (Tib. Sangs-rgyas-skyab).

such Communist trends to dominate his movement left a great impression on him.[3]

To those sympathetic to the Communists, Bai's very access to a high official like Prince Güng made his party a party of the nobles and officials. Compared to the leaders of the Nationalist faction, like Bai Yunti, Murungga, AltanOchir, or even Sainbayar, the most prominent Communist sympathizers among the Mongols were certainly poorer and less influential, although how much of this was simply a factor of their youth is unclear. A Mongolian security report describes Wu Wenxian, the leading Kharachin organizer for the Communists in 1924-1925 as being of "wealthy peasant" background, that is, someone who rented out land to others.[4] On their applications for the KMT's famous Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in Canton, however, the Kharachin Bai Haifeng described his family's economic situation as "Every year what we plow is barely enough to make ends meet," while Rong Yaoxian from the Höhhot Tümeds described his family as "Poor—In a good year produces only enough for food and clothes." Bai Haifeng's mother and father raised their seven children north of Yeboshou, the county seat of Jianping County and almost 110 kilometers southeast of the Kharachin Right Banner office that theoretically had jurisdiction over them. Bai had graduated higher primary school in Kharachin Right Banner, and entered the Rehe Normal School in Chengde, but had to leave the Normal School and return to Kharachin because his family could not pay the fees.[5]

In interpreting these statements, it must be kept in mind that in the Chinese countryside being an independent family farmer and even renting out land was not necessarily contradictory to experiencing hardship in food and clothing. The memoirs of the most famous Tümed Communist, Wulanfu/Ulaankhüü (1906-1988, Chinese name, Yun Ze, childhood name Yun Qingchun) give a clear example of a childhood a Communist class analysis could classify as "upper middle" or even "rich peasant," but which felt poor and deprived, particularly when Yun Ze compared himself to the sons of rich families he met in school in the city

[3] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 225-26, 265-66; Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai.

[4] Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 6 (Office of Internal Security investigation of Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932).

[5] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao di'er dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao* (1924; rpt. Taipei, 1990), pp. 495-96; Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao disi dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao* (1924; rpt. Taipei, 1990), p. 983.

of Guisui.[6] Even the one student sympathetic to the Communist Party who had a high official background, Wu Yunzhu, son of a high official in Kharachin Right Banner, was shut out from patronage by his father's long-lasting feud with the dominant clique around Prince Güng.[7] Thus, there does thus seem to be a pattern of somewhat lesser wealth, or else alienation from patronage networks, among those attracted to Communism.

The most clear-cut sociological criterion, however, distinguishing those leaning to the Communist Party rather than to the Kuomintang in Canton was age. Rong Yaoxian's birthdate is variously given as 1895 or 1901, but even in the latter case he was among the oldest of Mongols associated with the Communist Party.[8] This age difference, of course, was responsible for a large part of two groups' great difference in experience, wealth, and official connections. Thus, the conflict between what would form in 1925 as the Inner Mongolian Youth Party and the Nationalist faction among Bai Yunti was more a generational conflict than a class conflict.

Rong Yaoxian and Yun Ze hailed from the Höhhot Tümed Banner in western Inner Mongolia, while Wu Wenxian and Bai Haifeng came from Kharachin Right Banner. Their origins indicate the two areas of strength of the Communist Party among the Mongols. All of those party leaders known by name to have joined the Communist Party in 1924 or 1925 came either from the Tümed Special Banner, in the west of Inner Mongolia, or from Kharachin Right Banner in southern Rehe. The distribution of party members, when these young Mongols formed their own party in 1925, shows that this distribution applied not only to the leaders but to the mass of members as well. In July, 1925, this party had 45 branch committees, distributed in an extremely uneven fashion: all were in either southern Rehe, and especially Kharachin, or among the Höhhot Tümeds (see table 6.1).

[6] Compare for example, Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, p. 5, with pp. 22-23.

[7] Hukebater, "Wu Guting qiren ji zu jun jianwen," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 29 (1987), 40-41.

[8] Zhao Lüqian, "Menggu zu zuizao de Gongchandangyuan—Rong Yuexian," *Minzu tuanjie*, no. 193 (May, 1987), p. 20, gives Rong's year of birth as 1895, but the records reproduced in *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao*, (1936; rpt. Taipei, 1990), XI, *Huangpu tongxue mingce*, 101, gives his age as 24 at his entrance to Whampoa in March, 1924. Zhao Lüqian mistook the first character in his given name. As the both the archival evidence and the Mongolian transcription in Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 49-53 (Inner Mongolian Youth Party leaders to MPRP CC, July, 1925), demonstrates, it was *yào* "shine, illumine, dazzle," not *yuè* "leap, jump."

The regional distribution shows how close social proximity to Chinese culture and language was an essential precondition to later attraction to the Communist Party. With the exception of Kheshigten Banner, Chinese Communism had no influence whatsoever among Mongols in either pastoral or semi-pastoral regions, or where the Chinese language was not widely used. Again, with the sole exception of Kheshigten, those banners in Josotu and Juu Uda where the party had members were precisely those with a mixed pattern of residence, where Mongols and Chinese by and large lived in close proximity, in ethnically-integrated villages. Of those who are mentioned in contemporary sources in connection with Han Linfu, with the Inner Mongolian Youth Party of 1925, or as cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, the vast majority at this point used only Chinese names, even when writing in Mongolian. Of the fourteen listed in table 6.2, only two had clearly Mongolian names (Mandulakhu and Baigulagchi), and one a Sino-Manchu name (Algimbu, perhaps from the Manchu transcription of the Chinese Erjinbao). All the others used only Chinese names, and while the four who later spent time in Mongolia (Wu Wenxian, Bai Haifeng, Bai Yonglun, and Wang Bingzhang) came to use Mongolian names, they previously used Chinese names, even when writing Mongolian.

The education of Bai Haifeng (1904-1957) exemplified the kind of schooling students received in these mixed Sino-Mongolian communities in the early twentieth century. After studying the Five Classics and the Four Books at home, along with Mongolian writing, he entered and graduated the Kharachin Right Banner's Higher Primary School, and would have studied at the Rehe Normal School if he had not encountered financial difficulties. Returning to his home banner heworked for two years at the Kharachin Right Banner yamen as an apprentice clerk.[9] Yun Ze's education in the Höhhot Tümed Banner was similar. The curriculum that he could received in his hometown was almost purely Chinese and traditionally Confucian, even after the establishment of the Republic.

Yun Ze's father taught him the "Three Character Classic" (*San zi jing*) and the "Hundred Surnames" (*Bai jia xing*), and his uncle, began teaching him on the Four Books and the Five Classics. A tutor, Mr. He, taught not only Chinese (*Guowen* "the state language"), but also a little geography and arithmetic. When the tutor returned to his home in Shanxi, Yun Ze and his cousin went to a private academy in Yun Ze's

[9] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao di'er dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 496.

Table 6.2: Leading Members of the Youth Party Faction, 1924-1925 (Communist Party organizers, Youth Party leaders, Whampoa cadets)

Name	Banner Origin	Year of Birth	Affiliations
Wu Wenxian (Namrindorji)	Kharachin Right.	1899 (?)	CCP organizer
Rong Yaoxian	Tümed Special (Guihua city)	1901 (?)	CCP; Whampoa 1st class; Youth Party
Bai Haifeng (Düürinsang)	Kharachin Right (Jianping County)	1904	CCP; Whampoa 1st class; Youth Party
Baigulagchi			Youth Party
Mandulakhu			Youth Party
Bai Yonglun (Korlô)	Kheshigten		Youth Party (not CCP)
Liang Yulan			Youth Party
Chen Guozhen			Youth Party
Algimbu (Guo Gaoxuan)			Youth Party (not CCP)
Duo Shou	Tümed Special	1905	CCP; Youth Party
Wang Bingzhang (Dorjisürüng)	Kharachin Right (Pingquan County)	1903	CCP; Whampoa 2nd class
Rong Shangyi	Tümed Special (West Chaasuchi)	1908	CCP; Whampoa 4th class
Zhu Shifu	Tümed Special	1908	CCP; Whampoa 4th class
Wu Yunzhu	Kharachin Right	1910	CCP; Whampoa 4th class

Sources: Central Party Archives, 7-1-23:12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, Aug. 22, 1925); 7-1-26:49-53 (Inner Mongolian Youth Party leaders to MPRP CC, July, 1925); *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao*, XI, 53, 101, 147, 205, 208, 210; Hao, "Diyi, erci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 602-04.

mother's village, ten *li* (five kilometers) distant, where they completed the Four Books and Five Classics. Of all his teachers, only Yun Ze's uncle seems to have known Mongolian along with Chinese; his uncle also had the fair hand that marked a good scribal education. When Yun Ze entered the Tümed Higher Primary School in Guisui, and the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School, Chinese continued as the main language, and the medium of instruction for other classes but Mongolian was also taught. Even in the Mongolian and Tibetan school, in the early 1920s Confucianism formed a significant part of the curriculum.[10]

Documents produced by those Mongols who responded to Han Linfu's overtures and joined the Youth Party show that the leaders of the party had only an imperfect knowledge of Mongolian and were still learning how to write the language in an idiomatic way. The Mongolian-language constitution of the Youth Party, written in February, 1925, was a classic example of Mongolian preserved solely as a written translation language. Although proper usage was not required for clerks, penmanship was, and the party articles are written in an attractive and graphically correct hand (the Chinese date added at the end is not nearly so well written). At the same time, the document swarms with elementary errors. Chinese phonetic influence shows up in the frequent violations of vocal harmony (*yorongqai* for *yerüngkei*, *durim* for *dürim*, and *üiledqu* for *üiledkü*),while phonetic misspellings include *chagta* for *chag-tu*, *chikhul* for *chikhula* and *khoyardugar* for *khoyadugar*. The political terminology is virtually throughout a character-by-character translation of the Chinese equivalents: *chinar khubiyal* for *xingbie* "sex" *arad-un ulus ger* for *ren(min) guojia* "people's country," *tushiyaltan khural* for *weiyuan hui* "committee," *gajar oron-u* for *difang* "local," *salaburin khural* for *fenhui* "branch committee," *kheregten khural* for *zhixing (weiyuan) hui*, "executive committee," and *khüliyen nökhökhü tushiyaltan* for *houbu weiyuan* "candidate (committee) member."[11] When the party leaders wrote an appeal to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in July of the same year, the Mongolian spelling and use of terms had improved considerably, although the old *tushiyaltan khural* still alternates with the correct *khoriya* for "committee."[12] This adoption of a more idiomatic Mongolian language marked the beginning

[10] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 11-12, 14, 16, 21, 44.

[11] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 31-37 (Party Articles of the Inner Mongolian Youth Party, Feb. 9, 1925).

[12] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 49-53 (Inner Mongolian Youth Party leaders to MPRP CC, July, 1925).

of a trend that would continue when many, if not most, of the students involved went to Mongolia and/or the Soviet Union to study. Removed from the Chinese-speaking environment, many would adopt the Mongolian-language culture of the students from the Mongolia People's Republic. For the Youth Party faction, then, the process of political mobilization coincided with a movement of recovering their national language and (at least for some) making new "national" identities as symbolized by adopting Mongolian names.

Acculturation and Ethnic Tension

We can thus form a composite portrait of the sort of Mongol who would listen to the appeal of Han Linfu: born after 1900, a Mongol in a town or village with a substantial, if not majority, Chinese population, without patronage ties to the officials who dominated the Mongolian and Tibetan apparatus in Beijing, but able somehow to enter a school in a Chinese city, speaking "kitchen" Mongolian at most, but usually with training in a banner school emphasizing handwriting and the simple vocabulary necessary to handle routine banner administration. Given this picture, it is not surprising that the Tümed Mongols of the Höhhot region formed an area of striking Communist success. Like the Chakhars and Hulun Buir Mongols, the Tümed Special Banner had no nobility, and given its small population and poverty had no influence whatsoever in the Beijing Mongolian-Tibetan bureaucracy. The Höhhot Tümed were also widely recognized as being among the most sinicized Mongols of Inner Mongolia.[13] As the figures in table 6.1 show, the Kharachins of Right and Middle banners definitely outnumbered the Tümeds, but the Tümed Mongols stood out in the degree to which the Communist Party monopolized their political allegiance. Among the Kharachin, many Mongols, perhaps most, of the post-1900 generation still supported the Nationalist faction; Communist sympathizers were numerous but by no means all. Secondly, while most of the East Mongols in this faction eventually dropped out of Communist politics either to join the KMT mainstream or to stay in Mongolia, most of the Tümed activists remain loyal to Communism, and tried to return to China. Of the Rehe Mongols listed in table 6.2 with known political futures, Bai Haifeng abandoned the Communists for KMT politics, and Wu Wenxian, Wang Bingzhang (Dorjisürüng), and Bai Yonglun (Korlô) all ended up moving perma-

[13] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 201.

nently to the Mongolian People's Republic—indeed Bai Yonglun never formally joined the Communist Party at all.[14]

As noted above, the Tümeds were probably among the most sinicized of all the external Mongol bannermen. The incorporation of the Tümeds into the Eight Banner system resulted in the widespread use of Manchu and in 1835, Galsang, the Tümed author of an introduction to Mongolian writing, complained, "While books and writings in the Mongolian script are very numerous, I have simply never seen the Mongolian alphabet used in this era in the area of the Höhhot Tümeds. Because the twelve letters of the Manchu alphabet are extremely clear, obvious, and widespread, everyone reads that instead..."[15] Despite Galsang's efforts, the situation did not improve and the generation born after 1885-1890 generally could not speak fluent Mongolian at all. By the twentieth century the Tümed Mongols' language of political thinking and intercourse was above all Chinese. It would be wrong, though, to see the Tümed Communists as simply Chinese who happened to have had some Mongolian ancestry. The only detailed account of early life for a young Tümed Mongol, the memoirs of Yun Ze/Wulanfu, show the multiple ways that even in a sedentarized, farming village, where daily interaction between Han and Mongol was the norm, the difference of ethnicity intruded on life.[16]

Yun Ze was born into an extended farming household in the plains of Tumochuan, or "Tümed Stream," the heartland of the Tümed Mongolian

[14] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 602, 603-04. This strong loyalty of the Tümeds to the Communist Party, and their eventual role as key agents of Communist Party activity in Inner Mongolia after 1931 resulted in the mistaken impression given by secondary "party history" materials that Tümeds from the beginning dominated the ranks of Mongols recruited by Han Linfu.

[15] Galzang, *Monggol üsüg-ün bügüde tayilburi bicig* (1828; rpt. Höhhot, 1979), p. 1; see also Gereltü, *Monggol jokiyalcid-un sigümji ügülel-üd: 1721-1945*, pp. 165-66, and Rincingawa, *Monggol orcigulg-a-yin teüke-yin quriyanggui toyimu* (Höhhot, 1986), pp. 103-04.

[16] Yun Ze/Wulanfu's memoirs were certainly ghost-written; the authorial attribution to the "Wulanfu Revolutionary Materials Compilation Office" (Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi) makes that clear. Sources in Inner Mongolia indicate that Hao Weimin (Mongolian name Odkhonbilig), Inner Mongolia's foremost party historian and author of Inner Mongolia's major study of the PRPIM, actually authored the account based on interviews with Wulanfu, and that Wulanfu's role was limited to simply signing off on the final draft. The distortions created by political needs are numerous and will be noted in the text. Despite these problems, the memoirs still contain large amounts of valuable material, which, when used cautiously and under corroboration by other sources, can, I believe, shed valuable light on Mongol life in Chinese-dominated sedentary villages.

banner territory, in Tabucun, a village whose mixed name (*Tabu* from Mongolian *tabu* "five" and *cun* from Chinese *cun* "villages") illustrated its mixed inhabitation.[17] As Yun Ze's grandfather, the family patriarch, told him, the Yun family had early been herders in the area, but long, long ago (Wulanfu later guessed perhaps in the Ming-Qing transition of the seventeenth century), the Yuns had settled down. With the settlement of four Han families from northern Shanxi, surnamed Nan, Guo, Wang, and Meng, the Yun settlement became a village of five surnames, hence the name, Tabucun. Yun Ze's own family retained a strong consciousness of the family heritage, and sense of lineage. Yun Ze's grandfather was a ten-household head and held a certain prestige in the village. His maternal relatives included an uncle who was a clerk in the Tümed Special Banner's Controller's Yamen (*zongguan yamen*) in the county town of Guisui. His ancestors had been among the hereditary patrons of a temple in the "Lama Cave Monastery" (*Lamadong Zhao*, officially named Guanghuasi), the largest monastery in the Tümed lands, dating back to the sixteenth century and with almost 300 monks at its height in the early nineteenth century.[18]

Along with this consciousness of being the truly native settlers, there was also a profound sense of decline and inability compared to the rising Chinese families. Originally Tümed's banner households had received "household land" (*hukoudi*) from the banner office based on the number of mouths in the household and free from taxation. The original land allotments were very large, as befitted the combined agro-pastoral land-use. The possibilities in settling this land more densely and moving to a predominantly agricultural land use were demonstrated first by the Catholic mission settlements that were set up here and there in the late nineteenth century; Ershisi Qingdi "Twenty-Four *Qing* Plot" was the nearest to Yun Ze's village. (A *qing* is 6⅔ hectares, twenty-four *qing* is 160 hectares.) Although this church was burned down and the missionary father publicly lynched during the Boxer rebellion, the New Policies colonization program from 1902 continued the same policy on a much larger scale. By issuing official title deeds (locally called

[17] In 1965, with the approval of its most famous native son, Wulanfu, then the chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Tabucun was renamed Tabusai/Tabusain "Five Goods" in token of "nationalities unity" (*minzu tuanjie*). In 1982, the village had 2,013 residents of whom 161 were Mongol, and 1 Hui. See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Huhehaote shi fence* (1985), p. 223.

[18] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 1-2, 10-11, 16, 9. On Lama Cave Monastery, see *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Huhehaote shi fence*, pp. 146, 336-37.

dazhao), the Suiyuan authorities reclassified the land and handed the bulk of the Tümed bannermen's land over to colonization agents for resettlement by Han Chinese immigrants. The Tümed bannermen retained bottom-soil rights which supplied a small rent, but lost any actual control over the land-use; contracts with the Chinese sub-contracting landlords who rented out to the actual cultivators were permanent and transferable. Yun Ze's grandfather in these years only learned that he had lost most of his land when he found a Chinese landlord overseeing the cultivation of a large part of his own "household land." In the ensuing quarrel, he was beaten on the leg by the developers' guards, and a year-long lawsuit, pursued first at the banner yamen and then at the Chinese county yamen, ended up without any satisfaction. In the end the Yun family lost 90% of its household land and was left with only three *qing* (about twenty hectares). The whole system of bottom and top soil rights, with divided jurisdiction between banner and county yamens created incessant lawsuits among the Mongols, about which a proverb spoke: "Old Tartar goes to law, and gets a big loss" (*Lao dazi da guansi changchang yu*).[19]

Compared to others who left Tümed Stream, Yun Ze's family adapted relatively well, switching to a more intensive agricultural land-use, while keeping some sheep, but a sense of decline still haunted the family. Trying to explain why his family, like so many other Mongols seemed unable to hold their own in agriculture, Wulanfu underlined how the Mongols had to pay two taxes and labor services, one to the banner and one to the county, while the Chinese only paid one. At the same time, however, he passed over the bottom-soil rents which the Mongols received from many of their Chinese neighbors, as part of the land title settlement. Even so, Wulanfu, like many other observers of farming Mongols, acknowledged that Mongols were simply unable match the yields their Han neighbors got out of the same plot of land.[20] This sense of Mongol incompetence extended to other areas of life. Once the grandfather told his grandson about how the people of Tiemao village, all from Shanxi's Xinxian County, would set out watchers and fight back against the bandits who terrorized the villages on the Tümed plain. When

[19] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 2-4, 7. *Dazi*, a corruption of *dadan* "Tatars," was a derogatory word for Mongols in Suiyuan (Lattimore, *Mongol Journeys*, p. 19).

[20] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 4-5, 3. On Mongolian inability to compete with the Han as farmers, see also Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society* (Boulder, Col., 1979), pp. 315-6, and Heissig, "Mongolian Farming," pp. 79-96.

Yun Ze asked if his village could do the same his grandfather said, "No way! People in our village can't stick together like that. We Mongols can't stick together either!"[21] Such observations of Mongol inability were not merely theoretical; his own father and uncles, none of whom were good farmers, split up the grandfather's three *qing* after Yun Ze left home and could barely get by on one *qing*. This constant reality of declining family fortunes played a strong role in Yun Ze and Yun Run's education; the family patriarch hoped that educating his grandchildren might give this old lineage a way out of the dead-end of competing with the more proficient Chinese farmers.[22]

In line with the official sentiment of nationality unity, Wulanfu's memoirs stress the common sufferings of the laboring people. Children of different ethnic groups always played together and inter-ethnic marriages were not unheard-of. There was a difference of religion—the Mongols patronized lama temples, while the mosques were for the Hui and the Catholic and Protestant churches for Han—but his masterful grandfather had no need of supernatural assistance, from lamas or anyone else, and let the family temple go to pieces. He recalls that when a neighboring Han mother's breast would not give milk and didn't have any sheep to milk for her infant son, his grandfather ordered Yun Ze's mother to nurse the poor baby and he and Yun Ze grew up to call each other brother. The very fact, however, that such an intimate association was remembered as an ethnic interaction is testimony to the ever-present awareness of ethnic difference. Despite his grandfather's reputation as a wise and able man in village affairs, Yun Ze and his cousin Yun Run were derided and punished by their Han first teacher, a Mr. Bai, while children of the up-and-coming Han farmers were easily forgiven their many delicts. Was it the difference of Han and Mongol, or that of families with a future and those with none? The grandfather soon removed him from this class, and hired a tutor, Mr. He from Shanxi. Yun Ze dreamed about studying martial-arts and one day slaughtering those who had cheated his family and the other bannermen, and sharing out their goods among the Mongols. Mr. He's stories about Chinggis Khan, inspired him, yet also reminded him of the futility of his ancestors' martial exploits in improving the Mongols' life.[23]

[21] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 6-7.

[22] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 10, 11, 13, 17-18.

[23] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, pp. 8-9, 5, 11-12, 14. The decline in Lama Cave Monastery was general, and by the early twentieth century, most of the complex was in ruins (*Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi:*

Life prospects and, even more, the interpretation of these prospects given by the social actors themselves, were thus heavily influenced by the identities of Mongol and Han, even in villages whose material culture and economic life was entirely homogenous. A study of Mongol villagers in Kharachin and Tümed Right Banner in Josotu League (the Josotu Tümeds are not to be confused with the Höhhot ones) found a very similar situation of Mongol farmers frustrated and mystified by their seeming inexorable decline relative to their Han neighbors and tenants. One way for the Mongols to deal with this steady sapping of their self-respect was to focus on the unjust advantages that the Han received, whether from the political system or from their worship of evil fox sprites. Another response was to use the banner system and the Mongolian and Tibetan bureaucracy to find the upward mobility in the political realm that seemed so elusive in the economic realm.[24] By the time they arrived in small cities like Guisui for the Tümeds, or Chengde for those of Rehe, and moved on to Beijing, young Mongols from farming villages were already primed to think of economic life as a zero-sum game in which one nationality's gain was their competitor's loss, and from which only politics, and with it the ultimate appeal to force traditionally embodied in the banner system and the martial memories of the Mongols, could rescue the less skillful loser.

Rong Yaoxian, Han Linfu, and the Tümed Youth

The earliest ethnic Mongol member of the Communist Party, and the key recruiter of other Tümeds, was Rong Yaoxian. The eldest son of widow woman, née Yun, in a poor peasant family in the Chaasuchi town in the Tümed plain, about 18 kilometers north of Yun Ze's Tabucun, Rong received the recommendation of the Tümed Banner Controller's Yamen to enter the special law and politics course at the newly-expanded Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School in 1918, the same year as Bai Yunti.[25] While Bai Yunti graduated in 1919 and went south to join Sun

Huhehaote shi fence, p. 337).

[24] E-tu Zen Sun, "Results of Culture Contact in Two Mongol-Chinese Communities," pp. 203-4.

[25] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao disi dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, 983-84; Zhao Lüqian, "Menggu zu zuizao de Gongchandangyuan—Rong Yuexian," p. 20; Song Zhou, "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 29. Rong had a Mongolian name which Zhao gives in Chinese transcription as "Qiandengruoxian," but he never used it in his public life, either in

Yat-sen, Rong along with several other students participated in the May Fourth protests, the great movement against the Paris Peace Treaty in 1919 and the assignment of Qingdao to the Japanese as leased territory. Uncorroborated secondary sources, derived from the memoirs gathered after 1949, show Rong Yaoxian and the students from the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School participating in all the founding meetings. On May 6, the Mongolian students set a letter to the editor of the sympathetic Beijing "Morning Post" (*Chen bao*) and struck classes to protest against the arrest of students by the Duan Qirui government.[26]

Most of the other Mongolian students who joined the demonstration did not join the Communist Party or even play a major role in political life in the next few years.[27] As Arif Dirlik has shown for the Chinese Communist movement generally, socialist, anarchist, and anti-imperialist movements among students in China did not at that time lead in any direct way to Communism.[28] Before late 1923, Rong Yaoxian seems to have been the only Mongol with any serious involvement in Communist-led organizations. Secondary sources say he joined Li Dazhao's Marxist study group at Peking University in November 1921 together with Wang Xiang and Heng Sheng, two other Mongols who had participated in the May Fourth demonstrations.[29] Although Wang and Heng did not join the Communists, Rong later wrote that he "from year 10 [of the Republic, that is 1921] organized the Inner Mongolian Youth Corps (*Nei Menggu*

Chinese or in Mongolian. It derives perhaps from "Tsedenlobsang," but in any case is certain a Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhist name.

[26] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 179; Song Zhou, "Beijing 'Meng-Zang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 29. Although Rong Yaoxian is said to have been an official representative to the May 4, 1919, meeting that began the meeting, the list of thirteen schools represented does not include the Mongolian and Tibetan School. Probably he was only an unofficial observer if he was present at all; see Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 105. On the role of the *Chen Bao/Peking Morning Post* in the May Fourth Movement, see Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, pp. 76, 124, 146, 298-99.

[27] See the list of demonstration leaders in Song Zhou, "Beijing 'Meng-Zang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 29, and Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 179: Rong Yaoxian, Wang Xiang, Ba Wenjun, Heng Sheng, Zhang Liangwo, Chen Fuyuan, and Meng Zhizhong. Apart from Rong, only Heng Sheng appears subsequently as a significant figure politically.

[28] Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York, 1989), especially pp. 253-273.

[29] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 182. On this study group, see Dirlik, *Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 202-203.

qingnian tuan)."[30] While nothing else is known about this organization, its very name indicates that Rong, like Bai Yunti in the Kuomintang, sought a greater degree of political independence for the Inner Mongols than his Chinese mentors would comfortably accept.

Like all Inner Mongolian activists seeking support, Rong looked first to his own native place, and since few at that time were studying in Beijing, he returned to the Tümed plain to recruit them. The political and cultural center for the Tümed plain lay in the city of Guisui, about 45 kilometers west of Rong's hometown of Chaasuchi. Guisui was a typical "twin city" on the frontier, two walled towns set side by side. The older city, the small Guihua (modern "Old Town"), was the former capital of the sixteenth-century Mongol ruler, Altan Khan, and held the Tümed Special Banner yamen, the Guihua County yamen, and many Tibetan-rite Buddhist temples patronized by the Mongols. Outside the small walls, alleys and shops spread out in all four directions; "Old Town" was a long-standing center for trading firms doing business on the Mongolian steppe. Square-walled Suiyuan was built in the eighteenth century as the seat of the Qing imperial administration, and the military lieutenant-governor or dutong of Suiyuan dwelt in a large compound at the north of the city. In 1913, the two towns were consolidated and the name contracted to Guisui; Khökhekhota or Höhhot, "Blue Town," the town's old Mongolian name under Altan Khan, was still used occasionally by the Mongols.[31]

Compared to villages like Yun Ze's Tabucun, Guisui was a modern metropolis. When Yun Ze and his cousin Yun Run went to Guisui to enter the Tümed Higher Primary School, his maternal uncle made him cut off his queue, since the people in Guisui would force him to cut it off anyway, as a ridiculous Qing-dynasty custom.[32] In the early Republic, Guisui's "Old Town" had three schools established and funded by the Tümed Banner Controller's Yamen: Tümed Higher Primary School, which was originally a banner clerical school dating back to 1724, the Suiyuan Middle School (later No. 1 Middle School), and the Guihua Higher Primary School, which was originally the Middle School's attached primary school. The latter school was actually mostly Chinese

[30] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao disi dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 984.

[31] On "twin cities" on the frontier, see Piper Rae Gaubatz, *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers* (Stanford, 1996), pp. 164-76. Pp. 62-70 of the same book give a general history of the Guisui city.

[32] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyilu*, 18-19.

in enrollment, and far better appointed than the Tümed Higher Primary School, which was still housed in the Confucian temple compound.[33]

In the winter of 1921, Rong led the Mongolian and Tibetan school's spoken theater troop back to Guisui to perform various propaganda pieces, like "One Dollar" and "The Peacock Flies Southwest." In 1922, he and Li Shizhai (otherwise unknown) attempted to organize a "Common People's Work-Study Society" (*Pingmin gongdu She*) in the Pengshun Juu Temple near the Suiyuan Middle School, outside the walls of "Old Town." Their plan was to attract handicraftsmen, urban residents, and suburban farmers with classes on spinning and weaving technology, finance their living-learning community with the proceeds of the industry, and so raise the consciousness of both the deprived workers and the alienated students. The projected club was a typical example of Chinese anarchist and socialist attempts to merge manual labor and intellectual life, one in which early Communists had actively participated, but which by 1921 was already losing its glamor after repeated failures. In this case, the police soon broke up the community before it had the chance to dissolve like the others in financial difficulties and cross-purposes between workers and students. Rong returned to Beijing.[34]

Throughout this early phase in the Communist Party, party founders, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, paid little attention to actual conditions in the border regions. As has been noted previously, the Communist formulas about autonomy and self-determination for Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, like Sun Yat-sen's formulas borrowed from them, were based on abstract considerations of high-level policy, not on any real familiarity with the situation in those areas. The Chinese Communist founder, Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), active primarily in Shanghai and Canton, explicitly supported Mongolian independence and believed that China was too vast and economically too unevenly developed to have anything but a federal system, but never paid attention

[33] On the Guihua Higher Primary School (later known as the Guisui County No. 1 Primary School) on Ox-Bridge Street (*Niuqiao jie*), see "Nei Menggu jiaoyu zhi" bianweihui, ed., *Nei Menggu jiaoyu shizhi ziliao*, I, part 2, 419, 421, II, 107. On the Tümed Higher Primary School on Little East Street (*Xiaodong jie*), see I, part 1, 1-2, 3-4, and II, 107. On the Suiyuan Middle School on South Firewood Street (*Nanchaihuo jie*), see II, 107.

[34] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," pp. 182-83; Wang Shusheng and Hao Yufeng, *Wulanfu nianpu* (Beijing, 1989), pp. 19-20. On "work-study" experiments and their difficulties, see Dirlik, *Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 86-87, 91-93, 188-190.

to ethnic issues elsewhere in China.[35] Another founding member of the party, Beijing-based Li Dazhao (1889-1927), had, unlike Chen, actual experience with ethnic Mongols of Inner Mongolia. He enthusiastically supported the new position of the KMT, one which he had probably helped to write. In his June, 1924, article on "The Race Question" (*Zhongzu wenti*), he wrote:

> When the Chinese Kuomintang's all-national congress opened in Canton, it had a new explanation of nationalism. This explanation consistently divided the issue into internal and external aspects. For the humiliated nation of China, it was a desire for independence and resisting oppression and exploitation by any other nation whatsoever. This is the external part. At the same time, for the internal nationalities with their unequal living standards, it was a desire to bring about their liberation, self-determination, and independence; this is the internal part. The Kuomintang's nationalism having undergone this new explanation, its meaning is newer and more up-to-date.[36]

The addition of "independence" (*duli*) as the party's aim for the minority nationalities went beyond Sun Yat-sen's position, but just as with the KMT program, there was no serious discussion about how such ethnic federalism and the party's centralized constitution were to be reconciled.[37] This would soon become an important issue as the Communists found that even their most successful Inner Mongolian recruits still retained a strong taste for pure Mongolian party organizations.

If the Communist leaders were relatively open to ethnically-based separatism, those Chinese Communists with actual experience in Inner Mongolia viewed the issue of ethnicity as a distraction from the real task

[35] Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring)* (Leiden, 1991), p. 364. On Chen Duxiu, see Lee Feigon, *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party* (Princeton, 1983).

[36] See Li Dazhao, *Li Dazhao wenji*, II, 772. On Li Dazhao, see Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (1967; rpt. New York, 1973).

[37] Ji Yatai [Jiyaatai], "Li Dazhao tongzhi he Nei Menggu chuqi de geming huodong," in *Huiyi Li Dazhao* (Beijing: People's Press, 1980), pp. 169, 172-73, and "Menggu zu jianshi" bianxiezu, comp., *Menggu zu jianshi* (Höhhot, 1985), pp. 356-57, paraphrase an article by Li Dazhao on "The Inner Mongolian National Liberation Movement" not included in Li's collected works, which supposedly emphasized the necessity for the Inner Mongolian liberation movement to be part of the Chinese liberation movement. The fact that the essay was not included in the collected works, and that the sources do not give any direct quotes indicates that Li probably viewed the possibility of the Inner Mongolian separatism with more equanimity than subsequent Chinese Communist leaders would allow.

of a united front against the warlord armies and foreign goods. The early Communists' exciting discovery of the economy as a determining factor in history disposed them to see the ethnicity of the Mongol farmers of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe, as an unimportant, super-structural detail. This tendency to dismiss ethnicity as no longer very important was all the stronger, as it was these local Han Communists from Inner Mongolia who made the early connections with the Mongol students in Beijing and elsewhere. Secondary accounts purport to show famous Communist leaders like Li Dazhao and Deng Zhongxia directly recruiting Rong Yaoxian and other Inner Mongols, but all contemporary evidence indicates that Han Linfu, a native of Rehe's Chifeng County in the territory between Ongni'ud and Kharachin Right Banner, was the prime mover in the early advances to the Mongol students. One of the founding Communists, Zhang Guotao, later recalled that Han Linfu "made the Mongols his personal project."[38] Han began his career in the Communist movement as an organizer for the Communist Party's Socialist Youth Corps; he had participated in organizing the Tianjin branch of the corps in early 1921.[39] From 1923 to 1925, however, he primarily focused on Inner Mongolia, recruiting Mongol students into the party and Chinese bandits in Rehe and Chahar into front organizations for the CCP. Han's views about Inner Mongolia can be seen from his article, "The Modern Situation in Inner Mongolia and the Three Special Regions, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan" published in the Communist magazine *Xiangdao zhoubao* "Guide Weekly."

In many ways, Han was very well-informed about Inner Mongolia, going far beyond the usual revolutionary cliches about "autonomy and self-determination." He emphasized the economic exploitation of Inner Mongolia, focusing on how foreign goods were flooding in through Zhili and Shanxi despite being sold for twice the price they fetched in China proper. Opium taxes took in four to five million yuan a year. The regions had a wide variety of local currencies, but the local gentry, in order to profit their own banks, prohibited private money changers from handling denominations larger than ten yuan.[40] Han was particularly interested in the village militias (*xiangtuan*), which he saw as the genuine forces of

[38] Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Communist Party, 1921-1927* (Lawrence, Kan., 1971), p. 129.

[39] Chang, *Rise of the Communist Party*, p. 128.

[40] On this issue, see Kenneth Pomeranz, "Local Interest Story: Political Power and Regional Differences in the Shandong Capital Market, 1900-1937,' in *Chinese History in Economic Perspective*, ed. Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li (Berkeley, 1992), pp. 295-318.

people's self-defense. Rehe and Suiyuan's armed militiamen numbered, he claimed, 40,000, while Chahar's reached 20,000. Suiyuan also had the *Gelaohui*, or "Elders and Brothers' Society," formed of merchants, farmers, and handicraftsmen, and numbered, Han estimated, 70-80,000 strong, one-tenth of which was armed. Compared to them, the warlord garrisons in Inner Mongolia were weak, numbering only 40,000 and affiliated into more than ten different cliques.

Implicit throughout Han's article, however, was a sense that conflict between Mongol and Chinese, was no longer a significant issue for Inner Mongolia. From the opening of the article, Han emphasized the importance of the Chinese immigrants in the area:

> This area is called Inner Mongolia, as if to say that in the three regions of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan there is contained a belt that is purely composed of the Mongolian nationality. In the last two hundred years, the Inner Mongolian nationality has already been more than half assimilated by the Han nationality, with the three regions, Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan being most obvious cases.

In discussing the incursion of foreign goods, Han compared it to the influx of Chinese goods in the "period when the Inner Mongols lived by nomadic herding." The unmistakable implication was that nomadic herding was already extinct as a significant part of the Inner Mongolian economy. Indeed Han paid no attention to herding and the animal products industry in any sense and referred throughout to Inner Mongolia's rural inhabitants solely as "peasants" (*nongmin*). In introducing his remarks on local village self-defense forces, he analyzed Inner Mongolian society as having been formed by the mixing and amalgamation over two hundred years of the declining Mongol nationality and the Zhili, Shandong, and Shanxi immigrants. It was to this that he attributed the strength of self-defense organizations.[41]

In all these comments Han, himself a native of Inner Mongolia, apparently believed that since his Mongol neighbors were living peacefully with the Han as farmers, then the ethnic issue was effectively dead. Rightly emphasizing the importance of the Han immigrants in contemporary Inner Mongolia, he ignored both the degree to which the immigrant presence was uneven, and also the degree to which it sparked continuing conflict. Setting aside the continued existence in the northern part of all the three regions of genuine pastoral nomadism, he seemed

[41] [Han] Linfu, "Nei Menggu ji ReChaSui san qu jin zhuang," *Xiangdao zhoubao*, no. 75 (July 23, 1924), pp. 602-3.

unable to grasp how even despite economic integration, the social fact of ethnicity remained overwhelmingly significant for the Mongols. Day-to-day interaction did not remove this significance, one which was fed by contrasting family memories and continuing conflict over legal rights, especially to land. The issue of village self-defense forces and the Gelaohui is a good example. Han viewed these organizations as potentially progressive forces and ignored how these Han Chinese village defense forces had first arisen as vigilante patrols against Inner Mongolian reprisals directed at Chinese immigrants occupying banner land. The Gelaohui, in particular, was intimately associated both with the ideology of Han anti-Manchuism and with the Han land developers in the Hetao region. Thus in 1926, when Bai Yunti and Mersé were operating in the Suiyuan area, they by contrast came to believe that the Gelaohui's main program was the extermination of the Mongols and the seizure of their remaining land.

In April, 1923, the CCP's Northern Committee approved Rong Yaoxian as a party member, with Han Linfu and Li Bohai as sponsors.[42] Rong Yaoxian soon demonstrated his utility as a recruiter to the Communist Party. Rong was returning home that summer to visit his widowed mother in Chaasuchi, to the west of Guisui. Rong solicited an assignment from the Mongolian and Tibetan school administration to go by Guisui on the way and recruit students there. The Northern Committee of the CCP hoped to exploit this opportunity and also entrusted Rong with the task of specially recruiting likely Communists to apply.[43]

Likely candidates for student activism would not be hard to find. Students from all three schools had participated in the May Fourth movement and had founded the Guisui City Student Union (*Guisui cheng xuesheng lianhehui*) which sponsored further demonstrations in subsequent years. The Student Union was led by Li Yuzhi (1901-1927, Mongolian name Batu-Ochir), a tall, well-built martial-arts enthusiast, native to Tümed Stream and attending Suiyuan Middle School. Li and the Union had no national affiliation, no distinct ideological position, and seemingly no program other than attacking Japanese-funded firms.[44]

[42] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 183.

[43] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 40.

[44] On Li Yuzhi, see Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 27, and his hagiography in ZhongGong Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui bangongshi, Dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui bangongshi, ed., *Nei Menggu yinglie zhuan*, I (Beijing, 1989), 8-14.

This target, however, was rapidly growing as the extension of railroads, telephone lines, and foreign goods integrated the central towns of Suiyuan into the Chinese treaty-port economy. In May, 1921, the railhead reached Guisui, and in January, 1925 it reached Baotou. After a great controversy, electricity came to Guisui in May, 1922, and telephone service to Baotou in December, 1924. Although the first part of the Beijing-Datong Railway had been built with Chinese capital, a Japanese firm had won the right on April, 1921, to finance its extension to Guisui and Baotou.[45] This advance of foreign-financed technology was deeply threatening to Suiyuan's native shops and trading firms, for whom the independence of Outer Mongolia had already been a major blow. The railway ran through the western Chakhar banners and the Mongol nationalists later charged the project with bringing Chinese and Japanese capital directly into the western Chakhar banners, accompanied by a massive influx of Chinese farmers.[46] From the available evidence, however, based on secondary accounts, the Tümed students for their part saw the danger purely as Japanese "economic aggression," and Li Yuzhi was known and respected by the local Tümed authorities and Chinese shopkeepers.

In September, 1921, a Tianjin businessman, Shen Bingwen proposed to build an electric generator in Guisui, and supply electricity, and telephone service. Local companies, led by the Weifeng Enterprise Company, and supported by the Tümed Controller's Yamen, had been planning to exploit this profitable opportunity themselves, but Shen had received Japanese capital which they could not match. The local authorities thus turned a blind eye as the Guisui students protested this clear case of Japanese economic aggression, vandalizing Shen's telegraph bureau and gaining the help of farmers, who resented losing part of their fields to Shen's telephone poles, to pull down his telephone lines. On the anniversary of the May Fourth demonstrations in 1923, the students planned to target a local firm that not only sold but even dared advertise a wide variety of Japanese goods with catchy Japanese jingles. The first demonstration on May 7 was disappointingly peaceful after the manager defused the protesters' anger with his seemingly patriotic attitude. The next day, however, he prematurely hardened his stance and

[45] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," pp. 179, 181, 185, 186; "Huhehaote gaikuang" bianweihui, ed., *Huhehaote gaikuang* (Höhhot, 1987), pp. 45, 88; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 29.

[46] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 56, 58 (Chakhar *Aimag* Bureau, report, June 20, 1930).

the students attacked the firm and destroyed its goods. Again the police stood by watching. Wulanfu (Yun Ze) in his memoirs recalled in proud detail his participation in the action; the expressions of fear and deference on the part of the shop-keepers and policemen towards the massed students struck him as a revelation of the power of politics.[47]

When Rong Yaoxian came to Guisui, he gave talks about the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School among the Mongolian students, and distributed information sheets for applicants. The most attractive thing was that tuition was public, with room, board, and one student uniform a year being supplied by the school. Even so, many eligible students worried about clothing, pocket money, and travel expenses. The Tümed yamen wished to raise its profile in Beijing and agreed in negotiations with Rong to supplement the existing support with a subsidy of their own. Further negotiations with interested students, including Li Yuzhi, then head of the Guisui Student Union, raised the subsidy to six taels of silver per month for every student accepted, and one-time travel expenses to Beijing. After a final graduation portrait in October, 1923, the fortunate students left for Beijing.[48]

Beijing Studies and the United Front

The forty or so students that Rong recruited that year included Li Yuzhi and Jiyaatai (1901-1968, Chinese name, Ji Yatai) from the Suiyuan Middle School, and Meng Chun, Zhu Shifu (b. 1908), Yongfu (b. 1908, a.k.a. Yun or Rong Shangyi, or else Rong Chongren), the cousins Yun Run and Yun Ze, Duo Shou (1905-1927, a.k.a. Duo Songnian), Foding (b. 1905, Mongolian name, Altandorji), Kui Bi (1905-1986, a.k.a. Kui Zizhang, Mongolian name, Urtunasutu), Gombojab (1905-1968, Chinese transcription, Gaobuzebu; Chinese name, Chun He), Yun Jixian, and others from the Tümed Higher Primary School. These students would eventually come to form the backbone of the Chinese Communist Party in Inner Mongolia from 1931, until their virtual destruction in the Cultural Revolution.[49] By the 1930s they would mature into fighters that

[47] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 26-39.

[48] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 41-42.

[49] The fullest list (and the only one that includes CCP members who later turned against the party) is in Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 184. A biography of Gombojab is in "Gombojab nökör-tü cagadqan ögjü gasigudaqu qural-i öbedegsi yekeber kibe," *Öbör Monggol-un edür-ün sonin*, February 15, 1979.

even their enemies acknowledged as unusually tough and dynamic—as much or more so than the East Mongolian intellectuals.[50]

At the time, however, they were still students and entered the middle school course at the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School. As has been noted, the ranks of the more radical, more sinicized Young Mongols sympathetic to Communism were dominated by southern Rehe students, especially Kharachin Right and Middle banners, even more than by Höhhot Tümeds.[51] Later history has magnified the presence of the Tümeds in secondary accounts, however. As the East Mongolian youth tended to turn away either to the MPR or the KMT, none rose to high leadership positions in the People's Republic's Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and party history researchers have published little, if anything, about their experiences.

It is clear from the memoirs and biographies that have been published, however, that regionalism remained very much alive on the Mongolian and Tibetan campus. Wulanfu's memoirs and the biographical facts found in other writings show the Tümeds moving about almost as a block, sticking to themselves and having little connection with the more numerous Kharachin students. The only photograph of the Tümed students in Beijing, dating from November 11, 1923, was not taken with their classmates at the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School but rather with the Suiyuan students and officials in Beijing, as they gathered to see off some Suiyuan co-provincials to Japan.[52] The first political issue to grab their attention after arriving in Beijing was a parochial Tümed one, although one with resonance for all Inner Mongols. The Suiyuan government, in the process of revising title deeds, was again removing large amounts of land from Tümed control and opening them to further colonization. A local delegation from Tümed Banner came to Beijing to protest and sought out the new student at the Mongolian and Tibetan school, Li Yuzhi, for possible assistance. A month of fruitless petitions showed the Tümeds that pressuring the Beijing government was by no means as easy as pressuring the Suiyuan government.[53]

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[50] Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 128; Liu Yingyuan, *Li Shouxin zishu*, pp. 196-97.

[51] Another list of special course and middle school students, made by a Kharachin from memory, is in Song Zhou, "Beijing 'Meng-Zang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," pp. 29-30.

[52] The photograph is best reproduced in Song Zhou, "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 23.

[53] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 45.

In December, 1923, however an issue emerged that brought all the students together. As Song Zhou, from Kharachin Left Banner and one of the three youngest students in the middle school class, recalled, one day the students all gathered at the assembly hall, where the student president of the special law and politics class, Chen Fuyuan, and his co-president Wang Yuxuan, gave speeches attacking the administration of Zhang Wu, the school's president. Song Zhou did not understand the issue at the time, but the student government was protesting a decision by the Beijing authorities to abolish the public tuition, and make the students pay for their own food and student uniforms. For the Tümeds, in particular, for whom public tuition had been essential to their attendance, this was a direct violation of the terms on which they had agreed to attend the school. The students marched out of the assembly hall and surrounded the house of the school president, Zhang Wu. President Zhang, who had studied in Germany and maintained generally good relations with the students, conciliated the students and presented their demands to the authorities. The response from the Beijing government was to dismiss Zhang Wu and appoint a president who could crack down on the turbulent young Mongols.

This next president, Wang Weihan, had served in the Beijing police administration. The students took the appointment of a police officer, with no educational experience, as an additional insult to their school and after a week of constant demonstrations drove Wang to resign his position. At one public meeting, the student protesters would not let him speak for over an hour. As he left they mobbed his rickshaw until he reached his own home courtyard, sticking onto it banners with their slogans: "Down with Wang Weihan who insults Mongolian and Tibetan education!" and "Against police officers being school presidents!" Prince Güng appointed AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang) as Wang's replacement. AltanOchir was a Mongol, had some academic credentials, having been educated in Japan, was considered to be intelligent and able, and, finally, was in need of a job, as his election to the 1913 Parliament had finally exhausted its potential. The demonstration leaders this time allowed him to address the students, but in the end drove him out as well.

The end of the demonstrations came only when after the demonstrators confronted Prince Güng himself and extracted from him a promise to reverse the decision on public tuition, and dismiss AltanOchir. Prince Güng appointed Engkhebürin (Wu Enhe), another of the students he had sent to Japan, but a genuine educator and already a teacher at the Mongolian and Tibetan school. With the promise of the revival of public tuition, and an appointment that reflected respect for the

school's academic status, the demonstrations quieted down.[54] Wu Enhe did not prevent the students from participating in radical events, such as the commemoration of the first anniversary of the February 7 suppression of the Beijing-Hankou railway strike, and a March 30 memorial service for V.I. Lenin.[55] Eventually, however, even Wu Enhe would have to confront the difficulties that constant demonstrations put in the way of academic achievement for the students. Yun Ze confesses that after good grades in Guisui, his constant involvement in politics kept him from paying attention to academics. During the summer vacation of 1924, he and several other Tümeds had to attend remedial education courses at Beijing Normal University.[56] It is not surprising then that even a mild academic like Wu Enhe would have switched the focus in recruiting students from political protests to academics; the only notable Tümed Communist to enter the school after the demonstrations was Jirgal (1907-1941).[57]

As with Rong Yaoxian, secondary memoirs speak of Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, Zhao Shitan, and Li Bohai as propagandizing the Mongols, and there is no reason to doubt that they occasionally contacted the students at the Mongolian and Tibetan school.[58] Yet when Li Yuzhi,

[54] The two main accounts of the demonstration are that of Song Zhou, in "Beijing 'MengZang zhuanmen xuexiao' zhi bianqian," p. 30, and of Yun Ze/Wulanfu in Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 46-50. Both are detailed but in conflict on several points. Wulanfu says AltanOchir/Jin Yongchang was the police administrator, while Song Zhou says it was Wang Weihan. Wulanfu implies, but does not explicitly state, that the middle school Tümed Communists were the leaders, while Song Zhou says it was the regular student body president and other students in the special course who organized the demonstrations. On all of these points I believe Song Zhou is correct. It seems no CCP party history materials contained dates for these demonstrations, and so Wang Shusheng and Hao Yufeng, in *Wulanfu nianpu*, 27-28, guessed the date of the demonstrations as April-May, 1924, but this is a mistake. Song Zhou, apparently working from an official source, lists all the school presidents, and their dates of office, thus putting the demonstrations clearly in December, 1923, through January, 1924.

[55] Wang Shusheng and Hao Yufeng, *Wulanfu nianpu*, p. 29, claims that full public tuition was never restored. The corresponding passage in Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 55-6, does not mention this problem, however.

[56] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 44-45, 55-6.

[57] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 186 and "Daqingshan kangRi douzheng shi" bianxiezu, comp., *Daqingshan kangRi douzheng shi* (Höhhot, 1985), pp. 359-60.

[58] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 50-54; Ji Yatai [Jiyaatai], "Li Dazhao tongzhi he Nei Menggu chuqi de geming huodong," p. 169.

Altandorji, Meng Chun, Duo Shou, Yun Ze and other Tümeds joined the Socialist Youth Corps in late 1923, the sponsor was Han Linfu.[59] By early 1924, Han was also working with another Rehe-born Communist in Tianjin, Chen Jinghu. Chen was a native of Habaqigou ("Habaqi Ditch") village in the west of Bai Haifeng's Yeboshou Township in Jianping County, and in a companion piece to Han Linfu's description of Inner Mongolia, analyzed the Zhili alliance's Mongolian policy for the Communist publication "Guide Weekly" (*Xiangdao zhoubao*).[60]

The party confirmed the importance of Han Linfu's work among the Inner Mongols when he was elected to attend the First Congress of the Kuomintang in Canton, together with the leading Communists from the Beijing-Tianjin area, Li Dazhao and Yu Shude. Han and Chen were elected as representatives for the Nationalist Party branch in Zhili, whose capital was Tianjin. Li Dazhao and Yu Shude were elected to the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, while Han Linfu was elected as a candidate member. When Sun Yat-sen made assignments for work in Inner Mongolia, Han Linfu and Chen Jinghu received their native Rehe for their assignment. Inner Mongolia was given to Bai Yunti, Chahar to Engkhebatu, and Suiyuan to Bai Yunti's Kharachin friend, Öljii.[61]

When Li Dazhao returned to the north with Yu Shude, Han Linfu and the others, he had to fight deep skepticism among other Communist comrades about the strategy of joining the KMT. This "united front" strategy had been theoretically in place for months, but it was only when Li returned from the First Congress in Canton that it was actively implemented. The First Congress had directed branch political councils to be organized in the major cities of China and the Beijing Political Council (BPC) soon opened a fancy office in Beijing with a pure KMT veteran Ding Weifen (1874-1954) at its head. Most of the work, however, was done by the Communists, with Li Dazhao responsible for leading the Communist fraction in the council and Yu Shude and Yang

[59] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 54.

[60] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao di'er dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 496. [Chen] Jinghu, "LuoWu dui Nei Meng zhi xin zhengce," *Xiangdao zhoubao*, no. 75 (July 23, 1924), p. 603. Chen's contribution to *Xiangdao zhoubao* demonstrates his Communist affiliation; the magazine was a purely party publication.

[61] *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 13 nian*, I, 371. Yu Shude had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party since 1921, and stayed a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee until 1927. After the defeat of the Communist bid for power in July, 1927, he left the CCP, and taught at various schools. See Alexander Pantsov, *The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919-1927* (Honolulu, 2000), p. 298.

Fangzhou, one of Han Linfu's Tianjin comrades, handling routine work. Han was responsible for Inner Mongolia and the three special regions. Since the KMT members in Beijing were mostly young May Fourth generation students, there was little of the friction between the two parties that soon erupted in Shanghai and Canton.[62] At the same time, however, the Communist fraction thoroughly controlled the BPC. Throughout 1924 and 1925, when outside observers spoke about KMT organization among the young Mongols, or when the MPRP began negotiations with the KMT in Beijing, the Kuomintang's policies were effectively those of Li Dazhao and Han Linfu. Thus while the Kuomintang presented an appearance of activity among the Inner Mongols, the reality was that all activity that was not carried on by Bai Yunti and his associates in their de facto separate party was actually carried on by the Communists.

To make use of the KMT's name among the Inner Mongols, and implement the united front policy, Han Linfu had to bring his young Inner Mongolian recruits into the KMT. KMT members would also be eligible to enter the new military academy in Canton where the First Congress had planned to train revolutionary officers for the cause. Han Linfu organized the entry of two Mongols, Bai Haifeng and Rong Yaoxian to join the first class at Whampoa, which officially opened in May, 1924. On February 5, 1924, the Lunar New Year's day, Bai Haifeng was admitted to the KMT in Tianjin with Chen Jinghu and Han Linfu as sponsors. Bai was a twenty-one year old apprentice clerk in Kharachin Right and had never studied in Beijing, so he was presumably brought into the party through Chen Jinghu whose hometown was quite near to Bai's. Rong had been spending the New Year in Beijing at the Suiyuan Guildhall (*Suiyuan huiguan*), serving candy and sunflower seeds to his fellow Tümed students. He did not get to Tianjin to be admitted by Han and Chen into the KMT until March, and when he was sent to Whampoa he had not yet received his KMT party card. Applications to Whampoa had to have at least four sponsors, and Han and Chen found them in the Rehe Party Branch and the Beijing Party Branch. For the army academy's second class at Canton, which opened in August, 1924, Han Linfu and the Communist Party's Northern Committee selected another rural Mongol, twenty-two year old Wang Bingzhang, from Pingquan County, south of Kharachin Right Banner.[63]

[62] Chang, *Rise of the Communist Party*, pp. 337-38.

[63] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao di'er dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 496; Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao disi dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 984; *Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao*, XI, 53, 101, 147; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 56, 74-75.

Why did these young Mongols wish to go so far from Inner Mongolia to study? Bai Haifeng, an intense and taciturn youth, stressed revolutionary self-denial, and gave no hint of any Mongol aspirations: "[I] desire to seek knowledge in revolutionary military science, to work for the party and shun my personal aims."[64] The more wordy Rong, squeezing characters into every available space on the application form, felt less compunction about mentioning his own aims and desires:

> Since the warlords have held the reins of government, the people's livelihood has been disturbed and the foreign policy has been defeated, to the point that [illegible] the republican country for the last thirteen years and [the idea of protecting] the small and weak nationalities are but a name and not a reality. I have struggled against this, and this year having obtained intelligence that this party [the KMT] was opening this school to arrange practical study, I thought, if one has not knowledge in military science, and a soldier's spirit, there is no way to resist the warlords, so [I desire] to enter this school and plan to improve my training in revolutionary methods.[65]

Rong Yaoxian's focus on the warlords shows that he had added internal enemies to the foreign goods that had at first occupied the other Tümeds. The allusion to the small and weak nationalities showed, moreover, that the position of the Mongols in the Republic was one of his serious concerns.

Sun Yat-sen, Sosordawa and the Youth Party of Inner Mongolia

1924 was a quiet year for the Communist-affiliated Mongolian youth as it had been for Bai Yunti and the Nationalist group and the Hulun Buir Young Mongols. The apparent strength of the Zhili regime led by Marshal Wu Peifu intimidated those who saw the warlords as the root of China's ills. After Li Dazhao had returned from Canton he had to dodge a warrant for his address from the Beijing authorities. From June on, he was in Moscow attending the Comintern's Fifth World Congress, returning only after Marshal Feng's coup d'état had broken the Zhili

[64] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao di'er dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 496.

[65] Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed., *Lujun junguan xuexiao disi dui xuesheng xiangxi diaocha biao*, p. 984.

regime's power. Just as with the Nationalist group and the Hulun Buir Mongols, the fall of the Zhili government and the agitation connected with Sun Yat-sen's arrival in Beijing dramatically revived the wilting prospects for revolution. Li Dazhao returned from the Soviet Union in November and organized the CCP's North China Executive Committee with himself as secretary.[66]

When Sun Yat-sen arrived north and appointed propaganda workers for the northern region, the effects of Han Linfu's activity among the Mongols was evident. Already by December 1924, Li Dazhao hoped to enroll Mongols in the North China Committee's projected new party school.[67] When Sun Yat-sen turned to the local KMT organization in Beijing for dynamic party members to agitate for a National Assembly, the resulting names bore the stamp of Communist initiative. For Rehe, the appointees were Chen Yintan, who was working with Han Linfu among brigands in the Inner Mongolian area, and Du Zhensheng (otherwise unknown). For Chahar Special Region, the appointees were Bai Rongxuan (otherwise unknown) and Zhang Liangwo. Zhang was a student in Rong Yaoxian's class at the Mongolian and Tibetan school, had participated in the May Fourth demonstrations and, while probably not a Communist, could be considered sympathetic. For Suiyuan, Wang Xiang, another of Rong's classmates and participant in both the May Fourth movement and in Li Dazhao's Marxist study circle, was appointed along with Han Linfu and Cui Boting (otherwise unknown). For Inner Mongolia, Bai Yunti was the only one associated with the Inner Mongolian Nationalist faction appointed, and he was paired with Wu Wenxian, a Mongol Communist.[68]

Bai Yunti treated this appointment as a cover to organize his fledgling People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. Likewise, Han Linfu and Wu Wenxian used their appointment to create their own Inner Mongolian organization, no more controlled by the KMT party center than Bai's was, but in this case run from behind the scenes by the Communist Party. Wu Wenxian (styled Wu Zizheng, Mongolian name Namrindorji), apparently from a wealthy peasant family in Kharachin Right Banner, was a student at the Beijing Normal School. It is unclear when Han Linfu first recruited him, but by December, 1924, he was

[66] Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, p. 235.

[67] Zhang Jingru, et. al., *Li Dazhao shengping shiliao biannian* (Shanghai, 1984), p. 240.

[68] Luo Jialun and Huang Jilu, *Guofu nianpu*, pp. 1169-70.

Han's most active Mongol acolyte.[69] Gürüsede, a Mongolian official sent to pursue negotiations with the KMT in the summer of 1925, noted that Han Linfu had been appointed by the Kuomintang to do party activity in Inner Mongolia and convene party members. Alongside Han was Wu Wenxian, who was directed by the Kuomintang "to examine the situation of the southern [that is, Inner Mongolian] leagues" and to propagandize the bandits and bring them into the Kuomintang party.[70] Sun Yat-sen's original purpose in publicizing the demand for a National Assembly had been to revitalize a stagnant North Chinese KMT. Having appointed Han and Wu, presumably on the advice of Li Dazhao, however, he (and outside observers like Gürüsede) were unaware that the recruitment going on was only nominally under KMT control.

Another figure, however, had already appeared to gather disciples among the Inner Mongolian students in Beijing. Just as Rinchino's repression of his party rivals at the Third Congress forced Buyannemekhü into exile in Hulun Buir so too it seems to have forced Sosordawa, a mid-level organizer in the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, into exile in Beijing.[71] In late 1924, Sosordawa went to Beijing, claiming to be an official representative of Mongolia's revolutionary youth and a member of the Communist Youth International (KIM, from *Kommunisticheskiĭ Internatsional Molodëzhi*). Wulanfu's memoirs say he first heard of Sosordawa early in the winter (which could be as early as November by the lunar calendar) as a student at Peking University who was already in touch with the Chinese Communist Party. Other sources say that Sosordawa's first contacts in Beijing were with Han Linfu, and with Wu Wenxian at the Beijing Normal University, and not with the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School. The Communist organization in Beijing (presumably Han and

[69] Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 6 (Office of Internal Security investigation of Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932); Hao Weimin, "Diyi, erci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 602. The report from the Mongolian Office of Internal Security that calls Wu's class background as "wealthy peasant" is extremely hostile, and it is possible that his family's wealth was overstated. The same report says Namrindorji/Wu Wenxian was over 30. Since the original data seems to have been collected in 1930-1931, this would give 1899 or so as his birth-date. In any case he seems, with Rong Yaoxian, to be one of the older of the pro-Communist Mongols.

[70] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

[71] I have virtually no biographical information on Sosordawa, whose only appearance elsewhere in the historical literature is as a delegate from the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League to the First Congress of the Peoples of the Far East in January-February, 1922; see Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, 439 n. 1.

Wu) then organized a public lecture for him in Peking University's Sanyuan Assembly Hall, inviting a large number of Mongolian students in Beijing to attend. Sosordawa spoke for two days on the Mongolian People's Revolution and was invited after one of the talks to the dormitory of the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School to answer questions.[72]

Sosordawa's lectures and answers sparked intense discussion and speculation among the young Inner Mongolian students at the Technical School. Wulanfu's account gives one side of this fermentation and excitement. The actual ability of Mongols to do things—to electrify their country, to establish a people's government, and to bring herders into government affairs—suddenly inspired what Wulanfu called "discussing-the-future craze" (*tan jianglai renao*) among the students, who dreamed about electrifying the Suiyuan steppe, working for only eight hours, and going to the movies afterwards with the "old lady and the kids."[73] What Wulanfu passes over is the specific political program Sosordawa was advocating. As Gürüsede reported, Sosordawa's aim was to organize "the youth holding the principle of pan-Mongolian unification" (*bükhü Monggol-i nigedkhekhü zorilga bükhüi zalaguchud*).

The importance of pan-Mongolism even for those students who had joined the Communist Party soon became clear. The first result of the fermentation begun by Sosordawa was a new party, the Youth Party of Inner Mongolia (*Dotogadu Monggol-un Jalaguchud-un Nam*), whose party articles or constitution were drawn up on February 9, 1925. The articles were apparently written first in Chinese and then translated, as noted above, into a very unidiomatic Mongolian. No names are signed to the party articles but a July, 1925, petition lists the party's organizers. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, those of known origin are a mix of Tümeds and Rehe Mongols: Rong Yaoxian, Bai Haifeng (both back from Whampoa), the Kheshigten Bai Yonglun (Korlô), and the young Tümed Duo Shou. The most surprising absence is Wu Wenxian, and it is not clear whether he actually joined the party. His whereabouts in July, 1925, are also unknown, but he did go to Canton at some point

[72] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925); Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 6 (Office of Internal Security investigation of Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932); Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 56. Wulanfu calls Sosordawa "Dawa" throughout, but the same person is meant. On the KIM, see Viktor Vladimirovich Privalov, *Kommunisticheskiĭ Internatisonal Molodëzhi: Stranitsy istorii* (Moscow, 1973).

[73] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 56.

between 1925 and 1927, and he may have simply been away from Beijing at that time.

The party articles announced the aim of the party as hastening the creation of a single people's country for all the Mongolian nation. They authorized an elaborate structure of cells with 3-10 persons, local committees, provincial committees, and a Central Committee of ten members and five alternates to be elected at a yearly All-National Representative Congress. Membership was open to those who agreed with the party's aims, followed its directives, and actively worked to accomplish its aims, regardless of status, religion, or sex. On the other hand, violating the party congress's decisions, missing five party meetings without leave, non-participation in party work for five months, or revealing party secrets all warranted expulsion.[74] It is striking that the very first thing the students drew up was not a manifesto or an explanation but a detailed organizational chart. If Bai Yunti or the Hulun Buir pan-Mongolists sought to impress the Mongolian government with their individual heroism and determination, and the duguilangs appealed to Mongolia with flattery and pathetic neediness, the Communist-trained students sought to make their mark with iron discipline and strict organization. Certainly the Youth Party organizers were hostile to the Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party group (and apparently ignorant of the Hulun Buir Young Mongols), and by playing up their tight organization, highlighted one of the glaring weaknesses of the older generation of revolutionaries.

Although the new Youth Party leaders were dedicated to the unification of Mongolia, they seem to have had a difficult time contacting Mongolia. There is no information about Sosordawa after his first meeting and it is possible he did not stay in Beijing for long. The students' local mentors, Han Linfu and Wu Wenxian themselves, seem to have had no other contact with Mongolia other than with Sosordawa. The Communists did, however, have intimate contact with the Soviet embassy, and the Youth Party leaders may have used those contacts eventually to forward a copy of the party articles to the Soviet ambassador in China, Lev Karakhan.[75]

What did the Chinese Communists make of this new party, and the eagerness with which their Mongol pupils rushed to form a different

[74] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 31-37 (Party Articles of the Youth Party of Inner Mongolia, Feb. 9, 1925).

[75] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925). Gürüsede in August, 1925, saw Karakhan's copy, copied it, and forwarded it to the Mongolian Central Committee, which is how it came to be in the archives.

party? There is no direct way to tell. The total silence on this party in Chinese Communist sources, both secondary and even primary, could indicate ignorance of what the Mongols were up to, although more likely it indicates disapproval. In practice, Han Communists, particularly those involved with Inner Mongolia on a grass-roots level, were deeply suspicious of ethnic separatism among the Inner Mongols. Thus while the October, 1925, resolution of the Communist Central Executive Committee on the Mongolian question spoke of supporting the Mongolian peasants' (*sic—Menggu nongmin*) desire for liberation, it also warned that "we must realize that the Mongolian nobles and lamas use this national (*minzu*) liberation movement to enlarge their influence among the masses."[76] While the strongly leftist orientation of the Youth Party would certainly allay suspicions of influence from the nobles and lamas, its explicitly pan-Mongolist character was certainly not the preferred form of Communist organization in Inner Mongolia.

Despite these plans, however, Han Linfu had to work within the constraints both of Comintern policy and the realities of the situation. Comintern policy in the winter of 1924-5 was still unclear, and Sosordawa might have used the name of the Communist International of Youth to convince the Chinese that pan-Mongolism was Moscow's real line. Eventually the Comintern would settle on the purely Mongol PRPIM as the principal organization for Inner Mongolia and Li Dazhao, Han Linfu, and the Chinese Communists would adjust to that reality.

Although the Youth Party never had such patronage, the pan-Mongolist appeal tapped something very important even to the Chinese-speaking Tümed or Kharachin youth. The ability of Mongols to do things for themselves, to construct a progressive, modern society on their own, without the Chinese, seems to have relieved Wulanfu's nagging doubts about his ethnic self-worth that he recorded in his memoirs. The 1921 revolution as set forth by Sosordawa showed that the Mongols were not apparently condemned to uninterrupted decline. Mongols could stick together to slaughter White Russian bandits and Chinese merchants and these military victories could make a difference in the daily lives of the Mongols.[77] Sosordawa's lectures, by addressing these doubts, opened the doors to the future for the Mongolian students.

Thus, in the face of this "discussing-the-future craze," so useful in many ways to the revolutionary cause, the Communist Party organizers in Beijing seem to have adopted a strategy of patience. They continued

[76] Zhongyang dang'an guan, ed., *ZhongGong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, I, 492.
[77] Cf. Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 10, 7, 14.

to work closely even with those Mongol youths who had organized the new Youth Party. Over the course of 1925, however, Han Linfu, together with Chen Yintan, would focus his efforts in a different direction, that of organizing local garrison troops and bandits in Rehe and Chahar special regions. This eventually led to another Inner Mongolian organization, the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia, which while theoretically a multi-ethnic front was in fact dominated by ethnic Chinese. For the time being the Mongol students would be allowed to play at their new party, isolated from any outside patronage. If the Youth Party appealed to Karakhan, Han Linfu must have been confident enough of Li Dazhao's influence with the Soviet ambassador to prevent the matter from going any further.

Agit-Prop in Inner Mongolia

In the early months of 1925, radical dissent became a significant organized force in Inner Mongolia for the first time. Feng Yuxiang's new regime in Inner Mongolia allowed activists operating under the Kuomintang name to organize more or less without restraint. The authorities in China were divided and distracted by the continued uncertainty over the division of the spoils of the recently concluded war. As a result, the month of March, 1925, saw the first grass-roots party organizations in Inner Mongolia dedicated to the idea of national revolution. This first wave also revealed the Communist Party, and the People's Revolutionary Party as the two main contenders in the area, the first with strength among the Han Chinese and younger students, the second among the Mongol intelligentsia and also among those Mongols still beyond the line of heavy Chinese settlement.

For months after the fall of Wu Peifu, Duan Qirui continued his wily, but ultimately futile, plans to strengthen his own power between that of Marshals Feng and Zhang. From late December to its opening day on February 1, Duan created his list of the one hundred and fifty or so leading personalities in China to convene at his Aftermath Conference (*shanhou huiyi*) to decide China's future. His list was topped by Sun Yat-sen, but below him dominated by military with only a sprinkling of old-line Nationalists, like Tan Yankai and Yu Youren, and of course no Communists. Among Mongols, he chose members of the old Mongol elite, such as Prince Güng, the Khalkha expatriate prince Nayantu, and

the incarnate lama, the Janggiya Khutugtu.[78] During these developments, Sun Yat-sen himself was removed from the picture by his developing stomach illness, which after exploratory surgery on January 26 at the Peking Union Medical College the doctors confirmed was an inoperable malignant tumor. From his discharge on February 18 to his death on March 12, Sun Yat-sen turned away from the political maneuverings to going over drafts of his final testaments to the Kuomintang and China.[79] On March 19, Bai Yunti joined Li Dazhao, Yu Youren, and other distinguished members of the party at a memorial service for the departed leader.[80]

The incapacitation of Sun Yat-sen deprived the national-level leadership of the Kuomintang of its only leader who saw any real hope in solving China's problems by another great gathering of its leaders. Sun Yat-sen's National Assembly (*Guomin huiyi*) would certainly have had a radically different guest list from that of Duan Qirui's Aftermath Conference, but in any case none of the other leaders in the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, or the Soviet mission to China had any interest in seeing it through. Agitation for such an Assembly and against Duan's "bourgeois" Aftermath Conference, however, could serve as a wedge issue to helpfully illuminate the difference between the people and their enemies. The party ordered its local branches to organize national assembly realization associations (*guomin huiyi cucheng hui*) in provinces and regions, and on March 1, to convene the All-National Congress of National Assembly Realization Associations (*Guomin huiyi cucheng hui quanguo daibiao dahui*). The Communist organization in Beijing soon put its activists in motion, including the students at the

[78] On the Aftermath Conference, see Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, pp. 226-227; the list of members is in Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, p. 527-8. The famous Prince De or Demchugdongrub is said to have attended by Lu Ming Qui [Lu Minghui], *Monggol-un öbertegen jasaqu ködelgegen-ü egüsül ba tegüsükül*, trans. Nasun'öljei and Cenggel, (Hailar, 1986), pp. 8-9 and Paul Hyer, "Demchugdungrub: Nationalist Leader in Inner Mongolia's Confrontation with China and Japan," in *Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia & North Africa*, I, *Central Asia*, ed. Graciela de la Lama. (Mexico City, 1976), 67 n. 10. Actually, it was only after the Aftermath Conference met that Duan appointed Prince De to his Preliminary Committee for Political Consultation, in July, 1925; see Sechin Jagchid, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902-1966* (Bellingham, 1999), pp. 27-29, and pp. 22, 27, where he emphasizes Prince De's youth and political insignificance at that time.

[79] Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 273-80.

[80] Zhang Jingru, *Li Dazhao shengping shiliao biannian*, p. 253.

Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School, who played their part both in the city and in Inner Mongolia.

Yun Ze and Duo Shou, for example, were sent to Beijing's East City District to man a registration booth at the entrance to Cuihua Hutong (alley). At a table covered with red bunting and under the banner "Welcome Sun Yat-sen's Northern Mission, Firmly Convene the National Assembly Realization Association!," their task was to register Kuomintang members for the congress. The higher organs in the Communist Party, however, had directed them to register only Kuomintang members from the left wing; rightists, as found in a confidential list, were in no case to be registered. This involved the two in at least one tussle with a KMT member on the list who refused to accept that he could not register. Local work in Inner Mongolia could also be organized under these auspices. Inner Mongolia's three regions also had to have national assembly realization associations, and the Communist Party dispatched representatives to organize them. Tümed Communists played a large role in Suiyuan, at least, where Jiyaatai (1901-1968) went back in January to organize the Suiyuan National Assembly Realization Association; the Association elected Kui Bi, Zhao Cheng, Chong Dechen, and Jiyaatai himself as its four delegates to the National Congress of National Assembly Realization Association.[81]

By late March, the National Assembly movement seems to have lost its appeal, but youth dissatisfaction with the post-coup regime showed no signs of dying down. The main development in this month was thus the organization of party branches that could serve as permanent centers of the national revolution, and both the Communists and Bai Yunti's PRPIM were actively involved in this recruiting cells and local branches. Back at the Kuomintang's first congress in 1924, four provincial committees had been planned for the Inner Mongolian area (three for Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan, and one for "Inner Mongolia," that is, the ethnic Mongols), but only now was there sufficient local leadership and grass-roots interest to organize them. Unfortunately for the Kuomintang's mainstream national organization, this local leadership was supplied almost entirely by the Communists and the Mongol nationalists.

In order to organize a provincial branch (*dangbu*) in Inner Mongolia, the Kuomintang leadership in Beijing in March dispatched at least seven members to the area: Han Linfu and Chen Yintan to Rehe, Zhang

[81] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 64-67;Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10. 1)," p. 186.

Liangwo and Yang Hongtao to Chahar, and Yu Shude, Jiyaatai, and Li Yuzhi to Suiyuan (see table 6.3). In fact, all of these men (except Yang Hongtao, who is otherwise unknown) were either CCP members or clearly sympathetic to the party. Thus alongside the open Kuomintang party branches they also set up covert Communist work committees (*gongzuo weiyuanhui*). The membership of the four Kuomintang branches and Communist work committees mostly overlapped, with the chairmen of the Communist work committees being members of the executive committees of the Nationalist party branches *ex officio*.[82] The Soviet embassy also gave what help it could to the Communists in building up Kuomintang branches. In late March, 1925, when He Zichen, a representative of the CCP's North China Committee, went to supervise the establishment of that party's Suiyuan work committee, Aleksandr Ivanovich Oshirov, the Buriat Mongol whom the Comintern had recently posted to the Soviet embassy, went with him.[83] The strong Communist influence on the KMT branches in Inner Mongolia was an open secret by the fall of 1925.

While students at the Mongolian and Tibetan School were thus playing an active role in Communist agitprop activities, they also kept up their own organizations and activities. Unfortunately, the secondary sources on the Chinese Communists in Inner Mongolia, which supply most of our information on their activities in this period, give us very little information about those linked to the Youth Party. Both Rong Yaoxian's and Wu Wenxian's whereabouts are obscure—Rong at least seems to have returned to Canton—and nineteen-year-old Duo Shou seems to have been the most active Youth Party member at the Mongolian and Tibetan school. Thus, a single entry in a secondary chronology speaks of Duo Shou, who is known to be one of the Youth Party leaders, founding an Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Youth League on April 18, 1925. Since there was already a Communist-led Socialist Youth League cell in the Mongolian and Tibetan School, with Duo Shou himself as secretary, this otherwise obscure organization was most likely connected to the Youth Party.[84]

[82] Hao Weimin, *Nei Menggu jindai jianshi* (Höhhot, 1990), pp. 109-10; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 67-68; "Nei Menggu Zizhiqu gaikuang" bianxiezu, ed., *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu gaikuang* (Höhhot, 1983), p. 37.

[83] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 187

[84] Du Fan and Wurijitu, "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 187; Zhao Lüqian, "Menggu zu lieshi Duo Songnian." *Minzu tuanjie*, no. 168 (April, 1985), p. 20.

Ten days later, Duo Shou, Yun Ze, and Kui Bi privately printed the first issue of a magazine, the "Mongol Peasant" (*Menggu Nongmin*) in Chinese. Duo Shou had thought up the title and been responsible for the writing, and in order to improve the production had made a ten-day's trip through Mongol areas in Chahar and Suiyuan. Yun Ze handled the printing, while Kui Bi took on distribution; no one else was involved. The journal produced four issues and then folded.[85]

I have not been able to access copies of the journal, but the list of articles given in secondary sources and the very name of the journal itself would indicate that it followed a similar line and format to the writings on the Mongolian questions produced by Han Chinese writers such as Chen Duxiu, Han Linfu, and Chen Jinghu. Articles described the situation in the Mongolian People's Republic, encouraged lamas to marry, and added revolutionary lyrics to Mongolian songs. The very title, "Mongol Peasant" and the Chinese-language of the publication (the only Mongolian was the literal and unidiomatic translation of the Chinese title on the masthead, *Monggol-un tariyalang arad*) indicates that Duo Shou had accepted Han Linfu's analysis of Inner Mongolia as a predominantly farming region, with an ethnically mixed but assimilating population, in which pastoral nomadism was only a memory. Although secondary sources often give the impression that this journal was an officially supported Communist publication, Wulanfu's memoirs reveal that the role of their Communist Party contacts was limited to casual suggestions before hand, and some words of praise afterwards. The three creators paid all the production costs out of their own pockets. To a considerable degree, then, the students in the Mongolian and Tibetan School were free of both the material benefits and the costs in lessened independence which would have come with more active Communist patronage.

The main competitor with the Communists for control over Kuomintang recruitment in Inner Mongolia was not the regular Kuomintang, but the Mongol nationalists associated with the fledgling People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. Lacking the rich, although often unreliable, secondary material available on the Tümed Communists, the evidence is rather sparse, but enough exists to make clear that Bai Yunti and his

[85] On the journal's production, see Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 60-64. "Menggu zu jianshi" bianxiezu, ed., *Menggu zu jianshi*, and its Mongolian translation, *Monggol ündüsüten-ü tobci teüke*, have a photograph of the cover of the first issue.

group were also seizing the agitprop opportunity presented by the disintegration of the Wu Peifu regime. Just as with the communists and National Assembly movement, the PRPIM used a front organization to recruit followers and legally spread its ideology. In March, 1925, the PRPIM founders in Beijing sent members of the new party to the six leagues, Bargu, and elsewhere with various manifesto-style pamphlets and letters to establish provisional committees. Sainbayar went to Jirim League, Yue Jingtao (that is, Murungga) went to Juu Uda, and Mandaltu to Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu leagues in order to secretly recruit party members, promote the party's thinking, and distribute literature. A newspaper article published in 1928 in Shanghai likewise spoke of Bai Yunti as going deep into the hinterland to do secret propaganda work for the KMT, and heroically bearing burdens alone for the Kuomintang, with considerable success. The main limit on the work was to some extent the remaining restrictions on printing of pamphlets, but more crucially the lack of money.[86]

The PRPIM's base of influence within the Kuomintang lay in the "Inner Mongolian Party Branch" (*Nei Meng dangbu*), which ever since it was first conceived at the Kuomintang's First Congress had been Bai Yunti's bailiwick. As the above references indicate Bai, at least, was personally involved in expanding Kuomintang membership among Inner Mongolia's Mongols, although what the relation between PRPIM membership and Kuomintang membership at this point was is uncertain. Sun Yat-sen had paired Bai Yunti with a young Communist, Wu Wenxian, in December, 1924, but unfortunately we have no evidence of Wu's activities in spring, 1925. Engkhebatu, who had been Sun Yat-sen's appointment for the Chahar party branch in early 1924, was sent sometime in spring 1925 to the KMT party center in Canton, so there was some continuing contact between the North and the KMT center. It is impossible to say, though, exactly how the work was presented, but it was probably as recruitment for the KMT's Inner Mongolian party branch.[87] By 1926, when its seat had moved to Baotou, Bai Yunti was this branch's chairman and Sainbayar its secretary, while the Tümed Communist, Li Yuzhi, was the secretary for its covert parallel Communist work committee. The evidence indicates that the two PRPIM

[86] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 50-51; Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 29 (Buyangerel, Altan, and Erkhimbatu to MPRP CC, May 13, 1925); "Nei Meng dangjunzheng qingkuang," *Minguo ribao*, June 4, 1928, p. 2.

[87] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 29 (Buyangerel, Altan, and Erkhimbatu to MPRP CC, May 13, 1925).

Table 6.3: Kuomintang Party Branches in Inner Mongolia

	Rehe	Chahar	Suiyuan	Inner Mongolia
February, 1924: (preparatory members)	Chen Jinghu Han Linfu	Engkhebatu	Öljii	Bai Yunti Kheshingge
December, 1924: (National Assembly propagandists)	Chen Yintan Du Zhensheng	Bai Rongxuan Zhang Liangwo	Wang Xiang Han Linfu Cui Boting	Bai Yunti Wu Wenxian
March, 1925: (organizers)	Han Linfu Chen Yintan	Zhang Liangwo Yang Hongtao	Yu Shude Jiyaatai Li Yuzhi	n.a.
Seat of party committee, 1926:	Santiao alley, Nanyingzi, Chengde city	n.a.	Chorji Temple, Guihua	Zhaoliang Juu, Baotou
County & city branches, 1926:	8	6	11	6
Members, 1926:	> 3,500	> 3,200	> 3,600	2,109

Sources: *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 13 nian*, I, 371; Luo and Huang, *Guofu nianpu*, pp. 1169-70; Hao Weimin, *Nei Menggu jindai jianshi*, pp. 109-10, 111.

leaders paid little attention, and that not friendly, to their Communist shadow.[88]

A chance event in Beijing gave the PRPIM leaders a significant opportunity to draw in the as yet non-politicized Mongolian population. Early in 1925, the Panchen Lama, who had left Tibet in 1923 over differences with the Dalai Lama's government, had been invited to come to Beijing and participate in Duan Qirui's Aftermath Conference.[89] From

[88] Strong, *China's Millions*, pp. 317-18. The reference here is clearly to the Inner Mongolian branch of the Kuomintang, not to the PRPIM, especially as Sainbayar was never the PRPIM's secretary. "Mr. Pei" is an obvious error for "Mr. Pai."

[89] Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqi nian zhiguan nianbiao*, p. 528. The text of his proposals to the conference are given in Zhongguo Zangxue yanjiu zhongxin and Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan, eds., *Jiushi Banchan neidi huodong ji fan Zang shouzu dang'an xuanbian* (Beijing, 1992), pp. 2-4. Huang Fensheng, *Bianjiang*

then until late April, he was actively giving audience to Mongols from all over the plateau. Marshal Feng recalled that Mongols would pass through his new headquarters in Zhangjiakou in groups of 300 to 400, or even 1,000 to 2,000 in order to see the Tibetan incarnate lama. Despite his own private contempt for Buddhism as a backward superstition, Feng saw a chance to show his magnanimity and supplied frequent cars to take them to Beijing.[90]

The crowds drawn by the Panchen Lama would resolve the logistical problems—poor communications, an almost entirely rural residential pattern, and low density—that made reaching the Mongol population with political appeals so expensive and time-consuming. The people attracted by the Panchen Lama's blessings might not be the most promising material ideologically, but they certainly included a diverse cross section of the Mongolian population. Sometime after the beginning of May, Buyannemekhü, having finished his stint as instructor in the Bargu cooperative school, left for Beijing with $150 silver borrowed from the co-op head, Tseden-Ishi. In Beijing he worked with the PRPIM party leaders as well as with A.I. Oshirov. When he saw the peddlers selling *utulga* (fragrant herbs for censing) and *janggiya sakhigusu* (scarves or threads worn around the necks) blessed by the Holy Panchen, Buyannemekhü saw his opportunity and labeling the party publications "Testaments of the Holy Panchen" (*Wangchin Bogda-yin jarlig*) distributed them free to the believers.[91]

Bai Yunti and his group also organized a formal front organization to draw in that vast majority of Mongols who would not be attracted by the political agitation of the Kuomintang. In the spring of 1925, the party organized an "Assembly of Mongolian Racial Revival" (*Mongol ugsaagaa delgerüülen/tenkhrüülen manduulakh khural*), or as an early Russian source translated it, "National Renaissance Clubs" (*Kluby Natsional'nogo Vozrozhdeniia*), as a non-party organ for spreading party principles and recruiting members. The assembly or clubs were open to all, lama or layman, male or female, and its slogan was "Let us free our own race from the oppression of imperialists of other ones, and make all the real people (*jinkhene ard*) equal." The "poor and proletarian people of the banners" (*olon khoshuudyn ügeegüü yaduu ard tümen*) were, the party leaders claimed, dragging each other into this organization in

renwu zhi, pp. 21-29, has a valuable account of the Panchen Lama's activites in China.

[90] Feng Yuxiang, *Wode shenghuo*, II, 423.

[91] G. Düinkherjaw, "Chandmaniin tülkhüür," introd. Sonombaljiryn Buyannemekh, *Oirkhi tsagiin towch*, pp. 8-9.

droves, and the notebooks of its organizers were bursting with names. Once in the association, PRPIM party members would instill them with the revolutionary ideology (*khuwisgalyn üzeltei sanal*) and choose likely-looking members as candidate members of the party.[92] The strength of the Mongol nationalists in the PRPIM lay in their ability to reach those Mongols outside the frontier of Chinese settlement. By July, the party had committees in all eight leagues (that is, the traditional six leagues, with Chakhar and Hulun Buir), and claimed that almost 10,000 Mongols had joined the Mongolian Racial Revival Assembly (or Clubs). The PRPIM itself counted more than 3,000 candidate members and about 300 full members.[93] By 1926, the KMT's Inner Mongolian branch, headed by Bai Yunti and Sainbayar, would record 2,109 members; we may assume that these members were concurrently members of the PRPIM. The Assemblies also claimed a significant political success in the spring of 1925. "The Japanese" (the Russian source gives no details, but presumably this means employees of the South Manchurian Railway), had recruited 300 Mongols as railway-related construction workers in the Taonan (modern Tao'an) area. The Racial Revival Assemblies dispatched agitators who persuaded the Mongols to abandon the work, thus giving a significant check to Japanese activites in the area.[94] This was the sort of activity which was not only important in itself, but also of tremendous utility in persuading possible patrons such as the Soviet embassy and Mongolia to take the Inner Mongolian nationalists under their wing. Fear of Japan was the guiding principle of Soviet Far-Eastern policy and any organization that could check

[92] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn dörödügeer ikh khural*, p. 51; I.I. Genkin "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoĭ narodnoĭ partii," p. 190. From the 1960s on, Bai Yunti claimed that he convened the PRPIM's First Congress on March 1, 1925, along with Xu Qian and Li Liejun. Sun Yat-sen, he said, was unfortunately too sick to attend, but gave the congress his blessing. Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary*, I, s.v. Buyantai is the locus classicus of this erroneous claim, and from there it has unfortunately spread far and wide; see for example, Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 266, and Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Menggu Geming Jun," pp. 10-11. The idea of a spring, 1925, party congress probably reflects in part the activities of the "Assembly" or "Clubs," yet March 1 was the date when the Communists convened the congress of their National Assembly front organization. Ironically in light of his later anti-Communist activities, Bai Yunti seems to have attached this date to that of the PRPIM. On the significance of this misdating, see Christopher P. Atwood, "Inner Mongolian Nationalism in the 1920s: A Survey of Documentary Information," *Twentieth-Century China* 25.2 (April, 2000), pp. 97-98.

[93] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn dörödügeer ikh khural*, p. 51.

[94] Genkin "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoĭ narodnoĭ partii," p. 190.

Japanese plans to turn Mongolia into "a second Korea" were guaranteed a favorable reception from Soviet officials.

While the numbers for the Kuomintang organizations in the three special regions were also impressive, with more than 10,300 members, the Han population from which they were drawing was close to ten times as large as the pool of Mongols in Inner Mongolia. In contrast to Bai Yunti's Inner Mongolian branch, the three Communist-dominated special region branches recruited few Mongols. The Suiyuan branch, at least, did do some recruiting of Mongols, but they seem to have had no success outside the Tümed plain. Of the five early branches organized by Jiyaatai and Li Yuzhi—Wuchuan, Salaachi, Horinger, Guisui, and Tümed Banner—one was a Mongol banner, but they did not reach any of the region's pastoral Mongols in Yekhe Juu and Ulaanchab leagues.[95] Han Linfu and Yu Shude's primary focus was on the Chinese vigilante forces in Chahar and Rehe, and while the Communists certainly retained their strong influence on Mongol students from the Rehe area, there is no evidence of any organization among the local Mongol banners. Thus, in the developing rivalry of these two mass organizations, the older PRPIM leaders still held the inside track in reaching the Mongol masses.

[95] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 68; Hao, *Nei Menggu jindai jianshi*, p. 111. For Salaachi, this source has Sha County, which Hao, *Nei Menggu jindai jianshi*, p. 110, interprets as Sa County, that is Salaachi (Chinese Salaqi).

PART TWO

FUNDING THE COALITION

> And his mother's brethren spake of him in the ears of all the men of Shechem all these words: and their hearts inclined to follow Abimelech; for they said, He is our brother. And they gave him three score and ten pieces of silver out of the house of Baal-berith, wherewith Abimelech hired vain and light persons, which followed him (Judges, 9:3-4).

CHAPTER NINE

EXPANDING THE PARTY, JULY-SEPTEMBER, 1925

When Bai Yunti returned to Beijing, he was unaware of the problems that the MPRP had and would have with the KMT, or that the Comintern would have with the pan-Mongolist activities of the MPRP. Eventually a satisfactory way to phrase the exact relations between Canton, Ulaanbaatar, and Moscow, and between all these three and the new party would have to be found, but in the meantime, the Inner Mongolian nationalists focused on expanding their party and unifying all the factions of the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement. Outside pressure, both from the MPRP's Central Committee in Ulaanbaatar and from the Comintern agent, A.I. Oshirov, at the Soviet embassy in Beijing, assisted greatly in this task, as did some difficulties in Hulun Buir that weakened what had hitherto been the strongest rivals of the Kharachins for the position of Mongolia's prime clients in China.

The Assembly of July 26

Buoyed by his new status as Ulaanbaatar's designated supporter in Inner Mongolia, Bai Yunti called a Provisional Assembly (*tür chag-un khural*) of the PRPIM, on the afternoon of July 26 at its regular gathering-site of the Fuquanguan Restaurant on Beijing's Longfusi Temple Street.[1] The meeting was a plenary one, convening full and candidate members of the party's Provisional Committee (the record of the meeting for the first time also refers to these leading members as the presidium [*terigülegchid*], a term borrowed from MPRP usage). Of those members of the Provisional Committee elected in December, 1924, only Mersé was absent, attending business in Hulun Buir. Seven candidate members were present, including Dechin, who would later serve as one of the party's presidium members and Bai Yunti's right-hand man, and Alta, a well-regarded young Kharachin graduate of the Qing dynasty's Army

[1] In a 1929 newspaper article whose primary source was probably AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang), this Provisional Assembly was mistakenly called the First Congress of the PRPIM; see "Nei Menggu dangwu baogao," *Minguo ribao*, March 30, 1929, p. 2.

Academy for Princes and Nobles (*Lujun guizhou xuetang*) and a rising star of the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement before his murder by bandits in 1926.[2] Other guests included Gobol Erkhimbatu, the kinsman of Mersé, who had returned with AltanOchir and Fumingtai from Ulaanbaatar and represented the Eastern Border People's Party, Gürüsede, then waiting for the KMT to resume negotiations with him, and the wives of Bai Yunti, Gürüsede, and the Ordos incarnate lama, Wangdanima.[3]

Bai Yunti's mood at this important meeting overflowed with optimism as he summarized the work of the party in its first year of existence, officially announced the results of his mission to Ulaanbaatar, and summoned the party leaders to the more active role in revolutionary politics they were now expected to play. His speech began with some encouraging remarks about the party's growing influence among the poor people of Inner Mongolia:

> We have gone among the true poor and oppressed people, and now we have relations with them. Since we have led them to understand our party's aims and the path of revolution, the number of members entering our party has, as you comrades know, grown daily more numerous. This shows that from now on it is necessary to focus our work on going into the midst of the poor people.[4]

He then focused on his journey to Mongolia. Ignoring the inconclusive missions of AltanOchir and Fumingtai, he only mentioned his more than

[2] On Alta's educational background, see Wu Enhe and Xing Fuli, "Gongsang-nuorbu," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 1 (1962), 107; Wu Luoji, "Jinxie zai xianyan qiangao 'Xinhai geming shiqi de huiyi lu' zhi qian," *Menggu wenhua tongxun*, no. 5 (July, 1989), p. 50.

[3] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 1 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925). See also the photograph, with a caption written in Russian (from Central Party Archives, foto-fond B3.01.1). Sechin Jagchid (personal letter, [summer 1993]), identified the place as the Fuquanguan ("Fountain of Fortune House") Restaurant, which he also knew as a meeting place for Mongols in Beijing in the 1930s. The caption for in the Party Archives for this photograph was written in Russian around late 1925 or early 1926, perhaps by A.I. Oshirov, who was not at the meeting, but knew most of the principals. O. Khosbayar noted that the woman identified as "Wangdanima's wife" was certainly not Khosbayar's own mother and Wangdanima's only known consort, Oyuntodo. Sechin Jagchid believes the one identified in the caption as "Erintsen (studied in Japan, and is now in Japan)" is his acquaintance Öljei (Chinese name, Shi Xiangting or Shi Yunqing). Since the records of the assembly record Erintsen, but not Öljei, as present, Erintsen may have been Öljei's Mongolian name during the 1920s.

[4] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 2 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925).

one month visit. Despite his words of high praise for the new Mongolian regime, he cautioned against mechanically imitating the actions of the Mongolian government:

> [I] met and discussed with many comrades, as well as investigated in broad outline the government and party policies. Now Outer Mongolia has already become an independent, sovereign, people's state. They have already made their political foundations...stable, and in truth everything is being conducted in a fair and progressive fashion. When I come back and look at the situation in our Inner Mongolia, it is truly shameful. Even so, however, the Inner Mongolian conditions are not the same as those of Khalkha, so we cannot proceed in the same way they did.[5]

Aid, he told the members, would be forthcoming not only from Outer Mongolia but also from the Citizen Army. Given these favorable factors the party chairman felt he needed to warn against underestimating the obstacles ahead: "Even so, however, whether our revolution succeeds or not depends on how hard we comrades work for it." He told the Provisional Committee that Zhang Zuolin has already signed a secret treaty with Japan making Manchuria and Inner Mongolia Japanese territory, an assertion that seems a product of anti-Zhang propaganda, and drew the conclusion: "If we cannot accomplish the revolution quickly, then we will become slaves like a second Korea (*Koli*) and our nation will decline and be wiped out—this is as clear as the sun rising." Bai Yunti concluded his address to the assembly with a warning that "we must keep what we are discussing today strictly secret. It must not be revealed to outsiders."[6] Fortunately for later historians, however, Gürüsede secured a copy of this speech and the assembly's decisions and forwarded it to the MPRP on his return to Ulaanbaatar along with the other documents.[7]

The main issue for the assembly was to prepare for the Party Congress which the MPRP leaders had insisted must confirm the PRPIM's policies and leadership. The resolutions of the Provisional Assembly all related to calling this congress. The date of the congress was set for September 1-10, and the place would be Zhangjiakou, the site of the headquarters of Feng Yuxiang's Northwest Army command. Bai Yunti had proposed and the MPRP approved of a party committee at

[5] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 2-3 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925).

[6] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 4-5 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925).

[7] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23:12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, Aug. 22, 1925).

Dolonnuur, near the site of the likely battlefront between Fengtian and the Citizen Army, but logistics would prove difficult in such a remote site. In preparation for the congress, and perhaps to avoid the growing reach of Fengtian power, the Provisional Committee would move its official seat to Zhangjiakou also; Bai Yunti and Engkhebatu would prepare the party center's new residence and handle liaison with all the local official organs. Eight of the full and candidate members of the PRPIM's Provisional Committee—Bai Yunti, Dechin, Mersé, AltanOchir, Alta, Bekhijorigtu, Injab, and Erinchin—would prepare drafts of the party's program, constitution, and manifesto. Although he did not attend the assembly, Oshirov as a representative of the Comintern, attended the meetings of the commission in August as it drafted rules and an agenda for the up-coming congress.

A big difference from earlier meetings showed up in the question of money. The PRPIM now had both $20,000 silver to use and a promise of being able to send more students to Mongolia. The disbursement was put in the hands of a special commission containing only the most senior leaders: Bai Yunti, AltanOchir, Mersé, Fumingtai, and Murungga. All party members on special mission would receive a stipend of one silver dollar per day. This amount, somewhere between the daily wage of an unskilled laborer and a foreman or engineer in a factory, would certainly not cover all expenses, but marked the start of the transformation of the party from a network of like-minded friends into a professional political organization.[8] The assembled delegates designated seven members to travel to the different leagues of Inner Mongolia and conduct elections of delegates to the congress, and most of these members received significant sums of money to help them carry out their tasks. These same seven delegates also received the task of selecting fifty young Inner Mongolian men, Mongolian-speaking, literate in Mongolian, and healthy in body and mind, to be sent in August to the Mongolian Military Academy in Ulaanbaatar for training as cadets. For expenses related to bringing the youth to Beijing and then sending them to Mongolia, the committee set aside $1,750 silver.

The arrangements for the election of delegates showed that, despite the beginnings of professionalization brought on by the receipt of funds from Mongolia, the party still functioned as a coalition of regional groups. Delegates to the up-coming congress were explicitly chosen by regional formulas which, to judge by their proportions, represented a

[8] On wages typically paid in Chinese factories in 1926-7, see *The China Year Book 1928*, ed. H.G.W. Woodhead (Tianjin, 1928), pp. 934, 945-46. See also Appendix D on currency and costs of living.

Table 9.1: Preparations for the First Party Congress (Resolution No. 3 of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925)

League or Region	Number of delegates assigned	Supervisor of elections	Money supplied (silver dollars)
Ulaanchab	3	Mandaltu & Wangdanima	$25
Yekhe Juu	3		
Chakhar	2	Engkhebatu	—
Shili-yin Gool	3	Yue Jingtao (Murungga)	$45
Juu Uda	6		
Josotu	6	Injab	—
Jirim	4	Sainbayar	$250
Hulun Buir	6	Buyangerel (Fumingtai)	$300
Qiqihar	1		
Budkha	1		

Source: Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 5-7 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925).

compromise between the party's existing distribution of support, and its aspiration to be a pan-Inner Mongolian organization (see table 9.1). Each election was supervised by a member (full member, except Injab, a candidate) of the Provisional Committee and with the exception of Mandaltu, assigned with Wangdanima to Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu, the members were assigned to their own home districts. In fact, several of them were known to have been on assignment in these areas since the spring, so that the decision in July simply ratified their existing placement. To judge from the seniority of the members assigned and their budgets, the Provisional Committee was most serious about increasing the party's representation in the far west (Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu), and in the east (Jirim), and northeast (Hulun Buir, Qiqihar, and Budkha). Josotu, however, to which was assigned only a candidate member, with no funding, was clearly a low priority, perhaps because the

party's active recruitment there had already reached a point of diminishing returns.[9]

The most important leaders, however, were not those dispatched to the countryside, but rather those at the party headquarters. The three concurrent members of both the drafting committee and the special committee handling finance, Bai Yunti, AltanOchir, and Mersé, were clearly emerging as the three main leaders of the party. This emergence bore obvious connected to the fact that Bai Yunti, Mersé, and AltanOchir (under their Chinese names Guo Daofu and Jin Yongchang) were the only ones relatively well known outside the circles of the Mongolian nationalist movement. Mersé in particular had a substantial reputation (for a Mongol) among Chinese educators and politicians due to his book, *Menggu wenti* "The Mongolian Question," and his activities as a minority educator in Hailar. Thus he had been invited to speak at an all-China conference on education at Nanjing on April 22, 1924,[10] and when in 1927 the party's Buriat advisor, A.I. Oshirov, went to negotiate with the leaders of the KMT, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Xu Qian all specifically asked about Mersé.[11]

Bai Yunti and AltanOchir were less famous, probably because they had not published any books in Chinese. Yet Bai Yunti had contributed a preface to Mersé's *Menggu wenti*, and after 1924 became relatively well-known for his position as a candidate member of the KMT's Central Executive Committee (CEC). Of course he shared this distinction with Engkhebatu, a full member of the CEC, but Engkhebatu had much less reputation among the Mongols. AltanOchir had been one of the earliest young Mongols to be educated in Japan and had a period, however brief, as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan School. Thus it was not surprising when a 1927 article in Liang Qichao's liberal Beijing daily *Chen bao* ("Morning Post"), the first public description of the PRPIM, identified Bai Yunti and Jin Yongchang (AltanOchir) as its primary organizers. Given his long-standing connection to Ulaanbaatar, Fumingtai was well known to Russian observers, and in his 1926 article on the MPRP and the PRPIM, I.I. Genkin named Mersé, Fumingtai, AltanOchir, "and especially Baiunti [sic]" as the party's leaders.[12]

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[9] On the resolutions of the Provisional Assembly, see Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 5-8 (Record of the Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM, July 26, 1925) and Central Party Archives, 7-1-23:11-12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

[10] *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao (chugao)—Zhonghua Minguo 13 nian (1924)* (Taipei, 1983), I, 848.

[11] Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 61-63 (Oshirov to PRPIM CC).

[12] "San qian li wai zhi chiguo," *Chen bao* (Beijing), January 31, 1927; I.I. Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoĭ narodnoĭ partii," *Novyĭ vostok*, No. 12 (1926), pp.

Of course, such prominence later gained these well-publicized leaders the hostility of those who had barbs to sling at Mongolian nationalism, whether from the right or the left. Zou Lu, the anti-Communist KMT leader, identified Bai Yunti and Engkhebatu as the leading secessionists trying to detach Inner Mongolia from China.[13] His selection of Engkhebatu was undoubtedly due only to his position as a Mongol in the more radical First and Second Central Executive Committees. With somewhat more reason, in 1929, the left-wing Central Committe of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar would denounce Mersé, Bai Yunti, and AltanOchir as the party's leading rightist renegades.[14] Renegades or not, they were the most prominent of the early leaders of the party, at least in terms of outside reputation.

Oshirov Brings in the Youth Party

Although the PRPIM was thus confident of becoming the only significant Inner Mongolian nationalist organization, its leading role in Inner Mongolia was still not assured. The party's relations with the Citizen Army, with the Comintern, and even with the Kuomintang were still not formally settled. After his return from Ulaanbaatar, Bai Yunti had met Lev M. Karakhan, the Comintern representative, A.I. Oshirov, and Li Dazhao, representing the Kuomintang. Bai Yunti had openly revealed to the Kuomintang leaders in Beijing then, if he had not before, that the Inner Mongolian Party Branch authorized by Sun Yat-sen was actually a cover for a separate party. I have not found any record of the negotiations, but Gürüsede reported that the Kuomintang approved the creation a separate People's (or Nationalist) Party of Inner Mongolia, but apparently believed that the PRPIM was willing to admit ethnic Chinese into its party.[15]

In arguing for this concession, Li was undoubtedly thinking of Han Linfu and Chen Yintan's League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia. Gürüsede, believing that any organization bearing the name of Inner Mongolia ought to be restricted to ethnic Mongols only, commented that Han Linfu had obviously failed at his designated task of

190, 191.

[13] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, 1988, p. 272.

[14] Temürküü, "Öbör Monggol-un aq-a degüü-nar-tagan uqagulugsan bicig," (December, 1929) in Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguy ilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 345 (Serengdonrub or Bai Yunti, Altan, Mandaltu), 349 (Mersé).

[15] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23:11 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

organizing Mongols for the Kuomintang, and this so-called Mongolian party is being filled solely with Chinese.[16] Merging this organization, almost purely Han Chinese in composition, with Bai Yunti's party would ensure that the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia reflected what Han Linfu, and following him Li Dazhao, saw as the multi-ethnic character of Inner Mongolia. In fact, however, the Soviet authorities shared the ethnic understanding of Inner Mongolian nationalism and put no pressure on Bai Yunti's party to merge with Han Linfu's organization. Li Dazhao's hopes to have the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers recognized as an umbrella organization for all Inner Mongols bore no fruit, although the Soviet embassy was still eager to make use of it as a guerilla force parallel to the PRPIM's ethnic Mongol forces.

More promising from the Mongolian nationalist point of view as a partner for the PRPIM was the party of pan-Mongolist youth who had been inspired by Sosordawa. By July their organization claimed 30 full members and 1,500 candidate members, while Gürüsede estimated their number in August at 800 members. The leaders of this youth party had forwarded their constitution, written in February, to Karakhan, who gave a copy to Gürüsede.[17] Although two of the original sponsors of the Inner Mongolian youth movement, Han Linfu and the Kharachin Wu Wenxian, had either lost interest or left the Beijing area by the summer of 1925, the Youth Party members were still eagerly looking for Mongolian patronage. Claiming to have set up cells in eight banners, and gathered 1,500 members, the Young Mongols hoped to elect representatives to go to what they still called Neislel Khüriye (the use of this obsolete term was undoubtedly due to following the Chinese usage of Kulun for Ulaanbaatar) and "discuss secret party affairs with the party chairmen." Finding it too difficult to do so, they sent a letter, probably via Gürüsede to Ulaanbaatar to ask for Mongolia to send a representative to give them leadership, so that the MPRP's "majesty will rise."

This letter, dated July, 1925, was an appeal to what they called the Central Committee of the "Great Mongolian Social People's Party" (*Yekhe Monggol-un neigem-ün arad-un nam*)—the addition of the word "Social" (*neigem-ün*) was perhaps an allusion to socialist principles—describing their organization and asking for assistance. Signed by Rong Yaoxian, Bai Haifeng (Düürinsang), Bai Yonglun (Korlô), Duo Shou,

[16] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

[17] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 52 (Youth Party of the Banners of Inner Mongolia to MPRP CC, July, 1925); Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

and other Young Mongols, the petitioners claimed that a year or six months ago (the petition gives both dates), unable to bear the sufferings of the Inner Mongolian people suffering under a "savage government" and being "destroyed by reactionaries," they organized their own party and Central Committee. The party's aims were the usual mix of democratic, enlightenment, and nationalist goals: to "relieve the Mongolian people's suffering under arbitrary government (*erkhetü jasag*)," enlighten them, spread education, liquidate the reactionaries, liberate the people, unify with Khalkha Mongolia as one country, and so increase Mongolia's abilities and honor.[18]

The continuing strength of this organization, despite being virtually ignored by all of the powers with an interest in Inner Mongolia, indicated that here was an organization with much to contribute to the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement. Their concern with Mongolian honor and capabilities, and the majesty of the MPRP in some ways resembled the rhetoric of the duguilang members, but this group of pan-Mongolist youth was obviously far more adept at large-scale organization. The tight organization envisioned in the February party constitution seems to have become a reality remarkably quickly. One feature of this appeal, absolutely unique among pan-Mongolist petitions of the period, was the absence of any denunciation of the Chinese as an oppressor nationality. The Youth Party was more or less exclusively Mongolian in membership (the new party name "Youth Party of the Inner Mongolian Banners," sent the clear message that ethnic Chinese need not apply), but this remarkable absence of ethnic rhetoric indicated that the early patronage of Han Linfu and the Chinese Communists still influenced their attitudes. Since the immediate tasks called for cooperation with the Chinese Kuomintang and the Citizen Army, this lack of expressed ethnic hostility may have seemed more promising to the Soviet embassy personnel than the pan-Mongolist program might suggest.

In fact, the main obstacle to bringing all of Inner Mongolia's nationalist forces together was the animosity between the PRPIM and the Youth Party. As Gürüsede observed, "the youth lead by Sosordawa were not friendly with Bai Yunti's party and have a principle of acting completely independently." Given the massive demonstrations against AltanOchir when he had served as President of the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School, it is not surprising that the Youth Party saw the PRPIM as a party that admits "the rich and the nobles."[19] Looking

[18] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 52-53 (Youth Party of the Banners of Inner Mongolia to MPRP CC, July, 1925).

[19] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

forward to the impending war between Fengtian and the Citizen Army, both of these parties, however, were very promising and the Soviet representatives in Beijing strived to bring them together. Oshirov, in his office as the Comintern agent for Inner Mongolia thus opened negotiations between the two parties with himself as go-between, seeking to get the two to become friendly and combine forces. When Gürüsede left Beijing in mid- to late August, he reported that Oshirov "had given them the appearance of friendship."[20] Bai Yunti had beaten Rong Yaoxian and Bai Haifeng to Ulaanbaatar and the Comintern was now actively discouraging the MPRP from taking the lead in Inner Mongolian affairs, so regardless of how they felt about the big-shot officials like AltanOchir in the PRPIM, the Youth Party students had not much choice but to work with the PRPIM if they wished for any outside support at all.

Fiasco in Hulun Buir

While Bai Yunti had been undertaking negotiations with virtually all sides, Mersé had spent most of the late spring and summer in Hulun Buir pushing the expansion of the Hulun Buir People's Cooperatives (*Khölön Buir-un olan arad-un khorshiya*). From the beginning of the Eastern Border People's Party, it had existed in a symbiotic relation with the cooperatives. The oppression of both the Chinese reactionaries and the officials and the rich in the Hulun Buir yamen meant to the party leaders that "it is harder than ever to conduct the aims and ideals of the party of new thinking in an open and comprehensive way." The answer to the conundrum was provided by the cooperatives: "The only way to spread the party's ideology is through the gate afforded by the cooperatives...With the cooperative name we could draw in the people, incline the leadership to our side, and shut certain people's mouths." Over the months since the cooperatives general meeting during the "White Month" or Lunar New Year, Mersé believed that using the cooperatives the party had been mostly successful in spreading the party's ideology, youth were becoming ever more numerous and working harder, and the power of the cooperatives was growing to the point of matching that of the yamen itself.[21]

[20] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, August 22, 1925).

[21] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 27 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

Each year, during the fourth moon, the officials of Hulun Buir held their general assembly, or *tsuglaan*, at which yearly policy and tax assessments on the banners were settled. In the fourth moon of 1925 (April 23-May 21), the party and cooperative members took the lead, popularizing their ideology and discussing plans to expand the cooperatives, open rural schools, and train local soldiers. Far from meeting with opposition from the "rich and the nobles," the fudutong's yamen forwarded $50,000 silver for the Mengqi Pimao Gongsi (Mongolian Banners' Hide and Wool Company) and $30,000 silver for Mersé's school in Mekhertü Ail.[22] Undoubtedly, the support of Duke Tsengde, who as the yamen's Left Section Head and manager of both the yamen-run Hulun Buir Bank and the Pimao Gongsi played the preponderant role in yamen financial and economic policy, was vital for securing these funds for the cooperative. Another influential official Erkhimbatu, the commandant-general (*ukheri da* or *bügüde-yin daruga*) of the New Bargu Left banners, was made general chairman of the cooperative, although Mersé, Tseden-Ishi and other party leaders insisted he was only being used by them for his position.[23]

The ultimate aim of these big plans was a substantial increase in the power of the Hulun Buir state in general, the same strategy which had been pursued by the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperatives in Khalkha which Tseden-Ishi had been heading since 1924. The plans for training soldiers and expanding schools—prime areas of state-building expenditures in China since the New Policies—would demand an increase in

[22] Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden-Ishi's letter here gives the denomination of the gift as the *tögörig* (*tögrög*), but it seems quite impossible that it could be referring to the new currency of the Mongolian People's Republic. Since *tögörig* or *tögrög* originally signifies any round thing, it was presumably also used for the round Mexican and Yuan Shikai silver dollars, one of which is evidently meant here. See the Appendix D on money and currency. This same letter does not mention Duke Tsengde's Pimao Gongsi, but it is clear from U.S. consular records that the Pimao Gongsi served as the intermediary between the yamen and the cooperatives. See U.S. State Department, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia" July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

[23] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 27-28 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925);T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State), p. 4. According to the memorandum, the Fudutong, Guifu, told Mr. Lilienstrom on July 1 that the "tsuklan" (Mongolian *tsuglaan* or *cuglagan*; in Bargu dialect the c- is pronounced as ts-) had concluded some forty days before, that is, around May 20, which coincides perfectly with the Chinese lunar date.

revenue. The subsequent course of events makes it clear that the ultimate source of this revenue would come from putting Hulun Buir into the position of the middleman in this trade between the Mongol herders and the British and American buyers, and that the $50,000 silver forwarded by the yamen was not a gift but a loan which the yamen expected to get back from the profits of the Pimao Gongsi's wool trading. The simplest way for the company to maximize its profit was to corner the market in wool by prohibiting the sale of wool to the Chinese dealers who then resold it to the American and British companies. If the company could use government force to prevent the herdsmen from selling to the Chinese middlemen, then it could resell the goods at a substantial mark-up thus bringing in the money to repay the loan and fund the party's plans for social transformation and state-building.

The dynamics of the wool and fur trades on the Mongolian plateau and in Hulun Buir made them especially amenable to such a policy of market monopoly. First the trade was highly seasonal, which meant that a brief period of prohibition could rule or ruin the trade. In the Bargu area the following chronology applied: shearing began in June, and continued through July, and the wool was delivered to the foreign firms in autumn.[24] Incomplete quarterly breakdowns of exports show a general pattern of shipments abroad taking place largely in the first two quarters with the third and fourth quarter, when wool was being sheared and gathered to export locations, being lulls in the actual export shipping. This was only a general pattern, however, and market conditions not infrequently forced exporters to store the wool at ports such as Tianjin and then sell off-season.[25]

Second, the capital of the trade was almost all supplied in advance by British and American firms. This meant that one or two seasons'

[24] RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia" July 13, 1925,1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State). Note the letter of appreciation from the American firm worried about the Hulun Buir Coop monopoly on the wool trade came on December 4, 1925, presumably after the company had ascertained that the season's trade had gone through and the bulk of the wool gathered in; see RRIAC, roll 184, 893.62222/4, Consul G.C. Hanson to U.S. Secretary of State, December 15, 1925.

[25] See figures in *Chinwangtao & Tientsin Trade Returns, October-December Quarter 1920 and Trade Report 1920* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1921), pp. 5-7; *Chinwangtao & Tientsin Trade Returns, July-September Quarter, 1921* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1921), pp. 5-6; *Chinwangtao & Tientsin Trade Returns [October-December Quarter 1921] and Trade Reports 1920* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1922), pp. 6-7.

monopoly by the rival Hulun Buir yamen could cause massive losses that would bankrupt the Chinese middlemen and drive out the foreign firms. In Bargu, the shearing and felt-making was done by about 1,500 Han Chinese laborers, most of whom received cash advances, tools, and provisions from the British and American companies who dominated the market, although these funds would often be distributed through the intermediary of Chinese trading firms. The Chinese laborers had their own organization, the "Chinese Felt Makers Association." The Chinese felt makers would do the work of shearing and felt making for the Bargu and Solon Mongols who owned the herds and receive wool in payment, which the felt makers could sell to the highest bidder, presumably after settling accounts with the firm that had supplied their advances. The Chinese shearers and felt makers also could buy wool from the Mongols on their own account. In 1925, the American firms committed in advance to purchase about $200,000 silver, while the British firms were committed to a somewhat larger amount.[26] (The total sheep's wool sale from Manchuria as a whole—and virtually all of that was from Bargu—in 1925 was about 1 million haiguan taels or about $667,000 silver).[27]

While German firms played a significant role in the trade in the Mongolian People's Republic, in Hulun Buir, British and American firms were the only foreign merchants, although the local agents were usually White Russian or Chinese (see table 9.3).[28] Just as in Mongolia proper, while there were many Chinese firms, they were weak, and at least in the case of Bargu, largely reduced to serving as middlemen between the foreign firms and the Chinese laborers. As we have seen, as early as 1923, Mersé believed that the international market's dependence

[26] See the detailed report on the trade in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia" July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

[27] The Haiguan tael officially stood at 1.5 silver dollars to the tael, although the market rate fluctuated around this figure (see Appendix D).

[28] The name of the German firm is given from its Mongol form. "Mongol dakhi nemtsiin khudaldaany nökhörlöl," (see B. Shirendew and B.G. Gafurov, ed., *Mongol-Zöwlöltiin khariltsaany tüükh* [Ulaanbaatar, 1981], p. 108). Two firms are listed by Turar Ryskulov as German in Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 90, but his "Yung Fung Trading Co." is actually the nickname of the British firm Fairchild & Co. Ltd. and Joseph Ullman & Co. is an American firm. Data on capitalization of foreign firms in Ulaanbaatar in *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn V Ikh Khural: 1926 ony yesdügeer saryn 26-naas arawdugaar saryn 3. Delgerengüi tailan.* (Ulaanbaatar, 1981), p. 44, speaks of three German firms with a capitalization somewhat larger than that of the five American ones, but far smaller than that of the British ones.

on Mongolian wool and furs gave the Mongols a position of strength in the world market. Tseden-Ishi also believed that only by implementing a monopoly and then raising the price of the raw materials sold by Mongolia could the country's unfavorable balance of trade be rectified. As he stated to the Mongolian People's Party's Third Congress in 1924, Mongolia exported $9.5 million silver worth of goods, while importing $13 million silver (these estimates in fact underestimated the amount of trade and thus overestimated the deficit). Thus, as he explained to the delegates, Mongolia needed to sell its goods for 3.5 million more silver dollars. "For this reason, our cooperative is trying above all else to get all the raw materials being exported from Mongolia into its own hands." In the meantime, while the monopoly was still incomplete, a fall-back strategy of limiting imports was used: "Leaving the market price as it is, we are making it our aim to allow only a certain amount of goods to be imported."[29]

Following this same strategy, cornering Hulun Buir's much smaller and better serviced market proved a quicker business than in vast Mongolia. Once Duke Tsengde's Pimao Gongsi had received the $50,000 silver, it then forwarded the money to the cooperatives and used it as "bargain money" to sweeten compulsory purchases of wool from the herdsmen. Although the rural branches of the cooperatives were both in the New Bargu Left Banners under Erkhimbatu, cooperatives were operating in both New Bargu Right and Left and the wool procured was held by the two commandant-generals of the New Bargu banners, that is Chibsengge of the Right Wing banners and Erkhimbatu of the Left Wing banners, who could sell it to the foreign merchants.

The advance of silver furnished a key precondition for competing with the foreign firms. The other key measure was to prohibit the herders from dealing with the foreigners. Hualintai (Fumingtai's Japanese-educated brother), Mersé, and Tseden-Ishi, as presiding members of the Eastern Border People's Party, wrote to the MPRP that the yamen had given orders to prohibit the sale of wool to foreigners, and accompanied this order with propaganda that such sales would strengthen the foreigners, while selling it to the cooperatives and the Pimao Gongsi would strengthen the Hulun Buir people. What these supporters of the wool monopoly did not mention was that these same orders also specified a single price that was to be required of all sellers of wool and pelts. In addition, the Chinese sheep shearers and felt makers would no longer receive payment in wool, which they could then sell to the highest

[29] *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural: 1924 ony naim-yesdügeer sar. Delgerengüi temdeglel* (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 184, 185.

bidder, but instead must receive payment only in cash, $4 silver per hundred sheep. Replacing in-kind payments with cash payments (undoubtedly supplied from the money advanced by the yamen) removed the Chinese shearer and felt makers' role as middlemen for the wool trade and turned them into mere salaried employees.[30]

The result of these measures was deadlock. The local Chinese shearers and felt-makers resisted being demoted from entrepreneurs to hired laborers, and the Chinese firms which had advanced them funds, tools, and provisions did not trust the new regulated prices to give them fair return. The American consular official sent to investigate claimed that the Mongol herdsmen themselves were not willing to hand over their wool to the cooperatives and the Pimao Gongsi at the fixed price. Some sold their wool secretly to Chinese buyers, mostly at night, since Mongols caught selling their wool against the regulations were beaten and had their wool confiscated. Meanwhile, the British and American firms, finding that the supply of wool from Bargu was suddenly drying up sent protests to both the Chinese daoyin or circuit intendant in the city, and to the Hulun Buir fudutong's yamen. Both organs assured the foreign firms that the trade was proceeding without hindrance, while reports from the interior left no doubt that the regulations against dealing with foreigners were continuing.[31]

A. Engkhebatu and Erkhinbayar's biography of Duke Tsengde states that the Pima Gongsi fixed the price of a single sheep's skin at $1.5 silver, and that of a pood (a Russian measure equaling 36.11 lbs.) of sheep's wool at $7.5 silver. The Pimao Gongsi, they continue, expected to sell the wool at a 100% mark-up, and at times wool prices rose to $17-18 silver per pood.[32] Such prices do represent a large gain over the Hailar market prices of $0.40 silver per skin and $4 silver per pood of sheep's wool reported in 1922 (see table 2.2). Yet when compared with contemporary customs data (see table 9.2), the Pimao Gongsi, while generous to the herdsmen, seriously overestimated the possible profits

[30] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 28 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925); T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State), pp. 1-2, 7, 9.

[31] T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State), pp. 1-3.

[32] A. Enkebatu, "Zhenguo Gong Chengde luezhuan," *Dawor zu yanjiu*, 1 (1987), 155-56.

Table 9.2: Estimated Market Value of Sheep Skins and Sheep's Wool Exported Through Chinese Customs

Price of sheep skins, tanned and untanned, in Haiguan taels and silver dollars per piece:

Year \ Port	Harbin	Dalian	Tianjin
1924	0.62 (.93)*	0.71 (1.07)	0.74 (1.11)
1925	0.66 (.99)	0.70 (1.05)	0.76 (1.14)
1926	1.22 (1.83)	0.65 (.975)	0.84 (1.26)

*Haiguan taels (silver dollars)

Price of sheep's wool, in Haiguan taels per picul and silver dollars per pood:

Year \ Port	Harbin	Dalian	Tianjin
1924	26.7 (10.8)*	20 (8.1)	30 (12.2)
1925	21.3 (8.7)	35 (14.3)	30.75 (12.5)
1926	37.8 (15.3)	35 (14.3)	33 (13.4)

*Haiguan taels per picul (silver dollars per pood)

The picul, a standard weight unit of the Chinese Maritime Customs, equaled 133.33 lbs., while the pood, a standard Russian unit used widely in Hulun Buir, equaled 36.11 lbs. Haiguan taels have been converted to silver dollars at the official 1.50 rate although the market exchange rates fluctuated.

Source: Unit prices calculated from customs data in *Foreign Trade of China*, 1926. Part II, vol. II (Shanghai, 1927), 108, 123.

they could make, particularly for skins. Since Tianjin was by far the major export center and Hulun Buir supplied only a relatively small part of the skins and wool traded there, the most likely result of the continued monopoly would have been simply to price Hulun Buir out of the market. Wool might continue to be competitive at $15 silver per pood, but only with rigorous quality control, and there is no evidence that the Pima Gongsi had any plans to improve production methods. The only sustainable alternatives would have been to either accept a much lower rate of profit, and hence a serious limit on the possibilities for funding Hulun Buir's development activities, or else revise the prices given the herdsmen sharply downward.

By early June, the major British and American firms, stymied by the formation of the monopoly, reported to their respective consulates in Harbin, who protested to the Chinese authorities in Hailar that any monopolistic restriction on foreign trade would violate the treaties signed by China with Britain and the United States at the conclusion of the First Opium War (the Anglo-Chinese treaty of Nanjing, 1842, and the Sino-American treaty of Wanghia, 1844). Since the obstructions continued despite the protests, and since the wool trade from Hailar held a significant place in American and British commerce in North China, the two consulates in Harbin consulted and dispatched two consular clerks, T. Leonard Lillienstrom from the United States, and F.G. Whittick from Great Britain, to go to Hailar and insist on the spot that the Chinese and Mongol officials in Hulun Buir cancel the orders giving a monopoly to the Pimao Gongsi. Robert Smith & Co., a major British dealer in both Hailar and in Ulaanbaatar, paid all the expenses of both clerks during this trip.[33]

Leaving the night of Friday, June 26, from Harbin, the two consular clerks were met at the Hailar station by representatives of British and American firms, as well as by delegations from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Chinese Felt Makers' Association. That Saturday, at 5:00 PM, the consular representatives convened a meeting on the premises of the Hailar Municipal Council with the following British and American firms and their representatives. The merchants told the consular officials about the situation, noting that "Prince Tsing Teh" (that is, Duke Tsengde) and the other Mongol officials of the area, as

[33] RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State), pp. 1-3, and T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," p. 1, in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

Table 9.3: Major Foreign Firms Operating in Hailar and Their Representatives, June 27, 1925

Firms	Representatives
China American Trading Co. (USA):	S.M. Braun
Joseph Ullmann & Co., Inc. (USA):	L.H. Kaplan
W. Forbes & Co. Ltd. (British):	"Chang Tsai Shan" [Zhang Zaishan]
Fairchild & Co. Ltd. (British):	T. Shapiro
Liddell Bros. & Co. Ltd. (British):	G.P. Terentieff (for Russian firm, Truhin & Smoliansky, buying agents)
Fur and Wool Trading Co. Ltd. (D. Biederman) (British):	M.M. Kashin
W. Kaufman & Co. Ltd. (British):	N. Loshnikoff
Robert Smith & Co. Ltd. (British):	"Han Teh-fu" [Han Defu]

Source: T. Leonard Lillienstrom in "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga" in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3.[34]

major stock holders in the Pimao Gongsi, were determined to gain the entire profit from the trade and expressed their feeling that without the consular representatives actually visiting the Bargu steppes and personally seeing to the execution of the revocation of monopoly, no change would happen. As the season went on, the stand-off was growing more and more risky, creating a dangerous delay in the beginning of the shearing season. Another meeting at 11:00 AM on Sunday with members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce both confirmed the foreign merchants' assessment and demonstrated that the Chinese merchants as well felt great alarm over the stand-off. Having already received advances from the British and American firms and distributed those advances to the shearers they worried that if they could not deliver wool to the foreigners in the autumn, the foreign firms would no longer risk giving advances to them, and both the trade and their fortunes would wither for want of capital.[35]

[34] Comparing these firms with the list of firms in Ulaanbaatar given by Turar Ryskulov in Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 90, we see that Joseph Ullmann & Co., Yung Fung Trading Co. [=Fairchild & Co.], Biederman & Co., W. Kaufman & Co., and Robert Smith & Co. also operated in Mongolia proper as well as in Hulun Buir.

[35] T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," pp. 1-3, in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in

The daoyin, the official responsible for the administration of the non-banner population of Hailar and environs was away in Qiqihar, but Messrs. Lillienstrom and Whittick met his Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at noon on Monday. The Acting Commissioner, Mr. He Shengren ("Ho Sheng Jen"), at first repeated the fudutong's assurances that there was no monopoly and no restrictions on trade, and agreed to the consular representatives' demand that the fudutong give written assurances to that effect. The next day however, Mr. He reported that the fudutong would not put his statement in writing, and so on Wednesday, July 1, the American and British consular clerks personally called on the Fudutong together with Mr. He.

The fudutong, Guifu, was of the Merden clan, and generally agreed to be weak and indecisive, especially compared to the officials like Duke Tsengde from the powerful Aula clan. His explanation to the foreign representatives was rather weak. He confirmed that a monopoly had been decided upon at this year's Tsuglaan in late May, when the people's delegates protested their exploitation at how "the Mongols were being cruelly exploited by unscrupulous foreign merchants." Guifu claimed that he had rescinded the orders "several days ago" but feared that with the "will of the people being heard stronger every day" conditions had changed and "officials had lost much of their authority." Messrs. Lillienstrom and Whittick, with the full support of the wool merchants, saw that they would have to pursue the matter in the field themselves if they wanted satisfaction, and received from the fudutong a promise both of a military escort and an official translator.

Their talks in Hailar had also raised political issues; understandably somewhat vague as to the relations of the Pimao Gongsi with the People's Cooperatives, Mr. Lillienstrom reported that it was "a Mongol Trading Society on cooperative lines, and there is reason to believe that the society is organized according to the soviet model." He also reported that "some of the officials at the Mongol yamen in Hailar were quite frank in their statements that it was their desire to see all of Mongolia 'formed into one brick,' which might conclude its own commercial and political treaties with political powers."[36] Indeed the hostile response of

Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State). Leonard Lillienstrom refers to the Chinese representatives as members of the Chinese Commercial Societies. This is obviously Chinese *shang hui*, and as this institution is usually referred to as "Chamber of Commerce," I have followed that usage here.

[36] T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," p. 9, in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

foreign powers to Mongol trade regulations, a response based solely upon treaties concluded with China in the nineteenth century, would only highlight the substantial benefits the Inner Mongolian and Hulun Buir nationalists might gain from independence from China and its treaty system.

That Thursday morning, a caravan of seven cars set out, arranged by the British and American firms, with an escort of four Mongol and four Chinese soldiers, and seven Chinese military policemen, the interpreter from the Mongol yamen and an interpreter, Mr. Ma, from the daoyin's office. The clerks had no fear for their safety—Hulun Buir with its relatively effective banner system and often gun-toting herders was a less hospitable environment for bandits than anarchic and disarmed Suiyuan—and hoped the escort would lend as much dignity to the mission as possible as they expected to have to overawe the officials on the spot. They first drove to Ganjuur Temple, the center of the great fair, where they received confirmation from the foreign buyers camped there that the monopoly was still in force. In any case, the American and British representatives could see for themselves that the sheep by the way were mostly unshorn. Stopping for the night at Orshun River where the American firms had established several trading camps, they learned that their target, Commandant-General Erkhimbatu, or as he was called in the Manchu style "E Ugurida" (E is a respectful abbreviation of Erkhimbatu, and *ugurida* was the local pronunciation of Manchu *ukheri da* "commandant-general"), was camped only a few miles away, and that the next day he would open the *naadum* or games with horse races, wrestling matches, and religious ceremonies.[37] That night after messengers were sent ahead to announce their arrival, Erkhimbatu replied with an invitation to come and watch the festivities.

The consular representatives left at four o'clock the next morning and after a reception by Erkhimbatu and his most important officials in the New Bargu Left Wing banners viewed with him the Mongolian children racing their horses. They returned to their own camp for a late breakfast, and then met at 11:00 AM to discuss the business at hand. The foreign visitors were conducted to the honored part of the ger and a number of people surrounded the ger where the negotiations took place. Stimulated, as the consular official thought, by the large audience, Erkhimbatu strongly protested that the monopoly was only conducted in the interests

[37] Lillienstrom's own text has O Gurda, but O is simply the Wade-Giles transcription for the first syllable of Erkhimbatu's Chinese name O-erh-ch'in-pa-t'u (Pinyin E'rqinbatu) and the initial syllable of Ugurida has been swallowed up by the "O."

of the banner folk and complained about the shoddy work done by the Chinese felt makers. In the end, however, Messrs. Lillienstrom and Whittick pressed the fact of China's treaty obligations and forced the Commandant-General to agree to announce that as Fudutong Guifu had lifted the monopoly he too had to do likewise.

Despite the stubbornness with which Erkhimbatu had held to his position, the follow-up of the meeting was most cordial, as the Mongol invited the visitors to a banquet and presented them each with sheep. The two still had to convince "Chi Ugurida" (Chibsengge, the Commandant-General of the New Bargu Right Wing banners), and after Erkhimbatu had given them a letter to present to his colleague, he rode with them in their motor caravan to his yamen at Amugulang, fifty miles distant, to get the official seal on it. The consular officials left with a very favorable impression of their interlocutor as "a strong but kind ruler."

After spending another day at New Bargu Left, the consular officials spent Saturday, July 4, motoring to Chibsengge's territory of New Bargu Right, close to the Mongolian frontier. They stopped at a wool-buying camp by the Kherlen River, but that night a heavy rain fall made the final 100 miles to the headquarters of New Bargu Right, where Chibsengge was staying impassible for the large caravan. Thus the consular officials sent their letter on with a single car carrying a Mongol official, a Mongol-speaking Russian buyer for the American firm W. Kauffman & Co., and a Chinese police officer. That evening, however, a reply from Chibsengge came in which he absolutely refused to abrogate the monopoly, and insisted that all wool would be sold exclusively to the Bargu authorities and only then to the foreign merchants.

Thus Messrs. Lillienstrom and Whittick concluded that, as with Fudutong Guifu and E Ugurida, a personal interview would be necessary to bring around Chibsengge. They left early Monday morning, July 6, and within ten minutes of their arrival, announced by their interpreters, the commandant-general had arranged a formal audience with himself in his court robes and a parade of school children outside the administrative ger. Here too in the discussions, the British and American clerks received seats in the back, honored part, of the ger with the commandant-general sitting close by. Chibsengge seemed more excited than Erkhimbatu had been by the visit from distinguished foreign officials and put only a perfunctory defense of the monopoly. In a few minutes he had agreed to cancel the monopoly and apologetically explained the letter of the day before had actually been dictated by some of "people's representatives" (that is, organizers of the People's Cooperatives) who had been present at the Right Wing Headquarters that day. Indeed Chibsengge seemed at a loss as to how he could explain his sudden reversal until the consular

representatives advised him to place the burden of responsibility on the Fudutong in Hailar and the stipulations of China's existing treaties with Britain and the United States. In the presence of the visitors the commandant-general sent letters to each of the four banners under his command canceling the monopoly, and publicly informed the people crowding around the ger that all restrictions on the sale of wool had been removed.

Having succeeded in breaking up the cooperatives' monopoly in the New Bargu banners that supplied virtually all of the wool, the caravan broke up, and while some returned to Hailar, the consular officials proceeded to Manchuria Station for a days rest before returning to Hailar by rail. Already news was coming from the countryside that "all of the camps were buying freely and openly, with any restirctions or interference, and that the Chinese shearers were working at full speed." After meeting with the Mongol fudutong, Guifu, the daoyin, and the Chinese commander in charge of the local garrison, they left for Harbin, arriving back on Thursday morning, July 9.[38]

What the consular clerks left behind was the issue of what to do with the silver that the cooperatives had advanced to the local Mongols for the expected fixed-price wool deliveries. At several places they visited, Messrs. Lillienstrom and Whittick had found that only a few days earlier, representatives from the Pimao Gongsi (as noted above, Mr. Lillienstrom in his account did not distinguish this from the cooperatives) had visited the Mongols and pressured them to accept the "bargain silver" which bound them to sell to the official trade organs only. In their negotiations, both Erkhimbatu and Chibsengge had been anxious to know what they should do with this money, to which the foreign officials replied that the Pimao Gongsi could of course continue to trade freely on equal terms with foreign merchants.[39]

According to Mersé, Tseden-Ishi, and Hualintai's account, Erkhimbatu then "conspired with the capitalists (*gabitaltan*) and took the wool from the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperative and did not give them the right price for it. He then acted slyly saying he had given more money for it [than he really had] and gave all the people's wool to the

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[38] The foregoing account is from T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," pp. 3-8, in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

[39] T. Leonard Lillienstrom, "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga...," p. 9, in RRIAC, roll no. 184, 893.62222/3, "Wool Monopoly in Mongolia...," July 13, 1925 (Consul Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State).

foreigners." The account is somewhat unclear, but it seems that Erkhimbatu insisted that those Mongolian herders who received advances from the coop deliver at least some of their wool at the fixed price whereupon he then sold it at the market price to the British and American firms. When the people heard that Erkhimbatu had sold the wool to foreign firms anyway, "they did not understand his wiles, but thought that the Hulun Buir cooperative was exploitative and close to the foreign capitalists, so its reputation really suffered."[40]

Still it is hard to see how the procedure Erkhimbatu is accused of having followed differed from Tseden-Ishi's original scheme for trade monopoly, and the party leaders seems to have unfairly singled out him for blame. The wool would in any case have to be sold directly or indirectly to "the foreigners" and the "the capitalists" as its eventual destination was the United States, and if Hulun Buir's Young Mongols wished to use the trade to finance schools and train soldiers, then they would have to sell it to the foreigners for a substantial profit, something which they could not conceal forever from the herdsmen. Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden-Ishi had written that the British and American consuls threatened the yamen that, "It is not right to arbitrarily ban [trade in] wool. No-one may collect it [all] by paying a high price."[41] While in the short run, they were cornering the market by giving the Mongols a higher price than the foreigners were willing to pay, comparative data from the Mongolian cooperatives in the People's Republic suggests that this would not have been sustainable in the long run. There complaints about the exploitative prices and poor service of the cooperatives had been rife from the beginning and ended only with the establishment in 1928-9 of a complete state monopoly and tighter political control that silenced all opposition.[42]

Whether due to problems with the original conception or with Erkhimbatu's response, the ultimate result of the monopoly scheme was a serious backlash against the cooperatives and the party. "Some ugly things took place which have not only put obstacles in the way of party activities, but even threaten to break up and disperse the party" lamented Mersé and Tseden-Ishi. Since the market was not monopolized, neither

[40] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 28 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

[41] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 28 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

[42] Christopher P. Atwood, "The Mutual-Aid Cooperatives and the Animal Products Trade in Mongolia, 1913-1928," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, March 9, 2000.

the quantity nor the price of wool sold that year by the Pimao Gongsi was particularly high and the Hulun Buir yamen hastily postponed the plans made at the Tsuglaan to fund schools and train soldiers with the profits from the trade. Finally the fiasco dashed the party supporters' confident hopes that New Bargu officials like Erkhimbatu would prove more bold at challenging the status quo than the Daur officials in the Hailar yamen had been: "Before we trusted Commandant-General (*bügüde-yin daruga*) Erkhimbatu, but now we don't as he hurt the party's cause solely for his own profit."[43]

On August 1, the leading members of the Eastern Border People's Party, Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden-Ishi, with Adiyabazar as secretary, reported to the MPRP the fiasco of the failed attempt at monopoly. They explained that the party leaders had not been on the spot when British and American consuls had intervened, but now they were trying to revive the discredited cause. They still embraced the aim of driving the foreign firms out of Hulun Buir and saw the hopes of the party as directly linked to the cooperatives, but confessed that "Our cooperative has little capital and is always struggling with the foreign and domestic capitalists...Now it is on the verge of disintegration." Only a new infusion of capital, they claimed, would allow the cooperatives under free-market conditions to actually drive the capitalists out of the wool market. With such capital "then [the cooperatives] can revive and defeat the capitalists, and again make friends with the masses," presumably by offering them more attractive advances. As always, Hulun Buir's Young Mongols emphasized the strategic importance of their area: "This border area is important and several years of effort should not be allowed to be destroyed in a moment; rather we request immediate aid." Without this aid "the shortages of personnel and money are serious and thus it is clear, we think, that the party can't go further."[44]

The sums requested were, as usual with Inner Mongolian requests from Ulaanbaatar, completely unrealistic, and perhaps not seriously intended. The petitioners asked for 70,000 tögrögs to recapitalize the Hulun Buir People's Cooperatives and 30,000 tögrögs to fund the Committee of the Eastern Border People's Party.[45] Unlike some other

[43] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 26, 28, 29 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

[44] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 26, 28, 29 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

[45] The denomination of this amount here is uncertain. The letter had previously used the word *tögrög* (a Mongolian word used for round currency) for subsidies from the Hulun Buir yamen, where the denomination was certainly in Chinese silver dollars (the so-called Yuan Shikai dollar). One might hence assume the same

petitions, however, this one advanced a proposal that contained at least some possible chance of Mongolia recouping its investment. Hulun Buir herd-owners, including Erkhimbatu himself, had long been pasturing their animals in neighboring areas of Khalkha Mongolia. Contrary to the usual practice elsewhere, however, the Khalkha authorities had not been levying pasture fees on this use. Thus the Hulun Buir party leaders proposed that the Mongolian government levy a rent on Erkhimbatu and "rich men like them" who used Khalkha pastures and then forward the proceeds of those rents to the Hulun Buir People's Cooperatives. This proposal seemed a fine way to punish the wealthy herders of New Bargu for their betrayal of the cause: "It would be most neat and appropriate to charge rent and give that money back to the Hulun Buir coop and party." The charges could be set so as not to destroy the rich herders' livelihood, but even if they did stop using the pastures due to the pasture fees, then the Mongolian government could try the second proposal. This was to make the Hulun Buir cooperatives an official part of the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperatives and then have the Mongolian cooperatives issue the 100,000 tögrögs as an internal matter. In any case, they warned, the party would need 30,000-40,000 tögrögs immediately, otherwise it would simply not be able to fulfill its tasks.[46]

This response to the party's difficulties demonstrated the self-reinforcing power of Mongolia over the Young Mongol imagination. Imitation of the new Mongolian Republic supplied them their program, but any failure in that program only led to a more intense desire for actual union with Mongolia, which would presumably eliminate the possibility of failure. Thus even a debacle like that of the attempted monopoly in Hulun Buir did not create doubts about the Mongolian ideal, but only increased the desire of those pan-Mongolists in China for union with their Khalkha brethren. Thus it was the failure of the modest programs for self-strengthening in Hulun Buir which increased the desire to have all Mongolia "formed into one brick." Had the local governments in Inner Mongolia been more successful at imitating the programs of People's Mongolia, the allure of outright union might well have become less.

In any case, even the limited union envisioned in the August 1 petition had become completely impossible. Under Elbek-Dorzhi

currency is meant here, but the new Mongolian currency called the tögrög had recently been introduced, however, and the petitioners may have meant that new currency. See Appendix D on currencies.

[46] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 29, 30 (Hualintai, Mersé, and Tseden'ishi to MPRP CC, August 1, 1925).

Rinchino, the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperatives had been actively used as a conduit for pan-Mongolian activities. Now, however, in the wake of the Rinchino-Ryskulov conflict and Voitinskii's intervention, such pan-Mongolian ventures had come under grave suspicion. As was noted in the last chapter, the Comintern's August 17 resolutions for the MPRP's upcoming Fourth Congress explicitly warned about pan-Mongolist tendencies in regards to both Inner Mongolia and the cooperatives.[47] Since this policy had dominated Rinchino's line toward Hulun Buir since 1923, the Young Mongols there were in for a painful period of readjustment. Up until the present, Bai Yunti and the PRPIM had considered the EBPP as a parallel party. By September, however, the Hulun Buir nationalists would be fighting just to preserve the very existence of their own party. The Daur Mongols' very closeness to the Buriats and Khalkhas which had been their strength in 1922-1924 would work against them in the new context of 1925-1926.

Duguilangs and Eastern Border People's Party Merged

The final push to merge all of the Inner Mongols into one party came in late August. On August 22, Gürüsede submitted the final report on his Beijing mission to the MPRP's Central Committee. As noted in the previous chapter the report was rather pessimistic about the possibility of fruitful relations with the Kuomintang. It was also rather critical of the various Inner Mongolian groups, about whose genuinely Mongol nature Gürüsede had strong doubts. The least genuinely Mongol one was Han Linfu's group affiliated with Li Dazhao and the "Kuomintang" (although actually it was more or less purely Communist in backing), the next was Bai Yunti's group, and perhaps the most promising in his eyes was Sosordawa's group organized in the Youth Party. Despite all these doubts, he also reported that the Comintern through A.I. Oshirov was actively involved in supporting these three organizations. His report thus implied that whatever their problems, if Mongolia wished to follow the Comintern's current line, then working through those Inner Mongols active in Beijing was the path to follow.

Gürüsede's report was discussed by the MPRP Presidium three days later, and as noted in the last chapter, appointment of a new representative to the KMT was postponed. The new Comintern adviser Amagaev, passed on at the same meeting an important decision about Inner Mongolia: "We in the Comintern will discuss first and then

[47] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 113.

implement our policy on the Inner Mongolian party with the Comintern representative appointed to that said party."[48] The clear implication was that the MPRP would play no further role in Inner Mongolian liberation. Yet there were still the Ordos Mongols and the Hulun Buir Mongols who had addressed petitions of unification, and also had many students studying in Mongolian party and army schools. What should the Mongolian party and government authorities do about them?

The leader of the Ordos Mongols from Üüshin, Öljeijirgal, had already raised this issue before the presidium met. After his July 20 letter requesting permission to go home to his banner, form party cells, and enlighten the masses, he had been asked to make his request personally to a meeting of the Organization Council at the same time as he reported on the situation in Ordos. Due to its important implications, the Organization Council referred this issue to the presidium where it was discussed along with Amagaev's statement about Inner Mongolia. The presidium decided since the "Inner Mongolian party committee" (that is, the new PRPIM Central Committe) and party congress were being planned, Ordos people's affairs were to be subject to the PRPIM Central Committee and Öljeijirgal should be informed of this new state of affairs.[49]

This decision must also have been communicated to the PRPIM leaders both in Ulaanbaatar and in Beijing, as by September 3, Bai Yunti was already taking responsibility for the Ordos students. On that date, he sent a letter to the MPRP Central Committee noting that eight of the students who had come to Mongolia with Khosbayar under the auspices of the PRPIM, as well as six of the students from Ordos who had come with Öljeijirgal had completed their programs of general training in the Sükhebaatur Military Academy and were doing nothing. On behalf of the Inner Mongolian Central Committee he therefore requested that they, along with two new students, Buyantogtakhu and Rashi, be all promoted to the Central Party School to study party principles and ideology.[50] This was a routine request but it showed how the Ordos students were now treated as one with the primarily East Mongolian and Höhhot Tümed students who had been sent by the PRPIM.

[48] Central Party Archives, 4-1-364: 81 (Minutes of the 47th meeting of the presidium of the 3rd CC, August 25, 1925).

[49] Central Party Archives, 4-1-364: 81 (Minutes of the 47th meeting of the presidium of the 3rd CC, August 25, 1925).

[50] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 34 (Serengdonrub to MPRP CC, September 3, 1925). By the time the request was actually discussed by the MPRP Central Committee the students had already entered and so no further action needed to be taken. Khosbayar had signed the April 25, 1925, petition with Tegüsbayar.

One could see the transformation of the Ordos students from their previous parochial perspective to a more all-Mongolian one as a natural development. A.I. Oshirov, the Comintern adviser, later wrote,

> In recent years more than twenty duguilang leaders have gone to Ulan-Bator Khoto...They have modern revolutionary thought, connection with the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and have decided to turn the duguilangs into Inner Mongolia's all-Mongolian mass organization and establish branches of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.[51]

Indeed in some aspects—particularly in assimilating the new revolutionary rhetoric—stays in Ulaanbaatar did result in greater uniformity among the students, but to claim that the Ordos Mongols were merging their movement with the PRPIM of their own accord, any more than to claim that they had "modern revolutionary thought," was wishful thinking. Yet it was understandable for Oshirov, the Comintern representative in Beijing, to presented this merger as a natural evolution, since it was his organization which had formulated the policies which led to it.

On September 16, Öljeijirgal sent a very ambivalent letter to the Central Committee of what he continued to call the "All-People's Party." He acknowledged his orders to now report his Ordos affairs to the headquarters of the Inner Mongolian party's Central Committee and to attend its forthcoming congress. In that light he asked for leave for five of his companions to go with him to the planned Inner Mongolian congress, explain the ideas of the Ordos peoples and with the approval of the congress work as much as they could for the party. His choices for those to attend as delegates seem to show a rather low opinion of the congress's work: his teenage son Gungganingbu, Sambuu and Sarbujab who had not been able to study, Saishingga who was too old to study well, and Tübshin and himself, who had been sick. In short, he seemed to be asking for leave only for those who had not benefitted much from their stay in Ulaanbaatar.

Öljeijirgal also made three requests which show that he had not resigned himself to working only within the PRPIM and losing his direct link to the Mongolian "land of salvation." First he asked for a branch office of the Mongolian Mutual-Aid Cooperatives to be opened in Ordos, "to develop convenient communication via the coop, as we make revolution in Ordos." Second, he wrote that although he was "following

[51] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., pp. 5b-6a.

his command" (*tushiyagsan-i dagaju*) to go to the Inner Mongolian congress,

> As I leave, I devoutly hope that those of our comrades who came last year to get a general education and are now being left behind to try to learn systematically the arts and ideas or are working as officials—I hope that after they have been trained by instructors from an institute they will be invited and sent back with them to our land to immerse [our people] in the People's Party ideology and enlighten them.

Thirdly, he stated,

> And even though our Ordos is now subjected to the Central Committee of the Inner Mongolian party, I hope our firm links here which we have reverently worshiped (*bishiren shitügsen*) from the beginning will always remain strong and youths can be repeatedly brought to be enlightened in all sorts of ideas.[52]

All of these requests demonstrated his hope to maintain a living connection between Ordos and the Mongolian state. Never did Öljeijirgal or any other Ordos Mongol speak of "reverently worshiping" their links to Bai Yunti's new party or see the seat of its Central Committee as the "land of salvation" (*abural-un gajar*). Öljeijirgal submitted to the new commands coming from the MPRP, but never gave to the Inner Mongolian organization anything like the same devotion which he had given to the Mongolian Republic.

Two days later the presidium approved the release of the people and the request for funds to cover their expenses. More surprisingly it also agreed to "delegate orally" the creation of a branch of the cooperatives in Ordos.[53] The Comintern had criticized the use of the cooperatives for pan-Mongolist purposes in August, but now the party was going even further in this direction. The earlier branches in Hailar and in Zhangjiakou and Tianjin served important trade interests of the Mongolian cooperatives. A branch in Ordos made no sense, however. Ordos did produce valuable cashmere but unlike Hulun Buir had no previous connection to the Mongolian economy either as a conduit for trade of Mongolian products to the outside world, or as a neighboring area with significant traditional trade relations. As it happened, despite a scattering of evidence of Khalkha economic officials visiting Ordos, no active coop branch was ever set up.

[52] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 14 (Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, September 16, 1925).

[53] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 14 (Additional note, dated September 18, to Öljeijirgal to MPRP CC, September 16, 1925).

At the same time as those Mongols in the far southwest of Inner Mongolia were being corralled into the PRPIM, so too the MPRP followed the Comintern's clear wishes and forced the Eastern Border People's Party to merge with the PRPIM. Here, too, members of the party resisted the merger until the very last minute. On September 3, a group of five Heilongjiang and Hulun Buir emigres petitioned to be naturalized as citizens of Mongolia. Their petition demonstrated that the idea of a direct connection between Hulun Buir and Mongolia was still the only form of organization they envisaged. The five emigres mentioned that they had been stricken from the rolls of their native banners and so had only party connections with their homeland. Thus they felt they should become Mongolians: "As we too are Mongols like you, we do not feel right being considered as foreigners." Their only point of hesitation was that they might not be doing as much for the Eastern Border People's Party and the Revolution. Tellingly, however, they believed that since the MPRP was helping the EBPP and the revolution in the East, they could still be active in the revolution in Bargu working in the name of the MPRP.[54] Clearly the only two alternatives they envisioned were either a single party for the Hulun Buir/Bargu area or direct leadership from Ulaanbaatar. Both alternatives were, however, coming under suspicion from the Comintern, and hence no longer viable for the MPRP.

There is no record of when the EBPP leaders received word that their party would be dissolved, but the Mongolian archives have preserved Mersé's response. On September 13, writing from Beijing where he was planning the somewhat delayed opening of the Inner Mongolian congress, Mersé wrote a final appeal to the "All-Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party" to cancel the scheduled abolition of the separate Hulun Buir party. He sent the letter to Mongolia together with his fellow EBPP member, Hualintai, who was traveling from Beijing to Ulaanbaatar to participate in the Mongolian party's imminent Fourth Congress.

Mersé rehearsed again the difficult situation of Bargu and the aims of the party, and emphasized five points that made the area different from

[54] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 43 (Bochiroo, Khasbaatur, Erdemjab, Merginjab, Chiganglama, and Buyanbaatur to MPRP CC, September 3, 1925). Delayed by the MPRP's Fourth Congress, the Central Committee did not deal with the request until October 9, when it was approved, and the emigres asked which banner and aimag (for rural residents) or city and khoroo (ward, for urban residents) they wished to belong to; see Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 48-50 (MPRP CC to Bochiroo, and others, October 15, 1925).

the rest of Inner Mongolia, and hence best handled by a special organization: 1) it has a semi-autonomous status (*dotogadu-ban jasakhu khagas erkhe bui*); 2) the Chinese Eastern Railway passes through it and hence the connection of its affairs with Russian and other foreign countries is especially intimate; 3) it has strong ties with Outer Mongolia; 4) its economy is also closely linked to that of Outer Mongolia; and 5) it is easier to organize troops there than elsewhere. For all these reasons, he urged that the Bargu Mongolian party committee ought to remain under the direct oversight of the Mongolian People's Party's Central Committee.

Mersé admitted that Bargu had connections with Inner Mongolia in the narrow sense. The two areas had common enemies in the East, such as Zhang Zuolin, and he therefore recognized that the Bargu organization and those party members in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia should give mutual aid to each other. He also conceded that directives on these questions should come from the Inner Mongolian Central Committee. The decision had already been made to cancel the seal of the Eastern Border People's Party as part of its merger with the Inner Mongolian Central Committee, but Mersé proposed that a new seal or stamp be granted to a "Revolutionary People's Party of Bargu Mongolia."

The plausibility of Mersé's attempt to argue for a separate Bargu organization was undercut by his simultaneous picture of a virtually disintegrated revolutionary organization there. The appeal of August 1 for immediate aid to revive the party and cooperatives in Hulun Buir had not been answered and Mersé again repeated his arguments. Since so many presidium members had left for more or less permanent special assignments (he to Beijing, Hualintai to Ulaanbaatar, Tseden-Ishi to Moscow to head the Mongolian cooperative office there, etc.), Bargu party affairs had lost their leadership and slackened, such that a wholly new Bargu party committee ought to be organized. Even more of the Bargu party comrades would be leaving their native area to attend the Inner Mongolian congress as representatives of their district: Mersé recommended that they should afterwards convene a Bargu assembly and elect a new committee. As for the cooperatives, "their financial state is very bad. We deeply believe you will approve the previous communication about local taxes (*gaili*) and aid to set up the new committee well." If the proposal to tax the wealthy Hulun Buir herder's use of the Khalkha pastures was not adopted he still hoped the plan to merge the Bargu cooperatives with the Mongolian ones might work.[55]

[55] Central Party Archives, 7-1-29: 14-15 (Mersé to MPRP CC, September 13, 1925).

Mersé's new proposal bore no fruit—there is not even any evidence that it was considered by the MPRP. At the same time as he was protesting the dissolution of the party he had helped to create, he was diligently working on the preparations for the First Congress of the new PRPIM which would replace it. Despite their objections, from the fall of 1925 to the summer of 1928, Mersé and the other Bargu party members would work loyally within the framework of an all-Inner Mongolian party. When that framework began to disintegrate as disagreements both personal and political dissolved the glue that held the party together, the Bargu party comrades would once again turn to a separate revolution based on their region's special strategic character.

CHAPTER TEN

CONGRESS TO CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1925

The Provisional Assembly of the PRPIM had set the date for the First Congress as September 1, but that deadline had already passed by two weeks, when AltanOchir, Mersé, and Alta notified the MPRP that the First Congress was now scheduled for October 1. The three, members of the committee to draft documents for the First Congress, announced that the preparations were going well, and asked for a representative from the MPRP to attend. Such an attendance was a regular courtesy of fraternal parties and would not cause the nervousness in the Comintern that a permanent adviser from the MPRP would.

The MPRP itself was also holding its own Fourth Congress, something AltanOchir, Mersé, and Alta noted as a "wonderful opportunity." The Provisional Committee of the PRPIM prepared their message of congratulations to the MPRP on special red paper and chose Bai Yunti and Fumingtai's brother Hualintai to deliver the greetings of the Inner Mongolian comrades to the Mongolian party.[1] This congress would be particularly important for the MPRP's relations with Inner Mongolia. The controversies between Rinchino and Ryskulov had led to an open airing of Moscow's nervousness about pan-Mongolism in Ulaanbaatar, and one of the items on the agenda was to clarify exactly the nature of the MPRP's relations to the PRPIM, which by this time had become the sole organization for Ulaanbaatar's Inner Mongolian acolytes. Also as tensions between Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin increased, the need grew for some sort of finalization of the issues between Mongolia on the one hand and the Kuomintang and the Citizen Army on the other. As a party gathering, the Fourth Congress had the responsibility to assess relations between the MPRP and the Kuomintang, and could also formulate a general policy framework on the issues between the Mongolian government and the Citizen Army.

[1] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 37 (Altan, Mersé, and Alta to MPRP CC, September 14, 1925).

New Paradoxes of Pan-Mongolism

As the congress opened at Ulaanbaatar's Lenin Club on September 23, the question of Inner Mongolia was implicitly raised in the typical opening messages of congratulations. Fumingtai's congratulatory message at the Third Congress a year ago had been entirely hortatory and inspirational, but this time Bai Yunti (under his revolutionary alias Serengdonrub) explicitly raised the issue of the MPRP's policy toward the new Inner Mongolian party. After the expected revolutionary boilerplate about the Inner Mongols being oppressed twice as badly by the internal reactionaries and Zhang Zuolin as they had been by the Qing, and being on the verge of national extinction, he announced to the Mongolian delegates that the Inner Mongols had formed a Provisional Committee in December of the year before and were ready to hold their First Congress this October. He thus expressed his hope that the Fourth Congress would issue clear directives on the path the Inner Mongolian party should take.

Hualintai, presumably with the uncertain future of the Bargu party in mind, did not take such a business-like approach. Excoriating the harsh black oppression under which the Bargu Mongols suffered, he extolled the freedom and development of the Outer Mongolian people under the leadership of the Comintern and expressed his wish that the other Mongol peoples would follow the same road.[2] These addresses represented the last opportunity for the next three years to express the separate Bargu Mongolian identity in the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement. In future congresses, Inner Mongolian delegates, both from Bargu and from the six southern leagues, would represent their area to the MPRP as a single region. Bai Yunti's focus on organization aptly symbolized the fact that it was his organization which, with the help of the Comintern and the MPRP had swallowed up the eager Bargu pan-Mongolists. Yet his asking for directives showed that regardless of the organizational changes, weaning the Inner Mongols from dependence on Ulaanbaatar would not be an easy task.

In the next two days, the political reports and questions from the floor revealed a paradox: just as the MPRP was being more open than ever before about its ties and activities among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the official basis of these ties in the party's pan-Mongolist

[2] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 18-19. The Cyrillic-script editors omitted the name of Serengdonrub/Bai Yunti, who was later labelled a "renegade" and confused the name of Hualintai with his brother Fumingtai, producing the garbled "Khumintai."

plank was being eliminated from the party's formal program. This paradox of an increasingly active policy coupled with an increasingly strict theoretical rejection of pan-Mongolism would continue to characterize Ulaanbaatar's relations with Inner Mongolia through to 1928, until the complete reversal in Kuomintang-Soviet relations and the replacement of the Dambadorji government by the "rural" (*khödöge* or *khödöö*) and student opposition changed the whole framework of the Inner Mongolian issue.

The report on party affairs presented to the congress on September 24 contained an extremely informative section both on Mongolia's long-standing relations with the Bargu Mongols and on the negotiations undertaken with the PRPIM over the past summer. This section, entitled "The Party and Relations With the Tribes (*olon aimgiin*) of the Mongolian Race" for the first and only time in the 1920s gave a substantial public account of what the MPRP had been doing south and east of the frontier. Beginning with the arrival of Bargu Mongolian nationalists in Ulaanbaatar and their formation of a party, the report went on to mention the creation of the PRPIM and the two missions of AltanOchir and Fumingtai and of Bai Yunti that came to Mongolia in the summer. The report then cited the MPRP Central Committee's own resolution on the Mongolian question made in June, speaking of aid to Inner Mongolia as both a revolutionary and a national imperative but also seeking for approval and assistance from the Comintern. The report then closed with the intervention of Grigorii Voitinskii and his call for a temporary moratorium on MPRP-PRPIM cooperation.[3] No conclusion was drawn but the implication was that once the Comintern worked out its obscure scruples about aid to Inner Mongolia, assistance could go forward on a large scale.

In the question and answer period which followed this report, Inner Mongolia was certainly not the major issue on the delegates' minds, but it was not the least significant one either. Four delegates asked diverse questions on Inner Mongolia: 1) "About a Southern Mongolian People's party being formed, how is our party connecting with it and has it sent a representative or not?"; 2) "How many of the Mongolian race are oppressed and are there cases of any immigrating here?"; 3) "How is the party work developing in Lower Mongolia [sic, *dood Mongol*]?"; and 4) "Is there any item [in the report] on uniting all the Mongols or not? Who is the party obstructing it?"

To these questions Dambadorji answered: 1) "Inner Mongolia has its own People's Party and will open its first congress at Zhangjiakou; a

[3] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 49-51.

representative will be sent from here to that congress"; 2) "Of the Mongolian peoples, the Buriat Mongols have a Soviet Socialist Autonomous state and the Outer Mongols have a sovereign People's Republic, but the other Mongol peoples are under the oppression of the greedy foreigners as before"; 3) "Although party work is progressing in Inner Mongolia, it is unknown exactly how many cells there are"; and 4) "Although our party hopes for the liberation of all the Mongol peoples as something very important, there is the obstruction of the foreign reactionaries." An additional note Dambadorji added to his reply to the second question showed that the fate of the Bargu party was not yet finally sealed; he mentioned, "In Inner Mongolia and Bargu there are people's parties and we have ties to those parties."[4] The congress thus showed an unprecedentedly open discussion of what had previously been treated as an extremely sensitive issue.

The other side of the paradox, that the MPRP was officially dropping the pan-Mongolist plank of its 1921 program, came up the next day when the commission on drafting a new program delivered its report. Originally the new program was to have been completed by the congress, explained the Central Committee's vice-chairman Jaddamba apologetically, but a special commission of the Comintern's Eastern Department had made such wholesale corrections to the draft that the Central Committee was not able to complete a new draft before the congress. The Comintern's revisions on this point emphasized not the special concern with the Mongol race but rather that the Mongolian revolution was an integral part of the revolution in the East. In the discussion that followed, one delegate Dorji timidly suggested going back to the original idea of the first program, "Perhaps all the Mongol peoples should be governed by our people's government," to which Jaddamba lamely answered that "some Mongol peoples were under foreign rule."[5]

Jaddamba's weak reply left it up to Amagaev to make the case against pan-Mongolism. Speaking after Jaddamba, the Buriat emphasized that the Central Committee had indeed approved the Comintern's suggestions, and that they did not mean Mongolia would stop supporting the struggle of oppressed Mongol peoples—far from it. But he listed two important issue that made the rejection of the pan-Mongolian plank vital. First of all, as a revolutionary party, the People's Party was aiming for Communism as its ultimate goal, and supported this goal not just for one

[4] For the questions, see *Mongol Ardyn khuwisgalt namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 74, 75, and 76; Dambadorji's answers are on pp. 78, 79, and 80.

[5] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 95-96.

people but for the whole world. Secondly, he criticized the pan-Mongolist plank for seeming to make decisions about the other Mongols before consulting them. The decision about whether all the Mongol peoples would come under the government in Ulaanbaatar could be decided only after their liberation. Finally Amagaev also chided the delegates for not accepting self-determination for Tuva, which had become a separate People's Republic under Russian tutelage, but which many in Mongolia still considered as rightfully a part of their country.[6]

After Amagaev's speech, the delegates, perhaps overwhelmed by his long discussion of what had seemed a simple issue, approved the program without any more questions. When it came time to draw up resolutions, the congress's leaders did not present any directives on relations with Inner Mongolia or China for approval, despite Bai Yunti's hopes for instruction. The program as finally approved spoke only of forming ideological and organization links with neighboring Far Eastern parties such as the Tuvan People's Revolutionary Party and the "Chinese People's Party" [that is, the Kuomintang], as well as peasants movements in Korea, Japan, and China.[7] Certainly as Amagaev pointed out, the MPRP could and indeed should extend aid to the Mongol peoples in Inner Mongolia, Bargu, and elsewhere under this rubric, but at least formally, such aid was no different than that to the Chinese Kuomintang. Relations of Inner Mongolia and Mongolia would thus have to take place under this paradoxical policy of practical intimacy and theoretical distance.

MPRP and the KMT: Relations at an Impasse

The fact that the program adopted at the new congress replaced the previous pan-Mongolian plank with one explicitly naming, after the dominant link with the Soviet Union's Communist Party, only the Tuvan party and the Kuomintang of China, exemplified the importance that Mongolian ties with the Kuomintang began to assume in the Comintern policy. Despite the negative conclusions of Gürüsede, the MPRP congress organizers did their best to present relations with the Chinese party in a positive light. Since there was so little of substance to KMT-MPRP relations, however, the references to the Kuomintang or China's

[6] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 96-98.

[7] See the text as quoted in *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, p. 111, and D. Dash and Kh. Magsarjaw, ed., *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn programm, dürim* (Ulaanbaatar, 1980), p. 53.

"People's Party" as it was always referred to, were almost entirely rhetorical in nature.

On the opening day of the congress, immediately after the messages from Bai Yunti and Hualintai, Zhang Yunrong, Feng Yuxiang's representative in Ulaanbaatar, delivered his congratulatory address. Since this was a party congress, Zhang greeted the Mongolian delegates as representatives of the Kuomintang's party committee for Feng's sphere of influence, the Northwest Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang. Despite the problems revealed in Gürüsede's negotiations with the Kuomintang, the Fourth Congress marked a dramatic increase in that party's public profile in Mongolia. Not only did Zhang give a congratulatory address, but his party was referred to here and throughout the congress as the "People's Party of the Republic of China" (*Dundad irgen ulsyn ardyn nam*), not the less formal but more usual "Kuomintang of (Han) China" (*Khyatadyn Gomindang*).[8] Referring to the Kuomintang as the People's Party not only removed the common confusion between the "Kuomintang" on the one hand and the "Geming" (Mongolian, *gaming*) or "revolutionary" soldiers who had such a notorious reputation in both Khalkha and Ordos, it also downplayed the party's association with Han Chinese ethnicity and specifically Han Chinese nationalism. Zhang's final slogan, "Long live the development of all the world's people's parties!," highlighted the idea of "people's parties" being a world-wide phenomenon. Implicitly, such parties were a distinct form of party for the colonial world, where purely Communist parties were not suitable, and Zhang thereby implied that the Chinese Kuomintang and the MPRP were two such anti-colonial and Soviet-allied, but non-Communist parties. Within a few years, Dambadorji and his supporters would be looking wistfully to this idea of an alliance of peoples' parties as an alternative to both the imperialism of the Versailles powers and the increasingly confining embrace of the Comintern.

The same report on party affairs that discussed the situation of Inner Mongolia at considerable length also devoted a sub-section to "The Party and the People's Party of the Republic of China," giving a very optimistic picture of the two parties' relations. Rather than quote from Gürüsede's rather depressing conclusion, the report cited Xu Qian's comments and the final letter from the Beijing Political Council to Gürüsede that gave a picture of industrious activity in forging close relations between the two nations' people's parties. The MPRP's report closed by saying that the party was ready both to send representatives to

[8] *Mongol Ardyn khuwisgalt namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, p. 19. The usage "People's Party of the Republic of China" can be seen elsewhere as well (pp. 32, 48-9).

the Kuomintang and was waiting to sign the four-article treaty on party cooperation, as soon as the KMT's party center in Canton sent its approval.[9]

The Central Committee's report on government activities also emphasized the importance of parties like the Kuomintang in defending Mongolian independence. China's reactionary government wanted to take over Mongolia as before, but paralyzed by its internal difficulties and by foreign imperialism, it "cannot go beyond empty words." A more positive guarantee, however, was given by the strengthening revolutionary forces in China, and the far closer relations which Mongolia had with them than before. At the same time, the report boasted that these ties had earned Mongolia the ire of the imperialists who saw it as a bad example of Asian peoples befriending Soviet Union and spreading revolutionary propaganda to China, Tibet, Manchuria, and Xinjiang. For this reason the imperialist press criticized Mongolia as having been taken over by Russia, although others (for reasons the report did not disclose) desired relations with the new Republic.[10]

Reading between the lines, it was obvious that Mongolia's high-level relations with China and other powers had, despite the negotiations, made little or no progress for since the last congress. This stalemate was only emphasized by a communique that the government of Mongolia dispatched the very next day to Duan Qirui's regime in Beijing, demanding that China proclaim national self-determination so that Mongolia may send a plenipotentiary minister to reside in Beijing and negotiate together the issues relating to a lasting peace between the two countries.[11] Such public diplomacy between Ulaanbaatar and Beijing had as little chance of resolving the continued deadlock between Mongolia and China as the loud declarations of common principles had of creating practical cooperation between the Mongols and the Chinese revolutionary parties. There is no reason to doubt that figures like Zhang Yunrong were sincere in their belief in these common principles; when Zhang returned to Zhangjiakou on October 4, he briefed his commander Marshal Feng, about how the Mongolian government was "implementing democracy" and "doing everything for the country and

[9] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, p. 49.

[10] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 28-29.

[11] Liu Shaotang, *Minguo dashi rizhi*, I, 301. This appeal created a small stir among those Mongol students in Beijing not already familiar with the People's Republic; see Sechin Jagchid, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrub, 1902-1966* (Bellingham, 1999), p. 29.

for the people."[12] But such sincere admiration of Mongolia's domestic policies, which eventually came to be shared by Feng Yuxiang himself, could overcome neither the deadlock on independence, nor the tendency of Chinese progressives like Li Dazhao to wish to do anything for Mongolia except pay attention to it.

Early in October, when Dambadorji arrived in China to attend the PRPIM's First Congress in Zhangjiakou and made a side-visit to Beijing, the Beijing Political Council took the opportunity to send a letter to the Mongolian party up-dating the situation of the KMT-MPRP four-point agreement. This update, however, only confirmed the persistent problems standing in the way of real cooperation with the KMT. The BPC reported that in Canton, the KMT's Central Executive Committee had finally approved the BPC's own version of Amur's original four-point agreement, saying they agreed with it fully. Canton said, however, that in order to sign the agreement with due honor and ceremony, they would like to invite a representative from the Outer Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party to come to the Canton seat of the new National Government which the KMT had formed in Guangdong province. The problem was, the Canton government was currently involved in suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and only after that was completed and the area peaceful again would it be possible to hold the ceremony. Canton promised to send a telegram to the MPRP when that time came and invite a representative of the Outer Mongolian party to come and sign the agreement.[13] The "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" referred to the Canton government's Second Eastern Expedition directed against General Chen Jiongming and others opponents of the party-state in the eastern part of Guangdong province. This expedition began on October 6 and was largely wrapped up by late October, but with subsidiary campaigns lasting until January, 1926.[14] By that time, however, Northern China in its turn would be engulfed in the Citizen Army-Fengtian war and so the signing of the treaty was postponed indefinitely.

The other major problem with the message was the text of the actual draft which the BPC had sent to Canton, and which Canton now assumed was the agreed-upon basis for MPRP-KMT relations. In his talks with

[12] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 113.

[13] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 44 (Beijing Political Council to MPRP CC, undated; original Chinese text); 7-1-20: 5-6 (early Mongolian translation); 7-1-23: 58 (Cyrillic-script Mongolian translation).

[14] Jordan, *Northern Expedition*, p. 31; Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 173-77, 555-61, 564-73.

Gürüsede, Li Dazhao had tried to explain how the this version respected Mongolian sovereignty, but the actual text justified all of Gürüsede's suspicions about the real attitude of the Kuomintang on the Mongolian question. A comparison with the Amur draft dramatizes the difference.[15]

Draft on relations between the MPRP and the KMT presented by Amur, April, 1925	Draft on relations between the KMT and the MPR presented by the Beijing Political Council, July, 1925
1) The two national people's parties both uphold Dr. Sun Yat-sen's (*Sun Wen xiansheng*) principle of national self-determination (*minzu zijue*).	1) The National People's Party of China, based on the principle of self-determination for all nationalities in China shall aid the nationalities in their pursuit of freedom and hopes for the protection of the interests of the minorities as deeply linked to their own desires. The Mongolian race and its liberation is fully honored and respected. The National People's Party of China, however, deeply desires that the Chinese nation and the Mongolian nation establish the warmest fraternal friendship. Thus we hope that after the completion of the Chinese revolution, when the interests of the two nations have become identical, the two nations may, of their own free will, form a free and equal federation. We will strive actively from the present to do extensive propaganda for the realization of this ideal.
2) The two national people's parties shall each spread the aims and ideology of the other.	2) The National People's Party of China shall advertise among its party members and among its people the principles and aims of the revolutionary people of Mongolia as well as its political situation. The Mongolian National Revolutionary Party shall also acquaint its members and the people with the aims and principles of the National People's Party of China as well as the opinions of the real people of the Chinese nation.
3) The two national people's parties shall exchange representatives.	3) The two parties shall from the present exchange representatives, with the representative of the Central Committee of the Mongolian National Revolutionary Party residing in the city of Canton or Beijing. The representative of the Central Committee of the National People's Party of China shall reside in Ulaanbaatar.
4) The two national people's parties shall mutually consult in case of necessity.	4) Should any force in China or any other hostile force commit aggression against Mongolia or harm it, the National People's Party of China shall in appropriate fashion persuade the people that all oppression is the same and prohibit the harmful actions. If the National People's Party of China encounter such an action, the Mongolian National People's Party shall accept the same responsibility.

[15] Both texts from Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 41-43 (Beijing Political Council to MPRP CC, undated; original Chinese text); 7-1-20: 1-7 (original Mongolian-script translation); 7-1-23: 55-58 (Cyrillic-script Mongolian translation).

The most striking difference, apart from the greater length of the Chinese version, is its elimination of the strict equality and reciprocity of Amur's draft and the assumption of paternalistic responsibility on the part of the Kuomintang. The first article in particular, originally about the two parties recognizing a common principle of self-determination, became in the Chinese draft a purely one-sided commitment by the Chinese party to respect and honor the freedom and liberation (and not the independence) of the Mongolian party. The result, of course, was to portray Mongolia as the passive partner and China as the active, an impression strengthened in the fourth article, where Mongolia is assumed

to need KMT assistance against Chinese reactionaries, but the possibility of Mongolian aid to China is only vaguely recognized. While such an asymmetry may have been grounded in political realities, it violated the principle of equality which was the most important thing about the agreement from the Mongolian point of view.

The members of the Beijing Political Council proudly presented their proposal to Dambadorji as a mutually-acceptable framework, and closed their accompanying letter with a slogan "Long live the Outer Mongolian National Revolutionary Party and the Outer Mongolian nation!" The signatories were (in order) Han Linfu, Yu Shude, Ding Weifen, Xu Qian, Li Dazhao, Yu Youren, and Gu Mengyu (b. 1889). Of these seven, Han Linfu, Yu Shude, and Li Dazhao were Communists, Xu Qian and Gu Mengyu, a professor of economics at Peking University, were left-wing members of the Kuomintang, and only Ding Weifen and Yu Youren came from the Kuomintang mainstream.[16] The Mongolian party could not hope to find a group more favorable to Mongolian independence in the KMT, but their language showed how even these leftist and Communist members of the party could not escape the paternalistic cast of Chinese thinking about Mongolia. In the case of Inner Mongolia, the Comintern and the Soviet embassy made sure that this problem did not scuttle the new PRPIM by a merger with Han Linfu and Li Dazhao's League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia, but no such outside pressure was there to force the KMT to formulate its relations with the MPRP in such a way that reflected their supposed sovereign equality.

Mongolia and the Citizen Army

Relations with the Citizen Army presented an opposite picture from those with the Kuomintang. While short on rhetoric, the ties between Mongolia and the Citizen Army continued to have a good deal of practical substance. At the Fourth Congress, the complete absence of any explicit mention of Feng Yuxiang's Citizen Army made a striking omission from the celebration of international fraternity between revolutionary forces, one that also contrasted strongly with the party

[16] On Gu Mengyu and the Kuomintang Left, see So Wai-chor, *The Kuomintang Left in the National Revolution, 1924-1931* (Hong Kong, 1991). On Xu Qian, Ding Weifen, and Yu Youren, see Boorman and Howard, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, II, s.v. Hsü Ch'ien, III, (New York, 1970) s.v. Ting Wei-fen, and IV, s.v. Yü Yu-jen.

congress one year later in 1926, when Marshal Feng and the Citizen Army would be highlighted as one of Mongolia's main allies abroad. Evidently, in 1925 the admiration for Mongolian reforms held by KMT members like Zhang Yunrong was not yet reciprocated, and that the Mongolian authorities had not yet overcome the legacy of suspicion left by the negotiations with Amur.

Logistical cooperation between the Citizen Army and Mongolia was, however, in full swing. By late September, the staff of the Citizen Army's office in Ulaanbaatar had grown to ten persons. Sixty to eighty cars were operating on a bimonthly schedule between Ulaanbaatar and Pingdiquan (modern Jining city on the railway line between Guisui and Zhangjiakou), shipping ammunition, machine guns and field pieces. Camel caravans were also being used on a significant scale to supplement the shipments made by automobile.[17] On September 2, Dambadorji, Amagaev, and one other unidentified Mongolian participant had been in Zhangjiakou and discussed details of motor transport with Feng Yuxiang.[18] As per the original plan of Ambassador Karakhan and Marshal Feng, the new state-owned company had a monopoly on auto transport between Mongolia and China, with private merchants forbidden to operate private cars, which only further damaged the interests of American merchants trying to retain their position in the Mongolian wool and skins market. On September 21, the acting U.S. consul in Zhangjiakou, E.F. Stanton, met the Chinese marshal in part to raise the issue of the restrictions on trade, but the Citizen Army commander proved a much harder nut to crack than the Hulun Buir officials. Vice-Consul Stanton reported fatalistically that "Marshal Feng seems to have more or less made up his mind to continue the automobile monopoly."[19]

After his address to the MPRP's Fourth Congress, Zhang Yunrong returned to Zhangjiakou, which gave Feng Yuxiang an opportunity to try to increase his influence in Ulaanbaatar with an unusual appointment.

[17] RRIAC, 1910-1929, roll 46 (893.00/6689), E.F. Stanton, "General Political Situation in the Kalgan Consular District," September 25, 1925, pp. 13, 5. See also How, "Soviet Advisers With the Kuominchun," pp. 42-43, 198-207, and N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Tianjin, n.d.), p. 45.

[18] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 96. The three names are given in Chinese as Zha-jia, Danba, and Amuga. The latter two are obviously Damba[dorji] and Amagaev (whose Mongolian name was Amuga), but the first two characters are impossible to sort out definitively. It is possible they are the initial characters of the names Jaddamba and Zhamtsarano.

[19] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 108; RRIAC, 1910-1929, roll 46 (893.00/6686), E.F. Stanton to Minister J.V.A. MacMurray, September 22, 1925.

Through Bai Yunti's influence, Mersé had received a sinecure as Marshal Feng's personal secretary, although Marshal Feng never developed any close feeling for Mersé and the Daur was never asked to do more than collect his salary.[20] Mersé did, however, recommend Fumingtai's brother, Hualintai, as a good choice to replace Zhang Yunrong as head of the Citizen Army's office in Ulaanbaatar, and Feng agreed.[21] Moreover, on September 30, Bai Yunti, writing on private stationary, reported that Hualintai had been confirmed as the Inner Mongolian party's provisional representative to the MPRP.[22] Apparently, he could not be confirmed as the official representative until Voitinskii's ban on official exchange of representatives between the MPRP and the Inner Mongolian party was reversed. Still there were too many important questions of interaction for liaison to be left up to ad hoc arrangements and Bai Yunti thus informally directed the MPRP to refer all questions of PRPIM party affairs and student expenses through Hualintai. Appointing him as a simultaneous representative for the Citizen Army fit into the Citizen Army office's pattern of working through Inner Mongolian emigres in Ulaanbaatar, and might allow him to penetrate the inner circles of the Mongolian leadership more deeply than a Chinese officer could. The disadvantage, of course, was that Hualintai had neither military experience, nor any previous association with the Citizen Army cause. Eventually, these disadvantages turned out to out-weigh the advantages and after some months, the office was back in the hands of Zhang Yunrong.

After the close of the MPRP's Fourth Congress, Dambadorji traveled from Mongolia to Zhangjiakou together with Zhang Yunrong to attend the First Congress of the Inner Mongolian party. On October 4, the same day that Zhang Yunrong had briefed his commander about the reforms in Mongolia, Dambadorji dined at 7:00 PM with Marshal Feng and Zhang Zhijiang the dutong (or military lieutenant-governor) of the Chahar Special Region, discussing, according to the notes in Feng's diary "mutual aid, seeking liberation together, to save China."[23] Mongolian archives indicate that these and later discussions also had a less lofty topic; on October 11, having met with Feng Yuxiang again, the

[20] Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), "Nei Menggu chihua yundong de bianqian," trans. Jin Hai, ed. Pan Shixian, in *Nei Menggu jinxiandai shi yicong*, ed. Nei Menggu Daxue ZhongGong Nei Menggu diqu dangshi yanjiu shi (Höhhot, 1986), pp. 167-168.

[21] J. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), p. 83.

[22] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 40 (Serengdonrub to MPRP CC, September 30, 1925).

[23] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 113.

primary topic was the dispatch of weapons, and Feng's request that Mongolia set up more horse and camel caravans to handle the bulkier and less urgent items.[24] As the planned war with Zhang Zuolin approached, Feng repeatedly requested that Mongolian soldiers participate in his attack, requests which Dambadorji forwarded to the Mongolian government several times; the final answer, delivered on November 11, was a flat no. Yet in the same telegram in which Dambadorji firmly dashed Feng's hope for Mongolian intervention, he also addressed the Chinese marshal as his "honored elder brother" and said he was "most extremely thankful that this minor person's whole household had been in your care."[25] Apparently Dambadorji had traveled with his family and felt required to thank his host for his hospitality. In April, Dambadorji had called Feng Yuxiang "this old reactionary, who is now our temporary comrade" but behind the epistolary conventions, the relation was very slowly warming up personally as well as politically.

Convening the First Congress

Despite the continued uncertainty of Sino-Mongolian relations even of those within the revolutionary camp, the plans for the First Congress of the PRPIM moved ahead. The revised date of October 1 proved to be too little time for the crucial delegates from Mongolia to arrive and the congress was rescheduled for October 12, at the same Tu'ergou where Amur had stayed during his negotiations with Marshal Feng. At 9:30 PM on October 11, Dambadorji wired the Mongolian government from Zhangjiakou to tell them that the congress would be delayed one more day, and formally begin on October 13. The reason for the delay is unknown, but the congress did finally open on that day, and once opened, concluded business quickly. Documents approved at the congress bear the dates of October 14 and 20, so it lasted about a week, if not longer.[26]

[24] Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 47-48 (Dambadorji to Gelegsengge and MPRP CC, October 11, 1925).

[25] How, "Soviet Advisers With the Kuominchun," pp. 47-50, 169; Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 31-32; 7-1-23: 70 (Dambadorji to Feng Yuxiang, Nov. 11, 1925).

[26] Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 48 (Damba to MPRP CC, October 11, 1925). Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu* (Beijing, 1989), p. 71 gives the opening date as October 12, which was probably the originally planned date. On the document dates, see Nozu Akira, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp.

The delegates began to gather in Zhangjiakou in the beginning of October. Of course, all the long-standing party leaders would attend (except Wangdanima, still confined to Beijing), but the purpose of the congress was to expose the broader Mongol population to the party's message. The July meeting had delegated several leading members to chose the delegates but I have not found either a comprehensive list of delegates or any information on whether any genuine electoral procedures were followed. A photograph of the participants shows 60 persons, which subtracting the three foreign dignitaries also present (Oshirov, Dambadorji, and Buyannemekhü) gives a total of 57 Inner Mongolian delegates.[27]

The scattered bits of evidence show the wide range of participants, but also indicate that delegates were largely, if not entirely, hand-picked by the party leaders. Many of the leaders were exiles and could hardly have been chosen by their home cells in an impartial process. Thus, Öljeijirgal and Dobdon and the other Ordos Mongols in Ulaanbaatar who participated in the congress went back to Inner Mongolia after long absences.[28] Also from Ulaanbaatar came Hualintai, representing the Hulun Buir youth.[29] Wulanfu recalled being his own selection by the Chinese Communist leaders to attend the congress as a representative of the Mongol students in Beijing.[30]

At one point, this nomination of delegates from above occasioned serious controversy. One of the students in Ulaanbaatar was to be chosen as a representative to attend the sessions and then relay them to those studying in the Mongolian capital. Bai Yunti originally appointed his younger brother, then studying in Ulaanbaatar, to this position, but the students demanded to elect their own representative, and eventually the Comintern (presumably Oshirov) stepped in and persuaded Bai Yunti to back down. Bai Yunti then wrote to the MPRP to ask that the

121-2. Secondary sources coming from interviews with Bai Yunti from the 1960s on often give the date of the First Congress as March, 1925. This date is, of course, wrong; on the reason for this misdating see Christopher P. Atwood, "Inner Mongolian Nationalism in the 1920s: A Survey of Documentary Information," *Twentieth-Century China* 25.2 (April, 2000), 97-98.

[27] See photo, Central Party Archives, *foto-fond*, B3.01.2(a).

[28] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20:16 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927).

[29] Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 83.

[30] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 70-71. It should be noted that in the official photograph of the congress's 57 delegates and three foreign supporters, I have not been able to find anyone who looks like Yun Ze, and to that extent, his formal participation is unconfirmed.

students' choice, the Höhhot Tümed, Altandorji, be given a one month leave for him to participate in the event.[31] Altandorji (Chinese name, Foding) had been selected to study in Mongolia only a month before with Chinese Communist support, and the controversy over his selection showed that Oshirov's mediation had not eliminated the old Youth Party's hostility to the supposed lackeys of the officials and the rich like Bai Yunti and AltanOchir.

The party leaders, however, had no intention of alienating possibly sympathetic figures in the Mongol establishment. The congress generated substantial support from some of the more distinguished figures in the officialdom who designated delegates to attend from their banners. Secondary sources say that Shagdurjab, the ruler of Jasag Banner dispatched "Ô Yingjang" (Battalion Commander Ô), Tügmid Lama, and Péljei, from his banner, while Prince Tübshinjirgal and Administrator (*tusalagchi*) Erdenigerel of the neighboring Wang Banner sent Norbusambuu and others. These admittedly not very reliable secondary sources also state that Rabdan, the son of Duke Nasundalai, the acting ruler of Ordos's Jüüngar Banner attended, as did Jodbajab (1876-1947), the amban of the Chakhar herds, and Lingsheng, son of Guifu, Hulun Buir's fudutong.[32]

Establishment figures proved particularly helpful financially, especially those from the wealthy ranchers of Hulun Buir. While the Young Mongols there had been stymied in their attempt to corner the wealth of the animal-products trade through the cooperatives, they still had the private wealth of the ranchers on tap. While it is not clear if they personally attended the congress, Fumingtai's uncle, Duke Tsengde, promised $5,000 silver on behalf of the Bargu people and said he would "talk to the distinguished gentlemen about further contributions." Mersé's father, Lieutanant-Commandant Minggu (*Ming galaida*), said he was happy to hear about of the party and contributed $1,000 silver. Mersé personally contributed $1,500 and Fumingtai $1,300, and while the article in the party journal mentioning these contributions spoke of sums totaling many thousands gathered from men and women of Inner

[31] Hao Weimin. "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 591; Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 40 (Serengdonrub to MPRP CC, September 30, 1925). Hao cites "interviews" for his account of this dispute.

[32] Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen-ü matériyal-un emkidkel*, II (1982), pp. 316, 312, 292-93; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Meng Geming Jun Zongsiling Bai Yunti jiqi muliao renyuan" *Menggu wenhua tongxun*, no. 6 (December, 1989), 19; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 98. "Ô Yingjang" may even be a respectful address for Oyuntodo, Wangdanima's lady, while Péljei may be his bodyguard Püljeijungnai.

Mongolia, the bulk of the new sums was clearly received from the notables of Hulun Buir.[33]

Another vital part of the proceedings was the assistance of foreign dignitaries. Aleksandr I. Oshirov attended from his base in the Soviet embassy in Beijing, representing the Communist International. From Mongolia, despite the tension with Moscow over direct relations with the PRPIM came a high-level delegation composed of Dambadorji and the former Youth League leader Buyannemekhü. Buyannemekhü's long stay in Bargu and in Beijing, assisting the Bargu cooperatives and doing propaganda among the Panchen Lama's devotees, had apparently won him back a trusted position in the Mongolian leadership and he was sent back to Inner Mongolia on a new, high-level assignment.[34] As noted above, the Comintern had no problem with fraternal parties sending delegates to each others' congresses, but Buyannemekhü, under a new alias "Tsetsenbiligtü," actually stayed in Inner Mongolia into 1926, assisting the party in composing its manifestoes and documents and thus playing unofficially the role of an adviser from the MPRP to the PRPIM. The Comintern's man on the spot, Oshirov, however, showed no jealousy about this rival for the position of the fledgling party's official mentor and put his name and face besides those of "Tsetsenbiligtü" in documents and in photographs.[35] The pattern established at the congress would continue as Oshirov behaved in a very different manner from the stereotype of the domineering Comintern adviser, deferring repeatedly to the judgement of the Inner Mongolian party leaders and willingly sharing the stage with advisers from Ulaanbaatar.[36]

Compared to the advisers from the Chinese side of the PRPIM's dual sponsorship, however, even Oshirov was treated as a valued and trusted leader. The official portrait of the party's new seven-man presidium shows only ethnic Mongols—Dambadorji, Buyannemekhü, and Oshirov—standing behind the Inner Mongols as their sponsors.[37] The sources indicate that several high-ranking Chinese members of the Citizen Army and the Kuomintang attended but there is no evidence that the Inner Mongols accorded them a similar level of intimacy or respect. The 1926 account of the Russian Orientalist, I.I. Genkin, mentions representatives from the MPRP's Central Committee, from the Kuomintang, as well as of Marshal Feng Yuxiang, while two newspaper accounts from 1927 and 1929, based on the memories of participants, mention more specifically that one representative came from the Beijing Political Council, which represented the Canton regime, and two from the Citizen Army. The Citizen Army representatives were Zhang Zhijiang, the dutong of Chahar and a high-placed member of Marshal Feng's inner circle, and Zhang Yunrong, who had become the Citizen Army's "Mongolia hand."[38] The early sources do not mention the name of the BPC representative, but a Japanese source from 1942 gives his name as Yu Youren, one of the signatories of the BPC's letter to the MPRP, a long-standing pillar of the KMT in North China, and one its few civilian politicians with experience in dealing with military units in the wilds of Northwest China.[39]

The same source also states that not only did several of Marshal Feng's Soviet advisers attend, but even the Marshal himself made an appearance at the congress. No other early source mentions Marshal Feng's personal appearance, and both his diary and his autobiography, *Wode shenghuo* "My Life," completely ignore the congress, casting doubt on whether he actually attended. The diary, in particular, demonstrates moreover that he did not really support either the congress or the PRPIM, and that his preferred mode of Mongol political life was very different. On the afternoon of October 11, a day or two before the congress was to begin, Feng boarded a west-bound train for Suiyuan to begin a tour of inspection of that area. The next day, at 11:00 AM, Feng convened his own group of Mongols from Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu leagues, headed by one Rinchin.[40] While the conference in Zhangjiakou

[33] Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 74-75. Ölzii quotes from the party's magazine, *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un sedkhül* "Inner Mongolian People's Magazine," copies of which have remained unavailable to me.

[34] G. Düinkherjaw, "Chandmaniin tülkhüür," introd. Sonombaljiryn Buyannemekh, *Oirkhi tsagiin towch*, p. 9.

[35] See for example the document in RRIAC, roll 50, 893.00/7085 (Vice-Consul E. F. Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926); and Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 63 (Special Inspiration Letter from the PRPIM CC, Dec. 20, 1925), which was signed by the seven presidium members, Oshirov, "Tsetsenbiligtü," and Alta.

[36] See Christopher P. Atwood, "A.I. Oshirov (c. 1901-1931): A Buriat Agent in Inner Mongolia" in *Opuscula Altaica: Essays Presented in Honor of Henry Schwarz*, ed. Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt (Bellingham, Wash., 1994), pp. 44-93.

[37] This photograph, found in Central Party Archives, *foto-fond*, B3.01.2, was also reproduced in I.I. Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoï narodnoï partii," p. 191, whence it was reproduced in Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, 1964), p. 167.

[38] Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoï narodnoï partii," pp. 191-92; "San qian li wai zhi chiguo," *Chen bao* (Beijing), January 31, 1927; "Nei Meng dangwu baogao," p. 2.

[39] Nozu Akira, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 121. See the biography in Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, IV, s.v. Yü Yu-jen.

[40] This Rinchin is most likely Rinchinsengge, who was the son of Babudorji, the duke of Urad Middle Duke Banner and the Deputy Captain-General of Ulaanchab

was taking measures to create a new form of Mongolian autonomy, Marshal Feng preferred to scold the backwardness of the Mongols. His three talking points were:

1) You ought to unite firmly with each other and present a single face to the outside.
2) The knowledge of the Mongols is too superficial, and they ought to investigate science, and follow the example of European and Western material civilization.
3) Japan's population is soaring but its national territory is small and cramped. Unless you develop, it will covet our Manchuria and Mongol more each day; if you don't enlighten the people's intellect, and turn towards the center, you will have no way to defend yourselves.[41]

In other words, the problems of the Mongols were entirely internal and the result of their own ignorance, inability to unify, naivete about foreigners, and lack of (Chinese) patriotism. The contrast in message with the Zhangjiakou conference, which attacked foreign imperialism and Chinese warlords for Mongolia's problems, was as clear as the contrast in the forum: Feng's gathering of princes from the Chinese-dominated special region vs. the party's congress of at least ostensibly elected popular representatives, taken from all over Inner Mongolia.

The Marshal's tour of Suiyuan continued through October 18, when he received the troubling news of the outbreak of war in the south between the forces of the Lower Yangtze warlord Sun Chuanfang and Zhang Zuolin, and he soon returned to Zhangjiakou. He found time on October 24 and 26, however, to repeat his arguments in greater detail to Prince Altanwachir, the deputy captain-general of Yekhe Juu League, and others, discussing "the difference between democratic countries and monarchic countries" and how "religion ultimately cannot be relied upon."[42] Clearly whether or not Marshal Feng found a free space in his busy schedule to address the Inner Mongolian congress or not, he obviously preferred lecturing dukes and princes about enlightenment, science, and democracy, to arguing with modern-educated Young Mongols about colonization, party-building, and autonomy. Marshal Feng tolerated the PRPIM in his territory, but it would be an exaggeration to say he supported it.

League. Although Babudorji was still alive to 1948, his son Rinchinsegge was an active assistant of his father for years before then and actually replaced his father as ruler in 1933.

[41] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 117.

[42] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 119, 122-3.

Another Chinese organization which kept somewhat aloof from the party congress was the Chinese Communist Party. No source before 1949 mentions any representative from the Communist Party to the Inner Mongolian congress, but the memoirs of Wulanfu (Yun Ze), who claims to have also attended as one of the representatives of the students in Beijing, claim that the otherwise obscure Jiang Hao, represented the Chinese Communists.[43] Jiang's very obscurity—he was a Hubei provincial commissioner whose only claim to fame was having joined the Socialist Youth Corps in fall, 1920, as it changed into the Beijing Branch of the CCP—is evidence in favor of the memoir's reliability on this point, and given the secrecy of the Communist Party compared to the Kuomintang at the time, it is quite possible that a member might have attended without leaving a trace in other sources. Some Mongols who were also members of the Chinese Communist Party, such as Jiyaatai and Li Yuzhi, supposedly attended the congress, although if so their identity was as representatives of the Tümed Mongols of Suiyuan, not as Communists.[44]

The Communists had continued building support among the Inner Mongolian students in Beijing and early in September, a new group of Mongol students in Beijing, including the Tümeds, Kui Bi, Yun Ze, and his cousin, Yun Run, advanced from membership in the Youth League to the Communist Party; Han Linfu again was most likely the sponsor.[45] Immediately after and before the PRPIM's First Congress, the Communists also got their first group of students chosen to join Ulaanbaatar's Central Party School, a group that included Kharachins Temürbagana (1901-1969) and Buyantogtakhu (b. 1903, alive in 1989, a.k.a. ÖljeiOchir, Chinese name Wu Xianwen), the Khorchin Pungsug (b. 1905), and Höhhot Tümeds Kui Bi (1905-1986, who began to use a Mongolian name, Urtunasutu) and Altandorji (the one chosen to

[43] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 71. On Jiang Hao, see Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Communist Party, 1921-1927* (Lawrence, Kan., 1971), I, 113.

[44] Ji Yatai [Jiyaatai], "Li Dazhao tongzhi he Nei Menggu chuqide geming huodong," in *Huiyi Li Dazhao* (Beijing, 1980), pp. 172-73; and ZhongGong Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui bangongshi, Dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui bangongshi, ed., *Nei Menggu yinglie zhuan*, I (Beijing, 1989), 10-11. The Ji Yatai/Jiyaatai article first appeared in *Minzu tuanjie*, 1961, no. 7, and has been widely reprinted.

[45] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 70 only says that Deng Zhongxia "joined" the ceremony, which shows that not he, but some other figures whom Wulanfu does not wished to name, served as the students' sponsors. Han Linfu is the obvious candidate.

represent the Ulaanbaatar students at the First Congress).[46] There they joined the students sponsored by the PRPIM in April, who had graduated their training course at the Sükhebaatur Military Academy. All the pro-Communist students who went to Mongolia in September are known to have been also affiliated with the PRPIM, and as there is no record of any direct contact between the Chinese Communists and Mongolia at this time, the Chinese party probably sent the students not in its own name, but by getting its candidates selected for study sponsored by the Inner Mongolian party.

Han Linfu and Li Dazhao, however, certainly did not see the PRPIM in its present form as the ideal organization for Inner Mongolia. As Gürüsede's report in August indicated, they had originally hoped to bring their almost entirely ethnic Chinese front organization of the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia into the PRPIM as a block. Despite Gürüsede's worries, however, the anticipated merger did not happen, due no doubt to the Soviet embassy and A.I. Oshirov who felt that a purely ethnic Mongol organization was necessary to win support of the Inner Mongols. The Soviet embassy was still quite interested in the possibility of organizing bandits to fight Zhang Zuolin, however, and Han Linfu and Chen Yintan went ahead with their separate organization.

In October, the Chinese Communists' Central Executive Committee went on record as supporting the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers as the primary revolutionary organization in Inner Mongolia. Undoubtedly on the initiative of Han Linfu and with the support of Li Dazhao, the party center approved a resolution on Inner Mongolian work that treated the Mongols there as an entirely farming population. The Mongol peasants were being oppressed by the Mongolian nobility, hoodwinked by the lamas, exploited by Chinese commercial capital, while the Chinese peasants were oppressed by Mongol and Chinese landlords. The Chinese peasants had already risen up against the local officials many times, and the Mongol peasants too showed an increasing consciousness. In this situation, the party resolved that proper handling of the issue of ethnicity was vital; too little attention and the Mongols would be alienated, too much and they would be led away from the revolution:

[46] See the lists in Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 71; Kui Bi, "Yanzhe dang zhishi de fangxiang zou," *Nei Menggu dangshi ziliao*, 1 (1988), 113; and Jinbazhabu, ed., *Chahar Mengguzu shihua* (1989), pp. 385-86. Biographical information on Altandorji, Temürbagana, Buyantogtakhu, and Pungsug in Hao Weimin, "Diyi, erci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 602-604.

> Among the Mongolian people there is also an ethnic consciousness, rising up to struggle for power for their own nationality. Our party must unite the ethnic liberation movement of the Mongolian people with the liberation movement of the whole country. We must realize that the Mongolian nobles and lamas use this ethnic liberation movement to enlarge their influence among the Mongolian masses. Therefore, our most important task is just to make the progressive nationalists among the Mongols, and especially the Mongolian intellectual class (*zhishi jieji*) come over to our side of the revolution.
>
> In revolutionary work among the Inner Mongolian peasants we must do our utmost to unite the Chinese and Mongolian peasants to oppose their common enemies, the big landlords, the nobility, the imperialists, and the warlords, but at the same time we must not sweep the ethnic interests of the Mongols under the rug.

The resolution therefore approved the creation of the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers as a front organization led by the Chinese Communist Party that could "unite the struggle of the Chinese and Mongolian peasants of Inner Mongolia."

Tacked on at the end of the resolution, following this conclusion, the Communist Party also bowed to the demands of the Communist International and approved the creation of the PRPIM. At the same time, however, the resolution demanded that the PRPIM "must keep close liaison with the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia; this is a kind of guarantee of the sufficient success of the revolutionary work among the Chinese and Mongolian workers and peasants."[47] The flow of argument in this resolution, in which all the factors mentioned led to the League as the appropriate organization and in which the PRPIM was not mentioned until the end, showed that despite its verbal approval the Communist Party remained unhappy with the Comintern's new creation. The approved sentiments also left their trace in Wulanfu's memoirs. When told he should join the PRPIM congress, he recalled "After I heard this I felt I did not understand, Inner Mongolia already has the Communist Party organization, why does it need to also set up the People's Revolutionary Party?" Deng Zhongxia, a prominent Beijing Communist, then explained that this was the decision of the party center, and that the PRPIM might be useful as a mass organization.[48]

[47] Zhongyang dang'an guan, ed., *ZhongGong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Beijing, 1989), I, 419-20.

[48] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 70-71.

Some time after the close of the PRPIM's First Congress, probably in late October or early November, Li Dazhao and Han Linfu organized their own First Congress for the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia, also in Zhangjiakou. For this occasion, unlike the PRPIM's congress, Li Dazhao was a keynote speaker. He left Beijing to attend personally and was elected secretary; the chairman is not given in the secondary sources but was probably Han Linfu or perhaps Chen Jinghu or Chen Yintan. Two older Tümeds, Jiyaatai and Li Yuzhi, whom the Communist organization had not sent abroad, also attended this gathering.[49] Li Yuzhi had spent September agitating among miners in the primitive and dangerous coal mines of Shiguaigou, east of Baotou County, which gave him credibility on the workers' part of the League.[50] Thus as Marshal Feng was gathering Mongol banner rulers as an implicit alternative to the PRPIM's approach, so too Li Dazhao and Han Linfu gathered their bandit chiefs and Tümed Mongol supporters to promote their own vision of Mongol-Chinese solidarity. From the point of view of the Soviet embassy, never willing to let any possible ally sit out the fight, the task of the months to come was to cobble these three different groups into a common front against Zhang Zuolin.

[49] Ji Yatai [Jiyaatai], "Li Dazhao tongzhi he Nei Menggu chuqide geming huodong," pp. 173-74; ZhongGong Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui bangongshi. Dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui bangongshi, ed., *Nei Menggu yinglie zhuan*, I, 10-11. The date of the congress is simply given as "winter, 1925" in these sources. By November 2 at the latest, however, Chen Jinghu representing the League was already negotiating with Feng along with the PRPIM as an established organization, so the congress probably occurred before then. See *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 101-02; and Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, II, 124.

[50] The coal mines of Shiguaigou, modern Shiguai Mining District in Baotou city, had been exploited at least since the latter part of the Qing dynasty. With the expansion of the coal market, commercial firms, of which the Deyihou company was the most prominent, began to invest in the mines. In the New Policies of the late Guangxu period (1875-1908), the Tümed Banner formed its "Coal Profits Bureau" (*Meiliju*) and began collecting taxes. After 1911, bureaucrat-merchants Kong Geng and Zhang Shaotang formed the Monan ("South of the Gobi") Mining Co., Ltd., rented land from the vast Badgar Juu (Wudang Zhao) Monastery, and opened the Lamaba ("Lama Flatland") Coal Mine, which at its height produced 100,000 tons of coal per year. Numerous small mines also continued operation, and by 1933, the population of the mining town had grown to 1,359 households. See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu diming zhi: Baotou shi fence* (1985), pp. 181-195.

The Congress and China's Great Revolution

It should occasion little surprise to say that the First Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia marked a turning point in the history of the PRPIM; after all, that is what congresses are supposed to do. Before October, 1925, the party only undertook distributing literature and signing up members, but afterwards it would throw itself into public activity, attempting to gain control of Inner Mongolia either through military conquest or popular mobilization. Within a month of adjourning the congress, the leaders of the PRPIM would have control of several counties in northern Rehe, and almost all the Mongolian population of Juu Uda League.

The congress enabled the party to claim this role in China's Great Revolution by a series of compromises which subordinated the separate agendas of Hulun Buir's Young Mongols, the duguilang vigilantes, and the Communist-oriented Youth Party faction to Bai Yunti's agenda, one which fitted more closely into the political environment of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Kuomintang. These compromises, which seem to have been largely brokered by the leadership of the MPR and the Comintern through their representatives on the scene, especially the Mongols Dambadorji and Buyannemekhü, and the Buriat Oshirov, served to keep peace within the party for almost two years, but when the Soviet-Kuomintang alliance which formed its foundation foundered in summer 1927, all of the old factional rivalries within the party and the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement as a whole burst out with far greater force than before. Even as the opposing factions saw the split as an opportunity to advance their forgotten agendas, they looked back to the spirit of unity around a common program that had been forged at the congress and claimed it was not they but the other side which had distorted that program and violated that spirit. For them, the congress became a nostalgic moment of lost unity.[51]

[51] See Bai Yunti's call for party reorganization in Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, (Hailar, 1989), III, 524; the manifesto of the new 1927 Central Committee in Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 78-82 (Abstract of the Letter of Enlightenment, undated); Bai Yunti's anti-Communist manifesto in Bai Yunti, "Nei Menggu Guomindang qingGong jingguo," *Minguo ribao*, Oct. 26, 1928, p. 4 (a Mongolian version is in Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 67-69 [Manifesto of the Inner Mongolian People's Party, Oct. 25, 1927]); and Mersé and Korlô's accusations against Bai Yunti in Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 41-44 (Mersé and Korlô to MPRP CC, Nov. 29, 1927). Despite the differences they all praise the First Congress as a solid foundation of Inner Mongolian liberation.

The most important document issued by the congress was a "Manifesto to the Masses from the First Congress of the PRPIM,"with an appended listed of immediate policies. It was dated October 20, 1925, and issued officially in Mongolian but appears to also have had a semi-official Chinese translation. Among other documents available, there is also a party membership form almost certainly adopted at the congress, an outline of the "Resolutions of the First Congress of the PRPIM," dated to October 14, and an outline of measures to be discussed and approved by a forthcoming People's Congress of Inner Mongolia.[52] In the absence of a stenographic record of the congress's proceedings, the analysis of these documents must supply the primary information about the ideas and views of the party leaders as they prepared to enter the fray of China's political and military revolution.

The most important aspect of the First Congress's documents from the ideological and strategic point of view was the placing of Inner Mongolian liberation entirely within the context of the Republic of

[52] The Manifesto, with the appended program, of the PRPIM was printed twice, once in lithograph and once in movable type in Ulaanbaatar; see *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un qubisqaltu nam-un nigedüger yeke qural-aca olan tümen neyite-dür tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig* (PRPIM Central Committee, n.d.) and *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un qubisqaltu nam-un nigedüger yeke qural-aca olan tümen neyite-dür tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian People's Party Press, December, 1925). The lithographed version is reproduced and translated in Urgunge Onon "The Proclamation of the First Congress of the People's Revolutionary Poarty of Inner Mongolia to the Masses," *Inner Asia: Occasional Papers*, 1 (1996), 79-88. The original Mongolian text of the membership card is reprinted in Altan'orgil, ed., *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 510-516. A Russian translation of the Manifesto and program, with a reproduction of the official photograph of the new presidium, was published in Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoï narodnoï partii," pp. 192-195. A Chinese translation of the manifesto and program (with some omissions) is found in the article "Sanqianli wai zhi chiguo," which appeared in the Beijing newspaper, *Chen Bao/Morning Post*, on Jan. 31, 1927. A fuller Japanese translation is found in Nozu Akira's 1942 article on the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement. (I have only been able to access the Chinese translation in Nozu Akira, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 121-124.) Nozu's text is also the only source for the "Outline of Proposals for the National (*guomin*) Assembly of Inner Mongolia" and the "Resolutions of the First Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia," as well as the only source for the specific dates of the Resolutions and the Manifesto. The "Outline of Proposals for the National (*guomin*) Assembly of Inner Mongolia" is perhaps connected with the "Manifesto to the Public from the Preparatory Meeting for the Inner Mongolian People's Congress" (*Dotogadu Monggol-un Arad-un Yeke Qural-un beledkel-ün qural-aca neyite-ber tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig*), which had a catalogue number 32Д (51)Д-564 in the Mongolian State Library although unfortunately the item is now missing.

China. It thus eliminated the pan-Mongolian ideology and the dependence on the MPRP that had formed the previous basis of political activity for all of the various factions and leaders within the party. Although the specific evidence is lacking, it cannot be doubted, given the developments leading up to the formation of the grand coalition and the calling of the congress, that the Comintern was fully responsible for this new line. Since the congress's declared policy line originated in Moscow, it is not surprising that Russian observers greeted it with satisfaction. I.I. Genkin, writing in 1926 for the Soviet journal of Oriental studies *Novyï vostok* "The New East," quoted the entire manifesto and concluded that, "The declaration of the [Inner Mongolian] congress consciously did not fan pan-Mongol tendencies, clearly understanding that the immediate task was not the union of all ethnographic Mongolia into a single unified state."[53]

The key phrase summarizing the political position of the manifesto in particular was the idea of "foreign and domestic reactionaries" (*gadagadu ba dotogadu ejerkheg khargis-ud*), a phrase which also expressed the core of the Kuomintang's ideology during the period of what was later called the "Great Revolution" (1924-1928), in contrast to the incomplete 1911 revolution and the second revolution of 1913 against Yuan Shikai. The manifesto's first three articles expounded to the Mongolian masses the view of China's situation held by the Nationalists in the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union. In this view, the 1911 Revolution had overthrown the Qing and established popular rule, but the benefits of this great accomplishment had been stolen by the "warlords" (*cherig-ün erkheten*) who prevented the realization of the benefits of a republic. These were China's domestic reactionaries.

The domestic reactionaries could not have secured their own rule both against other rivals in the country, and against the people, however, without the help of the "foreign capitalists" (*gadagadu-yin khöröng-geten*) who sold them arms. Thus, the "imperialist countries" (*ejerkheg ulus-ud*), among whom the manifesto listed Britain, America, France, and Japan, in that order, all actively supported their warlord clients in China. The imperialists were the foreign reactionaries in China, whose aim was to seize China's natural resources, control her trade, receive concessions in her cities, build railways through her territory, and finally occupy the country entirely. In pursuit of these aims they egged their clients on to wars that plunged the people of China into misery. Against

[53] Genkin, "Dva s"ezda mongol'skoï narodnoï partii," p. 195; cf. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, p. 188.

these foreign reactionaries, China's only help was the Soviet Union and the "People's Revolutionary Outer Mongolia" who supported "oppressed and weak nations" (*darulagdagsan baga bagurai ulus-ud*) like China.

In this situation when the existing authorities completely ignored the sufferings of the people and left them at the mercy of the foreign and domestic reactionaries (that is, the "imperialists" [*ejerkheg türimkhei*] and the warlords), China's workers and the peasants with the honest/progressive members of the educated class must rise up to destroy the warlords, expel the foreigner imperialists and truly implement a democratic country. The PRPIM's First Congress expressed its strong support and assistance for this goal.

Following this analysis of the Chinese situation, the next three sections of the manifesto used the same model of "foreign and domestic reactionaries" to analyze the Inner Mongolian situation. Inner Mongolia's own "domestic reactionaries," the dukes and princes who ruled its banners depended for their own rule upon the "Han warlords and reactionary officials" (*khitad-un cherig-ün erkheten ba ejerkheg noyad-ud*), who from the point of Inner Mongolia presumably played the role of external reactionaries. The Mongolian dukes and princes constantly sold off their banner land and other resources to the Han officials and merchants, and conspired with the "crafty Han merchants" (*khitad-un jalikhai khudaldugachin*) to contract loans, which they then forced their banner subjects to pay. The Mongol banners thus had to the warlords and merchants the same relation that China as a whole had to the foreign capitalists and gunboats. In this situation, the solution for Mongolia was the same as that for China: led by a "People's Party" (*Arad-un nam*), the Mongols must overthrow the rule of the dukes and princes and drive out the warlords. It is also important to note, that by accepting this analysis, the Inner Mongols also accepted that there were class distinctions and hence an oppressor class among the Han Chinese, an insistence which was at that time forming the key point alienating the more conservative KMT members from the Communist-KMT alliance.[54]

Just as Inner Mongolia's oppression was double that of the rest of China, as it was weighed down with two levels of internal and external reactionaries, just so the overthrow of the warlords in Inner Mongolia demanded the assistance of the all oppressed people of China. The Han peasants in Inner Mongolia were also oppressed by the Han officials and merchants, as well as by the Mongol dukes and princes (just as, although

[54] See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 164-67 and John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996), pp. 253-58, 315-23.

the link was not explicitly made, the workers and peasants of the imperialist countries were also oppressed by their own capitalists and imperialist governments). The Mongol and Han (*khitad*) revolutions would therefore help each other in the destruction of both the imperialists and the warlords. When "the officials and the rich" (*noyad bayad*) were destroyed, the people would then rule, both in the Mongol banners, and in the Republic of China as a whole, and the original idea of the 1911 revolution, of five races living in equality, each ruling their own affairs, could finally be implemented.

The idea of foreign and domestic reactionaries, imperialists and warlords, thus served as a map that made the Han and Mongol revolutions both part of one revolution, indeed both part of one world revolutionary cause. This connection found expression in the wordy slogans that concluded the printed versions of the manifesto:

> May the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia flourish and the whole Mongol race obtain its freedom!
> May the revolution in China be accomplished and the liberation of races swiftly flourish!
> May Mongolia and China both alike obtain freedom and build their perpetual link!
> May the whole world's people's revolution flourish and all oppressors and exploiters be destroyed![55]

The first slogan spoke to the idea of freedom for all the Mongolian race, but the second placed that freedom within the context of the Republic of China and its quinque-racial harmony. Lest this seem like distancing Inner Mongolia too much from the Mongolian People's Republic, the third slogan hailed friendship between both independent Mongolia and the liberated China, thus ensuring that emissaries from Ulaanbaatar would always be welcome as mentors for the Inner Mongolian revolutionary cause. The final slogan, however, prevented this assistance from being seen in a narrowly nationalist context, and placed the new party firmly within the international alliance of oppressed people assisted by the Soviet Union.

As a result of the Comintern's guidance, the manifesto thus expounded a concept of Inner Mongolia as a separate political realm nested within the Republic of China, and rejected both the purely nationalist

[55] *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un qubisqaltu nam-un nigedüger yeke qural-aca olan tümen neyite-dür tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig* (PRPIM Central Committee, n.d.), p. 18; *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un qubisqaltu nam-un nigedüger yeke qural-aca olan tümen neyite-dür tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian People's Party Press, December, 1925), pp. 24-25.

conception in which all Mongols had to be in one independent state, and the assimilatory one in which the Mongols were just oppressed peasants with at most some peculiar customs that needed respecting. A vital rhetorical resource in developing this theme was the distinction between "China" or "The Middle Kingdom" (*Dumdadu ulus* from Chinese *Zhongguo*) on the one hand and the Chinese or Han race or people (*Khitad*) on the other. As my exposition above has tried to emphasize, the manifesto carefully kept these two concepts, China as a state and the ethnic Chinese or Han as an ethnic group, separate. The introduction to the analysis of the current situation stated, "Many years have passed since we Mongols became citizens of China (*Dumdadu ulus*)" and emphasized how the aim of the 1911 Revolution was to create a quinque-racial republic, in which the five races (*ugsuga/zu*) would come together as equal components of a single country.

The party flag and seal which came into use at the congress also rejected the pan-Mongolist themes previously common and instead drew on a rather bland vocabulary of revolutionary symbols. Öljeijirgal had asked the Üüshin duguilangs to use the gold-*soyombo*-on-red-field flag of the Mongolian People's Republic, but the new congress rejected this use of the MPR's flag and created a new one composed of a white five-pointed star in a canton on a red field (see figure 10.1).[56] If the canton was, as seems likely, blue, then the flag was actually almost identical to that of the KMT's new national government in Canton, except that instead of a white sun, the PRPIM had a white star.[57] The white color found in the star was unusual for real Communist parties, but symbolically the party's literature and propaganda always emphasized the red color—it was most often called simply the "red flag," or "our red

[56] On the Soyombo flag in Ordos, see Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 286. The PRPIM's new flag is pictured on the cover of the lithographed version of the party manifesto. Although the picture has no colors, that the star is white and the field red is shown by the words to the revolutionary song in Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 386.

[57] On the flags of the MPR see Ts. Gotow, *BNMAU süld, dalbaa, soyombo, niislel* (Ulaanbaatar, 1986), pp. 26-27. The constitutional articles and government decrees defining the Mongolian flag are in *Bügd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Ulsyn ündsen khuuli tüünd kholbogdokh zarim aktyn emkhtgel*, I *(1921-1940)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1972), 127, 375; and II *(1941-1970)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1974), 56. On the Kuomintang party flag, and its National Government flag see Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, pp. 180-85, and Whitney Smith, *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World* (Maidenhead, 1975), pp. 109-11.

republican flag."[58] Everywhere the party was known among the Mongols simply as the "red party" (*ulagan nam*) or the "Mongolian reds" (*Monggol ulagantu*).

The party seal also rejected any specifically Mongol elements. That of the Eastern Border People's Party had used the Buddhist swastika, while that of the MPRP put the *arga bilig* "wisdom and means" or *yin-yang* symbol (also incorporated in the soyombo symbol) in the center of the revolutionary five-pointed red star. The Inner Mongolian party seal, however, had simply a plain red star, on two sides of which was written in the Mongolian script, "Seal of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia." Only after the split of the Kuomintang and the Soviet Union made something like pan-Mongolism again acceptable did the left-wing splinter of the old PRPIM imitate the MPRP seal directly, and add in the *arga bilig* symbol.

The Question of Autonomy

The party's positions on autonomy, implicit and explicit, must be understood in the political and demographic context of Inner Mongolia. As we have seen, in the view of the PRPIM leaders the existing Inner Mongolian banner system had three fundamental problems. 1) It was undemocratic, in that the nobility ruled absolutely and by hereditary right; and 2) it was disunified in that each banner and league was essentially independent, so that there was no single government to lead and represent all the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. Because these reactionary princes, ruling small parcels of land and hated by their subjects, could only hold onto power by relying on the Chinese warlords, this led to 3) the banner governments always acting contrary to the interests of the Mongolian nationality as a whole, with the princes constantly selling out the interests of the Mongolian people to the Chinese authorities in order to hold onto power and gain profit. The Inner Mongolian revolutionaries thus planned to solve the problem of Inner Mongolia by a government that would be at once democratic, unified, and truly represent Mongol interests.

The clearest statement of the eventual aims presented to the congress is preserved in the "Outline of Proposals for the Inner Mongolian National Assembly," apparently a set of guidelines produced at the First

[58] A secondary source mentions that the uniforms of the party's armed forces bore a five-pointed star, but unfortunately does not state its color; see Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 367.

Congress of the PRPIM for the never-convened All-Inner Mongolian People's Congress.[59]

1) To be resolved, a law on organizing the local autonomous government of Inner Mongolia.
2) To be resolved, that the Inner Mongolia autonomous area would have in its sphere the original six Inner Mongolian leagues[60] as well as Qinghai [Kökenuur], Hulun Buir, Alashan, Ejene, and Chakhar.
3) To be resolved, the location of the seat of the local autonomous government of Inner Mongolia.
4) To be resolved, that the highest administrative officer of the local autonomous government of Inner Mongolia, and the heads of the various banners must equally implement a popular electoral system.
5)[61] To be resolved, on the problem of how to determine the hereditary jurisdiction of the dukes and princes of Inner Mongolia.
6) To be resolved, the methods to divide the jurisdictions of the local autonomous government of Inner Mongolia and the various dutongs and daoyin offices, within the region.
7) To be resolved, exactly how to carry out the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement.

The manifesto likewise spoke of the party leading the Mongol people of the various banners, seizing power in them, and establishing elected banner governments, which would control the banner land, prohibit further colonization, and halt the payment of banner debts to Han Chinese and foreign merchants. Eventually, the revolutionary banner governments would call an All-Inner Mongolian People's Congress (*Bükhü Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un tölögelegchid-un khural*; Chinese *Nei Menggu guomin gahui*, "Inner Mongolian National Assembly") which, according to the outline cited above, would combine these banners into an autonomous government of Inner Mongolia, with its own capital, and an elected government. The PRPIM would undoubtedly continue to play a guiding role in the Inner Mongolian government, and although Inner Mongols as individuals would presumably be able to join the Chinese Kuomintang, the ruling party of Inner Mongolia would be the PRPIM alone. Finally, although this plan

[59] I have found this text only in the Chinese re-translation of the Japanese translation of the Chinese in Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 121-22. Note that according to the standard translation of the time, *guomin* in Chinese would render *arad* in Mongolian, thus making it the same as the "All-Inner Mongolian People's Congress" found in the Mongolian text of No. 3 of the "Immediate Demands" of the manifesto.

[60] Jirim, Josotu, Juu Uda, Shili-yin Gool, Ulaanchab, and Yekhe Juu leagues.

[61] The "5" has been added by the Chinese translator of the Japanese translation.

was not publicized at the time, the PRPIM was already planning its own military force composed of both a standing army and a militia.

The most distinctive feature of this autonomy plan lay in its proposal to base citizenship in the Inner Mongolian local government solely on ethnicity. This program, which we may call communal autonomy, occupied a position somewhere in-between the cultural autonomy of the Austrian Marxists like Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, where the right of autonomy would be decided by ethnicity but would only involve cultural issues like education and not governmental jurisdiction, and the territorial autonomy of the Bolsheviks, where in a given area, albeit within borders drawn ethnically, all residents would be citizens and would participate in the selection of the same government.[62] At the First Congress, the PRPIM leaders came to envisage the Inner Mongols as a separate corporate community, whose membership would be decided by traditional banner affiliation and not by territory alone. Thus, both no. 2 in the outline for the People's Congress and the preface of the PRPIM's First Congress listed the participant sub-groups by their traditional banner names.[63] In areas of mixed Mongol and Han Chinese settlement, the existing pattern in which two neighbors, one Mongol and the other Han, would belong to two different local governments, one the banner and Inner Mongolian government, the other the county and Chinese circuit and special regional government, would continue and indeed be carried on to a higher level.

[62] Unfortunately only excerpts of the works of the Austro-Marxists on the national question have been fully translated into English; see Irving Howe, *Essential Works of Socialism* (New York, 1970), pp. 128-32; Harold G. Gordon and Nancy M. Gordon, eds., *The Austrian Empire: Abortive Federation?* (Lexington, 1974), pp. 105-14; and Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, eds. *The Austro-Marxists* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 102-25. See also the assessments in Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, II, *The Golden Age* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 285-90; and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 21-28. On the Bolshevik nationality theory, see V.I. Lenin, *Critical Remarks on the Nationality Question; The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (Moscow, 1962); and Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National-Colonial Question* (1936; rpt. San Francisco, 1975), with the discussions in Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, II, 398-405; Pipes, *Formation of the Soviet Union*, pp. 29-49, 242-47, 269-93; and Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, 1984).

[63] The list in the Manifesto's preface included "the six southern leagues, Chakhar, Bargu, Daur, Solon, Alasha, Ejene, Ööled, and Kökenuur." Compared to that in the "Outline" Bargu, Daur, and Solon are combined as Hulun Buir, and Ööled Mongols are included in the list of party delegates, but not in the "outline." Probably those meant are the Yekhe-Minggadai and/or Hulun Buir Ööleds.

The party foresaw the practical difficulties and no. 6 of the "Outline of Proposals" envisioned laws at various levels to harmonize the two separate jurisdictions. The Manifesto as well foresaw difficulties over the perennial contentious land issue. After promising that the banner land previously held by the "internal reactionaries" (that is, the dukes and princes) would be returned to the power of the new elected authorities, the program also promised, "About cases where Han and Mongol people live intermixed, special regulations shall be decided with consideration to the interests of everyone" (Economic Proposals, no. 1). Thus although the Chinese peasants would have to take the details on trust, the congress did show more awareness than either the Young Mongols or the duguilang vigilantes previously had shown that the issue of the Han Chinese already in Inner Mongolia could not be met either by expulsion or complete denial of their rights. Han Linfu whose whole strategy on Inner Mongolia rested on the bedrock conviction that he and the other Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia were now a fully indigenous community whose rights could not be ignored, would have heartily agreed. Yet he and his League were not welcomed at the Party Congress, and the question thus presented itself: was this recognition purely a concession to the sensitivities of the Comintern, or had the party leaders really had their awareness of this issue raised?

The PRPIM by its very existence extended the principle of federalization to China's ruling party or parties. Although the Kuomintang is nowhere specifically mentioned, the party by allying itself with China's Great Revolution in article three of the manifesto implicitly supported the Kuomintang as China's true revolutionary party, but did so as an allied party, not as a mere branch of the Kuomintang. After the victory of the revolution, the rule of the Chinese Nationalists in the border areas would thus be exercised only indirectly, via mono-ethnic allied parties which would exercise political tutelage in their own autonomous areas. In outlining this program, the congress in effect created a substantially new interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's original idea of a quinque-racial republic. Instead of five nationalities living together as equal citizens with undivided rights, this program, if extended to the other three border races, would make each of the five races into a separate corporate community, with its own territorially extended but mono-ethnic government, led by their own mono-ethnic parties.

This new interpretation sprang out of the peculiar situation of Inner Mongolian administration in the late Qing and Republican periods. In areas where the Chinese and Mongols lived together, the administration was already divided, with counties set up for the Chinese and banners for the Mongols. Only where members of one or the other ethnic group were

a small minority did they come under the jurisdiction of the opposite administrative organ. The party's autonomy plan clearly took as its basis a union of these already existing banners, rather than a creation of an autonomous region *de novo*. This plan for a union of banners had two advantages: it dealt with the unfavorable demographic situation in Inner Mongolia, and by starting with seizing control in individual banners, was easier to set up. As the Chinese were already numerous in Inner Mongolia, any autonomous electoral system that included them would be distorted by their numerical preponderance.[64] As for starting with organizing banner governments, the party was here following the path of least resistance: for hundreds of years, the banners had been the largest social and political unit for the Mongolian commoners. As soon as the party, and its Chinese allies had produced a power vacuum in an area by defeating the Chinese warlord on whom the Mongolian nobles relied, then the people of each banner could rise up separately and take control of the old government.

Thus, despite the repudiation of pan-Mongolism, the purely ethnic Mongol nature of the party, ratified by the exclusion of Han Linfu and the League, fundamentally transformed the type of autonomy which the Kuomintang had agreed to support at its own First Congress in 1924. The leading role assigned to the party in Leninist politics meant that its composition was ultimately even more important than that of the government. All the parties participating in China's Great Revolution, whether the Kuomintang, the Comintern, or the Chinese Communists,

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[64] According to Song Naigong, *Zhongguo renkou: Nei Menggu fence* (Beijing, 1987), pp. 50-57, the population of the area of the modern Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was 36% Mongolian in 1912, and 19% Mongolian in 1937. These figures are largely estimates, and include the heavily Chinese areas in the Tümed Plain which the party seems to have excluded from its autonomy plan, but on the other hand do not include the Josotu area, now in modern Liaoning province, which was not excluded and which was also very heavily settled by Chinese. Regardless of the exact figures, it seems evident that any autonomous region that included all the Mongolian bannermen would have had a substantial Chinese majority, even in 1925. It is not clear, however, that the party leaders were aware of this; Fumingtai considered that Inner Mongolia and Bargu had a combined population of two million (*Mongolia: Yesterday and Today* [Tianjin, n.d.], p. 20), when the truer figure was somewhat less than half that. Bai Yunti spoke of "several million Mongols of Inner Mongolia" (Hao Weimin, "Diyi di'er guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 593), while Lattimore estimated there were two million Mongols in Manchuria (Josotu, Juu Uda, Jirim, and Hulun Buir) and one million in the rest of Inner Mongolia, figures which undoubtedly derive from his Mongolian acquaintances, notably Merse and Sainbayar. See *Mongols of Manchuria* (1934; rpt. New York, 1969), pp. 24-25.



Figure 10.1: The front cover of the lithographed edition of the Manifesto from the First Congress of the PRPIM, *Dotogadu Monggol-un arad-un qubisqaltu nam-un nigedüger yeke qural-aca olan tümen neyite-dür tungqaglan jarlaqu bicig.*

saw party dictatorship as the fundamental institution of revolutionary consolidation. Given that belief, Oshirov's decision not to bring Han Linfu's League into the PRPIM meant that a successful revolution would give the ethnic Mongols in the PRPIM revolutionary (that is, unchecked) power over the region.

The Congress and the New Policies/Republican Legacy

The unasked question of who controlled the party was all the more important as the manifesto fundamentally continued the New Policies direction of increasing the strength of the state. The Inner Mongols looking to Mongolia for leadership had without exception seen the development of public institutions in Mongolia as one of the great benefits of the revolution. As one might expect, then, promises for a similar expansion of state institutions occupied an important part in the proposals following the PRPIM's manifesto. To establish public offices to control use of banner land (Economic Proposals, no. 2), mutual-aid cooperatives to improve the terms of trade for the herders (Economic Proposals, no. 5), public schools at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (Cultural and Educational Proposals, no. 1), free education for the poor (Cultural and Educational Proposals, no. 2), public hygiene and clinics (Cultural and Educational Proposals, no. 3), and state-funded veterinary clinics (Cultural and Educational Proposals, no. 4) constituted a major increase in the power of the state.

These new public institutions, not to mention the party army that would be necessary to protect the new revolutionary regime, would not come free. Thus, the party's program implied a dramatic increase in banner revenues. If, as it also proclaimed, the banners should cease leasing out land, salt lakes, or other natural resources to Chinese or foreign merchants, then this taxation on the actual banner members, direct or indirect, would have to be dramatically increased. The party did call for the repudiation of debts previously contracted by the banner rulers which had been made public banner debts and demanded that henceforth only those who actually contracted a debt would be required to pay (Economic Proposals, no. 3). This measure would save some money for the banners, but not nearly enough to fund the whole of the new program. Even if utilization of natural resources was run directly for profit by the new banner governments, the banner folk would still have to consent to give up their traditional access to such resources. The whole program of the PRPIM would thus land itself squarely within the same political situation as the New Policies had faced. While even the

duguilang leaders supported such proposals in theory, the key questions were one of trust and finances: 1) did the people trust the leaders of this new strong state to act in their interests?; and 2) would the new regime finance its new institutions by leasing or exploiting natural resources itself on a for-profit basis or could it convince the bannermen to shoulder the increased tax burden that would otherwise be necessary?

As has been discussed in connection with the duguilangs, there was a surprisingly general agreement even among bitter enemies about the state-building measures necessary to defend the Mongol bannermen and their families in the new era. As Öljeijirgal's extolling of the Mongolian People's Republic's educational and army-building actions showed, even the most dedicated opponents of the New Policies had come around to seeing new schools teaching modern learning and stronger public institutions as necessary. The issue of trust and of tax base, however, were potentially dangerous ones for the PRPIM. As we have seen, the Young Mongols, hailing from within the edge of Chinese settlement in central and eastern Inner Mongolia and integrated by education and lifestyle into the post-New Policies China, were the prime advocates of extending these New Policies, run by Mongols, to the rest of Inner Mongolia. They thus ran the risk of being rejected by Mongols from the western leagues as sinicized Mongols pushing an agenda set in Beijing.

So far, only the independent government in Ulaanbaatar, by its resolute independence from China, both symbolic and real, had been able to win the trust of Yekhe Juu's vigilantes, a trust amplified by its reliance on customs dues, not internal sales taxes or direct taxation, to finance its new state. Nudged into symbiosis with Feng Yuxiang and at least a symbolic allegiance to the Republic of China, and prevented by China's treaties with Britain and America from making the burden of taxation fall on foreigners, the PRPIM would have to overcome significant handicaps to achieve the trust of those Mongols in Ordos, Ulaanchab, Shili-yin Gool, and Alashan, who were not associated with the party. Since much of the animosity towards the legacy of the New Policies and the Chinese Republic in these areas focused on markers of dress and language, the party leaders paid considerable attention to such issues.

As has been emphasized all along, the transition to the Republic had left many scars in the Mongolian lands, scars that certain key words, concepts, and practices could easily reopen. Among the words and concepts were *geming* "revolution," the idea of an *irgen ulus* "republic," and the distinction between the country (*ulus*) of China (*Dumdadu ulus*), and the five races (*ugsaatan*), including the Mongol and the Han (*Khitad*) which inhabited it and were to live in quinque-racial harmony.

Among the practices were the dating of years to the years of the Republic (thus, 1912 was year one of the Republic, 1913 year two, and so on), and the removal of the queue, the long braided pony-tail required of all subjects by Manchu law. Mongols who rejected the New Policies, either in western Inner Mongolia or in the high steppe outside the line of heavy Chinese settlement, found each of these practices to be strongly offensive in its reminder of the dramatic decline in Mongol status during the New Policies and the early Republic. Tied in part by the Comintern's directives that they operate within the context of the Republic of China, and in part by their own support for the modernizing measures first introduced by the New Policies, the party's East Mongolian leadership had to neutralize the symbolic purchase these practices gave the party's enemies.

Thus *gaming*, the Mongolian pronunciation of Chinese *geming*, "revolution," had become synonymous with "bandit" particularly in the western, more nomadic Mongol lands, such as Khalkha and Ordos. (In Mongolian secondary sources, *gaming*, from Chinese *geming* "revolution," is often confused with the *guomin* "national" or "citizenry" of the Kuomintang. The Mongolian term, however, has no relation to the Kuomintang.) In the early years of the Republic, Chinese *minguo*, literally "commoner country" had been translated into Mongolian as *irgen ulus*. While this translation was accurate it had problems for a Mongol audience as the word *irgen* "subject," "commoner," had also long come to mean "ethnic Chinese"; the Mongols saw the ordinary Chinese as purely subjects of the Qing, while they themselves as bannermen were particularly trusted servitors. The "Republic of China" in Mongol ears thus sounded much like a country only for the ethnic Chinese.[65] For "revolution" the party used the term already coined in 1921 in Khalkha of *khubiskhal*, which contained none of the violently negative baggage of *gaming*. For "republic" the new manifesto changed the *irgen* in the old *irgen ulus* to *arad* another term meaning "commoner," but one which had been used of ordinary Mongol bannermen throughout the Qing and carried no offensive implication, either of ethnicity or of servile status.

As noted above, however, the party had no way to avoid using the distinction between China as a country, the "Middle Kingdom" (*Dumdadu ulus*), and the Chinese as an ethnic group (*Khitad*).

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[65] See Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers or, How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?" in *Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China*, no. 5 (July, 1994), pp. 53, 55 and Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 263 and 277-278 n. 3.

Unfortunately, this distinction was terminologically still quite new in Mongolia. The use of the translated "Middle Country" (*Dumdadu ulus*) for China had been restricted to East Mongolia before 1911, and only after the revolution appeared in official sources from western Inner Mongolia.[66] Even in the various writings of the party leaders before the congress, *khitad* often meant both the Han Chinese as an ethnic group, and China as a country, thus implicitly denying the possibility of separating the two ideas. When Bai Yunti had written, for example, in his first 1924 proposal for a "People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia," that "If all us Mongols strive with one mind in the direction of progress and revival, then we can certainly throw off the imperialist Chinese government (*khitad-un ejerkheg türimekehi jasag*),"[67] he was not making any distinction between "Chinese" (*khitad*) as a political entity and "Chinese" (*khitad*) as an ethnic group. With the Comintern's rejection of pan-Mongolism, such sloppiness was no longer acceptable. In an effort to avoid even the suggestion of any international frontier between Inner Mongolia and China, the manifesto even avoided explicitly labeling the Chinese warlords and merchants as foreign/external (*gadagadu*) reactionaries, although that usage had previously been quite usual in Inner Mongolian revolutionary rhetoric.[68]

In 1911-1912, in ethnic Chinese areas, people marked their adherence to the new Republican regime, whether voluntary or forced, by cutting off their queues.[69] In the Mongol lands, however, even where Mongolia had declared independence, the queue remained a marker of good bannerman status, and acquired additional symbolic weight of rejecting the new Republic. In 1926, the taiji Dandar, commander of the banner garrison and opponent of Öljeijirgal's duguilang regime cut off his queue to express his loyalty to the Chinese commander Jing Yuexiu in Yulin,

[66] See Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers or, How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?," pp. 37-73; and Nakami Tatsuo, "A Protest against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution," in *The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive Essays*, ed. by Etô Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (Tokyo, 1984), pp. 147-49.

[67] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 8 (Tseringdongdub to MPP CC, April 6, 1924).

[68] See, for example, the article on Ordos published in *Ünen*, entitled "Gadagadu dotogadu-yin qargis-ud qabsuran süidkejü bui" ["Foreign and Domestic Reactionaries are Joining to Ruin Them"] *Ünen*, no. 4, May 24, 1925, p. 1.

[69] See Weikun Cheng, "The Politics of the Queue: Agitation and Resistance in the Beginning and End of Qing China," in *Hair: Its Power and Meaning in Asian Cultures*, ed. Alf Hiltebeitel and Barbara D. Miller (Albany, 1998), pp. 123-42. On clothing and fashion in the Chinese revolution, see also Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, pp. 23-25 and 55-57.

south of Üüshin. On returning to the banner, the locals mocked him in song:

> The five principals, and ten colonels
> Are useless now it seems
> Dandar, chief of fifty soldiers,
> Has gone quite bald it seems ...
>
> Although the principles of
> The Zhonghua Minguo soldiers spread,
> Are not the six rulers and the seven banners
> All caught up in a trap?
>
> As the unprincipled flatterers
> Become ever more,
> Do they not harass
> Us righteous many folk?[70]

Note that the name of the Republic of China is given in Chinese (*zhonghua minguo*); this clearly expressed the perceived ethnic identity of republican institutions, and its association both with the decline of official banner institutions (the "five principals and the ten colonels"), the adoption of unseemly customs (Dandar adopting a military crew-cut), the decline of morals, and the inexorable bondage of Ordos as a whole (the "six rulers and seven banners").[71]

By the time of the 1921 revolutionaries in Mongolia proper, cutting off the male queue had acquired a revolutionary meaning in Mongolia as in China, along with the rejection of both wives' silver crowns and the "five prides" (*tawan omog*): the large cuffs worn by both sexes, and the upturned hat brim and high shoulders for married women.[72] While the

[70] Buyan, Edünkesig, and Altanbagan-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, II, 327-28. "Net" translates *janggar*, which is unattested in any dictionary, but which I take to be *janggur*, that is a deverbal noun in -r from the verb *janggu-* "to snare."

[71] The "five principals" were the two administrators (*tusalagchi*), the adjutant (*jakhirugchi janggi*), and the two deputy-adjutants (*meiren-ü janggi*), while the ten colonels were the ten *jalan-u janggi*, commanders of Üüshin's ten *khariya* or districts. See Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos* (1941; rpt. New York, 1968), pp. 200a, 182a (s.v. *Dži ŋ χen* and *Dżalan*). Ordos had seven banners each with one ruler; the rulers are called six simply to make the head rhyme and parallel structure fit.

[72] Martha Boyer, *Mongol Jewelry* (London, 1995), pp. 30-34; Urgunge Onon, ed. and trans., *Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1976), p. 185; Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil?*, pp. 163-64; Ts. Damdinsüren, *Namtryn khuudsaas (namtar, dursamj, temdeglel, turshlaga)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1989), pp. 50-51.

details of this process are obscure in Mongolia, in Inner Mongolia, the rejection of the queue came as a rule with urbanization and education in Chinese cities: biographies of both Mersé and of the Tümed Yun Ze record how they cut off their queues either before or during study (in Qiqihar and Guisui, respectively).[73] By the 1920s in urban Mongol circles, wearing the queue was a sign of defiant monarchism that made the conservative Sönid prince, Demchugdongrub, unwelcome at progressive political gatherings in Beijing. While Öljeijirgal and Wangdanima as lamas had shaven heads, the party's lay supporters in western Inner Mongolia seem to have retained the queue. Thus, in Ulaanchab, the young banner clerk Engkhebayar who would emerge as one of the most efficient local party supporters in 1926, still wore the queue in his only extant photograph.[74] In Shili-yin Gool, Ulaanchab, and parts of Yekhe Juu, however, rural Mongols still wore the queue up until 1945.[75] Thus although they may have renamed their concepts, the party's East Mongolian leaders, young student cadres, and Khalkha Mongolian advisers could not avoid the identification with the new regimes that their contemporary trimmed hair suggested.

The problem of calendar dating offered slightly more options. Up until the Qing the Mongols like the Chinese had used the lunar calendar, and dated documents according to the reign years of the emperors. The Republic had compelled the adoption of both the Gregorian solar calendar and the dating of documents by years of the Republic, with 1912 as year 1. The new Mongolian theocratic state had retained the lunar calendar and used its own system of dating by the years of *Olan-a Ergügdegsen* "Elevated by the Many" reign year, proclaimed with 1911 as year 1. After the 1921 revolution, the solar and lunar calendars were often used together and in 1924, with the proclamation of the Republic, the *Olan-a Ergügdegsen* reign year was replaced by the "year of Mongolia" (*Monggol ulus-un...on*), although year 1 was set at 1911, not 1924. In Ordos and elsewhere in the rural areas of Inner Mongolia, however, the Mongols all continued to use the lunar calendar and, deprived of the Qing reign years, used instead the 60-year animal cycle.

[73] A. Enkebatu and Erhenbayar, "Women suo liaojie de Guo Daofu," *Dawor zu yanjiu*, 1 (1987), 160; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 18-19.

[74] Nasunbayar and Tugurbin, "Engkebayar-un 'Ulagan nam'-du orolcagsan ajillag-a-yin tuqai teüke-yin matériyal-un emkidkel," *Bayannagur-un teüke-yin matériyal* 4 (1985), p. 2. The reproduction in *Urad-un dumdadu qosigun-u soyol teüke*, 1 (1988), 90, is of equally low quality.

[75] Jagchid, *Last Mongolian Prince*, pp. 24, 304-05.

As Öljeijirgal had earlier proposed the Inner Mongols adopt the Soyombo flag, so Bai Yunti in 1924 adopted the Khalkha dating system of *Olan-a Ergügdegsen* "Elevated by the Many," and just as Öljeijirgal found his favored flag replaced by a new one, so Bai Yunti found his favored dating system replaced by the European calendar. As one not associated either with the "year of the Republic," which the Mongols of Ordos and other rural areas of Inner Mongolia had been resisting so staunchly or with the "year of Mongolia" with its unacceptable pan-Mongolist connotations, the European calendar formed a safe neutral bet. Thus all dates in the published manifesto were given in the European calendar without comment. Later public documents, including those issued in Ordos, however, used the years of the Republic and some texts of the congress documents indicate this practice began at the Congress itself.[76] Privately, however, only a few Kharachin party members ever used the "year of the Republic," while most others used either the "year of Mongolia" or the European year dating. (Since the Chinese Republican and Mongolian years had different starting dates—1912 and 1911 respectively—the difference is clear even where only the number of the year is given.)

Thus, identified with the new regime of the Chinese Republic, both by its symbols and language as well as by its dependence on Feng Yuxiang, the PRPIM faced serious problems of winning over the large number of Mongols in the rural areas and in the west of the region, who rejected both. In Oshirov's report on the first branch congress in Ordos in 1926, he reported what he called "the most interesting" questions from the local delegates:

1) Why did the party center's Central Committee put its own work in liaison with General Feng Yuxiang?—besides, the conduct of Feng, as the majority of the delegates observe it, takes a purely aggressive policy toward Mongolia.
2) Looking at it with the assessment of the Mongol people what is the difference between Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxiang?

[76] See for example the "Special Letter of Inspiration from the PRPIM CC" found in U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 50, 893.00/7085 (Vice-Consul E. F. Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926); and Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 63 (Special Inspiration Letter from the PRPIM CC, Dec. 20, 1925); and the Ordos treaties found in Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 55, 58 (Tripartite treaties in Üüshin and Otog banners, Oct. 1 and 10, 1926). The congress's "Outline of Proposals" and "Manifesto" are dated by years of the Republic in Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 121-22.

3) Is it true or not that Outer Mongolia under the rule of the Red Party has eliminated religion?[77]

These sorts of questions gave strong justification for the policy of assailing the secular nobility while at the same time not attacking, or even supporting, the Buddhist clergy. Since the Chinese generals in Mongolia, such as Feng Yuxiang, worked through the secular nobility, attacking them as internal reactionaries was a way of implicitly differentiating themselves from the existing Chinese Republican authorities. Defending Buddhism, by contrast, gave the party a way of demonstrating that their allegiance to a modernizing program did not mean that they had deserted the Mongol side to support the *gaming*-bandits.

These rhetorical strategies found reflection in the songs propagated by the PRPIM. Following the example of the Mongolian revolution, and assisted by Buyannemekhü who had written many of the 1921 revolution's most popular lyrics, the party would use songs to spread the revolutionary message. In these songs, their red star and red flag symbolized republican goals: "Let us cover the whole orb of the world/ with our red republican (*bügüde nairamdakhu*) flag" ran the lyrics to one party song, "The Mongolian Internationale," commissioned by the PRPIM Central Committee and sung to the tune of the "Internationale."[78]

Yet in subsequent years Bai Yunti, Mersé, AltanOchir and other East Mongolian leaders seem to have worried about extreme republican rhetoric provoking a loyalist reaction, particularly among the conservative rural Mongols.[79] Even at the congress, while they denounced the dukes and princes as internal reactionaries, they never explicitly promised the abolition of their rule, still less their liquidation as a class. This reluctance was amplified by advise from their Mongolian sponsors. Bai Yunti later recalled, for example, that Dambadorji urged him to be wary of strife within the Mongolian people, and archival sources indicate that this advice was repeated in the summer of 1926.[80]

[77] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., p. 8a.

[78] Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, 1, 387.

[79] See, for example, Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 15-16 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Jan. 2, 1927); and Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155.

[80] Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, p. 225. By denying inquiries from Ulaabaatar about rumors that the PRPIM had confiscated the property of the nobility, the letter from Bai Yunti and Meré to Ulaanbaatar (Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 36-44 [Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Dec. 19]) attests to concern among MPRP leaders that policy towards the nobility not be too harsh.

Thus the party, despite its class-based rhetoric, in practice pursued a purely political strategy toward the nobility and high officials, allying with those like Shagdurjab in Ordos or Jodbajab in Chakhar who seemed friendly, and only attacking those who attacked the party. Sensing the cultural conservatism of the western Inner Mongols, the more modern Mongols seem to have worried that too active attacks on the nobility would cause a backlash against the party as too far left. Ironically, it would be the duguilang vigilantes in Yekhe Juu who would handle the nobility most roughly. The East Mongols did not realize that while in the high steppe the prestige of the nobility was still strong, in southwestern Inner Mongolia the New Policies and the Republican revolution had discredited the nobility, while only intensifying their allegiance to the symbols of traditional Mongolian identity. Toning down republican propaganda in Ordos was thus an opportunity missed.

By the end of the congress, if not before, the party leaders were also well aware of the significance of lamas for the duguilang movement in Ordos. A.I. Oshirov later wrote about the question of the high lamas:

> At the party center's First Congress, there were already several different views on this question. One group proposed that religious feudalists should be viewed in exactly the same way as the ordinary feudalists but another group believed that sooner or later the religious feudalists would become allies of the party. The official position of the party center was that there is no difference in principle between the two.[81]

It is hard to tell exactly what Oshirov meant by the final statement. Certainly the congress's documents did not explicitly rank the lamas, high or low, with the dukes and princes as "internal reactionaries." Perhaps Oshirov was referring to the articles in the manifesto's measures, which by prohibiting both the banner rulers and the high lamas from compelling the people to pay for personal or religious expenses, established a certain equivalence between them.

The party, given its background in the East Mongolian enlightenment, and its support from the Soviet Union, could not compromise on the separation of church and state. The Cultural and Educational Proposal no. 5 declared that the party would make religious belief be voluntary, and compulsory payment of religious dues would be abolished. Yet the party officially held no brief against Buddhism and the conclusion of its

[81] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., p. 6b.

manifesto called on both lamas and laymen (*khara*) to freely join the party, if they sincerely supported its aims. Nor was the abolition of compulsory dues, especially to temples outside the banner, unpopular even with the Buddhist duguilang members. However threatening this measure may have been to high lamas in temples in Dolonnuur and Yonghegong Temple in Beijing which benefitted from such payments from all over Inner Mongolia, Öljeijirgal had asked the Üüshin people to stop paying these dues back in the spring of 1925.

The sensitivity of the religious issue lay in its potentially explosive interaction with the governmental changes instituted during the New Policies. These polices had authorized an increase in both the power and the revenues of the local governments throughout China at the same time as they also authorized these local governments to replace, whether directly or indirectly, traditional religious and cultural institutions with schools teaching modern science. This general situation was further complicated in Inner Mongolia by the additional issue of ethnicity, as the New Policies explicitly aimed to transform the Mongols in the direction of Chinese culture. As we have seen, the party's founding documents removed the clergy entirely from the list of "reactionaries" that the party was targeting.

Moreover in their popular propaganda, the party not only did not criticize Buddhism, but also actively advocated it. Buyannemekhü was probably instrumental in composing these songs as he had been a major lyricist for the 1921 revolution, and knew from that experience how important the defense of the faith was in building support for the nationalist agenda. Many of the MPR's songs and propaganda pieces adopted by the PRPIM advocated republicanism and Buddhism at once. A song called "The Red Flag," composed by Buyannemekhü in 1921 followed the call to raise the red flag of the state, with a parallel one to raise the yellow flag of the church:

> Let us raise the red flag high
> And make the great nation flourish.
> Let us reduce to ashes
> The rebellious thieving enemy.
>
> Let us raise the yellow flag high
> And make the church's strength flourish.
> Lay (*khara*) and clerical (*shira*) together,
> Let us crush the anarchic enemy.[82]

[82] This is a version actually sung by Öljeijirgal's troops in Üüshin (Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken Monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 516-517). The first stanza of the

(In Urad Right Duke Banner, however, where the clergy was much less influential in the duguilang movement, an alternate version of the second stanza with a blue, not a yellow, flag circulated.)[83] One song composed for and issued by the Central Committee even suggested that it was this people's party which would finally bring the Daurs and Solon Ewenkis into "faith" (*süsüg*). While the particular faith involved, whether Buddhist or revolutionary, was not stated, the song played into the idea that many Mongols had of these groups as not quite truly Mongolian, because they never adopted Buddhism, and the hope that someday they could be brought into the dharma.[84] After the break up of the party, Mersé, whose own religious beliefs had gone from traditional Daur shamanism to Christianity and back again, felt that as the unity of Khalkha had come from the common devotion to the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, Inner Mongolian leaders ought to try to use the Panchen Lama as a focus of Inner Mongolian unity.[85]

But even with this seeming friendliness to the Buddhist clergy, the Young Mongols could not alleviate all suspicions. They did still believe

text of the slightly different original is in Ts. Damdinsüren, Kh. Sampildendew, and Ch. Ariyaasüren, *Mongolyn orchin üyeiin uran zokhiolyn tüükh*, I, *(1921-1940)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1985), p. 192; P. Qorlo, et. al., *Orcin üy-e-yin uran jokiyal-un tobci teüke* (Höhhot, 1985), I, 347. Although the lyrics are said there to have been written by Buyannemekhü, they are not found in his collected works. Another set of lyrics based on the same red flag-yellow flag theme, as approved by the Central Committee of the PRPIM, are in Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 384. The song was originally inspired by the two flags, red and yellow, that the Mongolian partisans raised at the battle of Kiakhta (Ewing, *Betweeen the Hammer and the Anvil?*, p. 230). The melody apparently is cognate to that of a Buriat harvest song. György Kara, oral communication, Sept. 7, 1990, notes that the famous Hungarian composer and musicologist Zoltán Kodály used the melody, which was taught in Hungarian schools as a parallel to Hungarian pentatonic folk melodies.

[83] See Engkebayar, "Engkebayar-un '(Ulagan nam)-du orolcagsan ajillag-a-yin tuqai teüke-yin matériyal-un emkidkel'-i üjegsen-ü qoyinaki törögdel," *Bayannagur-un teüke-yin matériyal*, 4 (1985), 26.

[84] Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 384-5. On Mongol stereotypes of the Daurs, see Paul Hyer, "Mongolian Stereotypes and Images: Some Introductory Observations," in *Aspects of Altaic Civilization II*, ed. Larry V. Clark and Paul Alexander Draghi (Bloomington, Ind., 1978), pp. 68; Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society* (Boulder, Col., 1979), pp. 141-142.

[85] Taobuxin [Töbshin],ed., *Demuchukedonglupu zishu*, special issue of *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 13 (1984), 7-8; Lu Ming Qui [Lu Minghui], *Monggol-un öbertegen jasaqu ködelgegen-ü egüsül ba tegüskül*, trans. Nasun'öljei and Cenggel (Hailar, 1986), pp. 14-17.

that the clerical elite was as much to blame for Inner Mongolia's ills as the nobles were, and it is doubtful that they could keep their opinion entirely to themselves. When the party campaigned in eastern Inner Mongolia, the leaders, as we shall see, fiercely challenged the Buddha to match the power of transformation and liberation from evil karma that the party could show. Given the Young Mongols' background and ideology, some kind of balance with the culturally conservative local vigilantes was necessary to broaden the party's appeal.

The Party Leadership

At the close of the congress the delegates elected a Central Committee and its presidium (see table 10.1). The election offered no new faces; those elected to the presidium were all the old members of the Provisional Committee of December, 1924, and the presidium at the Provisional Assembly of July, 1925. The presidium, listed in order of rank according to the official photograph of the new leadership, consisted of the following members: Bai Yunti, Mersé, Fumingtai, AltanOchir, Murungga, Sainbayar, and Mandaltu. Bai Yunti was elected as the chairman, while Mersé took the position of secretary. An often unreliable secondary source gives the tasks assigned as follows: central organization department—Fumingtai; military department—Murungga; propaganda department—Buyannemekhü; popular cam-paigns department—AltanOchir. The more reliable 1942 report of Nozu Akira mentions that Mersé was responsible for letters and public documents directed to the nobility and that AltanOchir handled popular propaganda.[86] These lists are somewhat confused in their terminology but apparently reflect the real assignment of tasks. Archival sources show that following the model of the MPRP's Central Committee the PRPIM Central Committee had two departments, organization (*jokhiyal-un kheltes*) and propaganda (*surtal-un kheltes*), along with a military council (*cherig-ün jöblel*). One document has Alta as the acting chairman of the organization bureau and another source says the Daur Gobol Erkhimbatu headed the propaganda department in 1926.[87] Thus,

[86] Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Meng Geming Jun," p. 11; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 125, 128.

[87] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken surbulji bicig*, III, 516; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 81. In reading the former document, Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 584, 600 has evidently confused Alta with Altan (a.k.a. AltanOchir). The PRPIM's military council is attested in the archives, but its chairman is not stated: see Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 40 (Serengdonrub

Fumingtai probably headed the organization department at first, giving the task to Alta when he returned to Ulaanbaatar, and AltanOchir headed the propaganda bureau, later being replaced by Erkhimbatu. The early campaigns in Kheshigten made Murungga the obvious choice for first chairman of the military council. Mersé as secretary handled the party's high-level correspondence with outside forces. While Buyannemekhü certainly helped write propaganda, it seems unlikely that he would be given a formal post in the party. Sainbayar and Mandaltu held no posts outside of their Central Committee membership.

The one big surprise in this list of presidium members was the missing names: the lamas Engkhebatu of Chakhar and Wangdanima of Ordos. They had been members of the December, 1924, provisional committee and the July, 1925, presidium, but now disappeared from the top leadership. Their demotion left a striking regional and social imbalance at the party's top level: three of the seven were Kharachins, two were Daurs, one a Kheshigten, and one a Khorchin. None came from the central or western areas of Inner Mongolia, all were "Young Mongols" in ideology and upbringing, and none was a lama. The PRPIM had originally followed the Mongolian party's Third Congress in having nine members of the core leadership; since the MPRP had expanded its presidium at the Fourth Congress, the impression that the PRPIM was going out of its way to discriminate against Mongols from west of the Khinggan and against lamas was all the stronger.[88] The elimination of Wangdanima, in particular, would make winning the trust of the duguilang members that much harder.

All of the seven top leaders of this pan-Inner Mongolian party were from groups that were widely considered as less than purely Mongolian; the Kharachins and, to a lesser degree, the Khorchins because of their adoption of Chinese manners along with agriculture, and the Daurs because they too were largely sedentary, spoke a different language incomprehensible to the other Mongols, and had never converted to Buddhism.[89] The Kheshigtens, like other Mongols of northern Juu Uda,

and Mersé to MPRP CC, Dec. 19, 1926).

[88] On organization of the MPRP's leadership organs at the Fourth Congress, see *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, p. 281. The original number of member for the Central Committee and the presidium was fifteen and seven in 1923, and twenty-one and nine in 1924; see *Mongol Ardyn Namyn khoyordugaar ikh khural (barimt bichgüüd). 1923 ony doloo-naimdugaar sar.* (Ulaanbaatar, 1974), p. 142; and *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 215-16.

[89] Hyer, "Mongolian Stereotypes," pp. 67-69; Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, pp. 141-43.

Table 10.1: Leadership of the First Central Committee, 1925-1927

Name	Place of origin	Date of activity and special responsibilities
Bai Yunti	Kharachin Middle Banner	Chairman of the CC.
Mersé	Hulun Buir (Daur)	Secretary of the CC
Fumingtai	Hulun Buir (Daur)	Organization Dept.
AltanOchir	Kharachin Right Banner	Propaganda Dept.
Murungga	Kheshigten Banner	Military Council?
Sainbayar	Khorchin Bo Wang	
Mandaltu	Kharachin Right Banner	
Alta	Kharachin	Co-opted, Nov. 1925; killed, March, 1926; Organization Dept.
Erkhimbatu (Gobol)	Hulun Buir (Daur)	Co-opted, summer, 1926; Propaganda Dept.
Dechin	Kharachin Middle Banner	Co-opted, April, 1927; Acting Secretary of the CC

Foreign Advisers:

Dambadorji	MPR	Adviser at First Congress
Buyannemekhü ("Tsetsenbiligtü")	MPR	Propagandist; Oct., 1925-Spring, 1926
A.I. Oshirov	Buriat-Mongolian ASSR	Comintern Representative; Oct., 1925-May, 1927
Nasunbatu	MPR	MPR Representative; Aug.-Dec., 1926

Sources: Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken surbulji bicig*, III, 516; Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 81; Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 63; 7-1-26: 44; 7-1-18: 14.

often prided themselves as being more pure Mongols, but that was strictly relative to the Kharachins and Khorchins. That Mongols from elsewhere saw all of these groups as cliquish and condescending only exacerbated the problem. This unrepresentative nature of the leadership drew protests from the beginning, but the protests became more serious in 1926, when the center of party activity moved west to Ordos. Directed above all at the Kharachins, who, through dominating the ranks of the students sent to Ulaanbaatar, Canton, and Moscow, seemed to be preparing to extend their privileged position into the second generation, the protests focused on their supposedly arrogant attitude towards the ordinary herdsmen.[90] This dominance of East Mongols and especially the Kharachin banners in Inner Mongolia-wide organizations continued into the forties (indeed it still creates resentment today, although the Kharachins have been replaced by Khorchins), and gave rise to many stories expressing the resentment of the other Mongols. In one, a Mongol decides to commit suicide because all the best positions are occupied by Kharachins, and throws himself into a well. There he discovers another Mongol has already jumped in and laid claim to the well—he too is a Kharachin![91]

In the official photograph of the new standing members of the Central Committee, we see all seven in long gowns, with their hands folded in their laps or tucked demurely in their sleeves, except for Bai Yunti, who sits rigidly erect in a military style suit with his hands firmly on his knees. He seemed to relish his role as an austere, hardened revolutionary, but to many rural Mongols, who mostly still wore the Qing queue, his appearance, as much as his dialect must have seemed suspiciously Chinese and thoroughly alien, an impression confirmed by his Jiangsu-born wife who accompanied him.[92] Antipathy, both within and without the party, towards this alien arrogance of many of the revolutionaries eventually came to focus on him above all.

The Central Committee as a whole, in contrast to the presidium, represented a somewhat wider diversity of views and regional origins. Not all the names are known, but secondary sources mention Wangdanima and Öljeijirgal from Ordos and Jodbajab from Chakhar as members of the Central Committee.[93] Even so, the bulk of the other known members, and especially those who were seen speaking for the

[90] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., pp. 11b-12a.
[91] Jagchid and Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, p. 141.
[92] Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Meng Geming Jun," pp. 15-16.
[93] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 600; Harnuote, "Qiantan Nei Meng Geming Jun," p. 19.

party center were also East Mongols: Alta, Dechin, Durungga, Buyantai, and Wang Huimin from Kharachin and Jargal from Kheshigten.[94] Of these, two Kharachins, Alta and Dechin would be coopted onto the presidium. Alta within a few months of the congress, and Dechin in early 1927.[95] On the other hand, while Wangdanima and others would play a role in the local military and party organization in Suiyuan, they never appear as acting in the name of the party center. Thus the hierarchy was clear: Kharachins and to a lesser degree other East Mongols represented the agenda of Inner Mongolia as a whole, while Ordos, Ulaanchab, Chakhar, and others from the central and western parts of Inner Mongolia spoke only for local agendas.

Compared to the duguilang group, the former Youth Party faction had even less representation. Although several participated as student delegates, none of them is known for certain to have been elected to the leadership organs. Chinese Communist memoir accounts, summarized in Hao Weimin's 1979 study, state that Han Linfu's close Mongol assistant, Wu Wenxian, was elected as a member of the Central Committe and that two Tümeds, Jiyaatai and Li Yuzhi, were elected as alternates.[96] These statements are however uncorroborated in archival sources. Although Oshirov had gotten the Youth Party and the Communist-inclined youth led by Han Linfu and Wu Wenxian to fold their own party into the People's Revolutionary Party, he had evidently not gotten the older nationalist leaders to trust them.

The question of electing student representatives had raised controversy even before the congress began, and that controversy continued during debates over the party's policies. Bai Yunti and Mersé, writing a year later, justified their suspicion of the youth, by stating that from the

[94] Dechin, Buyantai, and Durungga appear as representatives of the Central Committee in the Ordos treaties of 1926; see Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 55, 58 (Tripartite treaties in Üüshin and Otog banners, Oct. 1 and 10, 1926). Dechin, Buyantai (here spelled Bayantai), and Wang Huimin and Jargal appear in the Hanshengjiyaozi incident narrative; see Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 1 (Altan to MPRP CC, undated).

[95] Alta is listed as a presidium member in the "Special Letter of Inspiration from the PRPIM CC" found in U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 50, 893.00/7085 (Vice-Consul E. F Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926); and Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 63 (Special Inspiration Letter from the PRPIM CC, Dec. 20, 1925). Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 121, lists Dechin as a presidium member, and in Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 15 (Serengdonrub and Dechin to MPRP CC, April 23, 1927), he appears as the provisional secretary due to Mersé's absence.

[96] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 601; Du Fan and Wurijitu [Öljeitü], "Nei Menggu dashiji changbian (1919.5.4—1949.10.1)," p. 189.

beginning in Zhangjiakou, when discussing how to do party work, "the young intellectual comrades (*jalagu erdemten nökhöd*) showed signs that they hardly understood the Central Committee's directives."[97] This continuing tension between the Youth Party faction on the one hand and Bai Yunti and AltanOchir's older Kharachin faction on the other adds significance to the fact that both the party's manifesto and the outline of proposals for the planned All-Inner Mongolian People's Congress omitted the Höhhot Tümeds from the list of constituent banners. (By contrast, the isolated Kökenuur Mongolian banners, who do not seem to have even sent a delegate, were explicitly mentioned in both.) One of the major strongholds of the most radical youth was in effect being excluded from the new Inner Mongolia.

The Party Ideal

Thus in this new coalition of all Mongol factions against the current Beijing regime, the duguilangs and the former Youth Party faction were brought in only as silent partners. Active leadership was reserved to East Mongols and Hulun Buir Daurs of about 30 to 45 years of age. Like Rinchino and Dambadorji at the Third Congress, the dominant Kharachin and Daur groups benefitted from occupying a centrist position between the extremes of (at least religiously and culturally) traditionalism represented by Wangdanima, Öljeijirgal, and the duguilangs, and of modern radicalism represented by the Wu Wenxian and the former Youth Party.

Later, when the party army would travel through Yekhe Juu League, the Ordos herdsmen resented the young student cadres in the guards regiments all as arrogant "Kharachins" and sinicized Mongols, even as those same students boiled over with hostility to the presidium. Conversely, Bai Yunti would charge that these young cadres viewed the Ordos people as backward and ignorant.[98] Given these reciprocal tensions, the party leaders portrayed themselves, undoubtedly sincerely, as the only ones with the combination of progressive background and age-tempered patience necessary to hold together the party's various

[97] Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 38-39 (Serengdornub and Mersé to MPRP CC, December 19, 1926).

[98] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., pp. 2b, 6b, 11a-12b; Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungga, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 336; Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 38-39 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Dec. 19, 1926).

factions in one revolutionary struggle. This positioning would work until the summer of 1927, when Amagaev would pull off the skillful political maneuver of uniting the previously antagonistic youth and duguilang factions to overthrow the old Central Committee.

Given these regional and age-related tensions, the party leadership put considerable energy into propagating within the party an ideal of selfless dedication and the abolition of all interests apart from that of the Mongol race as a whole. Songs issued from the party center strongly stressed the unity of all the Inner Mongols. Into the song "The Red Flag" quoted above, now renamed by the PRPIM leadership as "Advancing Inner Mongolia," the following lines were added:[99]

> While strengthening links and ties
> Between the leagues and banners
> Let us establish a fierce army
> And then we'll crush the evil foe.

And for the tune "Mongolian Internationale," which Buyannemekhü had originally written to extol the Third International as the power that will lead the poor against their exploiters, the PRPIM Central Committee commissioned new lyrics, with the title "The Song of All Inner Mongolia." This song glorified the People's Party and its Red Flag for relieving all the problems of the Inner Mongolian peoples mentioning them each separately. The party could make the suffering Josotu and Juu Uda happy, the backward Kökenuur advanced, the perishing Daurs and Solons enter the faith and so on, thus uniting all the Inner Mongols, by bringing them up to the same level.[100] Party members as individuals pledged themselves, in the document they received as members, among other things to "Unite with everyone of the Mongol race, to strengthen its foundations and aim for its revival."[101]

If regional diversity was seen only as an unfortunate legacy of the reactionaries' divide and rule policy, what about class diversity? The

[99] Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 365. Typically, Öljeijirgal ignored the new lyrics and stuck with something closer to the MPR original (see Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 516-17).

[100] Edünkesig, Buyan, and Dorungg-a, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, I, 385-88. On Buyannemekhü's original see D. Tsedew, "'Mongol intérnatsional' duuny tukhai," *Khel zokhiol sudlal*, 12, (1977), 161-66; Damdinsüren, Sampildendew, and Ariyaasüren, *Orchin üyeiin uran zokhiolyn tüükh*, I, 193; Qorlo, et. al., *Orcin üy-e-yin uran jokiyal-un tobci teüke*, I, 345-46; *Mongol Ardyn Namyn gurawdugaar ikh khural*, pp. 110, 254.

[101] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 512.

manifesto had defined the class support of the People's Revolution in China as the peasants, workers, and the honest or progressive members of the intellectual class. Did Inner Mongolia also have such class distinctions? Not according to the manifesto, at any rate. By contrast to the situation in China, the analysis of the Inner Mongolian situation never presented any division of the people into classes. Despite the common language of "proletarian" and "capitalist" in revolutionary circles, several of the party's major writers were on record as seeing the Mongols as a unique society, in a virtually communal state of classless relations. For them class vocabulary was relevant within other nations, and between Mongolia and the rich nations, but not within the Mongol people. In his 1923 book, Mersé had written:

> When you look at [Mongolia's] government, there is nothing to see but the flickering lights around its temples. When you investigate its politics there is nothing to study but the mutual flaunting of plumed hats. If you inquire of its cities and towns, then they will inform you of its mountain streams and fields. If you ask of its industry, then they will point to their horses, cattle, sheep and camels. Entering its borders there are no difficulties whatsoever with police or detectives, but robbers are non-existent while harming living beings is considered as the utmost sin...
>
> To have such a country in the world today, now! It is like having a utopia, a new crystalized formation of nihilism, something which could not have been expected in the present-day world of struggle and killing, stabbing and grabbing. But this is not a fable; Outer Mongolia before its second independence [in 1921] really presented this kind of scene.[102]

Bai Yunti would also criticize the idea of class conflict in Mongolia in 1927: "...our Mongolian region has a broad territory but few people. The majority of the people make a living from nomadic herding, and it has an isolated culture and a backward economy. There is no class of workers or peasants nor is there any social organization."[103] In such a situation, Buyannemekhü, for one, dreamed impatiently about how with the foreign and domestic reactionaries disposed of, nothing stood in the way of Mongolia's advance from last to first, from primitive communism to modern communism, by-passing the horrors of capitalism. As he would write in 1928:

[102] Guo Daofu, *Menggu wenti* (February, 1923), pp. 19-20. I would like to thank Ellen McGill for making a clear photocopy of the Tôyô Bunko copy of this book available to me.

[103] See Bai Yunti, "Nei Menggu Guomindang qingGong jingguo," *Minguo ribao*, Oct. 26, p. 4. A Mongolian translation is in Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 67-69 (Manifesto of the Inner Mongolian People's Party, Oct. 25, [1927]).

> Mongolia has not had big capitalists who exploit others. Those with a few head of livestock are automatically considered as rich capitalists. Not only is that not exploitative capital, but it even protects the national capital. If they are caught in a drought or a *zud* [a cold weather disaster] then they will become the poorest of the poor. From this we can see that we Mongols from the earliest times have never entered the path of exploiting and exploited capitalism, indeed it would be better to say we have been living in a socialist fashion. Thus we can now, with one step further, immediately enter communism...Our Mongolian lifestyle from the beginning did not have one exploiting the other; it would be better to say we have indulged in an easy living off the land. Therefore, the European countries can only enter communism after three or four steps, but we can set an example by moving into communism in one step. It would seem that while in Europe only the poor class can build communism, here the whole people at large can build our communism.[104]

Thus the leaders envisioned the essence of traditional Mongol society, apart from the distortions of Chinese rule, as a kind of communal utopia, where difference of any sort was unknown. The return to this state was expressed in the final item in the list of party aims carried on each party member's person: "There will be no hesitation before reaching in the end the great teaching of complete unity" (*bügüde neitelekhü yekhe surtal*), a discrete reference to the ultimate achievement of communism, although without class struggle or the prior development of capitalism.[105]

Desiring, through their political action, to recover that essential Mongolian state of communal unanimity, it is perhaps understandable, if somewhat ironic, that this party of the Mongol people demanded that its members separate themselves entirely from their actually existing Mongol social background and identify completely with the new party. In its literature and in its formal requirements for party membership, the party adhered to a vision of itself as a picked band of totally dedicated patriots. The extensive oaths and exhortations written on the PRPIM's party card, or "letter of firm intent" (*batu ilerkheilekhü bichig*), issued to each party member over the names of Serengdonrub (Bai Yunti's Mongol alias, which he was now using exclusively in party business),

[104] Quoted in Damdinsüren, Sampildendew, and Ariyaasüren, *Mongolyn orchin üyeiin uran zokhiolyn tüükh*, I, 180-81.

[105] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 512. Note that while most dictionaries define *neitelekhü* solely as "to announce" or "to publish," *Monggol Kitad toli/Meng Han cidian* (Höhhot, 1976), has a third definition as *zǒng qǐ lái* or *zǒnghé* "to assemble, put together, sum up."

Mersé, and Alta, gave a vivid picture of the ideal of dedication which the party held up as the ideal for its members.[106]

The "letter of firm intent" functioned as the party's identification card. After taking the oath in the presence of other party members, new members would fill in their names and ages, sign their signatures, and have the document stamped with the seal of the party central committee. The letter would, with the payment of one silver dollar (*tögrög*) now be a valid identification card. The party expected its members to keep this letter on their persons at all time, to memorize both its text, and their own personal party membership number. If a member went to a new place and met someone whom he thought was a member but whom he did not recognize, he was to ask first his party number, and only if the person knew it, then to check if he had his "letter of firm intent." If that letter was missing, the person should not be trusted as a party member under any circumstances. Members who lost their documents would have to apply again and possibly be excluded as untrustworthy. Finally, after three years, the identification documents would become void, and the Central Committee would have to issue to the members new documents.

The document set forth in general terms both the political aims of the party and the moral standards expected of party members. The political aims expressed in general terms, the party program already discussed: put power in the hands of the people, develop culture and the economy, abolish reactionary ideas and economic exploitation, support the revolution both world-wide and in China, and unite the Mongol race so as to make them the equal of all other races. The working character of the party members was expressed in six points: 1) work sincerely and honestly; 2) do not shuffle off work onto others; 3) understand the times and the cause; 4) in keeping with the party regulations, acquire learning; 5) perform promptly the tasks assigned, and if possible by yourself alone; and 6) recognize your own faults and correct them as soon as possible. In order to keep the party's reputation clean, members were also ordered to avoid exploiting or tricking others for selfish gain, and to always be sincere and cautious in their actions.

The moral rules acquired all the more force as the member by joining the party had left the previous context of family and neighborhood and joined a secret brethren. Thus party status, in theory at least, involved a strict separation between party life and previous social and familial status. In place of the birth family, the party would give its members a new family, one which in turn merged with the ideal family of the whole

[106] An example, issued to a party member in Ordos in 1926 is given in Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 510-16.

Mongol race. The party's oath of membership read, in part: "3) I shall consider all the sworn party comrades as my own brothers, and shall keep them without harm in any place whatsoever. 4) I will care for the people as if they were my own parents and defend and rebuild my race (*aimag ugsaga*) as if it were my own home." The party member vowed to willingly expend his body and property for the cause, and to be "burned in the righteous fire of revolution and destroyed by the people's weapons" should he violate the party's oath.[107]

The party, however, offered its members additional reasons for diligence and courage, even in face of death, beyond the mere achievement of the cause's worthwhile goals. Despite its denial of class distinctions among the Mongols, the party fostered an intense concern with personal honor. The party promised its loyal members that their heroism would be recognized and rewarded by the respect of the comrades, an imperishable name, and honor from the people and state. Two sections of the "letter of firm intent" promised members the "reward of good" (*sain-u kharigulal*) and threatened the "reward of evil" (*magu-yin kharigulal*). The "reward of good" was the fame and respect of the party and all the people: the party member loyal even to death would be "a supremely honored comrade forever," "with an extraordinary fame," and a name "written on jade," who would be "trusted in any circumstance whatsoever," and "the vanguard of ten thousand and the pillar of the state." The "reward of evil," however, was two-fold, both the shame of being "not trusted," and "treated as an enemy," or "as a trimming hypocrite," but also being "made to taste his crime," and be "burned in the fire of the true revolutionary oath."[108] Thus the ideal the party set before its members was not solely one of sacrificing one's self for the cause, but also one of immortalizing one's reputation through the cause. The code of party morality thus evidenced its continuity with the code of heroic martial service to the sovereign which had in centuries past played such a prominent role in the Mongols' loyalty to the Qing emperors.[109] It also created an expectation among the party members that upon the victory of the revolution, they would be the aristocracy of merit in the new people's state, receiving from the less dedicated masses the honor and deference due to those who had risked their lives in the glorious cause of racial revival.

[107] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 511.
[108] Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 513-14.
[109] See Christopher P. Atwood, "'Worshiping Grace': The Language of Loyalty in Qing Mongolia," 21 (2000), 86-139.

The party's subsequent history displayed ever more obviously its failure to imbue the ranks with this revolutionary ideal. For members in the rural areas, where hundreds joined the party at once and the vast majority never left their homes and neighborhoods, the ideal of a picked band of totally dedicated patriots was completely unrealistic. The Young Mongol students, however, who had left their homes and gone to study in Ulaanbaatar or Moscow, and returned to serve in the party's headquarters as it traveled through Inner Mongolia, facing ever-increasing difficulties, did repeatedly remind the people and the party leaders of how they had followed this ideal of revolutionary achievement, and also the honor that they deserved for their dedication. Yet even these young nationalists never realized the party's ideal of rising above all local ties and attachments to be dedicated solely to the Mongolian peôple. Local animosities and misunderstandings would continue both among Young Mongol students from different banners, as well as between the Young Mongols and the rural Mongols to whose liberation they had dedicated themselves. Of course, they could point to the persistence of regional factionalism in the leadership as justification for their own refusal to drain their Kharachin, or Kheshigten, or Daur identity into the larger sea of pure Mongolian patriotism. The party leaders had placed themselves in the position of mentors, both to the rural vigilantes of Yekhe Juu and Ulaanchab, and to the impatient students from the Mongolian and Tibetan Technical School with their Chinese Communist sympathies and halting Mongolian. They could hardly be shocked when these pupils picked up lessons from their mentors' actions, lessons both of regional pride and of inter-regional coalition building to overthrow the existing authorities.



Map 11.1: Inner Mongolia and Military Campaigns, 1925-1926

CHAPTER ELEVEN

REHE CAMPAIGN, OCTOBER, 1925-MARCH, 1926

Soviet advisers and diplomats had been referring to "the war" between the Citizen Army and Marshal Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian Army since May, 1925, and calculating the aid which the Inner Mongols could deliver to Feng Yuxiang. Indeed that was the Soviet Union's original justification for helping the Inner Mongols.[1] Already during the First Congress, war had broken out between the Fengtian Army and the forces of Sun Chuanfang in the Lower Yangtze provinces, and observers all over China expected the Citizen Army to soon join or be forced to join the coalition against Marshal Zhang.

After the PRPIM's First Congress, the party's new Central Committee felt that war between Marshals Feng and Zhang was imminent. Zhang Zuolin was very powerful and party leaders thought a victory for him would be a disaster for both the Mongols and the Chinese. In contrast, they believed, Feng Yuxiang showed an inclination more towards the side of the people. Hence it was up to the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (PRPIM) to support his side in the coming war with whatever force it could muster.[2] But getting the Mongols to join the coming campaign was more important to them than to the Citizen Army. The party's plan, which seems to have developed under the influence of the Soviet advisers' own desire for an aggressive prosecution of the war, was to earn a seat at the peace settlement, by participating in the battlefield. Yet Marshal Feng himself seemed hardly ready to make any offensives moves. On October 23, E.F. Stanton, at the U.S. consulate in Zhangjiakou, observed that he was actually withdrawing troops from Chahar to the west, as if he still hoped to avoid a war the Fengtian Army.[3]

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1 *Soviet Plot in China* (Beijing, 1928), pp. 110-112.

2 Central Historical Archives of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (hereafter "Central Party Archives"), *fond* 7, *towyoog* 1, *khatgalamjiin negj* 19: *khuudas* 5 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925).

3 U.S. State Dept. Record Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, roll 47, 893.00/6777 (E.F. Stanton to Minister J.V.A. MacMurray, October 23, 1925).

Marshal Feng's hesitation about attacking Fengtian proved justified in the long run, but in Rehe, the expected theater of action for the Mongols, the enemy was much less formidable. In the wake of the second Fengtian-Zhili war of fall 1924, the Fengtian Army still controlled Rehe but the office of dutong was transferred to Kan Chaoxi. Kan was one of the old school officers of Zhang Zuolin, with a mediocre record. His forces made up the 3rd Division of the Fengtian Army, but his real aim in Rehe was to sell the region's opium crop. His soldiers followed their commander; when the army evacuated in late November, every private had his opium pipe. The capital Chengde contained the bulk of the Northeasterners. Cavalry alone held northern Rehe (that is, Juu Uda League), with the 1st Cavalry Brigade stationed in Kailu under Zhang Liantong and the 2nd at Linxi under Chang Wanli. Irregular units (*youjidui*) held Jianping and Longhua counties. Kan's forces did not garrison all the region, however. The First Citizen Army's 11th Division under General Song Zheyuan (1885-1940) had a brigade of infantry and of artillery stationed in Pingdiquan (modern Pingquan) to the east of the regional capital Chengde.[4] Kan's troops, lacking artillery and poorly disciplined, could hardly resist the Citizen Army.

Creating a Party Army

After the party elected a new Central Committee, the first item of business was the army. Superficially, the party center had good relations with Feng Yuxiang. Bai Yunti made his home in Feng Yuxiang's model village of Xincun in the suburbs of Zhangjiakou, a place of which Marshal Feng was inordinately proud, and after the congress, the party headquarters met at the chairman's home.[5] Bai Yunti met with Marshal Feng for an hour on October 28, to discuss "organizing an East Mongolian militia." This discussion was followed up by another on November 2, with Bai Yunti representing the PRPIM, and Chen Jinghu, a Communist comrade of Han Linfu, representing the League of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia (*Nei Menggu nong, gong, bing datongmeng*) and its Chinese bandit constituency. Feng's summary of the discussions, "the devastation of the Fengtian Army in Rehe, and the unpleasant truth that our army dare not make a rash move against it," exemplified his pessimism about the prospects for success against Marshal Zhang's forces.[6] In these discussions, Bai Yunti and Chen Jinghu presented the plan they had worked out with Oshirov for a 5,000-strong Mongol cavalry (scaled down by half from the initial estimate of 10,000 he had made in May). This unit would be allied with two units of 3,000 each, drawn from the bandit forces along the Rehe-Chahar border and affiliated with Han Linfu's League. The Inner Mongolian party hoped to combine the Inner Mongolian forces with Han Linfu's units into a Citizen Army of East Mongolia (*Jegün Monggol-un arad-un cherig/Dong Menggu Guomin-jun*).

Despite his hope of avoiding war entirely, Feng agreed to appoint General Zhang Yunrong, recently representative of the Citizen Army to Ulaanbaatar, as overall commander. Marshal Feng also allowed the Inner Mongolian party and the League to recommend the subordinate officers of the Mongol and Chinese troops; those in the Mongol unit would be all Mongols. For their troops the Inner Mongols recommended Murungga, of Juu Uda's Kheshigten Banner, as commander and he received a seal from Marshal Feng's headquarters. This Mongol unit would also be organized by pulling together existing Mongol militias, such as Murungga's Kheshigten Banner force, in the Chakhar and Juu Uda areas.[7] By this time the party's planned Military Council (*cherig-un jöblel*), also based on the Soviet Union's Revolutionary Military Council and imitated in both the MPRP and in the Nationalist Party, was probably functioning.[8]

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[4] Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford, 1977), p. 166; Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshi nian Zhongguo junshi shi* (1929—reprinted, Taipei, 1971), I, *bian* 2, 33-34, 72, 147-8, 149-150.

[5] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian* (Beijing, 1928), IV, *San*..., 9b; James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang* (Stanford, 1966), p. 152; "Shou Wai Meng yingxiang zhi Nei Menggu chihua yundong" *Chen bao* (Beijing), January 31, 1927.

[6] Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang riji*, ed. Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan (Nanjing, 1992), II, 123.

[7] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 101-102.

[8] In any case, the PRPIM's council was in existence by September, 1926: see Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 40 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Dec. 19, 1926). In Mongolia, the chairman of the military council at first was the Buriat Elbek-Dorzhi Rinchino (1921-25) and later Jaddamba (1925-28), concurrently deputy chairman of the MPRP Central Committee. See D. Yondondüichir, ed., *Mongol Ardyn Armiin 50 jil* (Ulaanbaatar, 1971), p. 76, and D. Gombosüren, *Khuwisgalyn ardchilsan shatan dakhi BNMAU-yn zewsegt khüchnii baiguulaltyn zarim asuudal* (Ulaanbaatar, 1983), pp. 64-67. Proposed by the Soviet military adviser, General P.A. Pavlov, the Kuomintang's Military Council was composed primarily of generals and was ineffective at implementing centralized party control of the military. The relation between it and the party's Military Affairs Department is obscure—C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, *Missionaries of the Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927* (Cambridge, Mass.,

Oshirov was only lukewarm about Murungga's qualifications. The Buriat wrote: "He is a very good administrator but scarcely a real military leader. He speaks Chinese and Mongolian well, is sober minded and of calculating disposition. At present he is working earnestly and energetically." He also emphasized Murungga's previously pro-Chinese attitude. Despite these drawbacks, he was the natural choice, due to his rapport with Feng, and the fact that the Mongol force would include Murungga's local militia. Reading Oshirov's description, A. Egorov, the new military attaché in Beijing, commented: "He needs a good Chief of Staff." He would not get one until mid-January, when Ulaanbaatar appointed one.[9]

Bai Yunti also presented his party's political aims to Feng. If Feng would help abolish the feudal regime in Inner Mongolia and replace it with a system of autonomy in which all Mongols could participate, then the party could promise cooperation from both Inner Mongolia and Mongolia. Feng claimed to support these demands but considered that publicizing them would be tactically "premature." Nor would he announce the creation of the "East Mongolian Citizen Army"; indeed as his October 28 diary entry indicates, Feng thought of the troops more as a citizen militia (*mintuan*) than as a real army. He designated General Zhang's overall command as the First Route Army, in which Murungga and Han Linfu would command the First and Second Columns (*diyi zongdui*, etc.), respectively. Feeling the weakness of their own position, the Inner Mongols did not pressure Feng to put his obligations in writing. They felt that in the event of an impasse in negotiations, the formation of the special Mongol unit would be delayed. Here again was the pattern with Marshal Feng evident since the negotiations of April and May: talks would start well, but the party would be unable to get any written commitment.

When Bai Yunti, Mersé, Han Linfu, and Zhang Yunrong got down to details, they had to scale down their ambitions for an 11,000-man force. Supplies and equipment were extremely hard to come by. Marshal Feng insisted from the beginning that he had nothing to spare. The Central Committee thus decided to organize its force of 5,000 in two stages. Before the outbreak of war, a 1,000-man "base army" (*ündüsün chereg*) would be armed and trained as a revolutionary force directly under the control of the Central Committee. After victory in Rehe, the force could

1989), pp. 114, 120, 272, 337.

[9] *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 107; Sechin Jagchid, in a letter of autumn, 1991, recalled the Yue Jingtao (Murungga) had "a deep friendship and involvement" with Marshal Feng."

be expanded with supplies and equipment coming from the Juu Uda banners. The militias of the Rehe area, both Chinese and Mongol, had a fairly large number of diverse rifles, and could be mounted, clothed, and fed from local resources. They lacked, however, ammunition, and any heavy arms. Financially, General Zhang supplied $3,000 silver from his own funds, the Soviets put up $10,000 silver, and the PRPIM was expected to give $10,000 silver from its own resources (ultimately coming from the $20,000 silver previously issued by the Mongolian government and the several thousand silver dollars raised from members at the First Congress).[10]

Since it was useless to ask Marshal Feng for supplies, General Zhang and the Central Committee consulted with Grigorii Voitinskii, returning from Moscow via Beijing at the time. Voitinskii, the Comintern's chief adviser in China, said that the Soviet Union could "loan" weapons to the East Mongolian army, meaning they would be supplied with deferred payment, to which terms the outgoing military attaché of the Soviet embassy, N.M. Voronin, also agreed. The supplies would include 1,000 Russian Mosin bolt-action magazine rifles, with a relatively generous 750 to 1,000 cartridges supplied per rifle. An equal number of Japanese cartridges would be provided to supply the Arisaka rifles already held by the local militias. Thus the force's small arms would be brought up to date. To give the force added power, four Maxim heavy machine guns, and eight Lewis light machine guns, each with the appropriate ammunition, would be supplied. Two small artillery pieces with 500 shells each, and eight mortars with 200 shells each would give the force artillery that Kan Chaoxi's troops lacked. Along with the new armaments, however, the troops would need time to organize and train.[11]

[10] Based on Lt. Henry A. Allen [=V.M. Primakov], *Zapiski volontera (Grazhdanskaia voina v Kitae)* (Leningrad: n.d.), pp. 137-38; *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 102-03; Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 20 (Short report, undated); 7-1-19: 4 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925); Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi de Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang," in *Zhongguo Menggu shi xuehui chengli dahui jinian jikan*, ed. Zhongguo Menggu shi xuehui (Höhhot, 1979), p. 588. The unit of currency for the contributions was in dollars silver, that is dollars containing 24 ounces pure silver whether coined in Mexico or in China (the Yuan Shikai dollar). See Appendix D on currencies and prices.

[11] Based on *Soviet Plot in China*, 103; Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 5-6 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925). Cartridges for the First Citizen Army were generally supplied at a rate of 1,000 per rifle, while the less cooperative and less favored Second Citizen Army received about 600 per rifle (N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* [Tianjin: n.d.], pp. 42, 44, 45 and 43, 46). Before World War I, N.M. Voronin was a medical student at Iuriev University in

The Soviet Union would transport the shipments through the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, just as they shipped those for Marshal Feng. The drop-off point was Shili-yin Gool's Bandida Gegen Kheid monastery (the seat of Abaganar Left Banner, and modern Shili-yin Khota city). From the beginning, though, the transport of weapons from Siberia to the Citizen Army had been a mess. Shipments were left at depots unguarded and invoices were lost or never written up in the first place. Getting the weapons moved all depended on the initiative of people on the spot.[12] Fumingtai had been sent to Mongolia to arrange this shipment as soon as the Soviet approval had been granted. He was to leave Ulaanbaatar for the Russian border by November 12/13, and have the weapons at Bandida Gegen Kheid by November 27 at the latest.

On November 13, the Central Committee anxiously sent a letter to the MPRP's party center asking that Mongolia take over the transport of weapons, supplying them from its own arsenals first with repayment coming from the Soviet Union. In any case, the letter continued, send at least the two artillery pieces and the mortars, along with two trained artillery instructors and four machine-gunners to teach the Inner Mongols their use. Finally the Central Committee hoped the Mongolian government could release fifteen of the Inner Mongol students in the Ulaanbaatar military school to return to Inner Mongolia as political instructors. In Beijing, Voitinskii and Voronin sent similar telegrams to Ulaanbaatar. When the Mongolian side sent response, however, there was no mention of the weapons, and the PRPIM Central Committee directed Oshirov to send another telegram to the MPRP. Again there was no response.[13]

The War Begins

Growing tension between Marshals Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin made the party's leaders anxious that war might break out at any moment. The proxy war around Shanghai had been going on since mid-

Dorpat (Tartu). Before coming to China he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Leningrad Military District. See A.V. Blagodatov, "With the Chinese Revolution," trans. David Fidlon, in *Soviet Volunteers in China 1925-1945: Articles and Reminiscences* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 89-90.

[12] Julie Lien-ying How, "Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun, 1925-1926: A Documentary Study," *Chinese Studies in History*, 19 (1985/6), 82-85, 198-207.

[13] *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 103-04; Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 4-7 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925); 7-1-19: 52 (Mergen and Oshirov to Dambadorji, Amagaev, and Buyangerel, undated).

October, and the Fengtian Army was in slow retreat. On November 10, Feng Yuxiang had publicly announced hostilities with Zhang Zuolin, but his own vacillating frame of mind and the good offices of moderate members of the Fengtian camp reconciled the two forces. On November 12 at Tianjin, the two warlords agreed on a common offensive south against the remnants of the Zhili clique. In reality, though, Feng Yuxiang had already begun conspiring with Guo Songling, a promising general in the Fengtian Army, to launch a mutiny in Zhang Zuolin's rear. Pessimistic about the possibility of victory in open battle, Feng had to place his hopes on buying off key officers in Marshal Zhang's camp. Bai Yunti and Mersé did not know the real story—even the Soviet advisers were told of the mutiny just ten days before it happened—but still expected war any day. Although Soviet observers saw Marshal Feng stressing law and order, Bai Yunti and Mersé optimistically wrote that Feng was encouraging KMT propaganda in order to gain support in the coming war.[14]

Another card Marshal Feng tried to play, so as to make up for his weakness, was bringing the Mongolian People's Red Army into the war. When Dambadorji, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, had attended the PRPIM's First Congress in Zhangjiakou, Feng Yuxiang had used his hospitality to the Mongolian party leader and his family to thaw their previously chilly relations. After Dambadorji returned to Mongolia, Marshal Feng followed up the meeting with repeated requests for the Mongolian army to participate in the Citizen Army's coming attack. On November 11, Dambadorji tactfully replied that he had repeatedly transferred his "honored elder brother's" requests to the government of Mongolia, but that the government emphatically refused to send its own few troops beyond Mongolia's borders or to interfere directly in Chinese internal affairs. Thus, Dambadorji concluded, "I really cannot agree to your request."[15]

Despite the uncertainties, the party hurried to build up a militia. With the approval of Zhang Yunrong, the PRPIM would appoint a twenty-man command staff for the Mongolian units, while Han Linfu's League

[14] How, "Soviet Advisers With the Kuominchun," pp. 47-50, 169; Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 31-32; Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-1927*, trans. Stephen I. Levine (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 103, 106; McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, pp. 159-62; Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 4-5 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925); 7-1-23: 70 (Dambadorji to Feng Yuxiang, Nov. 11, 1925).

[15] Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 70 (Dambadorji to Feng Yuxiang, Nov. 11, 1925).

would designate thirty-five commanders for the Chinese units. As soon as Murungga received his appointment as commander of the East Mongol force, he went to his native Kheshigten Banner, in northwest Rehe. Meanwhile the Central Committee as a whole moved from Zhangjiakou to Dolonnuur, a traditional center of Mongolian Buddhism and Sino-Mongol trade, on the border between the Chahar and Rehe regions (modern Duolun County). The Central Committee appointed AltanOchir to Murungga's staff as the party center's direct representative. Murungga and AltanOchir were the only presidium members from the 1880s generation. A campaign in Rehe, the heartland of the old East Mongolian educational renaissance, was a way for these veterans of the old parliamentary dream to prove that they were up to the demands of a revolutionary era.

Murungga and his father had 500 men in the Kheshigten Banner militia and the party hoped to enlist additional men from western banners already under Marshal Feng's control. Representatives had been sent out after the party congress, each with $100 silver for expenses, to go to the leagues and banners and found party committees and cells. In August, the Panchen Lama had returned north to Beijing and the Mongols had again congregated "like clouds" there and in Zhangjiakou, and other transit centers. As it had with the Assembly for Mongolian Racial Revival in the spring of 1925, the party used this opportunity to reach the Mongol masses. New party organizations were formed in Yekhe Juu, Ulaanchab, Chakhar, Dolonnuur and Josotu areas.

In Chakhar, the area immediately to the west of Kheshigten Banner, prospects for military support seemed good. Engkhebatu, the lama from the distinguished Khanggin family and a party founder from the 1880s generation, had earlier induced his elder brother, former amban Serengdongrub (1872-1949), to join the party. Serengdongrub had been amban both of his home Taipusi Banner and of Chakhar's "Three Banners and Dariganga Sheep and Cattle Herds," a group of herds that traditionally supplied animals for the imperial table, and Serengdongrub's successor in the latter office, Jodbajab, is even said to have attended the First Congress. The party center thus relied on the Chakhar officials to support the party's autonomy program. Serengdongrub himself, however, had retired to Beijing, leaving his second younger brother Samdanlhünrub in charge of Taipusi Banner and of the Khanggin family compound; Samdanlhünrub does not seem to have had the same interest in the party as his older brother had.[16] Still, Jodbajab and the other Chakhar ambans

[16] Jinbazhabu, *Chahar Menggu zu shihua* (1989), pp. 381, 412-413, 424; Herbert Harold Vreeland III, *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure* (New Haven, 1957),

promised the party to supply 100 soldiers from each of the Chakhar banners; in fact the troops never arrived.

Mongols behind the Fengtian lines were not neglected. On November 15, the Central Committee had dispatched Nimajab as the party's official representative to Bargu. Nimajab, who stood out in party meetings with his natty Western suits, was one of the deputy members of the old Provisional Committee of the PRPIM, but had been widely rumored to be a spy for unspecified enemies. Bai Yunti and Mersé had, however, found him to be very effective both at penetrating hostile high-ranking strata and at recruiting new members. These characteristics along with his origin in New Bargu Right Wing's Plain Yellow Banner suited him well for secret party work in Bargu. Going via Ulaanbaatar he would pick up literature and instructions and cross the border into Hulun Buir with the mission to organize and do propaganda secretly for a rebellion timed to the arrival of the party army from the south. He thus had to contact the old General Committee of the Eastern Border People's Party and get it to rename itself as the General Committee of Hulun Buir in the PRPIM, for which the party also gave him a seal.[17] In mid-November, the party sent also five delegates to Jirim League to prepare a rebellion there and organize a cavalry detachment to link up with the core army. The delegates would work with a Chinese, "Bohowei," who was in contact with the Soviet advisers to the First Citizen Army and planning a *honghuzi* ("red beard" or bandit) rebellion in Northeast China. By late November, however, the party's base force was still only the original 500 Kheshigten cavalry, of which hardly half were armed.[18] The troops

pp. 142, 146, 159. On the office of the amban of the "Three Banners and Dariganga Sheep and Cattle Herds" *(San qi Daligangga niu yang qun zongguan)*, see Jinbazhabu, *Chahar Menggu zu shihua*, pp. 54-58 and the map opposite p. 62. It consisted of three discontinuous blocks of territory distributed over each of what is now the three Chakhar banners of Shili-yin Gool aimag. The area of Dariganga, in what is now the Sükhbaatar province of modern Mongolia, was also under the administration of the same amban, but from 1911 on this territory was part of Mongolian territory.

[17] Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 11 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 15, 1925); J. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), p. 90.

[18] Based on *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 104-05, 107-09; Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots*, pp. 103-04; "Nei Meng dangwu baogao," *Minguo ribao*, March 30, 1929, p. 2; Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 19-21 (Short report, undated); 7-1-18: 58 (Report of the Chakhar Aimag Committee, June 20, 1930); 7-1-19: 5 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925).

were gathered at Jürükhen Uula monastery, 80-90 kilometers to the northwest of Dolonnuur.[19]

Meanwhile, Marshal Feng, pushed by his Soviet advisers and relying on his plans to cause revolt in the Fengtian camp, reluctantly backed into the long-expected war with Marshal Zhang. Even so he moved against his powerful rival painfully slowly. On November 22, 1925, his secret confederate, General Guo Songling, announced his defection from the Fengtian camp in a circular telegram. Half of Guo's divisional commanders rebelled against Guo's defection, however, and were arrested. Three days later, Feng Yuxiang and another of Zhang Zuolin's commanders, Li Jinglin, commander of Zhili, called on Marshal Zhang to resign. Finally on November 27, unable to avoid the conflict any longer, the Citizen Army declared war on Fengtian. The Second and Third Citizen Armies attacked in Shandong, while the First Citizen Army, under General Song Zheyuan, was assigned to take Rehe. This move would protect the left flank of Guo Songling's forces as he advanced from his bivouac in the Tianjin-Beijing area into the heart of Zhang's domain.[20]

In Rehe, at any rate, the campaign soon looked as if it would be over before it started. Kan Chaoxi began withdrawing from Rehe the day before the Citizen Army had declared war on Fengtian. The common suspicion was that Kan had been in cahoots with General Guo and that the two had made a deal to preserve the opium harvest untouched. By November 30, Kan had deserted Chengde and fled to Mukden; Feng ordered forces of the First Citizen Army to occupy the region "as conditions permit." Song Zheyuan, brigades of whose 11th Division were already stationed within Rehe, occupied the capital that day. He was appointed dutong of the region on December 4. Not until December 3, though, did the Inner Mongolian units, Mongol and Chinese, receive the orders to occupy northern and central Rehe.[21]

[19] The location of the staging point, Jürükhen Uula Monastery, is probably Jürükhe Tologai, situated in Bayanshili State Ranch in modern Shili-yin Khota City (formerly Abaganar Banner). See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Xilinguole Meng fence* (1987), *diminglu*, p. 5. This conclusion is based on Central Party Archives 7-1-19: 5 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Nov. 13, 1925); 7-1-18: 20 (Short report, undated); and *Soviet Plot in China*, p. 104.

[20] How, *Soviet Advisers with the Kuominchun*, pp. 50-52, 55-56; McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, pp. 162-164; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 107.

[21] McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, pp. 164, 166; Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Two Years in Revolutionary China*, p. 106; Liu Shaotang, *Minguo dashi rizhi* (Taipei, 1973), I, 307; Wen Gongzhi, *Zuijin sanshinian Zhongguo junshi shi*, II, *bian* 3, 221; Liu Shoulin, *Xinhai yihou shiqinian zhiguan nianbao* (1966; rpt. Taipei, 1974), p. 452.

The Citizen Army staff ordered Murungga's First Column to seize Jingpeng, Linxi, and Kailu counties, while General Zhang Yunrong would accompany Han Linfu's troops from Dolonnuur to seize Chifeng (Mongolian Ulaankhada) in central Rehe. None of the weapons or instructors had arrived from Mongolia but Murungga ordered his cavalry into action anyway. The troops moved southwest from Jürükhen Uula monastery, crossed the frontier back into Rehe's Kheshigten Banner and advanced on the county seat of Jingpeng. The attackers estimated that the town was held by 500 local troops, with 500 more in the vicinity, thus outnumbering the Mongols two to one. The entire garrison, however, panicked and fled, as did most of the other troops in the area. Two hundred of them surrendered to the Mongols and several tens of ethnic Mongol prisoners were enlisted into the First Column. On December 7, the Mongols, swollen by local recruitment to possibly 1,100-1,200 men, struck east from Jingpeng to Linxi, bivouac for Rehe's 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Since the commander of the cavalry, Chang Wanli, had evacuated his force south to Wudan County, Linxi surrendered without a fight on December 8.

Murungga, having heard news that troops from Linxi were concentrating at Wudan, turned south to secure his flank and link up with Han Linfu's forces. Before advancing, Murungga enlisted another local force, a 100-man-plus battalion under Ren Chengye, that had been abandoned by Chang. The augmented First Column swung through Daban, a small settlement in Baarin Right Banner, recruited that banner's hundred-man Mongol militia with the prince's approval, and crossed the Shara Mören River. The Mongol force assaulted Wudan on the night of December 10 and in the only pitched battle of the campaign so far seized the city by morning. Before the attack, the brigade commander, Chang Wanli, had again fled south, to Fuxin, leaving his troops leaderless and disorganized.

From the front, Murungga claimed that the enemy casualties, mostly captured, were 1,000, while his own were only one dead and four wounded! Among the captives was Chang's chief of staff, many officers, a brigade of naturalized White Russians, seven field guns, and a baggage train. By recruiting the enemy captives, Murungga's column swelled into a 3,000 man mixed Mongol-Chinese force. After capturing Wudan, the East Mongol unit linked up with General Zhang Yunrong and Han Linfu.

Their force too had been wholly successful, capturing Chifeng and expanding their own forces to perhaps three or four thousand men.[22]

Military Strategy and Propaganda Themes

How could an ill-armed and virtually untrained force defeat so many foes? In its analysis, the party center rightly stressed the disarray in the enemy ranks. The supreme commander Kan had set the example by fleeing before the Citizen Army even attacked, while the treachery of Guo and other Fengtian commanders made mere cowardice positively respectable. Finally Murungga's force had the prestige of the Citizen Army soldiers behind it, some of the best-trained and led fighting men in Chinese warlord history. While Marshal Feng was extremely dubious about their ability to resist the formidable Fengtian military, outside observers rated its chances rather high. The sudden victory, however, carried with it hidden perils; a Soviet report of early 1926 noted how the recruitment of defeated troops in Rehe lowered the fighting quality of the Citizen Army there.[23]

Chinese military history suggests as well that these victories were easy precisely because, strategically, they were inconsequential. Due to the poor morale and logistics of the armies, Chinese warfare in this period was tied to the railroads, upon which moved both the infantry and heavy equipment, especially artillery. Territory outside the railway net was easily conquered, as it could not be held with heavy equipment. All of the towns conquered by the Mongols' First Route Army were unserved by railways or paved roads which made them virtually impassible for anything heavier than a light artillery. Such conquests however had little strategic significance even if they outflanked or surrounded areas within the railway net. With any approach back towards that railway net, the heavier equipment thereon would again become decisive. Thus territories in the hinterlands could change hands one day only to be lost just as easily the next. The way out of this dilemma, one found by the KMT's National Revolutionary Armies on the Northern Expedition, was to have secure enough finances to be able

[22] Based on Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 588; *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 104-5; Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 20-21 (Short report, undated).

[23] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 20-21 (Short report, undated); How, "Soviet Advisers With the Kuominchun," p. 113.

to hire civilians to transport heavy equipment off the railway lines, thus acquiring unprecedented strategic mobility.[24]

Such an achievement was far beyond the capabilities of General Zhang Yunrong's half-armed cavalry force. Guo Songling's forces were racing into the heart of Fengtian Province, throwing Zhang Zuolin's territory into a panic. At the battle of Lianshan, the Fengtian forces fled at the first sound of General Guo's artillery. On December 13, General Guo had arrived at Yingkou, on the threshold of the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway zone which bisected Northeast China north to south.

As the main offensive developed, the forces in Rehe saw great vistas opening before them. The party leaders thought the capture of Kailu would put all Jirim League into party hands and the 3,000 man force could expand to the originally proposed level of 5,000. In the euphoria of the weeks after the capture of Wudan, the PRPIM's Central Committee proposed to Marshal Feng and General Zhang a new advance on Kailu northeast through Taonan (modern Tao'an) to Qiqihar in Heilongjiang province. Since April and May of 1925, the Soviet embassy, the Mongolian government, and Marshal Feng had all dreamed about attacking Zhang Zuolin in Heilongjiang. General Zhang Yunrong supposedly had ambitions to become Heilongjiang's new governor.

The advance on Kailu was delayed for weeks, however, as the columns stopped to reorganize. No news came from the party's underground operatives behind Fengtian lines in Jirim and Bargu. Perhaps regretting the assignment of Nimajab to this sensitive task, Bai Yunti and Mersé replaced him as the party's agent in Bargu on December 18 with Fumingtai's older brother, Hualintai. Since Hualintai had been the party's representative to the MPRP Central Committee, the party center appointed Fumingtai as its new representative in Ulaanbaatar.[25] Murungga's First Column was distributed about the area

[24] Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928* (Honolulu, 1976), pp. 190-201; Hsi-sheng Ch'i, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928* (Stanford, 1976), pp. 127-142. Northern Rehe differed somewhat from Ch'i's "interior" type of warfare. Unlike Yunnan, etc., it was largely an open plain and the availability of horses made the mobility of light troops much greater. However, the same factors of inability to inflict heavy casualties or decisively defeat the enemy rendered warfare indecisive despite the seemingly rapid seizure of territory.

[25] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 18 (Hualintai to MPRP CC, Dec. 18, 1925). The MPRP noted this change on December 22. Nimajab remained in Hulun Buir and continued to be active in the party despite the Central Committee's suspicions (Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 90).

of Juu Uda. Murungga reported that the relations between the soldiers and the civilians, both Mongol and Chinese, continued to be friendly with no instances of pillage or insults, while the soldiers themselves had high morale. For party policy, the question was: could the party consolidate control over the new territory? The new regime would have to get hold of Juu Uda's tax resources, keep the army supplied, and secure law and order so that the First Column soldiers could be removed from garrison duty and advance on Kailu.

Party leaders believed instilling a political consciousness in the people and especially the soldiers formed an essential precondition of these tasks. Thus, they needed political literature in the Mongolian language, as well as a military-political school on the model of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton or the Sükhebaatur Military Academy in Ulaanbaatar.[26] Before the campaign had begun, Hualintai, the PRPIM Central Committee's representative in Ulaanbaatar, had forwarded to the MPRP Central Committee a copy of the first issue of the *Dotogadu Monggol-un Arad-un Sedkhül* ("The People's Journal of Inner Mongolia") with speeches of the First Congress, both of foreign guests and of domestic party members, and essays on the party's principles. To build support for the party, he asked that the Mongolians print 2,000 copies of the work, to which the MPRP agreed. By December 17, the journal copies were beginning to arrive at Zhangjiakou to be forwarded to the occupied areas.[27]

In the following weeks the party lithographed (Mongolian, *chilagun bar*) many new documents. It reprinted the First Congress's manifesto and the PRPIM's party articles, and produced two more issues of the ten-day "People's Journal of Inner Mongolia," as well as a new mani-festo (dated December 20), a longer article called "The Agony of Inner Mongolia," and literature directed specially at the Bargu Mongols. The difficulty, however, lay less in printing them than in writing them. Apart from Mersé very few in Inner Mongolia could write this sort of new ideology, party leaders complained, and even Mersé could only do a little. Most publications were handled by Alta, who had been co-opted onto the presidium of the Central Committee after the First Congress. He

[26] On Whampoa Military Academy (from Jan. 1926 on, the Central Military and Political Academy), see Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 95-97, 113-15, 142-43, 224-25, 245-46, 337-38, 490-96, 584-93, 777-80. On the Military Academy in Ulaanbaatar, see Yondondüichir, ed., *Mongol Ardyn Armiin 50 jil*, pp. 88-89.

[27] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 588; *Soviet Plot in China*, pp. 105-06; Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 8 (Hualintai to MPRP CC, Nov. 30, 1925).

received invaluable assistance from Buyannemekhü, who signed the December 20 manifesto and "The Agony of Inner Mongolia." Sometimes problems of language interfered; a young Mongol in Jirim League, named Jujuringga, wrote his own tract explaining "the ideology of the new thinking" (*shine ukhagan-u surtal*), and distributed hand-written copies all over his banner. The party leaders praised the work, but it was written in Chinese, since Jujuringga did not write Mongolian well. The Central Committee had to translate it into Mongolian before distributing it.[28]

The insistence on using the Mongolian language, even though ethnic Chinese were a large part of the population in the occupied areas, emphasized the ethno-national basis of the party's appeal. The party literature focused on the fraud of feudal autonomy (that is, the banner and league system) and the promise of a new democratic-style national autonomy. "The Agony of Inner Mongolia" (*Dotogadu Monggol-un jobalang-tu baidal*) was a long exposé of the old system written by Alta in collaboration with Buyannemekhü (under his pen-name Tsetsenbilig-tü). The loss of power of the Mongolian banners, the erosion of their demographic base, the impoverishment of the Mongol people, the people's oppression by both the princes and the banner officials, the collaboration of lamas with the nobility, the Chinese colonization schemes, the nobility's hostility to education, its theft of the Chinese parliamentary elections, and its refusal to speak out for Mongol interests—all were denounced with an abundance of both anecdotes and outrage. The December 20 manifesto announced the fall of Zhang Zuolin and the Mongolian nobility, and called on the people to rise up and support the new autonomy:

> Mongolian brethren! Do not foolishly worry yourselves that just because the authority of the noble lords we trusted and relied on has been destroyed...A people's party has arisen whose true aim (*jorilta*) is

[28] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 19 (Short report, undated); 7-1-19: 23-24 (Serengdonrub and Mersé to MPRP CC, Dec. 25, 1925). The texts discussed are most easily found in Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China 1910–1929, roll 50, 893.00/7085, Vice-Consul E. F. Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926 (the December 20 manifesto), Urgunge Onon "The Proclamation of the First Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia to the Masses," *Inner Asia: Occasional Papers*, 1 (1996), 79-88, and Sh.B. Chimitdorzhiev and S.D. Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrennaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaiskikh ekspluatatorov" in Sh.B. Chimitdorzhiev, eds., *Istoriko-kul'turnye sviazi narodov Tsentral'noi Azii* (Ulaan-Üde, 1983), pp. 119-37 ("The Agony of Inner Mongolia").

> certainly to obtain freedom and happiness for you, the masses, and give you refuge from your various tormenters...
>
> Right now rouse yourselves, realize that this is your own battle and join as soldiers this, your own people's army! Gather supplies for it! Further strengthen it and develop it! Your task is to bring to a fitting conclusion that which has already been begun for you. Join your own party! Act according to your own party's instructions! Help your party in all its needs! Seek out and read the literature and doctrines distributed by your party! They have all been distributed to help you. Soon will come representatives from this party to implement a new regime in all the leagues and banners that will give local power to the masses...Take up local power, and establish an assembly in every land, so that the public affairs may be debated and decided by the public and a local government established...Do not let others trample your head by running to the county yamens and dutongs for every decision as did the nobles. Are there or are there not your own groups, like the league yamens, banner governments, and party, ready to guide you?[29]

The initial successes of the campaign charged the party's public pronouncements with a vigorous grass-roots radicalism not seen subsequently, even when the official line turned much further left. In "The Agony of Inner Mongolia," Alta and Buyannemekhü openly attacked the clergy, a subject the First Congress had studiously avoided. They began by acknowledging the nobility of Buddhism's original ideas: "The teachings of the Buddha Shakyamuni's religion are some of the finest and most profound ideas in the world and guide living beings to perform good deeds. They do not for a moment countenance the total destruction of this world's inhabitants." They went on to denounce the sins of "some evil lamas who do not understand at all the philosophy of Buddhism," who stupefy the Mongols, teaching children about demons and spirits to frighten them, and turning them towards the emptiness of the next life. The authors claim monastic Buddhism 1) decreased the population; 2) increased idleness and weakened the economy; and 3) converted the once brave and warlike Mongols into passive sheep. Not only that, monks preached obedience to the nobility and self-denial in this world to achieve better birth in the next. "Mongol brethren, think!" they demanded:

[29] U.S. State Dept. RRIAC, roll 50, 893.00/7085 (Vice-Consul E. F. Stanton to Secretary of State, Jan. 13, 1926). The same manifesto is also preserved in the Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 63 (Special Inspiration Letter from the PRPIM CC, Dec. 20, 1925).

> If the Buddha is to save all people, why is one born a nobleman and the other a slave? If it is because of the slave's bad karma, then are not you worshiping a Buddha incapable of really purifying bad karma? Now, however, the People's Buddha has been born into this world. He will purify the sufferers born as slaves and do what the previous Buddha could not do and will let all humanity enjoy the blessings of freedom in complete equality.[30]

This mixture of Buddhist reformism and revolutionary millenarianism was startling in Inner Mongolia. Party tracts distributed in Ordos, by contrast, avoided any criticism of Buddhism, a caution dictated by the cultural gap between the free-thinking East Mongol and Daur leaders and the devout Ordos Mongols. Addressing the East Mongols, people who had absorbed anti-clerical currents for over half a century, the party leaders felt freer to expound the radical intellectual roots of their revolutionary vision.

Against the Chinese officials the party lived up to its tough words. The former magistrate of Linxi County, Zhang Fengxian, reported a reign of terror. Immediately after Linxi's surrender, the Mongols executed Quan Ji, the head of the Linxi County Tax-Collection Bureau, by firing squad. In Lindong to the east, they let Wan Lisan, head of the Lindong Administrative Conversion Bureau (*shezhiju*, the preparatory organ for the replacement of banner with county administration), die of exposure. They also imprisoned Li Shaogeng, the Lindong Colonization Assistant. Magistrate Zhang stated six or seven Fengtian officers and men were captured and executed, and claimed there were many more of which he did not know the details. Although Zhang's account may contain some hostile exaggeration, the Rehe campaign did involve directed reprisals against Chinese officials involved in colonizing Mongol land. The Mongol banner rulers, however, did not suffer. Reports from the Beijing government singled out not only Murungga's father, Adjutant Yue Shan, and the figurehead ruler of Kheshigten Banner, Bökhejayaa, as "Red Party" conspirators, but also the prince of Baarin Right Banner, concurrently captain-general of Juu Uda League. The treatment of the Mongolian nobility contrasted strongly with the hostile actions against ethnic Chinese officials.[31]

[30] Sh.B. Chimitdorzhiev and S.D. Dylykov, "Iuzhnaia (Vnutrenniaia) Mongoliia pod gnetom kitaiskikh ekspluatatorov," pp. 128-29 and pp. 28 and 32 of the unpaginated Mongolian text.

[31] Based on Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 588.

Shara Juu and some herdsmen in the surrounding steppe. The party members held several assemblies, electing Dambiyüngning as chairman, with Bald Choimsun as his secretary. Thus the cell hierarchy mimicked the monastic hierarchy. Later secondary accounts speak of friendly relations being established with the yamen, but contemporary reports always put the Khanggin ruler along with that of Dalad as the two most implacable enemies of the party.[67]

Rural Mobilization: Strengths and Weaknesses

The party finally crossed the Yellow River out of Ordos into Ulaanchab in early November. In a little more than two months, the party had organized 23 cells with about 4,000 members covering every single banner. By comparison, the MPRP only achieved that level of party membership in 1925, after four years in power. Every banner except Dalad had open party organizations, and in Wang, Jasag, Üüshin, and Otog the local party controlled substantial military forces.[68] In addition, the duguilangs offered the party a method to reach all the masses, even those who did not wish to join the party. They were viewed as something like an ethnic Mongol equivalent of the Peasants' Associations (*Nongmin xiehui*), that formed the transmission belt for rural agitation in the Canton base area and the middle Yangtze.[69] The party had made an impressive beginning in linking up with the rural Mongols, far more than it had done in Juu Uda. According to A.I. Oshirov, the "arat tribesmen" viewed the party's Central Committee as the supreme organ upholding the interests of the Mongolian people, and showed that support by donating cattle, sheep, and other livestock.

[67] Sir-a Juu-yin Coyimsun, "Önggeregsen üy-e-yin cuqum gool joriltu-yin bayidal-un tobci-yi teükhe bolgan bicijü beledken talbigsan medegdel," pp. 17-19; Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig, *Ordos arad-un duguyilang-un ködelgegen*, pp. 301-04; *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 9a-b, 16b-17a. Ulaanjirim is in Josu Township in northeast Otog Banner, and Khoroochaidam is now the center of a sumu bearing that name in south-central Khanggin Banner. See *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Yike Zhao meng fence*, pp. 365, 452-53. Choimsun writes the abbots name as "Dambiyüngning," while Buyan, Altanbagan-a, and Edünkesig render it as "Dambiyingnan."

[68] Based on *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 7b, 9a-b, 16b; Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots*, p. 103; *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 17a. Figures on party membership in Mongolia from Alan J.K. Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Boulder, Col., 1987), p. 55.

[69] See Roy Hofheinz, *The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 93-109.

Although, as I noted above, most of the party leaders saw no theoretical difference between the "religious feudalists" and ordinary ones, they were happy to use Wangdanima's tremendous prestige to mobilize the clerical stratum and garner the support of lay believers. Oshirov wrote that the high clerics "rather surprisingly have been able to help and are very worthy of notice. These people have a relatively high consciousness towards the mass movement, and even show a good deal of support for the party center."

Despite the enthusiasm for them expressed at the party assembly in Otog, however, only in Üüshin had the duguilangs become real nuclei of popular power against the feudal nobility and the Chinese militarists. The party center hoped that, by next spring or summer, other banners might follow the example of Üüshin.[70] Everywhere the party had recruited along the line of least resistance, and ignored many potential supporters: the right-side duguilangs in Üüshin Banner, the eight duguilangs in Otog, and lay sympathizers in Khanggin like Taiji Sangjai. Now that the Central Committee had returned to the Chinese-settled Yellow River basin, it was up to the local banner committees to break out of these old patterns by forging new alliances.

The party leaders formally expected that party members would join as individuals, leaving their families and existing social networks, and join a new family of the party, where the party comrade were one's brothers, the people one's mother and father, and the Mongol race one's home.[71] Yet in Ordos, membership expansion usually came in waves with active social groups, such as duguilangs, temples, or disciples of a particular lama, joining the party *en masse*. Party documents indicate that little growth occurred outside these waves; the party recruited by social groups, not individuals. This rapid, group-by-group, recruitment meant that party members had little commitment to the party as an institution apart from its constituent sub-groups. The fragmentary data on lines of authority within party cells and branches also indicates that party hierarchies in Ordos mimicked those of the sub-groups that joined it. In Shara Juu, for example, the temple party cell reinforced, rather than undercut, the authority of the manager, Dambiyüngning. In Üüshin, the list of the membership of one cell shows that status within the party (as marked by candidate membership, full membership, and committee membership), corresponded remarkably closely with existing status distinctions, particularly that of taijis and the commoners (see table 13.2). While the taijis were often no richer than the commoners, they did

[70] *Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian*, IV, *San*..., 6a-b.

[71] See the party card reproduced in Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 510-516.

Table 13.2: Social Status and Party Status in Üüshin Banner's Cell No. 4 (covering areas of Dabchag, Galuutu, Toorim, Yekhe Sebkhül)

	Subcell chairmen	Full members	Candidate members	Youth league members	Not entered
Total	8	30	42	54	63
Taijis	2 (25%)	4 (13.3%)	2 (4.8%)	3 (5.6%)	1 (1.6%)
Other high status		2			
Wives (*ekhener*)					24
Old women (*chibagancha*)					2

"Other high status" includes one secretary (*bichigechi*) and one chairman (*daruga*), meaning the lowest ranked traditional banner militia officer, heading ten households (Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, 121b). Dabchag is the seat of Üüshin Banner, Galuutu and Toorim are former temples now the seats of two sumus, while Yekhe Sebkhül is a modern administrative village in Bayanchaidam Township—see *Nei Menggu Zizhiqu dimingzhi: Yike Zhao mengfence*, pp. 309, 321, 322-23, 312, *Diminglu*, 122.

Source: Altan'orgil, *Kökeqota-yin teüken monggol surbulji bicig*, III, 508-509.

have both legal privileges and prestige associated with their descent from Chinggis Khan. The presence of eight taijis and only one *arban ail-un daruga*, "chief of ten," the lowest office in the banner system responsible for transmitting orders to the families, also suggests that the strong hostility to the banner's coercive power did not influence the prestige of Chinggisid ancestry.

The Üüshin party authorities expressed their fundamentally conservative position on questions of status distinction within the ranks of "the people" most dramatically by banning women or youths from party membership. While the duguilangs allowed female household heads and unattached youth to participate, membership in the party was restricted to male heads of household. The party center did not at first challenge this violation of the principles of open membership for male and female set forth in the manifesto and party oaths. Indeed, the party leaders' emphasis on seeing all Mongols as brothers and their repeated

invocation of the family as a metaphor for the Mongolian race militated against any consistent attack on the patriarchal social order. Indeed, not a single female delegate attended the First Congress in Zhangjiakou. The Youth League allowed young Mongol men to join, as juniors, the party brotherhood, but no such vehicle, outside of the duguilangs themselves, existed for women.

The merging of party and society embodied in the pattern of mass recruitment by sub-groups had both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it permitted rapid mobilization and identified the party with loyalties, especially religious loyalties, already meaningful for the Ordos Mongols. On the other hand it increased the centrifugal possibilities already latent in the decentralized political environment of Inner Mongolia. As long as the party center delivered on its promise to defend the Ordos Mongols, then that weakness might remain hidden. By returning once again to Citizen Army headquarters, the party leaders were gambling on Feng's ability to resist Zhang Zuolin and Yan Xishan. If he could, then the nobility would stick to their treaties, local party organizations could expand, and the Central Committee could build up its military-political school. If he could not, then another rout such as had happened after Nankou could wipe out all the gains of the last two months.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE SPECIAL CONGRESS, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1927

It is unknown exactly when Bai Yunti arrived in Ulaanbaatar or what reaction he and his colleagues had upon meeting after all the heated telegrams exchanged in the months before. Mersé was perhaps still on vacation in Verkhneudinsk; he missed the August 5 meeting of the presidium chaired by Bai Yunti in Ulaanbaatar. The meeting set the first session of the Special Congress (*tuskhai yekhe khural*) for 5:00 o'clock in the evening of August 8 at the Workers' Club. This session asked the MPRP to give a leave of absence to all the party members in Ulaanbaatar schools, whether in grade schools or the party school, so that they could attend the congress, even though the Special Congress in Ningxia had allowed only four student representatives, two from Moscow and two from Ulaanbaatar, to attend. The meeting also agreed to ask the MPRP Central Committee to send a representative to the congress.[1]

The protocols of the Special Congress (if they ever existed) would undoubtedly record a parliamentary drama of high order. The congress lasted for almost a month and marked a major reversal in the direction of the party. Longer and more tumultuous than any other congress, it was the first and only general meeting of the party where members of all ranks seriously debated the party's future. There was of course a good deal of manipulation of the delegates, especially by M.I. Amagaev, the Comintern representative, yet the incomplete record of the congress makes it clear that a genuinely free debate took place.

The results of this burst of free discussion blind-sided Bai Yunti. Expecting intrigues from Mersé, he instead received a public attack on the whole policy of the Central Committee up until the Special Congress. Despite the assurances that the old presidium had given to Bai Yunti, the Special Congress was in reality, if not in name, a Second Congress. By the end of the congress, however, Bai Yunti was hardly in a position to blame his old colleagues for breaking their promises, for the entire presidium—Bai Yunti, Mersé, and all the rest—was voted out, and its record excoriated. While the party's long term goals stayed the same, the

[1] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 35 (Serengdonrub to MPRP CC, Aug. 5, 1927).

organizational, strategic, and tactical means to achieve them were radically altered.

An Irrepressible Conflict?

On August 1, Stalin had finally put to rest the united front in China with a speech calling for true revolutionaries to organize workers, peasants, and soldiers' soviets (councils) in China, the same day as the start of the Chinese Communist's Nanchang rebellion. In this context, it is easy to see the PRPIM's Special Congress as the mere playing-out on Mongolian soil of the united front's break-down in China. Indeed, after the PRPIM's own final split into left and right factions, both sides presented the break as such. Bai Yunti in the aftermath of the Congress charged that "recently, though, a small group of opportunists returned from Moscow to Ulaanbaatar and began spreading Communist ideas and breaking up the party." Supported by the Comintern representative, he claimed, they dominated the proceedings, bullied the delegates, and directly violated the manifesto and resolutions of the First Congress. They elected a Communist Central Committee to replace the legitimate one and began to spread red ideas. Among modern authors, Jagchid Sechin has followed this view.

On the other side, Wulanfu (Yun Ze) in his memoirs claimed that Bai Yunti had always supported the feudal elements and protected their interests. In this situation, with the united front breaking up, the party had to call a Special Congress to abolish these errors and preserve the revolutionary line correctly set out at the First Congress. In this process, claimed Wulanfu, the Chinese Communist party members played the most active role. This view is adopted by his ghost-writer Hao Weimin (Odkhonbilig) in his own publications on the party.[2]

Despite coming from opposite sides of the ideological barricades, the two views have much in common. They both posit that Bai Yunti, as a long-standing rightist/anti-communist nationalist and opponent of Communist ideals/plots, inevitably comes into conflict with the Comintern whose representatives guided/manipulated the Communist-minded youth in the party into unmasking/unfairly criticizing him

[2] "Nei Meng Guomindang qingGong jingguo," *Minguo ribao*, Oct. 28, 1928, p. 4; Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 67-8 (Anti-Communist Declaration of the Inner Mongolian People's Party, Oct. 25, [1927]); Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, *Wulanfu huiyi lu* (Beijing, 1989), pp. 72-73; Sechin Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies* (Provo, Utah, 1988), p. 273; Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 591-95.

principally because of his long-standing reactionary/nationalist line. This view in either version is unacceptable for three reasons: 1) It erroneously assumes the pre-existing splits in the party were ones of right versus left. Bai Yunti was not a rightist or an opponent of the Comintern before his humiliation at the Special Congress made him into one. 2) The students were not simply following Moscow's lead. They had their own grievances against the old Central Committee, which were not exactly the same as those of Amagaev and the Comintern. On some points, the students' aims were directly contradictory to the Comintern's. Most of the youth who led the effort to dump Bai Yunti would later become disciplinary problems for the Comintern itself. 3) Most of the criticism of the old Central Committee and Bai Yunti was not directly related to the Nationalist-Communist split in China. Instead they were very specific criticisms of past PRPIM policies, which had nothing to do with the Chinese parties, and which would have been as relevant in August, 1926, as in August, 1927. While labeling him a rightist, Bai Yunti's actual fault, as detailed in the particulars of the indictment, seems to have been that he was an autocrat, suppressing intra-party democracy. Thus, the decisions of the congress must be primarily interpreted in light of the previous internal conflicts in the party.

Despite its prominence in subsequent accounts of the Special Congress, the issue of class is hardly to be seen in the congress resolutions and directives. Bai Yunti and the old presidium are never presented as "defending the interests of the feudal upper stratum," nor is there any concrete analysis of the class support of the Inner Mongolian revolution. Instead the documents simply used the term "real people" (*jingkhini arad*) to give a vague sense of the masses. This term had appeared before, for example in the summer, 1925, report to the MPRP on party activities in Inner Mongolia, written by Bai Yunti and others. This report talked of targeting the party appeals on the "real people" (*jinkhene arad* or "real arads"), and more particularly the "real poor people" (*jinkhene yadagu arad* or "real poor arads").[3] In Soviet terminology, from which it seems to stem, the Mongolian term *arad* (Russian, *arat*), which only meant "commoner" (as opposed to both the nobility and the serfs and slaves and others not subject to the regular sumu administration) often appeared as if it was some specific term designating ethnically Mongol rural nomads, as opposed to the rich herdlords and the city dwellers, corrupted by long proximity to the Chinese. The search for the "real arats" and their expansion of their ranks in the party became in

[3] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural: 1925 ony yesdügeer saryn 23-arawdugaar saryn 1. Delegerengüi tailan.* (Ulaanbaatar, 1978), p. 51.

itself the guarantee of the soundness of its policies. The Kazakh Comintern agent, Turar Ryskulov, had spoken in his report to the party's presidium in October, 1924, about the need to "uphold the interests of the real arats."[4] The reappearance of this term in Inner Mongolian party discourse marked the advent of a phase not of socio-economic analysis, but of purging; the party needed to inquire not only where were the "real people," but who in its ranks were "bogus people."

The closest the Special Congress came to actually defining a class position was in its "Directives on Party Structure and Work," which specified that party enrollments should emphasize the "real people." It then went on to state that the poor gentry (taijis), the lamas, and the petty officials were also oppressed so they too could join "when appropriate." Only dukes, princes, and high lamas were inherently suspect; they could only join the party with special permission of the Central Committee ("Directives on Party Organization and Work," no. 4).[5] By implication, then, the label *jingkhini arad*, the real or genuine people, meant those who were legally unprivileged, regardless of wealth or poverty, something like the Third Estate in *ancien régime* France.[6] Even the exclusion of the titled nobility, the dukes and princes, was not absolute; directives on state and government allowed that even they might be allowed to participate in the people's administration, if they they have "democratic views and a racial-revival consciousness" (*ardyn uzeltei bögööd ündes ugsaagaa manduulakh bodlogotoi*, "Directives on State and Government," no. 1, note). Nor did the congress call for the abolition of slavery and hereditary bondage, which AltanOchir and Fumingtai had denounced in May, 1925, and which Bai Yunti had promised to eliminate in the Ningxia Congress. At the same time, the implicit classification of high lamas along with the titled nobility as enemies of the revolution could have made unnecessary difficulties in places such as Yekhe Juu

[4] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 67; *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn döröwdügeer ikh khural*, pp. 31-32.

[5] Congress material cited from S. Rentsensonom, "Öwör Mongolyn teükhen amidral" (dated September 28, 1970) a typescript in the archives of the Oriental and International Institute of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences: *fond* 2, *towyoog* 4, *khatgalamjiin negj* 4, pp. 53-64. Rentsensonom quotes the entire resolutions and directives of the Special Congress, transcribing it into the Cyrillic script.

[6] In traditional Mongolian legal literature, this estate was variously called *arad*, "the people," *kharachus*, "commoners," or *albatu*, "the taxed." See Antoine Mostaert, "Matériaux ethnographiques relatifs aux Mongols Ordos," *Central Asiatic Journal* 2 (1956), 241; Nei Menggu Zizhiqu bianji zu, *Menggu zu shehui lishi diaocha* (Höhhot, 1985), p. 119. Local names were also in use; in Khorchin such elements were called *khökhe khuyag*, "blue (or state) soldiers."

League where the party had the support of considerable parts of the clerical order.

Rhetorically, though, the mood of the Special Congress popularized the use of a seemingly class-based Marxist rhetoric. The words "proletarian" (*ügeigüü*, literally "without nothing") and "capitalist" (*khöröngeten*, literally "ones with treasure") appeared frequently in letters of this period to describe the polarization of Mongolian society.[7] Despite the rhetorical rodomontade against the capitalists and the apostrophizing of the poor oppressed real people which would later become a staple of official propaganda, no one in the party gave serious thought to the question of purely economic inequalities amongst Mongol commoners or envisioned anyone outside the ranks of the banner yamen and its supporters as the enemy.

This coexistence of a pseudo-Marxist vocabulary of "bourgeois" and "proletarians" along with a predominantly ethical revulsion against the idle, and a lack of practical concern about specifically economic inequalities between various types of employment was also a feature of the predominantly anarchist socialism of the May Fourth movement in China.[8] As John Fitzgerald has pointed out, the class vocabulary did not really mean seeing socio-economic relations as having an independent role in determining politics; on the contrary, ideological differences between political factions of identical social origin were treated by a peculiarly Marxist form of mystification as inevitable conflicts of pre-existing classes.[9]

Nor was this pseudo-class vocabulary new to the PRPIM. Bai Yunti's first proposal of 1924 had emphasizing how Inner Mongolia with few capitalists (*khapital khöröngeten*) was having its blood sucked by the enormous number of Chinese ones, so that the Mongols were being deprived of their homes and capital/property and become proletarians.[10] Here it is ethno-national conflicts, not ideological struggles, that are being mystified as class conflict. Yet during the PRPIM's united national front period from October, 1925, to May, 1927, such a vocabulary, like the polarization between the old Nationalist Party and the younger Youth or Communist party allegiances, had been pushed to the margins. Its re-emergence marks not a new analysis of Mongolian society, still less any

[7] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 27-28 (Anonymous to PRPIM CC, Sept. 3, 1927); 7-1-20: 15 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927).

[8] Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York, 1989), pp. 78, 89-90, 127, 130.

[9] John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, 1996), pp. 15-16.

[10] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 8 (Serengdonrub to MPP CC, Aug. 6, 1924).

actual sharpening of objective class conflicts, but rather the re-legitimation of factional political struggle within the nationalist movement and within the party. In this way, the party was not so much moving into a new stage of "Bolshevization" as it was experiencing the re-emergence of the factionalism and sectarianism that A.I. Oshirov had discouraged in 1925.

The Protagonists

The major defeat for Bai Yunti in the Special Congress came when the decisions of the Ningxia Special Congress were voided.[11] As a result, the attendance did not follow the rules specified at Ningxia. Not only Mersé, but a large number of students, both from Ulaanbaatar and Moscow, participated in the meeting. The total participants added up to as many as forty, of which about half or more were students either in Mongolia or specially brought in from the Soviet Union for the occasion.[12] Bai Yunti must have been out-voted from the beginning and could not effectively contest the procedural legitimacy of these decisions. The new Central Committee later insisted that Bai Yunti attended the Congress from beginning to end and accepted all of its decisions.[13]

The intervention of the students into the affairs of the party marked both the recrudescence of the youthful zeal embodied in the old Youth Party of 1925, and, ironically, the full acceptance by the youth that the PRPIM was the only outlet for Inner Mongolian revolutionary activity. Bai Yunti and his partisans later identified seven figures as the most active promoters of "red imperialism": three (Bai Haifeng, Yun Run, and Korlô) had joined the Youth Party and two (Bai Haifeng and Yun Run) had also joined the Communists. Two were rural delegates, Buyanbaatur from Chakhar and Möngkhe'öljei from Üüshin, while Buyantogtakhu (b. 1903, from Kharachin Right Banner, a.k.a. ÖljeiOchir) was a PRPIM

[11] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 42 (Mersé and Korlô to MPRP CC, Nov. 29, 1927).

[12] Based on Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155 and Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 592-93. Presidium and Central Committee members known to have been present were Bai Yunti, Altan, Murungga, Fumingtai, Mandaltu, Erkhimbatu, Buyantai, and Mersé, while local delegates brought from Ningxia were Jamyangsharab (Otog), Möngkhe'öljei (Üüshin), Rabdan (Jüüngar), Buyanbaatur (Chakhar), Gaikhamshigtubaatur (Urad Right Duke?), and Örgendalai (Han Yuru, Jüüngar). The Comintern sent M.I. Amagaev, while the MPRP CC sent another representative, adding up to sixteen. The rest were students.

[13] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 42 (Mersé and Korlô to MPRP CC, Nov. 29, 1927), 7-1-26: 70 (PRPIM CC to Kuomintang and Communist Parties of China).

member and a student studying first in Mongolia and later at Moscow, but of unknown previous political affiliation. The last, Bao Shixian, is of unknown origin and political affiliation.[14] Four had been studying in Moscow when the Congress began: Bai Haifeng, Korlô, and Buyantogtakhu at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV, from its Russian initials), and Yun Run at the Sun Yat-sen University, set up specially for training Chinese revolutionaries.

Korlô (Bai Yonglun) came from a poor family in Kheshigten Banner. He graduated from the Zhangjiakou Normal School, and went to the KUTV in 1926. While there, he associated with the students from Mongolia, used his Mongolian name, and came to be known as "Big" Korlô (*Öndör Khorloo*). Bai Haifeng (1904-1957, Mongolian name, Düürinsang), after a stint at the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, had been selected for the KUTV in 1926, on the recommendation of Wang Bingzhang, and was probably in the same class as Korlô at the KUTV. Both Korlô and Bai Haifeng had used their Chinese names in the Youth Party in Beijing, 1925, but both switched to their Mongolian names in Moscow, perhaps a sign of growing nationalist consciousness. Yun Run (Mongolian name, Ariya) came from the small village of Tabucun in the Höhhot Tümed Special Banner, where he lived in an extended family with his parents, grandparents, paternal grandparents, paternal uncles, and two cousins, including Yun Ze (Wulanfu). Yun Run and Yun Ze both attended school in Guisui's Tümed Higher Primary School, before going on to the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy in Beijing. There Yun Run joined the Inner Mongolian Youth Party by the summer of 1925. In September, he joined the Chinese Communist Party which sponsored him to go to the Sun Yat-sen University. In July 1927 he graduated from the Sun Yat-sen school and was assigned to return to China, stopping on the way at Ulaanbaatar to attend the Special Congress.[15] All three of these students, along with Buyantogtakhu and several others, were given special leave in order to attend this congress.[16]

Two, at least, of Bai Yunti's tormentors, though, were not so assigned. One was Buyanbaatur (a.k.a. He Zhiyuan, 1899/1900-1939),

[14] Based on Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 55 (Inner Mongolian People's Party to MPRP CC, [Oct.] 31); Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 49 (Inner Mongolian Youth Party to MPRP CC), and Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," pp. 602-04.

[15] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 603; O. Pürew, ed., *MAKhN-yn akhmad ajiltan, gishüüdiin durtgal*, vol. 1 (Ulaanbaatar, 1978), p. 125; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyan shi, *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 8-10, 12-13, 16-18, 20-21, 23, 28-29, 33, 37, 41, 42, 59, 70, 75, 77-78, 91.

[16] Liu Yingyuan, "Zhang Wenxian tongzhi Etuoke qi ershi nian," *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao* 14 (1984), 169.

born in Chakhar Plain Red Banner (now part of Chakhar Right Wing Rear Banner), and educated in Mongolian and Chinese. Like other young Chakhars he became active after the PRPIM moved westward, joining the party at Baotou in June, 1926. He had followed the Central Committee west to Ningxia and attended the Ningxia Special Congress as a delegate from Chakhar.[17] Möngkhe'öljei, of course, had come with Bai Yunti from Ningxia, where he represented the party organization of Üüshin Banner. The text of his report on Ordos party activities delivered at the Ulaanbaatar Congress shows that he did not plan to attack the old presidium. The report made no mention of the executions at Bayanmöngkhe, and Möngke'öljei freely admitted that he had attended the Ningxia Congress and come to Ulaanbaatar at the behest of the party chairman. Indeed his own stated aims in coming to Ulaanbaatar were quite similar to those of Bai Yunti's. After making his report and receiving instruction, he hoped to have forty able Üüshin lads trained in Mongolia, and receive the new rifles promised since November, 1926.[18] Already Üüshin had lost about ten of its original one hundred rifles in clashes with Jing Yuexiu. Since Bai Yunti had originally chosen Buyanbaatur and Möngkhe'öljei to support him, they must have defected to the other side during the course of the congress.

Thus even if there was a conspiracy hatched in Moscow to spread Communist ideology and break up the party, the conspirators gained unexpected support on the conference floor. The manager of the effort to overthrow the old leaders was Matvei Innokent'ievich Amagaev. Amagaev had worked in Mongolia for five years, and been a major policy maker for two of those, and his opinions were given great weight in Comintern policy on Mongolia. Since the breakdown of the united front in China and his disagreements with Dambadorji and the MPRP Central Committee, Amagaev considered a major overhaul in the Inner Mongolian party necessary both in itself and as a prelude to a similar overhaul in the MPRP. In an October 15, 1927, letter to F.F. Petrov in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, Dambadorji commented bitterly on Amagaev's recent actions:

> The policy Amagaev is following with the Inner Mongolian party reveals his methodology in politics. At first he provoked quarrels

[17] Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei zhanzheng shiqi," p. 602; letter from Ya. Batsuuri, head of the Central Archive of the General Office for the Assurance of State Security (*Ulsyn Ayuulgüi Baidlyg Khamgaalakh Yörönkhii Gazar*), to Dashtsewel, Scientific Secretary of the Institute of Oriental and International Studies, April 30, 1992.

[18] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 38-41 (Möngkhe'öljei's report to the Special Congress, Aug. 1927).

> between the senior members, and between the senior members and the old [rural] representatives, and then when they began to argue with each other, Amagaev brought in against them a third force opposed to the aims of both the rural and the responsible comrades.[19]

To add names to this account, first Amagaev set Bai Yunti and Mersé against each other, then the rural representatives brought from Ningxia were encouraged to air their grievances against the presidium, and finally the youth delegates were brought in to complete the upset. Dambadorji was not unbiased, but he does give the best description of Amagaev's strategy at the Special Congress.

In the face of Amagaev's strategy, Dambadorji could only hope to moderate the decisions. A well-informed Japanese writer in 1942, Nozu Akira, claims that Dambadorji had originally added his voice to persuade Bai Yunti and Sainbayar to attend the Congress. Bai Yunti and Mersé's internecine quarrel distressed him and he hoped the Special Congress could finally resolve this conflict. The MPRP leadership had accumulated quite a bit of information on the developing party controversy and was in a strong position to broker a resolution of the issues. Thus, Amagaev's turning of the Congress from conflict resolution to a full-scale assault on the whole presidium offended him particularly. During the congress he tried to prevent an excessively harsh criticism of Bai Yunti and his supporters and the wholesale replacement of the old Central Committee. When the Inner Mongolian delegates and the chairmen of the Congress insisted on a complete replacement. Communist sources say, he shook his sleeves and stalked out of the meeting. At least while the struggle was going on, M.I. Amagaev demanded that the MPRP stay out of the Inner Mongolian party's internal affairs. Insisting that only the Inner Mongols themselves had the right to decide their own leadership, he encouraged the young Inner Mongols to defy the Mongolian leader.[20]

Once the Inner Mongolian party had been transformed under Amagaev's direction, however, he encouraged the young Inner Mongols to challenge the sudden coolness of the MPRP leadership toward the Inner Mongolian party. On August 18, Mersé's kinsman and party member Erkhimbatu charged the Minister of the Interior, Amur, with trying to sunder the links between the Inner Mongolian and Outer Mongolian People's Parties. Near the close of the congress the new leadership delegated three Inner Mongols—new presidium members Bai Haifeng

[19] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintern ba Mongol*, p. 192.

[20] Based on Nozu Akira, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155; Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 593.

and Buniyabazar, with the Daur Erkhimbatu—to investigate the truth or falsity of this claim and peremptorily demanded the Central Committee of the "All-Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party" reply at once. The Comintern considered Amur to be a necessary but stubborn nationalist and Amagaev must have enjoyed setting the students on him.[21]

In all this dispute Mersé played an ambiguous role. At the beginning of the congress, he pursued his vendetta against Bai Yunti with the aid of students like Bai Haifeng, and supported their demands for a greater youth role. Yet the congress in the end dismissed him as secretary and even presidium member. Unlike Bai Yunti, though, he did not fall into disgrace; he remained quite active in the Ulaanbaatar political scene even as he dropped out of the PRPIM leadership. On August 15-19, while the Special Congress was still in session, Mersé joined the First Congress of Mongolian Trade Unions, where he was elected as secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions. At that time the proletariat of Mongolia, such as it was, was largely Chinese with some Russians and only a smattering of Mongols. Someone like Mersé, who could speak all three languages, was a valuable resource.

If the resolutions of the trade union congress reflected Mersé's opinions, the ongoing turmoil of the Inner Mongolian congress did not break his confidence in the Soviet Union. Their main emphasis was on integrating the Mongolian Trade Unions with the international proletarian revolution, under Moscow's Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern). Mersé was chosen to join the delegation of the Central Council of Mongolian Trade Unions to the upcoming Fourth World Congress of the Profintern.[22]

Thus although Mersé did not emerge from the Special Congress victorious in his struggle with Bai Yunti—rather they were both

[21] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 39 (Special Congress of the PRPIM to MPRP CC, Sept. 3, 1927); J. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), p. 81. Amagaev said of Amur in November, 1928: "Amur will only pursue his own policy. He is a more direct man than Tserindorji. It looks like we may disagree with him on the question of dismissing the White advisers and inviting Soviet ones. On relations with the USSR he is against taking loans." Even so, Amagaev held that the he was necessary to the Mongolian regime as Prime Minister, both to refute charges of Soviet imperialism and to calm the opposition of the lamas and the old-style officials. See O. Batsaikhan, "Komintern shatar nüüsen ni," *Il towchoo*, Feb. 1-10, 1992, no. 4, p. 7.

[22] Nozu Akira, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," pp. 154-155; Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 503; *Ünen*, Sept. 17, 1927, no 31, pp. 2-3; "Bükü Monggol-un Üiledbüricin-ü Eblel-üd–ün töb jöblel-ece: neyite-ber jarlan sonosqaqu ucar," *Ünen*, Oct. 23, 1928, no 41, p. 3. On the Mongolian trade unions in this period, see D. Yadamsüren, *Mongolyn üildwerchnii ewleliin khödölgöön, tüünii ündsen shinj chanar ontslog (1921-1940)* (Ulaanbaatar, 1975).

supplanted by a whole new leadership—he was able to go on to new positions of responsibility. The position offered possibilities for helping young Inner Mongols and Mersé's supporters and relatives, such as Wu Wenxian (Namrindorji) and Erkhimbatu also found employment in the union apparatus.[23] The position also kept Mersé in close contact with Dambadorji who was acting chairman of the Central Council.[24] An important unsolved puzzle of this period is Mersé and Dambadorji's mutual relations. The record indicates that they were not personal enemies, but give no evidence on whether Dambadorji ever saw Mersé as an ally against the students like Korlô.

The Errors of the Old Central Committee

The Congress approved a list of eight errors of the old presidium (*tergüülegchdiin towchoo*) which together explained the party's inability to build a solid base among the people.[25] The criticisms added up to a damaging portrait of a presidium that emphasized urban intrigues and quick-fix solutions over patient party-building among the Mongol people. The shuttling of the Central Committee between Zhangjiakou, Dolonnuur, Beijing, and Ulaanbaatar—anywhere except the Juu Uda League where party work was actually being done—had damaged the party in the period of the Rehe campaign (no. 1). Hoping to seize power quickly the party did not emphasize long-term preparation (no. 2). Thus in building a party militia, the presidium did not wait to mobilize the Mongol people themselves, but instead tried to expand the forces as quickly as possible through enlisting Chinese soldiers, bandit forces, and other professional fighters (no. 7). Likewise, in admitting members, the party did not pay attention to quality, so that many cells and even banner committees were inactive and easily lost contact with the party. The party Central Committee did not even keep clear, up-to-date lists either of cells or of members as a whole (no. 5).

In the same hope of achieving power instantly through outside support, the presidium (and here Bai Yunti would be especially guilty) not only maintained relations with the Chinese Citizen Army, but even

[23] On Wu Wenxian (Namrindorji), see Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 6, 131 (Office of Internal Security, report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932): on Erkhimbatu, see Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 80-81.

[24] Sh. Dambarénchin, *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Nam Mongolyn Üildwerchnii Ewleliin tukhai* (Ulaanbaatar, 1983), p. 331 n. 3, 5.

[25] S. Rentsensonom, "Öwör Mongolyn teükhen amidral" (dated September 28, 1970), archives of MAS Oriental and International Institute, *fond* 2, *towïyoog* 4, *khatgalamjiin negj* 4, 53-64.

acted as if the party was subordinate to it, and stuck to it even after the Citizen Army had turned against the revolution (no. 3). Even when the opportunity came to build a real base in Ordos, the presidium did not use it correctly. Instead of using the duguilangs to begin building a people's government that would replace the feudal dukes and princes, they signed treaties with the nobility and recognized their power (no. 4). They even carelessly gave rifles to the reactionaries (no. 7). As icing on the cake there were vague allegations about "some presidium members" misusing party funds for personal enrichment, probably directed at AltanOchir (no. 6).[26]

These criticisms stemmed from a good deal of knowledge and reflection about the party's history so far. The party had in fact lost much of its position in Yekhe Juu due to the presidium's excessive reliance on the Citizen Army and insufficient trust in the Mongols' ability to make revolution in rural Inner Mongolia on their own. The presidium could have pointed out, though, that many of these policies, such as the treaties with the nobility, and the close alliance with Citizen Army, had been endorsed by the Comintern representative, A.I. Oshirov, the Soviet embassy, and the Mongolian government. As we have seen, the Comintern at that time had not been concerned that the party was too close to the Citizen Army and China's national revolution, but rather that it was too distant. The Rehe campaign had been impeded from the beginning by Grigorii Voitinskii's suspicion of any ties with the MPRP that had any odor of "pan-Mongolism" about them.

The Special Congress's "Directives on Party Structure and Work" outlined the delegates' response to these specific problems. They identified grass-roots party organizations among the rural Mongol masses as the foundation of party work. Activity had to be redoubled in Ordos, Ulaanchab, and Bargu, as well as other areas. Given their distance from each other and each one's unique foreign and domestic context, peculiar customs, and differing size, the central leadership could not focus on all of them at the same time. Thus the party was to create six bureaus (*tow-*

[26] There is a letter from Altan[Ochir] to "the Central Committee of the All-Mongolian Revolutionary People's Party," in the MPRP's Central Party Archives, 7-1-19: 21-3, unfortunately undated. In it Altan states that Fumingtai and Bai Yunti and later Mersé handled all financial matters, and disbursed all money—Altan did not. He said that all questions about money should be directed to them, not to him. "This is not my avoiding responsibility or inciting arguments among the comrades, but adherence to the division of labor." This letter clearly suggests that Altan was under some sort of suspicion of mishandling party funds supplied by the MPRP, during the period of May-July 1925 when Fumingtai and Bai Yunti were in Mongolia and after the First Congress when Mersé became secretary. It is of course impossible to tell if these suspicions were valid.

choo) to exercise intermediate leadership over the various regions. The Central Committee would thus not have run from league to league, picking up work here and abandoning it there, as it had before. Itself seated in one place, the party center would use the bureaus to keep in touch with all the leagues. Finally the preservation of a certain distance, both literal and metaphorical, between the Central Committee and any one league would prevent the unbalanced recruitment by local waves, which was closely linked to regional factionalism (no. 1). The directives envisioned six special branch bureaus of the Central Committee:

1. Jirim
2. Bargu and Qiqihar
3. Josotu and Juu Uda
4. Shili-yin Gool
[5. Chakhar?][27]
6. Yekhe Juu, Ulaanchab, Guisui Tümeds, Alashan, and Ejene.

Each bureau, appointed by the Central Committee, would serve as a transmission belt both for the execution of directives of the party center, modifying them to suit local conditions, and for the transmission of information on local situations up to the party center (no. 2).

The congress also hoped to strengthen local party organizations. At party cell or banner committee meetings, organizers would be trained to keep track of their exact membership (no. 5). League and banner committees were enjoined to meet once every few months, in order to enrich party life. Where this was not possible, the committee leadership should be invited in rotation to discuss on-going work and learn from other members' experience (no. 8). New party recruitment should emphasize quality, not quantity (no. 4). Perhaps drawing inspiration from Lenin's advocacy of a newspaper as an organ that could unite the scattered underground elements of a revolutionary party, directive no. 3 emphasized the crucial role of propaganda, especially in the form of a newspaper or journal. Alta and Buyannemekhü had begun this work with the *Dotogadu Monggol-un Arad-un Sedkhül* in Rehe but the journal had lapsed after the retreat west, Alta's death, and Buyannemekhü's return to Khalkha.

In many areas of Inner Mongolia, such as Shili-yin Gool, northern Jirim League, and the northern banners of Ulaanchab, the party still had hardly any members. The Special Congress called for special representatives to go to areas with no party cells and organize new ones (no. 6). Members of the party leadership could be sent out, but their authority

[27] No. 5 is missing in Rentsensonom's transcribed text. Since the text mentions six bureaus, the missing area is probably Chakhar.

should be carefully adjusted to local circumstances, and not bound hand and foot by the party center (no. 7). This directive could prevent a replay of the Alashan incident where the presidium quarreled over whether Mersé's plenipotentiary status allowed him to alter the Central Committee's directives in response to local conditions. Directive no. 10 sought to prevent the conflicts over authority such as had occurred when members of the presidium had all dispersed for various reasons, leaving Bai Yunti with de facto dictatorial powers in Ningxia. It enjoined that at least half of the presidium members shall be with the Central Committee at any time. The Central Committee itself must be stationed on Mongol territory and have one plenum per half-year.

New Discipline and New Allies

The Special Congress also had to take into account both the Comintern's new suspicion of pan-Mongolism and the desires of the student delegates, even though the two sides actually contradicted each other on several crucial points. Thus the "Resolutions of the Special Congress," which reflected both youth delegate demands and the Comintern's post-January 17 line, often pointed in two directions at once. The Communist International considered those students educated in Moscow and Ulaanbaatar to be the bulwark of the revolutionary left wing. Hence it encouraged the students to take a leading role in the party's affairs. The youth, however, resisted the Comintern's demands both for stronger party discipline and for closer cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party. The result was that the Comintern's main allies in toppling the old presidium were unwilling to implement important parts of its new program.

The "Resolutions of the Special Congress on Inner Mongolian Party Work" largely reflected the Comintern's directives. Following the Comintern's January 17 decisions, the resolutions redefined the aim of the Inner Mongolian revolution as an Autonomous People's Republic (no. 1) which would be a component of the future People's China, just as the Buriat-Mongolian Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic was an autonomous part of Soviet Socialist Russia. They explicitly decreed for the first time that the PRPIM, as a revolutionary party, would obey the Comintern:

> Since the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia is a revolutionary party of the people, protecting the interests of the real, oppressed, people, it should accept the general leadership of the Third

> International, the leader of both the world workers and peasants and the national revolution, and faithfully execute its directives.

Cooperation with the MPRP was definitely secondary to the leadership of the Comintern (no. 3).

As in Bai Yunti's Ningxia Congress, the Ulaanbaatar Congress's general line still replayed the slogans and ideology of the First Congress, with changes only in detail. The old presidium was criticized for not seizing power in Yekhe Juu, so now the Special Congress focused on how to secure the party's power. Propaganda directed at the "real people" formed the main instrument for local seizures of power (resolution no. 5). The keystone was to be the Special Congress's manifesto, a "Declaration to Rally the Forces" (*khüchin bürtgekh tunkhag*). Through this manifesto, the party would show the masses that the new party leadership would support them, not check them, and open the way for a mass revolutionary upsurge. The manifesto would emphasize the party's aim of an Autonomous Republic for Inner Mongolia and its immediate liberation from the power of China's reactionaries. The party would "ruthlessly resist all treacherous elements...whoever they are," and try to destroy all domestic and foreign reactionaries, who, by force or by guile, had occupied Inner Mongolia's land. More concretely the party claimed that upon seizing power they would immediately establish a provisional revolutionary assembly:

> At an appropriate time, people's representatives from the leagues and banners will be elected and they will convene to abolish all that, in the current era, is not consistent with the happiness of the region, the road of progress of the Inner Mongolian peoples, and the development of their powers and learning. All that prevents Inner Mongolia from becoming great again will be liquidated.

The party also distinguished its new grass-roots approach from the old presidium's authoritarian one, by pledging itself to respect the people's freedoms. The directives on party work and structure also specified that the measures to be taken by a new revolutionary government, and their significance, should be the chief theme of the party's publications (directive no. 3).

Several other resolutions specified the structure and policies of the future provisional revolutionary government. It would be led by the party, which would ensure it is based only on progressive elements, and it would pay close attention to the army and finance (no. 8). The army would be handled by a Military Council, appointed by, and subordinate to, the Central Committee as before. The Council would unify and politicize the Citizen Army of Inner Mongolia (that is, the base force in Ningxia), thus turning it into a true, well-trained People's Revolutionary Army of Inner Mongolia. Where appropriate the party would develop partisan forces (no. 7). The government (and the party) would be financed by taxes on the leagues and banners, as well as by recovering rights lost to foreigners (no. 10—this probably referred to land rented out to Chinese farmers and the salt lakes in Otog Banner). The provisional government would call a National Assembly (*ulsyn khural*) to confirm the new government and begin military preparations for further expansion to unliberated regions. Building a base force (*ündsen tsereg*), it would gather soldiers, arm the people, and disarm the nobles and other reactionary troops (no. 9).

"The Directives on State and Government" dealt with the more immediate situation where the party held power only in a few banners, the party would first establish peoples's representative assemblies (*arad olny tölöölögchiin khural*) to hold supreme power. The main aim of such banner governments, though, would be the fight for an Autonomous People's Republic. Thus the party would have to convince the local banner people that until all of Inner Mongolia was liberated, no part of the region was secure. Once the new Autonomous Republic was established the party would draft a document specifying its particular autonomous powers, that is, its frontiers, constitution and the structure of its government, to be presented to the National Assembly.

The Special Congress had to address the change in alliances dictated by both the Comintern's January 17 directives and the breakdown of the united front in China. It declared that the national revolution (*ündsen khuwisgal*) of the four million Inner Mongolians led by the PRPIM, must be closely linked to the national revolution of China's several hundred million workers and peasants (resolutions, no. 2). Indeed, since there were many Chinese in Inner Mongolia, the PRPIM must work together with the CCP wherever possible and link the Chinese and Mongol revolutions (no. 4). The party newspaper should explain to the Mongols that the "real people" of China were their friends, just as surely as the warlords were their enemy (directive on party structure and work, no. 3). Although the Special Congress's resolutions did not mention the Communist rebellions then taking place, they claimed that the right-wing Kuomintang (KMT) and opportunist generals will certainly fail in suppressing the workers and peasants' national revolution. Yet in accord with the Comintern and Chinese line, hope of rebuilding the old alliance with the KMT was not entirely abandoned. While contact with Zhang Zuolin was categorically prohibited, that with the Kuomintang rightists

and opportunist generals might be undertaken where necessary, as per instructions (resolutions, no. 2).[28]

The question of alliance with the CCP was particularly complex for the young, mostly East Mongolian, students. Mostly educated in Chinese-language schools, and many of them joint members of the Chinese Communist Party, these students should have been the staunchest allies of the Chinese Communists. As they had in the Inner Mongolian Youth Party of 1925, the same young Mongols supported the CCP because it was the most radical party around. Yet they were also the strongest opponents of any compromise with their pan-Mongolist dream. This same dynamic appears to have been at work at the congress, encouraging a theoretical link with the CCP but in practice pushing the party back towards Ulaanbaatar.

Given that Amagaev also considered the Comintern center's current policy of linking the PRPIM to the Chinese Commmunists to be impractical, it is not surprising that the spirit of that policy was contradicted by the specific points approved in the Congress. The old presidium was criticized, for example, for having opened the ranks of its army to Chinese soldiers and bandits and for having "wasted precious time in useless travel from Zhangjiakou to Ulaanbaatar and especially Beijing"—why was traveling to Beijing more useless than traveling to Ulaanbaatar? In addition, the new presidium was enjoined to station the Central Committee always in Mongol regions. While the party was being asked to ally with the CCP above all, the youth league was asked to ally with the Chinese Communist Youth League, the Communist International of Youth, and *especially* the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. Significantly, the resolutions and directives of the Special Congress, unlike those of the First Congress, did not contain any explicit assurance that the interests of the working Chinese people of Inner Mongolia would be protected under the new order.

The Congress nowhere addressed the practical problems of liaison that would have to be dealt with in order for the PRPIM and the Chinese Communists to actively cooperate. At the congress itself, the only delegate from the CCP, a young Kharachin, Wu Wenxian (Mongolian name, Namrindorji), had a question mark next to his credentials. Back at the beginning of the year, CCP leaders like Chen Duxiu and Li

[28] Throughout August and September, the Chinese Communists, too, tried to breathe life into the Nationalist Left, conducting their rebellions in its name. See Marcia R. Ristaino, *China's Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928* (Durham, N.C., 1987), pp. 21-74; Wilbur, *Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*, pp. 147-155; Nie Rongzhen, trans. Zhong Renyi, *Inside the Red Star: Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen* (Beijing, 1988), pp. 48-63.

Dazhao had hoped that Bai Yunti and Mersé might attend the CCP's Fifth Congress. When it was actually held, from April 27, 1927, the only known Mongol in attendance was Wu Wenxian, a protégé of Han Linfu's, and the crisis of the Communist-Nationalist split had crowded Inner Mongolian affairs off the agenda. Hence Wu may not have received any specific directives on the Inner Mongolian work at that Congress. From the congress, Wu Wenxian went north to Ningxia, possibly along with Sainbayar, and then on to the Special Congress. While in Ulaanbaatar he called himself a representative of the CCP, but another Inner Mongolian student, Algimbuu, claimed he was not.[29]

The Question of Youth

Another question of particular importance to the young, mostly East Mongolian, students was the establishment of a youth league. The eighth point in the criticism of the old presidium charged that it (and especially Bai Yunti) had opposed the creation of a youth league, criticized young educated party members unreasonably, treated them as counter-revolutionaries (*esergüütsegch etgeed*), and even executed two of them without proper trial (that is, the Bayanmöngkhe incident). Tension between the students and the presidium had been of long standing and the Bayanmöngkhe executions had shocked the students who felt that their honor as a group had been challenged.[30] Now the Comintern supported their desire for revenge on the presidium. Both the Comintern's and the KIM's (The Communist International of Youth) Central Executive Committees had called on the PRPIM to organize a Revolutionary Youth League of Inner Mongolia, and the Special Congress delegates enthusiastically approved.

The endorsement of the students' resentment towards the leadership ironically conflicted with the "iron discipline" touted at the same congress. Resolution no. 11 demanded that all members from top to bottom observe party and social discipline (that is, obey the party on tactics and behave as exemplary members of the new society). They must ruthlessly expose and liquidate cliques, those who obstruct higher

[29] Based on Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi" p. 602; Central Party Archives, 7-1-23: 12 (Gürüsede to MPRP CC, Aug. 22, 1925), 7-1-73: 6 (Office of Internal Security report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932).

[30] Wulanfu (Yun Ze), who was not at the Congress but heard about it from friends and his cousin, Yun Run, who did attend, laid primary emphasis on this criticism in his short summary of the party's history—Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, pp. 72-73.

decisions, and those who reveal party secrets. The resolution closed, though, by promising that there would be no executions except for traitors to the country or violators of military law. Resolution no. 7 on the military council also identified a unified command as a crucial problem for the party military, yet it was precisely this problem which Bai Yunti believed was being exacerbated in Yekhe Juu by the students' intractable arrogance. He restricted youth activity because they simply could not observe discipline. Once the Special Congress had, in effect, endorsed the most rebellious trends of youth radicalism, it would be hard to put those sentiments back under control.

Perhaps to control this unstable force, the Special Congress's "Directives on Youth" prescribed in detail how the youth league would function. Organizationally, the Revolutionary Youth League of Inner Mongolia (RYLIM) would be independent, but politically and ideologically under the PRPIM's leadership (no. 2). The Special Congress elected a special commission with a mandate to prepare, under the party's leadership, for a first congress of the RYLIM (no. 3). In this way, the commission, probably headed by Bai Haifeng and another Kharachin, Altanbaatur (b. 1909, Chinese name, Chen Qingyun), would be able to shape the character of the League in the nine months before the League's first congress.[31] The commission would draw up, again with the help of the party center, drafts of the League's regulations and program to be submitted to that congress (no. 5). In the meantime, the RYLIM was to accept all the resolutions of the KIM and the Comintern (no. 6). Even before the congress, scheduled for May, 1928, along with that of the party, the preparatory commission was authorized to found cells and committees (no. 7), drawing in various groups in Inner Mongolia which had similar principles to the RYLIM (no. 4). Reflecting the pan-Mongolist sentiment among the educated youth, the commission was told to keep close ties with the Chinese Communist Youth League and the KIM, but especially with the Revolutionary Youth League of Mongolia (no. 7), and advised to take Mongolia's Revolutionary Youth League as the model for the RYLIM's rules and ideology (no. 6).

[31] Based on Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 603; Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155. It is not clear, however, exactly when the Youth League was actually officially organized. The planned May Congress never took place, either for the party or the League. One organization, "The Youth Enlightenment Group" that had existed from Nov. 12, 1928, to at least Jan. 5, 1929, seems to have been a precursor to the RYLIM. The first official reference to the Youth League's central organ, the Central Bureau of the Youth League, appears on July 1, 1929 as the issuing organ of three pamphlets. Given these facts, the Youth League was probably organized between January and July, 1928.

New Manifestoes and New Leadership

How did the old presidium respond to this frontal assault on its record? Writing in 1942 but clearly drawing on the reminiscences of the many former party members working in the Japanese-supported Autonomous Mongolian State, Nozu Akira states that by the end of the congress AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang) joined Bai Yunti and Buyantai in defending the presidium's policies. The Inner Mongolian people would not accept the congress's radical declarations:

> The proposals of the Communist group are too radical in their attacks on the dukes and princes, their crushing of Lamaism, and their persecution of the proletarian Chinese living in Inner Mongolia. It will end up by giving the nobility, the lamas, and the proletarians of both the Chinese and Mongol nations living in Inner Mongolia the wrong idea about the true significance of the party. As a result, there is a really tremendous danger that the party itself will be rejected and attacked by them.[32]

Their assumption of broad resistance of Mongol people to violent attacks on the nobility or even the high lamas was questionable, at least in those areas where the party had support. Yet the conservatives' identification of the persecution of the "proletarian Chinese" living in Inner Mongolia as a major theme in the congress's rhetoric shows that cooperation with the Chinese masses was not something that came easily to the new forces. As we have seen, much of the party membership viewed the destitute Chinese immigrants as competitors, aiming to wipe out the Mongols and seize their land in alliance with the bandits. Thus attacks on the Citizen Army and the Kuomintang easily slid into a gut-level hatred of all the "vicious/reactionary Chinese" (*khargis Khitad*).

Perhaps as a result of these criticisms, the public manifesto of the conference was rather moderate. Instead of the planned "Declaration to Rally the Forces" the new leadership issued a "Letter of Enlightenment" (*Sengkheregülen ukhagulakhu bichig*).[33] This letter marked little change over previous policies adopted in the First Congress. The introduction denounced Zhang Zuolin, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan as warlords whose conflict has made all of Inner Mongolia "the slaughterhouse of war." The people's livelihood (*aju törökhü*) is impoverished and education retarded under the feudal regime. "Even though our poor three million people of Inner Mongolia suffer under the oppressive and

[32] Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155.

[33] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 78-82 (Abstract of the Letter of Enlightenment, undated).

despotic rule of the warlords and the reactionary princes and dukes, they have no one to tell of their sorrows and no door upon which to knock."

After this typical denunciation of Inner Mongolia's sufferings the letter expressed the congress's emphasis on a tight party organization and tried to justify it as something peculiarly necessary in the Mongolian situation. If the Mongols wished to struggle against this oppression and build a "genuinely popular self-ruling state" (*jingkhini arad-un öber-iyen jasakhu erkhetü ulus*) they would need an organizing force. Since the Mongols were scattered and nomadic, they were hard to gather in one place. Thus the only way they could carry on the struggle against the reactionaries was through a genuine party. By unifying, educating, and arming the masses, a party "leads them in a powerful and disciplined struggle for liberation from the enemy. This is the usefulness and power of a party, as well as being its obligation and purpose."

The concluding list of demands of the party was taken verbatim from the "Manifesto of the First Congress," with a few revealing changes. The previous items about protecting the interests of the common Chinese people living among the Mongols were dropped and banner land was now to be shared out among the Mongol people rather than being administered by new democratic banner governments. The ultimate goal of the party was more explicitly defined as an autonomous (but not explicitly republican) state. This manifesto showed that Amagaev and the new leadership was still unsure of how the Inner Mongolian people might react to its more radical proposals. Not wishing to test out its criticisms of the upper clergy or the advocacy of republic in practice, it confined itself to sure crowd-pleasers, such as denouncing all Chinese warlords, Feng Yuxiang included, and dismissing any concern for the rights of the local Chinese.

The eight-point criticism of the old presidium demanded its total replacement, a measure executed by the delegates over Dambadorji's opposition.[34] In place of Bai Yunti, they elected the Üüshin delegate Möngkhe'öljei as chairman of the new Central Committee, and in place of Mersé they elected "Big" Korlô, a former member of the Youth Party

[34] The exact treatment of most of the old presidium and CC members seems to be as follows: Bai Yunti, Mandaltu, Dechin and Mersé were expelled from the presidium but allowed to keep their Central Committee seats. AltanOchir (Jin Yongchang) and Buyantai were expelled the Central Committee. Probably Fumingtai alone of the old presidium was retained on the new one. Based on Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 43 (Mersé and Korlô to MPRP CC, Nov. 29, 1928); Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 593. I have no information on whether Murungga, Sainbayar, or Erkhimbatu stayed on the CC.

and graduate of the KUTV, where he had socialized mostly with the young Khalkha students. Möngkhe'öljei's report to the Special Congress was a clear history of the Üüshin party branch, without the bombast or breast-beating so characteristic of the duguilang petitions. He had no gift for abstract ideology, but electing him as chairman would underline the party's commitment to work among the "real people" of Inner Mongolia. He had party building experience and a mind at least marginally open to the new world. At the same time, he was still at home in the traditions of the Mongols, closing his speech with a benediction on the Congress: "Bless us that our Special Congress of Inner Mongolia may be great and our party's work rapidly develop firm and pure. And bless us that the relations between the Northern and Southern fraternal Mongols' two Peoples Parties, with their immaculate ideology, grow and forever be stable and strong."[35]

Möngkhe'öljei as chairman and Korlô as secretary thus neatly symbolized the traditions of spontaneous rebellion among the oppressed rural Mongols and the theoretically conscious radicalism of the Moscow and Ulaanbaatar-trained youth. The balance in the new seven-man presidium reflected that of its two chief officers (see table 17.1). It was almost perfectly balanced in regional origin, containing one member from each league or area of the party's strength, along with two from Yekhe Juu. The only Kharachin on the presidium was Bai Haifeng, although he and another Kharachin, Altanbaatur, had the important task of organizing the youth league. In terms of age, political culture, and experience, however, a more polarized picture emerges. The older East Mongol intellectuals in the prime of their life were replaced either by Soviet or Mongolian educated youths in their twenties or early thirties or by token representatives of the resistance traditions of western Inner Mongolia. Amagaev summarized their composition as follows: "As for the new bureau of the Central Committee, some of the youth who now make up most of it, are Muscovites, and some of these youth have gotten much experience in the past two years in revolutionary struggle and work, and it is to a great degree filled with representatives from the localities themselves."[36] Presumably, the students, whether "Muscovites," that is, Moscow-trained students, or those more experienced in revolution, would provide energy and ideological consistency while the local representatives would provide stability and links with the rural

[35] Central Party Archives, 7-1-26: 41 (Möngkhe'öljei's report to the Special Congress, Aug., 1927).

[36] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 21

Table 17.1: Presidium of the Second Central Committee, 1927-1928

Name	Place of Origin	Position or comments
Möngkhe'öljei	Üüshin Banner	Chairman of the CC. Dismissed as chairman, Nov., 1927
Korlô	Kheshigten Banner	Secretary of the CC
Bai Haifeng (Düürinsang)	Kharachin Right Banner	Chairman of the Youth League CC
Buyanbaatur	Chakhar Right Wing, Plain Red	
Buniyabazar	Jirim League	
Jamyangsharab	Otog Banner	
Fumingtai	Hulun Buir (Daur)	Either originally elected or co-opted onto presidium, Nov. 1927
Mersé	Hulun Buir (Daur)	Co-opted onto presidium as acting chairman, Nov. 1927

Sources: Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 46; 7-1-18: 44; 7-1-26: 20-21; 7-1-20: 26; 7-1-18: 54.

masses. The evidence shows, however, that the new Central Committee and its chairman and secretary did not form an effective leadership team.

In Ulaanbaatar, the Yekhe Juu Mongols were out of their element. Otog Banner's incarnate lama and party leader Jamyangsharab, a new presidium member, had spent most of the Special Congress looking on in silence at the heated arguments between the students and the old Central Committee factions, afraid to speak up because he did not understand the political principles being debated. After the congress he and Möngkhe'öljei spent their time in their hotel rooms desultorily reading political tracts assigned to develop their ideological educations.[37] The whole congress left a bad taste in many of the participants' mouths. After he returned home, Jamyangsharab was disgusted by political activity and eventually came to avoid contact with the PRPIM. Rabdan, too, although after 1928 he would continue to play a role in the new

[37] Liu Yingyuan, "Zhang Wenxian tongzhi Etuoke qi ershi nian," pp. 170, 172; Zhong Zhengwen, "Xueyu xingfeng de niandai," in *Xueyu xingfeng de niandai—Zhunger shiliao zhuanze*, special issue of *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 28 (1987), 18.

Central Committee's secret activities in Yekhe Juu, left the Special Congress with a distaste for the partisan infighting.

If Möngkhe'öljei was lost in his new role as party chairman, the secretary Korlô plunged with gusto into the thankless task of making sure the dissent so freely expressed in the Special Congress did not become a habit. Even before the congress ended, party dissent was focusing on him, not Bai Yunti. On September 3, a bizarre petition was presented anonymously to the PRPIM's new leadership. In it the author calculated with the aid of charts that the liberation of Hulun Buir would cost (minus weapons) exactly 6,547 *tögrögs* and 40 *mönggö*, and declared that "if this budget is not fully supplied it will be an obvious proof that party work in Bargu will be prevented just as it was before." The plan was cast in the leftist language of the Special Congress, with the author estimating that by mobilizing the "poor proletarian people" (*ügeigüü yadagu arad*) and the "rebellious youth" (*khubisun bükhüi jalaguchud*), he could create a *parchizang* ("partisan" or guerilla) army of almost 1,000. In this way revolution could spread everywhere, the "party's base army" (*nam-un ündüsün cherig*) would wipe out Zhang Zuolin's forces, free Bargu, and thus help the revolution both in Inner Mongolia and China. Yet the author chafed under party discipline, warning darkly that the members of the old General Committee (*Yerüngkhei khoriya*), the ruling organ of the former Eastern Border People's Party, had no reservation about finding their own way to revolution. He denounced the new secretary of the Central Committee, Korlô, as spreading "baseless rumors" that Hulun Buir work would be separated from the PRPIM and put directly under the Mongolian aegis. Presenting this plan would "shut Korlô's mouth and carry on our task effectively."[38]

Although without any immediate significance, this petition showed the encouragement which the rhetoric of the Special Congress had given to impatient revolutionaries demanding a liberation war in Inner Mongolia. The price of overthrowing the old authority of Bai Yunti was the re-emergence of old factional identities (the Youth Party for the East Mongolian and Tümed youth, the Eastern Border People's Party for the Hulun Buir Mongols, etc.) that A.I. Oshirov and the Soviet embassy had suppressed in the interests of creating a unified and strong PRPIM. In attempting to combat these trends Korlô was rapidly winning the enmity of most of the other youth in the party.

[38] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 25-28 (anonymous proposal to PRPIM CC).

The MPRP's Sixth Congress

The most immediate task for the Central Committee was to get control of the old Central Committee in Ningxia. The new Central Committee was in Ulaanbaatar for good, but without controlling the party center in Ningxia, it would be difficult to apply its new policies in Suiyuan. Moreover the party's seal, the concrete symbol of its authority, and its treasury (admittedly almost empty) were still in Ningxia. The new Central Committee would have to send representatives to Inner Mongolia to assert its authority. Möngkhe'öljei and Korlô did not prove active in this task, although much of the reason was that neither the Comintern nor the MPRP was actively aiding the reorganized party.

On September 9, the new presidium met to consider the situation. In document no. 1, sent to the MPRP without any seal, the new Central Committee forwarded a copy of the Special Congress's resolutions and asked for both a new representative to be appointed to the PRPIM and 2,000 tögrögs since the treasury was completely empty. Three days later, the MPRP presidium approved the request for money, but decided to temporarily delay the appointment of a new representative.[39] Alienated by the Inner Mongols' harsh criticisms of its leading members, the MPRP was keeping its distance from the new Central Committee. Amagaev noted that "Outer Mongolia on this issue is not assisting first of all because it itself has funds of no great extent, and because it believes that it has been pushed out of Inner Mongolian party work and participation in it in a most improper manner."[40] For him to criticize the MPRP about funding was rather unfair; in fact the MPRP was the only known source of funding for the party through the end of 1927, since Amagaev could not yet get the Comintern to directly support the Inner Mongolian party. Yet Dambadorji and other MPRP leaders did feel excluded from participation in PRPIM decision making.

By the time the MPRP's Sixth Congress rolled around, from September 22 to October 5, estrangement between the two parties was papered over. The Inner Mongolian party's new chairman, Möngkhe'öljei, attended the congress as a representative of the fraternal People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. As usual on such occasions, the Inner Mongolian representative effusively praised the education and freedom of the people's Mongolia, deplored the backwardness of Inner Mongolia, and admitted shamefacedly the lack of success of his own Inner Mongolian People's Party. He pledged that now with the fraternal

[39] Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 40 (Möngkhe'öljei and Korlô to MPRP CC, Sept. 9, 1927).

[40] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 213.

aid of the party of one race with the Inner Mongols, the PRPIM will strive to liberate the "real people." As in the Special Congress resolutions, he vowed that the PRPIM would strive as well for "the accomplishment of the aims of the revolutionary Communist Third International which strives to liberate all oppressed people." Möngkhe'öljei closed with another one of his inimitable benedictions on fraternal Mongol unity, north and south.[41]

Amagaev's disagreements with Dambadorji were also swept under the rug. The Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat appointed A.V. Shotman (a.k.a. Gorskii, 1880-1939) as its special delegate to the Sixth Congress. Arriving in Ulaanbaatar, he listened to both Amagaev and Dambadorji's stories and pronounced that the status quo in the MPRP ought to be maintained. While Amagaev considered this an "incontestable error" that would only encourage the right wing, Shotman overruled him.[42]

Shotman did, however, endorse Amagaev's long-held position that the MPRP now held the primary responsibility for Inner Mongolia. In his address on the Congress's opening day, he called upon the Mongolians to recognize the truth of the new stage in China. This meant realizing that "the truest friends of the working people of Mongolia are the working people of China and their vanguard, the Chinese Communist Party." The coming workers' and peasants' government of China will liberate all of that country's oppressed nationalities, including "your brothers, the working people of Inner Mongolia." Inner Mongolia's struggle for self-determination will take place in close union with the Chinese revolution, so the best aid Mongolia can give to the Chinese revolution would be to aid Inner Mongolia and its People's Revolutionary Party.

Dambadorji did not respond to Shotman's encouragement on Inner Mongolia. The next day, September 23, on behalf of the Central Committee, Dambadorji delivered an extensive speech on the economic determinants of the "temporary stabilization of capitalism," touching briefly on the "third stage" of China's revolution. Unlike Shotman, Dambadorji was very vague about what this third stage actually demanded, calling only for the MPRP to link up with "sincere people's revolutionaries in China," a phrase which could just as easily mean the left wing of the Nationalists as it could the Communist Party. Inner

[41] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn VI Khural, 1927 ony yesdügeer saryn 22-arawdugaar saryn 5: delgerengüi tailan* (Ulaanbaatar, 1980), pp. 21-22.

[42] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, pp. 209, 188-89, 194, 205.

Mongolia was not mentioned.[43] Dambadorji thus did not directly endorse all the upheavals in the Chinese and Inner Mongolian revolutionary organizations.

It was impossible, however, to avoid questions about the Chinese revolution. Michael Borodin, former Soviet adviser in Canton and Wuhan, crossed through Ningxia and Alashan into Mongolia and arrived in Ulaanbaatar on September 17. The MPRP invited Borodin to speak to the congress on the events in China. After Dambadorji concluded his report, Borodin delivered his talk; whether by design or accident, he concentrated on events safely far away in Wuhan, and safely in the past. The question and answer session, however, brought up questions about the popularity of Feng Yuxiang, the situation of Inner Mongolia and Bargu and the relations between the Chinese revolution and the Mongolian People's Republic. The protocols as published do not record answers to most of them; they were too sensitive to be announced to the reading public. On September 25, Borodin held a long question and answer session with the delegates on China, but again neither the questions nor the answers were published.[44]

Especially sensitive was the link with Marshal Feng Yuxiang who still hoped to maintain friendly relations with Mongolia. The Citizen Army's liaison post in Ulaanbaatar was not removed. The previous officer there, Chen Jiyan, had returned to the army's headquarters in Henan, but another, "Li Jing," remained there until March or April 1928. Retaining Feng's liaison was approved by Dambadorji, although he told Damdinsüren, then chairman of Mongolia's Revolutionary Youth League, that the Citizen Army officer was in Mongolia on proper authority, implying an arrangement with the Soviet Union. Ties with the Citizen Army had already become controversial at the Sixth Congress. During the debate on the political report, one delegate, Gonchugsürüng, noted how the Chinese Marshal's presence in Mongolia in 1926 had provoked rumors that Mongolia would once again fall under China. He then concluded, "Now it is a bit uncomfortable to admit, as we are hearing, that Feng has turned against his agreement. So from now on we should be on our guard against such political fence-sitters."[45]

[43] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn VI Ikh Khural*, pp. 10-13, 26-40 (esp. 39-40).

[44] Based on Strong, *China's Millions*, pp. 334-38; Jacobs, *Borodin*, pp. 296-300, and *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn VI Ikh Khural*, p. 92.

[45] *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn VI Ikh Khural*, p. 130. Relations with Feng Yuxiang based on "Dambadorji (egün-ü urid Kitad-un Wong lü Siyan-aca Töb Qoriyan-du iregsen jakidal-un ucar)," *Ünen*, Oct. 30, 1928, No. 42, p. 4; *Ünen*, Oct. 30, 1928, No. 42, p. 3; *Mongol Ardyn Khuwisgalt Namyn Doldugaar Ikh Khural: 1928 ony arawdugaar saryn 23, arwan khoyordugaar saryn 11 (Barimt bichig, matérialuud)*, (Ulaanbaatar, 1980), pp. 140, 344-45, 255; Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, pp. 209, 212, 252.

In communications with the Comintern, Dambadorji denied he had any special interest in ties with Feng Yuxiang: "About being blamed for hoping to establish ties with Feng, there is no need to say very much. We did not have and still do not have any special policy in regard to Feng. We were assisting him only according to requests from the USSR." This assertion was true in the beginning but as tensions with the Comintern grew Dambadorji found Marshal Feng's representative had his uses. During the congress, the Citizen Army representative passed on rumors to him that Amagaev told Chinese Communists in Ulaanbaatar that the Comintern had decided to replace him and the other rightists in the Central Committee with left-wing Communists. Dambadorji had heard the same from other sources, but when he pressed Amagaev for some explanation, he got no reply.[46] Understandably the MPRP leaders grew wary of Moscow-trained students. The first batches of Khalkha Mongolian students were also returning from Moscow, doing practicums in a mobile propaganda brigade in the countryside. Dambadorji, Jaddamba, Gelegsengge and their supporters treated the students with a distance that verged on suspicion.[47] Dambadorji and the party leaders refused to endorse explicitly the overthrow of the PRPIM's Central Committee, to denounce the Nationalists as a whole, or to embrace the Chinese Communists as the legitimate vanguard of the Chinese people.

Escape to Inner Mongolia

As the MPRP Congress proceeded, the conflict in the Inner Mongolian party steadily worsened. Bai Yunti and several others in the old Central Committee had not accepted their dismissal in the spirit of democratic centralism. In order to prevent them from returning to Inner Mongolia and causing trouble, Korlô asked the MPRP in late September to keep Bai Yunti along with AltanOchir, Mandaltu, and Murungga in Ulaanbaatar under strict surveillance and prevent them from leaving Mongolia. Eventually the four might be reeducated to the point where they would accept the correctness of their dismissal and could once again be used in minor party roles.[48]

[46] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintern ba Mongol*, pp. 186-87, 191-92, 220.

[47] O. Pürew, ed., *MAKhN-yn akhmad ajiltan gishüüdiin durtgal*, I, 125-26, 222-25.

[48] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 73; Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 52-3 (Serengdonrub, Mandaltu, AltanOchar, Murungga to MPRP CC, Sept. 27, 1927).

On September 27, Bai Yunti, Mandaltu, AltanOchir, and Murungga secretly addressed an appeal to the MPRP's Central Committee asking for protection from Korlô's plots. The letter, in AltanOchir's handwriting, denounced the tyranny of the new Central Committee. Defiantly signing themselves members of the presidium of the PRPIM, the authors claimed that it was they who first created the Inner Mongolian party and struggled against hardships for the sake of the people. To have newcomers like Korlô treat them as criminals was doubly galling. "We have done not the slightest thing either rebellious against the party or harmful to the Mongol masses. Moreover, while we have been within your borders we have never done anything at all in violation of the law." They blamed their troubles on Korlô, in particular, who imitated the dukes and princes in taking his will to be law. Korlô and his ilk

> likewise use their high position as if it were their private property and act to oppress the leading members in a brutal, fierce, savage, and reactionary manner. Obviously, they don't have any idea of equality in their heads, or even any common decency. From this you can understand the character of the secretary and the others in the new Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.

They claimed the new party center was oppressing them and violating their human freedoms (*khümün törülkhiten-ü erkhe chilöge*). Their demands were not limited to protecting their freedom of movement—since Korlô will use his high position to do skillful sabotage, they asked the MPRP to protect their persons and help them to continue to work for the fundamental interests of the Mongol race.[49]

Korlô's request and the suspects' appeal presented Dambadorji with a personal and political dilemma. If he did detain them, he would allow upstart students to further humiliate his closest friends in the Inner Mongolian movement. He would, moreover, be sanctioning the treatment of himself the same way, should the Comintern decide to turn the Mongolian students against him. Releasing Inner Mongols would, however, risk a major break with the PRPIM's new Central Committee and the Comintern, and cause an open split in the Inner Mongolian party. In the end, Dambadorji decided to help Bai Yunti discretely. Behind the scenes, he arranged for the Citizen Army liaison to have a truck ready to depart for the south. While the Sixth Congress was still in session, Bai Yunti hopped on the truck and rode at night out of Ulaanbaatar down to Ningxia. The Inner Mongolian leader was unable to rescue all of his

[49] Central Party Archives, 7-1-27: 52-53 (Serengdonrub, Mandaltu, AltanOchar, and Murungga to MPRP CC, Sept. 27, 1927).

supporters; only Buyantai and Mandaltu escaped with him. Back in Ulaanbaatar Dambadorji's role was never found out.[50]

The flight of Bai Yunti and his two comrades did not at first alarm the new Central Committee very much. Not being needed to fund an army, the 2,000 tögrög subsidy from the MPRP could fund many agents and through October they proceeded with the dispatch of representatives into Inner Mongolia. At least eight representatives had been dispatched out by the beginning of November, with two for Chakhar (Oyunbilig and new presidium member Buyanbaatur), a three-man team for Josotu, headed by the youth league organizer Altanbaatur, and another for Juu Uda headed by Damrinsürüng. A Bargu youth, Norbusambuu, seems also to have been sent back home around this time.[51] Amagaev placed highest hopes in these agents. On December 23, he reported to the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committe of the Communist International (ECCI):

> Now a certain number of cadres who have been schooled in Moscow are in the localities. We have gotten initial experience in preparing such cadres, they have scattered out to every region, and I am confident that within four or five months, they will revive their own organizations in the party's localities, establish new ones, and the party in a short time will come out firmer and stronger.[52]

Amagaev's bias in favor of "Muscovites," though, raised new quarrels between the impatient party members trained in Ulaanbaatar and Big Korlô, who had to enforce the Comintern agent's decisions. One Ordos

[50] Based on Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 155; Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, ed., *Wulanfu huiyi lu*, p. 73; Liu Yingyuan, "Zhang Wenxian tongzhi Etuoke qi ershi nian," p. 170; Hao Weimin, "Diyi, er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi," p. 593; Jagchid, *Essays in Mongolian Studies*, pp. 273; Central Party Archives, 7-1-18: 42 (Mersé and Korlô to MPRP CC, Nov. 29, 1927).

[51] Based on Dugurzhabu [Dugurjab], Wangdan, and Tegusi [Tegüs], "'Jiu. yiba' yihou Nei Menggu Renmin Geming Dang zai Dong Menggu diqu de geming huodong pianduan," in *Xing'an geming shihua*, vol. 2 (Ulaankhota, 1988), p. 238; Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 16 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927), 7-1-20: 26 (Buniyabazar to MPRP CC, Sept. 14, 1928); 7-1-18: 58-59 (Chakhar *Aimag* Bureau report, June 20, 1930); Central Party Archives, 7-1-73: 12 (Office of Internal Security, report on Inner Mongols in Mongolia, Nov. 15, 1932). The Dugurzhabu source has "Damulinreng" for the Juu Uda representative; this makes no sense as a Mongolian name and I have assumed a -su- is missing to make it "Damulinsureng," that is, Damrinsürüng.

[52] Dashdawaa and Kozlov, ed., *Komintérn ba Mongol*, p. 213; Luzianin, *Rossiia-Mongoliia-Kitaĭ v pervoĭ polovine XX v.*, p. 138, apparently by typographic error identifies them as MPRP members.

couple, Baldan and Saringgawa who had come from Üüshin with Öljeijirgal back in the fall of 1924, insisted that they be sent back home. They had completed their studies and were working in Ulaanbaatar as party officials, and thought the time had come to do what they had been trained to do: make revolution in Inner Mongolia. In the office of the Central Committee they confronted Möngkhe'öljei and Korlô. Möngkhe'öljei agreed and said they should be allowed to go, but Korlô absolutely refused. Despite the couple's heated arguments, Korlô did not budge and even began to shout a lot of "totally unreasonable words" (*khari ülemji üge*).[53] The meeting broke up in a fury, and the disappointed Ordos couple wrote a letter to the MPRP Central Committee asking for 400 tögrögs to return to their homeland.[54]

The letter itself perhaps illustrated why Amagev preferred "Muscovites" as much as it showed what Korlô faced in enforcing party discipline. Baldan and Saringgô's three year stay in Ulaanbaatar had not broadened their horizons much. They announced it as a well-known fact that Üüshin's Öljeijirgal and Jasag's Dobdon had created the Inner Mongolian party (in fact Öljeijirgal had resisted joining the party until the eve of the First Congress). Nor had they acquired the business-like style current in the Mongolian government. Their letter still had that mixture, unique to the duguilang activists, of obsequious flattery (the rise of the Mongolian People's Republic was "like the red sun lighting up the golden world") and shameless self-promotion ("Although we experienced every kind of hardship, practically going naked and bare-foot, we pushed on with our will unbroken for four months and six days," on the journey from Üüshin to Ulaanbaatar). They took as their model the knightly heroism which viewed party work as a test of personal courage, not as a results-oriented activity.

> Now Inner Mongolia is filled to the brim with the power of the reactionaries and its people are struggling for freedom, day and night suffering in deep floods and hot fire. But the party member, especially, as he struggles selflessly [lit. exiling his self] amidst the biting weapons of the deadly enemies must never avoid any danger or live free and easy in Ulaanbaatar, for he has already accepted the name of party member.

Or again, in their final peroration,

[53] The word *khari* here is used with a peculiar Ordos dialect meaning of "unreasonable," "very strong," "excessively," "terribly"—Antoine Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos* (1941; rpt. New York, 1968), p. 340a (s.v. *ʔχari*). While usually used in a compound, *khari khandagul ügei*, here it is used separately.

[54] Central Party Archives, 7-1-20: 16 (Baldan and Saringgawa to MPRP CC, Nov. 9, 1927).

> We still hope a thousand times to be able to return home to our country, work for the revolution to the best of our ability and thus justify our original aim and vow. And since to sit idly would be like a testimony against our given oath, we must regardless appeal to the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, race of our race, to consider the sincerity of us poor party members and remember that from the beginning we have come with a resolve that shrinks from no hardship and only hopes to fulfill our vow, fearing none of the dangers of Inner Mongolia today.

Despite differences in expression, Baldan and Saringgô's appeal resembled the plan for liberation of Bargu presented at the end of the Special Congress. In both, dramatizing the repression in Inner Mongolia underlined the heroic bravery of the youth who would fearlessly confront and overcome all obstacles. In this particular case, Korlô had no need to worry about his decision being reversed; the MPRP's Organization Bureau did not even put the proposal up for discussion, let alone vote on it. The issue of who would go and who would stay, inherent in schooling the new members in Ulaanbaatar would, however, poison the party's internal relations for years.

Comintern as the formulator of policy and the Soviet embassy replaced it as the transmission belt.[84] Inner Mongolian students were needed more as espionage agents than as revolutionary organizers and in September, 1933, the Comintern, having seen its own role in Mongolia virtually abolished, ordered the PRPIM's Central Committee, still in Ulaanbaatar, shut down.[85] Despite disatisfaction—a Japanese source reports that a month later, members of the "Inner Mongolian Youth Party" in Moscow convened a plenum to issue a new program of independence for Inner Mongolia[86]—the idea of an Inner Mongolian revolutionary party went into hibernation. Within four years, the Great Purges would kill off Inner Mongolian emigre nationalism in Ulaanbaatar and Moscow, but in East Mongolia the PRPIM idea survived in the earnest late-night discussions of Mongol students, teachers, army captains, and officials working by day for Japan. With the Soviet-Mongolian liberation of 1945, they would suddenly announce the rebirth of a People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, and make another attempt at an Inner Mongolian autonomous movement in alliance with Ulaanbaatar, Moscow, and the Chinese revolution.

[84] Tsedendambyn Batbayar, "Stalin's Strategy in Mongolia, 1932-1936," *Mongolian Studies*, 22 (1999), 1-17; Kyosuke Terayama, "Soviet Policies toward Mongolia after the Manchurian Incident," in *Facets of Transformation of the Northeast Asian Countries*, ed. Tadashi Yoshida and Hiroki Oka (Sendai, 1998), pp. 37-66.

[85] Wulanfu geming shiliao bianyanshi, *Wulanfu huiyilu*, p. 74.

[86] Nozu, "Nei Menggu chihua yundong," p. 161.

CONCLUSION

> The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them; and they said unto the olive tree, Reign thou over us. But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave my fatness, wherewith by me they honour God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? And the trees said to the fig tree, Come thou, and reign over us. But the fig tree said unto them, Should I forsake my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou, and reign over us. And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees? Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou, and reign over us. And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow: and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon (Judges 9:8-15).

On his first trip to the front of the Sino-Japanese war, in the fall of 1939, the American journalist Teddy White saw what he had earlier taken to be a unified war of resistance by the Chinese nation against the Japanese invaders resolve into a panorama of a thousand villages across the mountains of Shanxi, some belonging to the Japanese, some to the Communists, some to the Kuomintang, and many held in differing ways by both:

> The Japanese shattered structure after structure in their offensives, raids, forays, bombings of China. What was left was not a society but a spongelike mass, a honeycomb of mashed cells in most of which some sting was left. Some villages supported the Nationalists, others the provincial government, and yet others supported the Communists—but they supported whoever could serve their need of protection best, who could save their women from rape by the Japanese, their men from impressment as coolies. The Japanese had come to kill; the Communists were the most efficient counterkillers.[1]

[1] Theodore H. White, *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure* (New York, 1978), pp. 133-34.

In this slow-motion melee, new magistrates of three Shanxi counties, all in their twenties, educated at Shanxi Provincial University, or Peking University, and majoring in ancient history or government, were educating the peasants in nationalism, calling on them to support the resistance fighters. In and around their counties, White found examples of the armed forces disputing control with the Japanese: the unsmiling partisan commanders of the Communist *Balujun* "Eighth Route Army," the displaced Northeasterners in the 40th Army once under Zhang Xueliang, the well-appointed officers of Chiang Kai-shek's 27th Army filled with new recruits from Southwest China, the bandit-troops under Yang Hucheng, a one-time commander under Feng Yuxiang, and those locals still loyal to Yan Xishan, the old warlord of Shanxi, still hanging on to a few counties in the southwestern part of the province. Seeing the Chinese villagers feed and water the horses of a Kuomintang guerilla who loudly said, *women shi Balujun* "We're the Eighth Route Army," he concluded:

> I learned the first real lesson of politics, government and history: governments are instituted among men in the first instance, and accepted by men gratefully, to protect them from random violence and killing. I had begun to observe that when the central government replaced the local government of Chungking after the [Japanese] bombings. But I had now seen what government meant in the hills of Shansi, where the Communists, not yet calling themselves government, were becoming government. They offered protection.[2]

Certainly, the Inner Mongolian revolution in the 1920s involved issues and characters similar to those found in the war-time China that eventually gave birth to the Chinese Communist government of 1949. An area crisscrossed by soldiers and bandits of differing affiliations, new emergency governments manned by graduates of modern schools trying to exhort the country people to sacrifice for their army, and outside this village theater, large already-organized governments trying either to suppress or to draw over to its side the emerging links between the rural producers, the young intellectuals, and the fighting men. The armies were smaller, the intellectuals graduates of high schools, not universities, the rural producers often herdsmen not farmers, and the outside governments much weaker than either Imperial Japan or Chiang Kai-shek in 1939, but the similarity shows that the issue in Inner Mongolia in the 1920s was essentially identical to that in North China in the 1930s and 1940s. That issue was one of building a state that the basic producers

[2] White, *In Search of History*, p. 138.

could trust to protect them from all the other armed men, and not demand too high a price for doing so.

In early twentieth-century China, the form that revolution took of state-building was obviously related to the paradoxical weakness and growing strength of the state. The Qing state had been historically a very weak one, compared to those of Japan or Europe, at least if measured in terms of the government's take of the total national income.[3] As I stressed in the introduction, the New Policies had given local and provincial governments all over China a new task of more effectively policing and culturally transforming their residents, at the same time as it allowed, and even encouraged, the increased involvement of local private interests in designing the plan of these new reforms. The result as Prasenjit Duara has shown, was a government afflicted with an ultimately toxic combination of growing intrusiveness, cultural illegitimacy, corruption, and dysfunctional decentralization. These trends, together with the warlord conflicts and the spectacular rise in banditry, drove the more responsible gentry out of local government and encouraged armed "local bullies": entrepreneurs of government who took on, for a hefty commission, the unpopular tasks of transmitting to the villagers the increasingly heavy demands of local and provincial government.

At times, of course, the revolutionaries all presented their enemies as immensely strong reactionaries disposing of despotic power on behalf of the reactionary classes. The revolutionary task would then be the classic one of wresting control of the state from those reactionaries by a coup d'etat. Yet when Sun Yat-sen famously compared China to a "sheet of loose sand," Kuomintang figures observed that China had no "social structure," and Bai Yunti and Mersé announced that Inner Mongolia too had no social structure, and that Mongolian government was a "crystal fragment of nihilism," they all showed an awareness that the task of national revolution in both areas was not so much "seizing the state apparatus" as building a whole new one. The Inner Mongolian revolutionaries all aimed at building a fundamentally new type of state apparatus, and in the few areas where they achieved power, particularly in Üüshin and Urad Right Duke Banner, they did take steps to create both a new military force, and new civilian governing organs found in the duguilangs and the party cells. By all accounts these new governments were popular while they lasted, because they proved

[3] Dwight H. Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China," *Journal of Economic History*, 27.4 (1967), 478-92.

relatively effective at protecting the banners from bandits and doing so at a considerably lower cost compared to that of the old yamen.

These new governments could not solve the often-denounced structural problems of Inner Mongolia, such as Chinese immigration, the loss of banner land, debts to Chinese merchants, and general poverty and backwardness of Mongol life. They certainly were interested in the stimulation of education, but without outside aid were incapable of greatly expanding either the numbers or quality of the education provided. Yet the local power and relative popularity of these governments, coupled with their inability to really transform the structure of Mongolian life confirms that it was the very construction of new governments and their fulfillment of the basic function of guaranteeing order which was the one fundamental demand that the party could come to power by satisfying.

The two supporting forces of the new order consisted both of force and ideology, that is the military force which could both protect the people from alternative and less responsible wielders of violence, and the ideology which could align this force with the social and cultural transformations that would make its present burdens seem less galling. The Inner Mongolian nationalist movement was repeatedly devastated by the suspicions which the vigilante holders of military power harbored against the Young Mongol would-be impresarios of ideological growth but the ubiquitous insistence on a party army and an ideologically-based military school showed that this unification of the power of the gun and the pen was on everyone's mind. Here too the Inner Mongolian revolution proceeded along the same lines as the national revolution in China proper, where the most celebrated institution was the Whampoa Military and Political School, training politically aware officers and soldiers for the Kuomintang party. First in Jingpeng during the Rehe campaign of 1925, and then in Baotou during the Suiyuan campaign in 1926, the party had set up a Military Academy to train the officers and a Mongolian Banner Militia Training Bureau to train the enlisted men. The core of the Inner Mongolian party army was the small force variously called the "guards regiment" by the Russians, the "training corps" in Chinese, the "*Gümbüt'wan*" in Otog and simply the "Kharachins" in Üüshin, composed in theory of ideologically conscious cadets and soldiers with a pan-Inner Mongolian mission.

Thus, through building an ideological army, the Inner Mongols, like all Chinese revolutionaries during the Republic tried to unite the powers of the gun, the pen, and the purse, or to put it differently, to put together the armed men and the educated students into one organization that could apply both consent and force to collect sufficient taxes from the rural

producers. In the background, as the ultimate purpose and justification for the new state, lay the aim of challenging the foreign concessions, and transforming the people through science and democracy. The experience of the abortive Inner Mongolian revolution demonstrated that real progress toward this ultimate end, however, would have to wait for victory and the peaceful establishment of the new government.

As the history of the party showed, the key disagreement lay between the vigilante leaders in western Inner Mongolia, and the intellectual leaders of East Mongolia. The vigilante leaders saw the "Kharachins" as most unsatisfactory intellectuals and hoped to train their own intellectuals through instruction in civil and military arts delivered by Mongolia. From their point of view the Kharachins were both not really very Mongol, nor very trustworthy, and could not compare with Ulaanbaatar as patrons. At the same time, the vigilante groups instinctively thought in terms of banner-defense, not in terms of controlling Inner Mongolia. The vigilantes would surrender their weapons to no one voluntarily, and the peace-zone they were building was theirs alone, not the Young Mongols', not the revolution's, and not even Ulaanbaatar's. The results of the efforts to take the Üüshin militia to Ningxia and the Urad militia to Mongolia demonstrated that fact.

The Young Mongols, in their turn, saw the vigilantes in Urad and Ordos as most unsatisfactory soldiers and hoped to train their own party army by seeking new recruits all over Inner Mongolia, and training them in their own ideology. While they found the duguilang movement inspiring as an example of local resistance, they had quite justified suspicions about whether they would even support, let alone lead, a genuinely pan-Inner Mongolian movement. Confronted by the persistent localism of their western Inner Mongolian supporters, the Young Mongols would need to assimilate, intellectually and organizationally, supporters from those areas on an individual basis. The party army was an ideal place for this kind of assimilation, but to make it effective, weapons and trainers from Mongolia and the Soviet Union were vital. For both the Young Mongols and the vigilantes, therefore, support from the Mongolian People's Republic opened the door to escaping from the less pleasant alliances that would have been necessary to build a revolutionary state purely with Inner Mongolian resources.

In 1945, in discussions about the emerging post-war Chinese and Yugoslav Communist governments, Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslav Communist leader, noticed Stalin's instinctive appreciation of the formation of a new center out of government as a subterranean but undeniable

reality that could not quite fit the orthodoxy of revolutionary internationalism:

> Because Moscow abstained, always in decisive moments, from supporting the Chinese, Spanish, and in many ways even the Yugoslav revolutions, the view prevailed, not without reason, that Stalin was generally against revolutions. This is, however, not entirely correct. He was opposed only conditionally, that is to the degree which the revolution went beyond the interests of the Soviet state. He felt instinctively that the creation of revolutionary centers outside of Moscow could endanger its supremacy in world Communism, and of course that is what actually happened. That is why he helped revolutions only up to a certain point—up to where he could control them—but he was always ready to leave them in the lurch whenever they slipped out of his grasp.[4]

In 1948, as the Chinese Communists put the Kuomintang government into headlong flight, as Stalin worried that the Greek Communist insurgency would provoke an American reaction, and as relations between Moscow and Yugoslavia soured, Djilas felt certain that Stalin saw revolutions fundamentally as state-building enterprises:

> At any rate, he knew that every revolution, simply by virtue of being new, also becomes a separate epicenter and shapes its own government and state, and this was what he feared in the Chinese case, all the more since the phenomenon that was involved was as significant and momentous as the October Revolution.[5]

Djilas clothed his intuition of Stalin's gut apprehensions in Marxist-Leninist formulations, but the point was similar to Teddy White's: the most important thing a revolution does is to form a new state. What worried Stalin was the fact that the Chinese revolution had turned out to be big, and a big revolution couldn't help but create a big state.

Despite the internationalist rhetoric and the denunciation of "bourgeois nationalism," revolutionary movements inevitably strengthen, not weaken, the national identity and cohesion of the countries in which they occur. This fundamental reality marked the fatal weakness of the perennial idea of an Inner Mongolian revolution jointly sponsored by both Chinese revolutionaries (whether the Kuomintang or the Communists) and by the Mongolian revolutionaries. As the Inner Mongols tried to link their own revolution to that in Mongolia, they had to

[4] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovish (New York, 1962), p. 132.

[5] Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 183.

fight against the potential indifference of the Mongolian government, preoccupied with its own security and unwilling to jeopardize its successful revolution for an uncertain return in Inner Mongolia. In theory, as the product of a revolution of the oppressed Mongol people, the new Mongolian state had an international obligation to assist all oppressed Mongol people, and indeed all weak and oppressed nationalities in the world. Yet as they appealed for Mongolia to sponsor an Inner Mongolian army, or to fund the Inner Mongolian parties more generously, or most tragically, to defend the Bargu refugees against loyalist counter-attacks in 1928, they ran up against the same phenomenon that eventually turned Moscow's support of foreign Communist parties into simply a tool of its foreign policy.

Even when Mongolian revolutionaries tried to export their revolution to unliberated members of their own nation, the necessity to protect both the achievements and the preexisting supremacy of the old revolutionary center complicated any easy utilization of its strength. As the Mongolian state tightened and thickened the ties that bound the people within its territory to Ulaanbaatar, it made the possibility of actually changing the boundaries and bringing in new territories less and less plausible. As a state-building venture, revolutions actually separate its makers from other people, making the boundaries between them and other people more firm and rigid, no matter how ethnically close. Thus the 1921 revolution and aftermath in fact made Mongolia really separate from Inner Mongolia, just as the events of 1949 and their aftermath have made the mainland really separate from Taiwan.

This increasing separation of Mongolia and Inner Mongolia was expressed in mundane events, such as the increasingly tight border controls, the formation of new currency, and the disruption of previous patterns of pilgrimage to places like Tibet or Mt. Wutai where Khalkhas mixed with Inner Mongols. It culminated in the steadily deepening suspicion with which the radical new Mongolian government of 1928 viewed the Inner Mongolian party. From the beginning, with the arrest and execution of organizers of the Bargu revolution, through the repeated arrests and purges of 1930 and 1931, into the virtually wholesale destruction of the Inner Mongolian community in Mongolia after 1937, the growing expansion of the functions and the reach of the party-state and the ever-more radical transformation of culture and society in Russia and Mongolia brought on almost total isolation of these countries from the rest of the world. The need to find enemies, one that periodically broke out into hysterical spy-manias, precluded any fruitful support of political movements based in other countries. The same pattern took place in China as the Kuomintang consolidated its rule, with

the difference that the Chiang Kai-shek regime in effect treated areas outside of its lower-middle Yangtze base as virtual colonies, under Nanjing's rule, but not really trusted to be loyal to the Nanjing government. In either case, though, tolerance for an Inner Mongolian revolution that out of tactical necessity tried to straddle the line of China and Mongolia was a kind of infantile disease, which both the MPRP and the KMT outgrew as they created strong police states. It was thus the growing maturity of the Chinese and Mongolian national revolutions which doomed the first phase at least of the infant Inner Mongolian revolution.

The Japanese Occupation and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region

Given then that the strategy of dual sponsorship of the Inner Mongolian revolution was doomed from the start, what historical significance did the actions of the Inner Mongols in the 1920s have? Was it simply a futile movement that could not possibly have had any success? Although it may have seemed that way by 1931, when the "molecular" assimilation of Inner Mongolia by the Fengtian regime in Manchuria, and the Yan Xishan regime in Shanxi had for three years met only the most chaotic and disorganized opposition, the Japanese occupation of 1931 permanently closed off that possibility. This sudden intervention of this third force hostile to both the Kuomintang and its allied warlord regimes in China proper and also to the Mongolian People's Republic and to the isolated remnant of party cells it supported in Inner Mongolia, ended up reviving the wilting prospects of the Young Mongols. By giving them a state apparatus, it formed them into a much stronger, self-conscious, class, which for the first time had the necessary link to both armed force and to the power of taxation. Japanese rule, particularly in East Mongolia, eliminated banditry and established for the first time in post-Qing Inner Mongolia a real state monopoly on military force. The Japanese military authorities kept ultimate power for themselves, of course, but by recruiting Young Mongols, very often with PRPIM and Moscow- or Ulaanbaatar-educated pasts, to man this new state, it made the PRPIM program of 1925 once again plausible.[6]

[6] On the Japanese occupation and the Chinese Communist-Mongol nationalist alliance in Inner Mongolia, see Jagchid Sechin, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrub, 1902-1966* (Bellingham, 1999) and Christopher P. Atwood, "The East Mongolian Revolution and Chinese Communism," *Mongolian Studies* 15 (1992), 7-83. Much of the account published here was previously presented as "The Japanese Roots of Communist Nationality Policy in Inner Mongolia," at the Association for Asian Studies, Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., April 7, 1995.

From 1931 to 1937, the Japanese occupied eastern and central Inner Mongolia, home to more than 80% of the Inner Mongolian population. In this area, the Japanese set up several autonomous or semi-autonomous regimes. In the east, including the Khorchin Left Wing, Kheshigten, and Hailar Daur cradle areas of the Young Mongol intelligentsia, the Japanese set up four Khinggan provinces under the Manchurian Empire (Manchoukuo), but with considerable cultural, political, and even military autonomy from the central government. (The Kharachin banners were excluded from the Khinggan provinces, a fact that presaged the eclipse of their leading role in the East Mongolian intelligentsia). West of the Khinggan Range, the Japanese set up the Mongolian Border (*Mengjiang*) government, later renamed the Mongolian Autonomous State, under the famous Prince De (Demchugdongrub), that included the nationalist cradle area of the Chakhar Right Wing banners.

As has been repeatedly emphasized and illustrated, Chinese immigration into Inner Mongolia made the old forms of Mongol administration virtually obsolete. Mongols were still taxed and administered as part of the banner administration under the rule of a hereditary noblemen, but the growing number of Chinese immigrants came under the tax and administrative authority of newly created counties. Even within the Mongol population, status distinctions abounded. Some banner residents were personal dependents on the nobility, others were attached by heredity to banner offices as service personnel, while a small population of slaves also existed. Banner membership was also still hereditary, so that Mongols living outside of their banner of birth were not members or citizens of the banners in which they lived. Exempt from the regular banner *alba* or "requisitions" they paid special "hearth-taxes" for the right to use banner territory; in some areas, this out-banner population formed a substantial proportion of the Mongol residents.

In most of the areas which they occupied, the Japanese abolished this ascriptive system of administration. Intertwined banner and county units were amalgamated. Within the banner territory, all legal status distinctions were abolished and all residents, Chinese or Mongol, dependent or commoner, were made equal before the law and equally liable to taxes. The personnel of the banner yamens were expanded and reorganized into functional offices, with recruitment open to commoners. Banners lost much of their autonomy, however, to the larger Mongol autonomous governments. These new autonomous governments, whether the

Khinggan provinces or Prince De's Autonomous Mongol State, became Inner Mongolia's first modern supra-banner governments to be run by Mongols. Unlike earlier league yamens, they performed a full complement of modern governmental tasks with an adequate staff chosen on merit from a relatively broad class range. These new governments also had their own military forces and paramilitary police personnel, commanded largely in Mongolian. As a result, the Japanese reforms created a much stronger government in Inner Mongolia at all levels, increasing the government's administrative competence, and separating the armed bands into local garrisons, which were reorganized and brought under unified command, and bandits, who were ruthlessly hunted down.

Just as the Japanese encouraged certain forms of nationalism in Southeast Asia in order to build support for an anti-Anglo-American war, so too, in Inner Mongolia, the Japanese encouraged Mongol nationalism as a counter-weight to any possible Chinese resistance to Japanese rule. The newly amalgamated banners often had Chinese majorities, but administration remained purely in the hands of Mongols and their Japanese advisers. The Japanese also funded a major expansion of Mongolian education at the primary and high school levels.[7] Reform of banner governments and their merger with Chinese counties put greater resources in their hands, resources that funded services mostly for the Mongol population. As a result, Mongolian-language education under Japanese occupation took a qualitative leap beyond that under the Republic. By 1934, the Khinggan provinces had 75 Mongolian-language primary schools, with 183 teachers and 3,588 students serving about 475,000 Mongols. The primary school fed into two high schools, a vocational high school, and a military school, all newly established. By 1945, one Mongol nationalist estimated that there were 1,500 graduates of higher education, more than 1,000 graduates of military colleges, and 6,000 high school graduates. In the Chakhar area under Prince De's government, the total number of Mongol high school and college graduates rose to about 1,000, out of a population estimated at a little less than 30,000. The new Japanese-supported state apparatus thus brought in the nephews and children of the original Young Mongols as salaried employees.

[7] See Li Narangoa, "Educating Mongols and Making 'Citizens' of Manchukuo," *Inner Asia*, 3 (2001), 101-26; Bing Wang, *One School/Two Systems: An Ethnographic Case Study of a Mongol High School in China*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, August, 1999, pp. 40-43; and Hu Chunmei, "Wei Man shiqi Nei Menggu de Menggu zu jiaoyu," *Minzu jiaoyu yanjiu*, 1994, no. 1, pp. 70-75.

For the first time in Inner Mongolian history, state-funded public education with a modern curriculum took place in Mongolian—more advanced courses were taught in Japanese. Graduates of these schools took employment in the much greater number of white collar offices available in the new administrations. The spread of education played a major role in the spread of the Young Mongol-style modernizing nationalist movement to previously inactive areas, less directly influence by Chinese settlement, and often purely pastoral. Chakhar Left Wing banners, the Baarin, Aru Khorchin, and Jarud banners of Juu Uda, the Nen (Naun Muren) valley Daurs, the Gorlos banners, and the the Khorchin Right Wing banners—all areas that had showed little or none nationalist activity in the 1920s—became sites of substantial nationalist activty in the 1945-1946 period. Of all the areas under long-term Japanese rule, only the Shili-yin Gool banners were left behind by the expansion of modern education and nationalist activity.

Politically, only a few of the old leaders of the PRPIM stayed away from the Japanese-supported governments. Sainbayar headed a military division and then the state bank in Prince De's Autonomous State until his death in 1939, while AltanOchir came to be head of the Communications Ministry. Mandaltu worked in taxes and league administration before representing the Autonomous State in the Manchurian capital of Mukden where he died of heart failure during the catastrophic Soviet invasion of 1945. Dechin served as head of a cultural-development institute. In Chakhar and Hulun Buir, the Japanese employed in high positions not only the old officials such as Jodbajab, Serengdongrub, Erkhimbatu, and Lingsheng, who had traveled down the revolutionary road a piece, but also returned students such as Eldengtei who had studied in Moscow and Ulaanbaatar. Of the old party leaders, only Bai Yunti and Murungga, and some lesser figures like Li Yongxin, remained loyal to the Kuomintang government throughout the war years.[8] Nor did the radical younger Mongols of the new Central Committee stay away from Japanese imperialism: Buyantogtakhu, now calling himself ÖljeiOchir, became a military commander in the Prince De government, while Temürbagana, who had studied in the Soviet Union and returned to Inner Mongolia in 1929 ended up a minor official in the Khinggan administration. The younger politicians did differ from their older former PRPIM colleagues, however, in that they maintained a network of small political parties of varying complexions.

[8] See Nozu Akira ("Yejin Peng"), "Nei Menggu chihua yundong bianqian," trans. Jin Hai, ed. Pan Shixian, in Nei Menggu Daxue Zhong-Gong Nei Menggu Diqu Dang Shi Yanjiu Shi, ed., *Nei Menggu jindai shi yi cong* (Höhhot, 1986), pp. 166-68.

Underground, a self-described "Eastern Department of the PRPIM" continued, in extreme secrecy and out of touch with the Comintern, the legacy of the leftist coda of the old PRPIM.

Perhaps more important than explicit political movements, which under the conditions of Japanese occupation could take the form only of informal gatherings of like-minded friends or else of reclusive conspiracies, was the flourishing of cultural nationalism. The new nationalist intelligentsia was served by magazines and cultural activities that institutionalized the nationalist understanding of Mongolian history. A new printing press in Kailu issued the first published editions of Injannashi's *Khökhe Sudur* ("Blue Chronicle"), as well as the first modern Mongolian-language edition of the *Secret History of the Mongols*. The publishing house at Prince De's Presidential Palace in Zhanjiakou also reprinted the *Khökhe Sudur*. In both Khinggan and Chakhar, new writers such as Saichungga, Erdenitogtakhu, Khada, Rinchinkhorlo, and Sainbuyan called on the Mongols in novellas, poetry, and essays to develop and purify Mongol society of corrupt old elements, and revive the days of Chinggis Khan. In Wang-un Süme (modern Ulaankhota), the Mongols, with Japanese approval, built a new temple to Chinggis Khan. In it, *all* Mongols, not just the noblemen who were genealogically descended from Chinggis Khan could worship their glorious ancestor directly.[9] In Prince De's Autonomous State, the official calendar dated the years from the enthronement of Chinggis Khan in 1206. These public actions completed the transformation of Chinggis Khan from a private cultic figure, directly accessible only to his noble-blooded descendants, the aristocracy, and hence legitimating their rule, to a public hero-figure, directly accessible to all Mongols. In this new understanding, the legacy of Chinggis Khan called not for strict status heirarchies, but for a vigorous nationalist and reformist movement led by the modern-educated youth.

While the East Mongolian intelligentsia was thus consolidating itself as a self-conscious class, with both the desire and the social strength to rule Inner Mongolia, in the southwest of the region, the Chinese Communists were having little success in rallying the Mongols there to fight against the Japanese. Communist policy at this time was to work within existing provincial boundaries, add in some Mongol administrators to local party and government organs, and build a base among the Mongols by expansion of Communist power out from its existing bases among the Han Chinese population in western Inner Mongolia. In other words, the

[9] Paul Hyer, "The Chinggis Khan Shrine in Eastern Inner Mongolia," in *The Chinggis Khan Symposium in Memory of Gombojab Hangin* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001), pp. 113-138; Namusilaizhabu and Tong Batu, "Wulanhaote Chengjisi Han Miao," in *Wei Man Xing'an shiliao*, special issue of *Nei Menggu wenshi ziliao*, 34 (1989), 279-282.

new policy aimed at a piece by piece, "molecular," assimilation of the Mongol population into the growing Chinese Communist government. Banner strong-men, who had once been allied with the PRPIM, like Jamyangsharab in Otog and Möngkhe'öljei in Üüshin, rejected alliance with the Communists who could only find isolated recruits in the area. Details can be found elsewhere, but this policy proved, in essence, to be a dead end.

Just as the end of World War II in Southeast Asia confronted the European powers with their inability to restore the old colonial relationship, so too in Inner Mongolia it forced the Communist Party to come to terms with the East Mongol nationalists and their demand for a state separate from the Chinese one. It was this challenge from the Mongols themselves that determined the CCP's nationality policy for the next four years.[10] In the Khinggan provinces, the "Eastern Department of the PRPIM" came out of secrecy (some key figures were informed for the first time of their membership!) and announced that they intended to lead East Mongolia along the road once more of dual sponsorship of the revolution. The party proclaimed its obedience to Marshal Choibalsang in Mongolia and Marshal Stalin in Moscow, and its alliance with the revolutionary party in China. (Publicly that included Chiang Kai-shek, although in reality they meant only the Chinese Communists.) The actual human links to the old PRPIM were few: Temürbagana, Buyantogtakhu (now calling himself ÖljeiOchir), and Pungsug who had been sponsored by the PRPIM for study in Ulaanbaatar and Moscow and then returned to do underground work, Nairaltu in Hulun Buir, and a few others. Yet the members eagerly sought continuity with the legacy of 1925, and continued its distinctive strategies.

Over the course of the next few months, the new regime, and several other Mongol nationalist groups in eastern Manchuria and central Inner Mongolia forged an alliance with the Chinese Communists against the possibility of a Kuomintang-led restoration which would have destroyed all the Mongol gains under Japanese occupation. The Chinese Communists were eventually able to secure territorial control over central and eastern Inner Mongolia, but only by inserting themselves as the allies, leaders, and trainers of the several Mongol nationalist regimes that

[10] Important recent sources on this period in China include Xing'an meng dangshi ziliao zhengji bangongshi, ed., *Xing'an geming shihua*, 2 vols. (Ulaankhota, 1987-88), Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Dang'anguan, ed., *Nei Menggu Zizhi Yundong Lianhehui dang'an shiliao xuanbian* (Beijing, 1989), Qin Linmao, *Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi Nei Menggu qibing* (Höhhot, 1989), Hao Yufeng, *Wulanfu zhuan* (Höhhot, 1989), pp. 357-479, and Wang Feng, *Wushi chunqiu—wo zuo minzu gongzuo de jingli* (Höhhot, 1992), pp. 163-310.

sprung up in 1945-1946. The result, by 1947, was the first Chinese Communist-controlled regime in a non-Han Chinese area that was effective in recruiting soldiers, in exercising local control, and mobilizing resources. Most of the leading members of the Eastern Department of the PRPIM joined the Chinese Communist Party, often undergoing reeducation and reassignment to work teams assigned to the countryside. In other words, the CCP successfully pursued with the eastern Inner Mongolian nationalists the policy of allying with, and then slowly transforming the local power holders, which the PRPIM's party center had tried to apply to the western Inner Mongolian vigilantes. A key phase in this reorganization was the land reform movement and the violent struggle against class enemies, identified as "landlords," which was extended to all the three eastern leagues (Juu Uda, Jirim, and Josotu) as well as to Chakhar by 1947. Land reform, or herd reform as it was called in pastoral areas, meant the repudiation of the long-standing Mongol contention that Mongolia, unlike China, did not have class divisions. Politically it meant an unprecedented expansion of state power, establishing the party-state's full and active power over property, and giving the participants in the class struggle, which often involved assaults and killings of the designated targets, a life-and-death stake in the regime.

In 1947, the Communists felt their control to be secure enough to create an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, with a high level of autonomy, especially in the area of symbols. Despite later claims, however, this government did not form the institutional model for any subsequent autonomous regional government in China—it was far more autonomous than the party would later allow.With the subsequent victories of the Communist forces in the civil war, the policy in Inner Mongolia once again swung away from federalist formulas toward those stressing China's inseparable unity. These changes were capped with the reorganization of Inner Mongolia into an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) that was in fact and theory an integral part of the new Chinese state. Yet the Communists continued and expanded into western Inner Mongolia the Japanese-initiated policy of combining banners and counties. Just like the Japanese as well, although to a less striking degree, the Communists gave the Mongols disproportionate influence in these new, often majority Chinese, local territorial units, and funded Mongol culture and education heavily.

The tightening control after the Communist victory in 1949 also involved a reevaluation of the recent history of Inner Mongolia. From that year on, the local party and youth league set in motion a campaign within their ranks to discredit the East Mongolian nationalists of 1945-1946 as "feudal upper-stratum" elements. Yet until 1966, the more

potent charges of collaboration with the Japanese and "splittist" devotion to independent Mongolia were muted and the crucial role for the East Mongol intelligentsia as a subaltern ethnic elite remained secure despite criticism. As the Inner Mongolian regime expanded westward with the civil war, so too did East Mongols move west as cadres, soldiers, officers, school teachers, and administrators—some settling down as far afield as Qinghai and Xinjiang among the Mongol populations there.

Those East Mongolian leaders with a past in the PRPIM and in Japanese-occupation autonomous regimes, such as Temürbagana, Khafungga, and ÖljeiOchir (the former Buyantogtakhu) received significant posts in the IMAR, but never became the leading group. The origins of the new regime in the Japanese-trained intelligentsia who formed the rank and file of the CCP's Mongol cadres in Inner Mongolia appeared particularly sharp in the sphere of Mongolian-language culture. Much of the ideology of the ethnic Mongol Communist culture in the 1940s and 1950s, while appearing superficially Marxist-Leninist, actually betrayed a more fundamental ancestry in 1920s-1940s nationalist synthesis detailed above. Buddhism was attacked not only as a super-structural "opium of the masses," but as the actual cause of Mongolian decadence. Chinggis Khan was venerated as the great leader of the Mongols who proved their heroic qualities as a race. Eventually, the Communists built their own Chinggis Khan mausoleum in Ordos in 1963, modeling it closely on the model of the temple completed in the Khinggan capital in 1944. Injannashi's *Blue Chronicle* was again reprinted and as a "democratic" and "progressive" work became the mainstay of pre-modern Mongolian literary curricula up to the 1980s both on academic and grade-school levels.

A substantial part of the Mongol intelligentsia up to 1966, and virtually all of its senior figures had been schooled in the pre-1945 Khinggan and Chakhar schools. A survey of thirty-two noted Inner Mongolian authors shows first that all but one of them were born and grew up in eastern or central Inner Mongolia, that is, under Japanese occupation.[11] Seventeen certainly had primary schooling in these

[11] The list of leading authors was taken from the volume on pre-Cultural Revolution authors in "Dumdadu Ulus-un Monggol ündüsüten-ü odo üy-e-yin udq-a jokiyal-un teüke"-yi nayiragulqu komis, comp., *Dumdadu Ulus-un Monggol ündüsüten-ü odo üy-e-yin udqa jokiyal-un teüke* (Hailar, 1987), I. Only those writers originating among the members of the Inner Mongolian 49 banners, plus Hulun Buir, Butkha, Chakhar, Tümed, and Alashan have been included (those excluded are from Xinjiang, from Henan, and Beijing). The authors are: Sainchogtu, Bürinbekhi, Chimeddorji, Erdenitogtakhu, Manijab, Dugarsürüng, Sutubilig, Serengwaijab, Uuta, Dugar, Saishiyaltu, Dambijalsan, Sainbayar, Osor, Asar, Yarimpil, Han Rucheng,

schools, while only eight definitely received all their formal schooling under Communist auspices. Five had attended secondary schools in the Japanese period, and three were high-school teachers during the period of 1931-1945. Since not one of them spent World War II in areas under Kuomintang or Chinese Communist control, it is not surprising that none of these future builders of Inner Mongolia's socialist literature joined the party before 1946. At least seven participated openly in the activities of the various Mongol nationalist regimes of 1945-1946.

Inner Mongolia's cultural background in the Japanese-period Mongol nationalist *milieu* was all the more pervasive when we take into account qualitative factors. Only one major Inner Mongolian author of the period 1949-1966 was actually educated in Japan, but he was Saichungga (later known as Sainchogtu), the officially declared "founder of contemporary Mongolian literature." The founder of literary history and criticism in contemporary Inner Mongolia, Erdenitogtakhu, was likewise a normal school teacher under the Khinggan government and an official in one of the Mongol nationalist regimes of 1945-1946. Not surprisingly, given these influences, into the 1990s, Japanese, not English, was the most commonly taught foreign language in Inner Mongolia's Mongol-language high schools.

Just as telling is the negative fact that none of the western Inner Mongol groups, among whom the Chinese Communists had worked for eight years in World War II, had any major influence on the 1949-1966 culture of Inner Mongolia. Few Mongols had supported the CCP agenda even then, and Communist influence declined there even further after 1946 when those areas came back under Kuomintang rule. The general rejection of the Chinese Communists, even by Ordos politicians who had had some experience with the PRPIM kept the Ordos brand of populist, Buddhist-influenced, duguilang organizations out of the political and cultural elite of the new autonomous region. The Höhhot Tümeds, led by Yun Ze, now styling himself Wulanfu, meaning "Red Son" in a Sino-Russo-Mongolian melange, held a strong position in the new government, of which Wulanfu was the chairman and party secretary. Culturally, however, the Tümeds had little to offer and little presence outside of the film industry.

Shinekhüü, Malchinkhüü, Oddzar, Jalgakhüü, Angchinkhüü, Pungsug, Gerelchogtu, Gangpürbü, Khasbars, Odkhanchimeg, Chogtunaran, Damrin, Jigmedsereng, Dawa'osor, Serengdorji. The lone screenwriter, Yun Zhaoguang, was an exception to these trends, being a Höhhot Tümed and a relative of Yun Ze.

The Legacy of the Young Mongols Today

The assimilation of the Inner Mongolian nationalists in the 1940s and 1950s into the Chinese Communist revolution was greatly eased by the Sino-Soviet alliance, which allowed the rhetoric at least of dual patronage of the Inner Mongolian revolution to continue. Yet as Stalin had feared, the new Chinese party-state was very much its own power center, and the influence of Mongolia and the Soviet Union on the new Inner Mongolia was felt only in cultural matters, such as in the short-lived introduction of the Cyrillic script. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 revealed the degree to which the Inner Mongolian state had already been wholly integrated with China and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1979 destroyed the position of both the East Mongolian intelligentsia and the old Tümed Communists in Inner Mongolia.

The Red Guards and their backers among the Inner Mongolian and Beijing cadres assaulted the whole legacy of Mongolian autonomy culminating in the "New Inner Mongolian People's Party" case in which scores of thousands of Inner Mongols were tortured to death for being secret members of a continuing party dedicated under Wulanfu's "black line" to creating a "separate kingdom" in Inner Mongolia and ultimately handing it over to the Soviet and Mongolian revisionists. In the middle of the hideous persecutions, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region lost more than half of its territory, with the eastern areas and Hulun Buir being divided among the three provinces of Northeast China, and the western banners of Alashan and Ejene Gool were divided among Gansu and Ningxia. The Revolutionary Committees which formed the new government were packed with Han Chinese military men from outside the region. The cultural nationalism of the 1950s and early 1960s was rejected root and branch, and Inner Mongolia's historical experience, like that of every region and social group in the country, merged with that of the Chinese Communist Party.

The repudiation of the Cultural Revolution opened up the way once more for the cautious reassertion of Inner Mongolian nationalist perspectives. In the 1980s, many of the old Japanese-educated writers and essayists were still alive, as were Wulanfu, Kui Bi, ÖjeiOchir, and other survivors of the PRPIM movement. The government once again subsidized education and minority-language culture (overwhelmingly humanistic, rather than scientific in its orientation) and the earnest ethos of Mongol national revival through secular education in the Mongolian language and filio-pietist history, all with the aim of catching up with the Han, was still attractive to many of the youth. Mongolian cultural mobilization seemed again a way to reconcile the universal ambition of

getting a good job in a major city with the reality that urbanization meant assimilation for most Mongols. Publications once again addressed the significance of the old PRPIM, focusing particularly on Communist leadership and local heroes, like Engkhebayar in Urad, Shine Lama Öljeijirgal in Üüshin, or Dechinyishinnorbu in Alashan.[12]

What does the history of the PRPIM have to say about the current issues of autonomy in Inner Mongolia? If, as I have argued, the main aim of the PRPIM's program, and the process of the Chinese revolution was, for better or for worse, building a revolutionary party-state, then the state-building issues that the PRPIM addressed as part of the revolutionary front are obsolete in a region with a powerfully despotic state like the People's Republic. Certainly, as Doak Barnett has emphasized in his studies of western China, including Inner Mongolia, the demilitarization of society has made a dramatic change in the social environment of political activity.

> One of the greatest contrasts between 1988 and 1947 was the demilitarization, or civilianization, of society, not only in the area I went through on this trip [to Baotou], but also, I was to discover in the months ahead, in most of west China. I saw no signs of military forces or activities anywhere on my 1988 Baotou trip . . . One could argue that this was unremarkable four decades after the Communists won the civil war. Yet having seen the area when military forces not only were ubiquitous but constantly intruded into ordinary people's lives, I found this simple but fundamental change striking.[13]

This demilitarization has made the history of local militarization and the Young Mongols' interactions with the local garrisons, vigilantes, and bandits one of purely academic interest for contemporary issues of autonomy in Inner Mongolia.

Likewise the issue of pan-Mongolian unification is also effectively dead. In an Inner Mongolia which has been expanded to the point where 85% of the population is non-Mongol, it is of course a tempting option for the Mongols there to seek power by an identification with independent Mongolia in the north, just as it was for the Inner Mongols in the 1920s. Even so, the Chinese revolution has, as Djilas predicted, created such a fundamentally new situation in Inner Mongolia, such that

[12] On this literature and problems in its method and interpretive framework, see Christopher P. Atwood, "Inner Mongolian Nationalism in the 1920s: A Survey of Documentary Information," *Twentieth-Century China*, 25 (2000), 75-113.

[13] A. Doak Barnett, *China's Far West: Four Decades of Change* (Boulder, 1993), p. 47.

the border between it and Mongolia may now be accounted permanent. Sino-Mongolian relations were normalized in 1989, and Mongolians from independent Mongolia have once again become a presence in Beijing and Inner Mongolia just as they had been in 1924-1928. While the result in the 1920s was an upsurge in pan-Mongolian identification supported by the Mongolian authorities, the result in the 1990s has been a mutual process of disillusion, reinforced by Ulaanbaatar's strong rejection of any pan-Mongolist political line.[14] While ethnographically and culturally there remains a great deal of common ground between the Mongolians of Mongolia and the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, historical facts over which they had little control have formed them politically into two different nations as they did the Americans and the Canadians, the Eritreans and the Ethiopians, or the Serbs and Croats. This formation was already visible in embryo in the 1920s despite the deep pan-Mongolist desires of the Mongols on both sides of the frontier, and the two revolutions of 1921 and 1949 have effectively made it an unalterable reality in the foreseeable future. Continuing Inner Mongolian nationalist groups and emigres still draw inspiration from the example of Mongolia and the "People's Parties" of the 1920s, but the animating spirit behind such activity seems to confuse the agenda then of strengthening the state, and using it to put the Mongols on top, and the reality now that the state could hardly get any stronger, and could hardly be seized by such a small minority. The programs thus seem nostalgic in the worst sense.

Yet at the same time, the party's history refutes the common assumption that integration with the Chinese economy and state necessarily means peaceful assimilation of the Mongols, or that the issue of ethnic nationalism will go away. As I have interpreted it, nationalist groups that formed the party arose precisely out of the strongly assimilatory policies of the late Qing and the early Republic. In the 1990s, the Chinese government in Inner Mongolia, as elsewhere, has dramatically privatized many of its functions yet without instituting either a workable rule of law or actually removing anything from the sphere of ultimate state control. The result is corruption very reminiscent of that which accompanied the New Policies. This corruption is strikingly illustrated in Dee Mack Williams' studies of grassland enclosures in Ongni'ud (Chinese, Wengniute) Banner. Here, as in the colonization of the New

[14] Christopher Atwood and Lincoln Kaye, "The Han Hordes: Inner Mongolians a minority in their own homeland," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 9, 1992, pp. 18-19. Uradyn E. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford, 1998), is a an attempt to analyze this creation of separation through a cultural-studies approach, one which while often very perceptive I believe misses the more fundamental forces related to state power and class formations.

Policies, those with clout in the dominant kin network and/or the ruling apparatus (today the Communist Party), have been able to secure effective use over the local pasture, while banishing the powerless into ever smaller and more barren plots of land.[15] At the same time, the Chinese government continues to use resettlement of farmers on grazing land as a "solution" to rural poverty. Projects such as the "China-Western Poverty Reduction Project" which involved resettling Han and Hui villagers in eastern Qinghai on Mongol-settled rangeland in Haixi Prefecture in the western part of the province, show that despite the anesthetized language of "voluntary resettlement" and the new involvement of international organizations like the World Bank, the Chinese state's approach to the borders shows little change from the New Policies. It is also an illustration of the continued power of teleological nationalism both in China and abroad that the primary controversy over this plan pitted China's collective economic development against the Tibetan people's collective cultural authenticity. Had the 4,000 (in fact mostly Mongol) herders who lost their land and livelihood because development specialists decided that 57,000 farmers would make better use of it been of the same ethnic group as the farmers, the program would presumably have been uncontroversial.[16]

In these circumstances, it is worth repeating that the combination of raw state power expressed in colonization programs (regardless of their ethnic dimensions) that explicitly dispossess some citizens for the benefit of others, combined with the steady blurring of the lines between the government elite and the ambient upper class, was precisely at the root of the unpopularity and the inefficiency of the post-New Policies governments. To maintain the virtually unlimited prerogatives of the state and at the same time to allow increasing role for profit-making

[15] The research of Dee Mack Williams in the Ulaan'odu (Wulan'aodu) *Gachaa* of Ashikhan (Asihan) Sumu, Ongni'ud Banner, in former Juu Uda League (now Chifeng Municipality) has illustrated this process in detail. See *Beyond Great Walls: Environment, Identity, and Development on the Chinese Grasslands of Inner Mongolia* (Stanford, 2002).

[16] See the "China-Western Poverty Reduction Project" reports on the World Bank website at http://www.worldbank.org. News accounts include Erik Eckholm, "China Resettlement Plan Starts Debate over Tibetan Culture," *New York Times*, Friday, June 18, 1999; "China Defends World Bank Project," *New York Times*, Thursday, June 24, 1999 (Associated Press report); David E. Sanger, "China to Get World Bank Loan Despite U.S. Objections," *New York Times*, Friday, June 25, 1999; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, "China's Long March: Newton Man Becomes Pawn in Debate on Resettlement," *Boston Globe*, Sunday, August 22, 1999; and Joseph Kahn, "China Resettlement Plan Killed by World Bank's Richest Nations," *New York Times*, Friday, July 7, 2000.

among those well-connected with the government is a recipe for corruption on a grand scale, the same kind of corruption that destroyed the legitimacy of the dukes and princes in Inner Mongolia and the Republican government in North China.

At the same time, I have emphasized how the revolutionary agenda obscured the degree to which increasing the power of the state over the citizenry, far from being simply a means to an end, came in fact to become the primary aim of the revolution's key supporters. As someone in the Canton area, reflecting on the revolutionary past, told the anthropologist Helen Siu in 1982:

> Collective ownership means that the collective "owns" us peasants as well as the resources we work with. The cadres who control the collective then do whatever they please with our lives. They behave no differently than the local bullies we heard so much about in the "recall bitterness" accounts of our fathers. However, the strongmen of the 1930s and 1940s had no legitimate claim on the peasants, who regarded them as excesses of the traditional society. The cadres, on the other hand, enjoy total authority given by the socialist system. Chairman Mao once said that the scriptures were good except that from time to time they had been recited by monks with crooked mouths. I wonder about these scriptures; it seems that they have distorted the mouths instead.[17]

At the same time, Helen Siu, like other anthropologists of the Chinese revolutionary state, have emphasized how an eager complicity between the demands of the party-state and the parochial ambitions of the local beneficiaries of the revolution formed an essential precondition for the fashioning of the "cruel weight of pervasive security, police, and militia apparatuses."[18] They recognized, in common with Jan Gross's study of Stalin's incorporation of eastern Poland, that the party-state cemented its rule not by pressing down as an impersonal force on a passive "society," but rather by inviting social groups, in all their particularity and multiplicity, to use the power of government to satisfy their ambitions and destroy their enemies. In other words, the party-state grew not by confiscating the private realm but by privatizing the public realm.[19]

[17] Helen F. Siu, *Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution* (Yale, 1989), p. 291.

[18] Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Mark Selden, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (New Haven, 1991), p. 268. Cf. Helen Siu's conclusions that the power of the party-state "could not have penetrated local society had it not been for the initiative of the ambitious individuals who actively pursued the symbols of power recognized by the state tradition" (Siu, *Agents and Victims in South China*, p. 294).

[19] Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, 1988), esp. pp. 114-22.

Given this history, and in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the history of the conflicts in the constellation of nationalist movements that formed the PRPIM serves as a reminder that a political movement's nationalist, ethnic, or proletarian rhetoric is no guarantee of its benevolence once in power. As I have emphasized previously, the focus on ethnicity assisted the Inner Mongolian nationalists in avoiding the issue of the possible dangers of state power. A unified revolutionary government in Inner Mongolia need not worry about the abuse of power because it would be in the hands of the "people," and because those in the party took the people as their "brothers." While the history of the party has shown both that Mongol ethnicity can never be ignored in the political process of a multi-ethnic region like Inner Mongolia, it also shows that people of any ethnic group allow nationalist rhetoric to confuse them into assuming a utopian identity of interest among all the race only at their own peril.

In this situation, it is the more "primitive" opposition to the New Policies which may perhaps have relevance to the issues of Inner Mongolia today. The duguilang opposition in Ordos was profoundly suspicious not only of the Chinese state's insistent demands that local interests must be sacrificed for the nation but of all out-banner government (except that of Mongolia itself, comfortably far away). They were attached to a view of politics as the defense of banner resources by banner members. Finally they located Mongolian identity not in a culturally cosmopolitan vision of the awakened nation but in the concrete "things" of religion and banner membership, whether they be the Buddhist temples, the bier of Chinggis Khan, or the graves of their ancestors. Preserving these tangible things was a integral element of preserving the banner way of life. Today, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia face serious problems: 1) somehow reining in a state that still recognizes in theory no limits on its power, and yet allows that power to be exercised in its name by increasingly irresponsible modern versions of the pre-revolutionary yamen hangers-on; 2) dealing with the consequences of decades of environmental abuse brought on first by government-sponsored colonization programs, then by over-grazing, and finally by a policy of de-collectivization that in practice has allowed the politically well-connected to socialize loss and privatize gain; and 3) a sense of crumbling ethnic boundaries that generates deep anxiety about the possible extinction of the nation and an attraction to unrealistic ethno-nationalist political programs that assume a total unity of the Mongol nation in order to reinforce those boundaries in a utopian scheme. For all of these problems, the history of the duguilangs and similar vigilante movements provide not a program, certainly, but resources for solution.

The previous historiography of the duguilangs, however, has gelded this possible alternative and broken it in under the grand narrative of the revolution and secular state-building. It has taken the duguilangs as pre-conscious, native rebels, needing guidance and leadership from the more cosmopolitan revolutionary forces (whether it be the Young Mongols of the Kharachin banners and Hailar, or the Communists and their Höhhot Tümed agents), and has therefore neutralized the real challenge that the duguilang movement posed to the monolithic modernizing agenda that has in various forms dominated China since 1901. This neutralization curiously recalls Antonio Gramsci's comments about the role that Benedetto Croce and his allies played in the Italian "Southern Question." Cosmopolitan and anti-Catholic, although in a detached, Olympian, way, the influence of this great Neapolitan philosopher and historian alienated the southern intellectuals from their popular milieu, and so served the interests of the northern industrialists who dominated the Italian state:

> In far wider circles than the stifling sphere of the agrarian bloc, [Croce and his allies] have managed to ensure that the way in which the Southern question was approached did not go beyond certain limits, did not become revolutionary . . . In this sense Benedetto Croce has fulfilled an extremely important 'national' function. He has detached the radical intellectuals of the South from the peasant masses and made them participate in national and European culture. Through this culture, he has ensured the absorption of these intellectuals by the national bourgeoisie . . .[20]

In a like manner, the inability of the duguilang leaders to fashion their own movement put them under the aegis of those Mongols better connected with the Chinese revolutionary parties, and so ensured their absorption by the bureaucracy of the new Chinese state.

The duguilangs thus represent, like the rebels against the New Policies, Bai Lang and his army in 1913, and the Army of Great Unity fighting against the Kuomintang's anti-religious policy in 1928-1929, a failed but still important alternative voice to the lineage of East Mongolian modernizing reform that started with Injannashi and Prince Güngsangnorbu, led through the PRPIM into the autonomous regimes of the 1940s, and then via the years of Wulanfu's ascendancy into the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution. Prasenjit Duara, writing of Mohandas Gandhi, has concluded that

[20] Antonio Gramsci, *Pre-Prison Writings*, trans. Virginia Cox, ed. Richard Bellamy (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 333-34.

> In preserving local—here religious traditions in relation to the modernizing center—as a value, Gandhi was able to transform it into a space from which the dominant ideology of the state could be critiqued—a space similar in many ways to civil society in the West . . . Yet the consuming commitment of Chinese intellectuals to the narrative of modernity has tended to produce a monologism in which gradualist reformers like Liang Shuming, Jimmy Yan, Tao Xingzhi, and others (each of whom could perhaps have played the role of a Gandhi under different circumstances) have been marginalized. In the process, this narrative has obscured the vitality of popular culture, religion, and their associational life and delegitimized the critique of modern ideologies originating outside of modern discourses. Despite the repeated persecution of the intelligentsia by the Chinese state, it is this shared narrative which has thrown so many of them repeatedly into the arms of the state and at the same time alienated both from the living cultures of the "masses" and of "tradition." While the state has made effective use of the narrative of modernity to expand its own powers, the Chinese intelligentsia has robbed itself of alternative sources of moral authority which it might have found in history and popular culture.[21]

This tragedy of the Chinese intelligentsia is doubly that of the East Mongolian intelligentsia.

Certainly the duguilang fighters, Jamyangsharab, or other local vigilantes such as Mao Baatur and the opponents of the coup d'etat in Alashan, must not be idealized into precocious defenders of the ideals of civil society in Inner Mongolia. In its own era, the purely local agenda of the western Inner Mongolian vigilantes was incapable by itself of bringing civil order to the area. The emphasis on community uniformity enforced by the same brutal tortures which the yamen used to enforce its own rule can hardly be received as merely a colorful local custom. Indeed, all of these forces recognized their desperate need for an education that could give them an understanding of the social, economic, and political forces that were destroying the world in which they grew up. For this reason they all turned to a utopian idealization of Mongolia as a force that would come and perform the liberation of the Ordos people which they were incapable of performing themselves. From the perspectives of the twenty-first century, however, the problematic aspects of their legacy seem precisely the most easily discounted and the positive aspects of the ones which offer the most important resources for the future of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia.

[21] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, 1995), pp. 226-27.

Two Men Named Erkhimbatu

Throughout this history, I have tried to keep the story focused on people, not abstractions. In earlier writings on the topic, my titles bristled with abstract concepts like "nationalism" and "localism," "revolution," and "mobilization." Readers may feel that these concepts have once more taken over this conclusion, as I try to summarize in abstract form what the history of the PRPIM tells us about the Inner Mongols, their place in Chinese Republican history, and the historical roots of their present situation. Yet I have always striven in the narrative to respect the irreducible particularities of the people and events of Inner Mongolia in the 1920s. For this reason I would like to close this history with the story of two men, both named Erkhimbatu, both from Hulun Buir, and both deeply involved in the party. Both were men of solid intellect, and exemplified in differing degrees the great opportunities opening up in Hulun Buir during the 1920s for talented scholars and organizers. Yet in their political activities, one gave his unguarded faith to the party and the powers that supported the revolution, while the other in the end refused to trust any of the outside powers wholly and always kept himself in reserve.

The Daur Erkhimbatu, was born of the Gobol clan in a poor family in Mekhertü Ail in 1902.[22] From the beginning he was an able student, and studied in Tokyo. In an essay reprinted in the Hulun Buir local gazetteer of 1922 he spoke of the need for education among the Mongols, and he himself was one of the most promising students of the Hulun Buir people. At the same time, he was also concerned about the backwardness of his people and became an early member of the Eastern Border People's Party. Late in 1924 he followed many other of the Daur youth to Ulaanbaatar where he called upon the Mongolian government to give its support to the Bargu independence movement. He had at first seemed to have abandoned his scholarly pursuits for political action, training at the Mongolian Sükhebaatur Military Academy, and serving in a signals company, before going on to school in Moscow, most likely the Communist University for the Toilers of the East. By 1926, however, he had gone back to his academic interests and was studying at the Oriental Institute in Leningrad. Yet once again, when the revolution called, Erkhimbatu answered. Fumingtai, called him from Moscow and appealing to him with the difficult situation of the party, got him to

[22] The main source on Erkhimbatu's life is J. Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), pp. 80-82, which is a Cyrillic transcription of Erkhimbatu's appeal for amnesty in 1930 and 1931.

abandon his studies again and throw himself once more into the revolution. Placed in charge of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, he traveled to Baotou, into Yekhe Juu, through Ulaanchab, and with his comrades was kidnaped by bandits at Hanshengjiyaozi. Sent south again in February, 1927, Mongol militiamen on the border attacked his party and he barely escaped alive back to Ulaanbaatar.

Reassigned to Ulaanbaatar, the frenetic pace of his life slowed down. Like other party leaders who had supported Amagaev and the new Central Committee in 1927, the following year was a time of political stagnation. Erkhimbatu spent the following year as a white-collar employee in Ulaanbaatar, serving under his cousin Mersé in the Central Council of Trade Unions. When Rinchen Bimbaev, a young Mongolian folklorist of Buriat origin, was looking for informants who could share Mongolian folklore with him, he first found three old party members, Fumingtai, Ülügüü, and Bochiroo. They then led him to Erkhimbatu who with the help of his Russian Buriat wife, Nadezhda Bogdanova, called Nabchi ("Leaf") in Mongolian, told him some riddles and comic stories. Rinchen's note on Erkhimbatu, longer than those for any other of his informants, seem to express his amazement at the sort of talents going to waste in Mongolia at the time:

> 14 Jan. 1928. Erximbatu of the Gowol clan, Daγúr [that is, Daur]. Chairman of the Chinese Workers Department of the Mongolian Trade Union. Speaks and writes Mongolian, Manchu, English, Japanese, Russian, and Chinese. Has been in schools in Qayilar [Hailar], Tokio, Leninggrad. Studied at the Research Institute for the Living Languages of the Orient in Leninggrad.[23]

In the summer of 1928, the life of waiting came to an end. He attended the secret Tsogtusümbür meeting to organize the Bargu Revolution, but for some reason did not join Mersé in crossing the frontier back home to Hulun Buir. Had the attacks and hardship he had tasted in Suiyuan intimidated him? Or was he needed as a liaison man with the Comintern and the Mongolian government? In either case, he was thus in Mongolia in the last months of 1928, when the new leftist regime in Mongolia was looking for suspects to blame for the Bargu turmoil. Arrested in November, he was held without trial for almost a year and then sentenced by a special court to ten years in prison. Working as a cashier in a coal mine, he appealed again and again for a pardon. In his appeal he expressed the political sentiments that had led him to participate in the Bargu revolution, and abandon a promising career as a scholar:

[23] Rintchen, *Folklore mongol* (Wiesbaden, 1965), IV, 176. Material from Erkhimbatu and his wife on pp. 174-80, 182-83.

> In my humble childhood, I did not endeavor to leave the light of the sun and the rays of the moon.
>
> Truly I cannot bear my thoughts when I consider that I was not able to fulfill my aim to strive until death in the revolutionary cause on behalf of the several million poor and hired herding and farming people of Bargu and Inner Mongolia, terribly oppressed by the internal and external reactionaries.[24]

For him, the revolutionary cause meant the repayment of the grace accorded to him by the loving care of his father and mother and all the legitimate authorities (that is what is meant by the stereotyped formula of "the light of the sun and the rays of the moon"). Like so many of the party members, the party became for him a substitute emperor, the emperor that in Qing ideology had been the summation of all the blessings that heaven and earth shower upon the children of men. The Qing emperor himself had abdicated and the new Republic had neither wanted nor earned any right to that same devotion. Thus he had sought to repay this grace first by education to deliver his Bargu people from backwardness. Eventually, the destruction of the people's enemies appeared as the only way to open the broad way of popular enlightenment. Yet in the end, the party declared that for all his devotion, he was really an enemy of the people himself, worthy of death, and granted the mercy of prison only in view of his origin among the poor, "real" people.

Was he a fool or a victim? The futile revolution he helped sponsored in Bargu led scores of ordinary Mongols to their deaths, all in the pursuit of a Moscow-designed plan to further its own control over Mongolia. It may have seemed unjust that the most irresponsible Bargu agitators such as Fumingtai and Fat Ölzei, were still distinguished revolutionaries while Erkhimbatu languished as a prison trusty, but they too were executed in the end, Fumingtai in Moscow and Fat Ölzei in Ulaanbaatar, both on charges of being Japanese agents.[25] In the history of Communism, of course, this sort of story was the rule not the exception, and again as usual in the history of other Communist parties, those who managed to spend the 1930s underground under fascist rule, such as Temürbagana and ÖljeiOchir with the Japanese, had a rather better chance of survival.

[24] Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 81.

[25] On Fat Ölzei's execution, see Shagdariin Sandag and Harry H. Kendall, *Poisoned Arrows: The Stalin-Choibalsan Mongolian Massacres, 1921-1941* (Boulder, Col., 2000), pp. 107 and 112; on his participation in the arrest and persecution of others, see p. 113. On Fumingtai's execution, see his biography in Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 78-79.

Even there, however, dangers were not absent. In 1924, Hairui had led a group of female Daur students to emigrate to Russia to join the revolution, inspiring great hopes of the dawn of a new age. Leaving with the mixed ambitions of a revolutionary and an intellectual, she returned to Mongolia as a high school teacher but went back to Inner Mongolia as a spy in 1930, surviving under her code name "Manila" until her arrest and execution by the Japanese in 1944.

Galzuud Erkhimbatu, from New Bargu, had come from a militia captain family and by 1924 had risen to the height of official eminence as the commandant-general of the New Bargu Left banners.[26] He too believed in education and cultural development and as a man in authority had the power to supply it for others and not only for himself. In 1922, he founded an official school of the banners, holding classes in a ger beside the commandant-general's own official ger. In 1926, he chose a location at Amugulang Khashiyatu Spring, the center of the Left Wing four banners, and built about ten adobe buildings to serve as a school. Scribe Sandag was made the teacher for the more than thirty pupils. That winter the spring overflowed and flooded the building and he moved the school further uphill to the current site of Amugulang. Next year, he invited a Chinese *xiansheng* or Daoist fengshui expert, to choose a site where dragons descend, "blessed to unite ten thousand men,"and built there of blue glazed brick a new yamen hall in the form of a Mongol ger, with one hundred square meters floor space, four pillars, and an electrical connection as well.

Erkhimbatu had attended the pan-Mongolist meetings in 1919 and been involved with the Eastern Border People's Party since 1924 when the Bargu spy and artillery captain, Fat Ölzei, called on him in his ger. He had backed the trade monopoly in 1925 but pulled back when it appeared to lead to an unbreakable impasse with the American and British governments. Bitterly disappointed by his "opportunism," Mersé and Hualintai attacked his retreat as the typical treachery of a greedy capitalist, and indeed Erkhimbatu's own herd eventually grew to the thousands. He did not support the Bargu revolution, and saw his own forebodings about its course justified when the revolutionaries proved to have been completely mistaken about the support they had from the Comintern and Mongolia.

[26] Sources covering the biography of Erkhimbatu are Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 106-107, and my interviews with Ya. Shaariibuu, April 12 and 15, and May 15, 1992.

From 1932, the Japanese reconfirmed him as head New Bargu Left Banner, and in 1936 after the former provincial chairman Lingsheng was shot as a Soviet spy, Erkhimbatu became the new chairman of Khinggan North Province, the Japanese name for the Hulun Buir territory. Judged from his actions, his aim was to protect the investment that the people of Hulun Buir had made in their lands. He had made a substantial investment himself, not only in the great hall he had built in Amugulang, but also in his library full of rare items, and the literary works in the didactic Manchu style he had written. Yet one historian claims archival evidence proves that from 1923 to1936 he operated on an undercover assignment from Fat Ölzei, and that he had secretly attended the Tsogtusümbür meeting which had organized the Bargu revolution of 1928. Was he really a mole penetrating the Japanese administration, or an opportunist only willing to support the revolution when it looked successful, or simply a prudent administrator keeping touch with all possible allies and enemies? Like most successful politicians in small countries with powerful neighbors, he did not give himself over to the luxury of easily read motives.

In 1945, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria burnt his library, but Erkhimbatu did not desert his post. The Soviets appointed him as their head for the new Autonomous Government of Hulun Buir. Nationalist parties and movements flourished, with only the anti-Soviet (and pro-Kuomintang) groups suffering repression. Within two years, the Chinese Communists had established their own control, closed down the Mongol nationalist parties, and brought Hulun Buir out of its neutrality into the Communist camp in the Chinese Civil War. Even so, they too employed Erkhimbatu as chairman of their Hulun Buir League government until 1949. After that, almost in his seventies, the commandant-general lived in retirement until his sickness and death in 1952.

In all this period, as earlier, his motives were not easy to read. In August, right after the Soviet invasion, he signed his name to a pan-Mongolist call for Bargu's final liberation in unification with Mongolia.[27] At the same time, he followed the directives of the Soviet and Mongolian officers and set about restoring the area's previous administration. In November, 1945, he wrote a letter to Mongolia's maximum leader, Marshal Choibalsang, announcing the formation of his new autonomous government, but still hoping that the Marshal and

[27] On the Soviet and Mongolian occupation of Inner Mongolia in 1945, see Christopher P. Atwood, "Sino-Soviet Diplomacy and the Second Partition of Mongolia, 1945-1946," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman (Armonk, N.Y., 1999), pp. 137-61, esp. pp. 151-52, 154.

Generalissimo Stalin might prevail with Chiang Kai-shek to merge his Bargu homeland with Mongolia. Yet when that unification proved impossible, and one of Erkhimbatu's bannermen, Ya. Shaariibuu tried to lead the New Bargu people to migrate over the border, Erkhimbatu together with Jamsarangjab (nicknamed Bömbé), mobilized the officials and lamas to convince the people not to leave their homeland. Jamsarangjab, now the head of New Bargu Left Banner, had been in the thick of the 1928 Bargu revolution, and emerged bitterly disillusioned by the experience. Erkhimbatu and Jamsarangjab never directly prohibited the Bargu people from leaving, and Shaariibuu knew better than to ask for permission, but they circulated many arguments against migration. Sometimes they said, "It is right that [Bargu and Mongolia] become independent-thinking friends, and develop deep, broad, and complex relations, so that when we make a noise our voice is one, and if we make a move our force is one, and unify the Bargus of Hulun Buir with Mongolia, but we should unify together with our whole land." At other times, they spread the kinds of arguments that would have landed less deft operators in prison: "Mongolia's situation is difficult; it is poor and completely under Stalin's power like a colony, so it can't flourish."[28]

Again who can say what was Erkhimbatu's real view of Mongolia in 1945? Like his assistant Jamsarangjab, he evidently believed the Manchu proverb that "A man ought to keep honey on his lips and a knife in his belly." Yet even Shaariibuu kept a real respect for him: "He was taciturn, calm, and I think never got angry. He was not greedy—he was already rich himself." The American consular clerk in 1925 also gave a very favorable opinion of this enigmatic politician:

> Prince O Gurda, who impressed us most favorably as a strong but kind ruler, arranged a banquet in our honor, and made us presents of sheep. He was extremely courteous, and even went to the trouble of proceeding in one of the motor cars of our caravan to his camp, some fifty miles distant, to procure the seal for the letter with which he provided us.[29]

The Bargu historian resident in Ulaanbaatar, Ölzii, writing in the 1990s, was aware of the judgement of ardent supporters of Mongolia's national revolution, who condemned Jamsarangjab's opposition to Shaariibuu's emigration movement and said that "circulating bogus slogans," he "did

[28] Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, p. 55; interviews with Ya. Shaariibuu, April 12 and 15, and May 15, 1992.

[29] U.S. State Department, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, roll no. 184, no. 893.62222/3 "Memorandum of Visit to Hailar and Certain Parts of Barga . . .," p. 6, in Samuel Sokobin to U.S. Secretary of State, July 13, 1925.

propaganda in defense of upper stratum." Yet Ölzii himself called Erkhimbatu a "great historian, political thinker, and scholar" and after reviewing the slim evidence that he was really a pro-Soviet mole all along, concluded "Shouldn't we proudly and respectfully record in history the revolutionary activities of Comrade Erkhimbatu and leave them in the memory of the coming generations?"[30]

The two choices these two Erkhimbatus made have confronted the Inner Mongols—and all people born in "small and weak nationalities"—not only in the 1920s but also today. Depending on one's temperament, it is easy to ridicule the first Erkhimbatu as a pawn, or the second as a calculating cynic. Certainly, Galzuud Erkhimbatu's age and high position played a part in his preference for stewardship, while Gobol Erkhimbatu's youthful studies abroad opened his mind to possibilities which the New Bargu official could never have taken. Both played their part in a game which was not their own, and it is to be hoped that coming generations of earnest Mongols seeking to repay the grace of their ancestors in devotion to their future need not pay so high a price when their tongues lack honey and their bellies lack knives.

[30] Ölzii, *Bargyn tüükht khümüüsiin namtar*, pp. 55, 107.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS[1]

adjutant (*jakhirugchi*): One of the five senior officials in the banner, by custom a commoner.

administrator (*tusalagchi*): The two senior officials in the banner, by law required to be a taiji (of noble blood).

aimag ("province," "division"): 1) Mongolian banners that share a common name, dialect, and other folkways; 2) the four traditional divisions of Khalkha; 3) the current eighteen provinces of Mongolia; 5) the Mongolian-language term for the modern divisions ("leagues," Chinese *meng*) of rural Inner Mongolia.

albatu ("one subject to requisitions"): a commoner in the Mongol autonomous banners.

amban: Manchu word for high official, commonly used in Mongolian to designate a variety of officials, including: 1) the high commissioners supervising Outer Mongolia and Central Tibet under the Qing dynasty (Chinese *banshi dachen*); 2) the heads of the three special regions of Inner Mongolia (Chinese *dutong*); 3) the heads of the banners and pastures in Chakhar; 4) the head of the Hulun Buir administration (Chinese *fudutong*).

arat: Russian spelling of Mongolian *arad* (Cyrillic *ard*) "common people, tax-payers" (equivalent to albatu). Often used in Soviet Russian writings to give an appearance of sophisticated class analysis.

bag: A sub-unit of the sumu, used particularly in sparsely inhabited banners, such as Alashan, Khanggin, and the Khalkha banners.

banner (*khoshigu*; Cyrillic *khoshuu*; Chinese *qi*): The main unit of Mongolian administration under the Qing, about 1/5 the size of an average American state but with a population around that of a smallish rural county. Headed either by a hereditary nobleman or (in Chakhar and Hulun Buir) by an appointed militia official.

captain (banners) (*sumun-u janggi*): head of the sumu, a banner sub-unit, consisting on paper of enough families to supply 150 adult men.

captain-general: head of one of the six leagues into which Inner Mongolia was divided.

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[1] The language and script of non-English terms is Mongolian in the vertical script unless otherwise specified.

Chinese Eastern Railroad: Russian-built and (in 1924-1935 and 1945-1954) Soviet-controlled railroad crossing Hulun Buir and northern Manchuria. The railroad's administration was seated in Harbin.

Citizen Army (Chinese *Guominjun/Kuominchün*): a coalition of armies in Northwest China commanded by Marshal Feng Yuxiang and supplied by the Soviet Union from 1924 to 1928.

colonel (banners) (*jalan-u janggi*): head of the *jalan* or regiment. In banners with several such regiments, part of the banner's staff outside the yamen. In banners with only one jalan, effectively an assistant to the deputy adjutants. Lowest rank allowed to join tax deliberations.

Comintern: Russian abbreviation of "Communist International."

commandant-general (Hulun Buir banners) (Manchu *ukheri da*; Mongolian, *bügüde-yin daruga*): commander either of four banners forming one wing of an eight-banners ethnic unit (Solons and New Bargus), or else of the whole ethnic unit (Ööleds, Buriats).

controller (Höhhot Tümed banners) (Chinese *zongguan*): head of the Höhhot Tümed banners, resident at Guisui (modern Höhhot).

Communist International: organization created by Soviet leader V.I. Lenin in 1919 to lead the world Communist revolution. In theory all Communist parties were only branches of the Comintern. Commonly abbreviated as "Comintern." Also called Third International.

corporal (banners) (Manchu, *boshukû*; Mongolian, *khögegchi*): a low-level banner militia rank. In the autonomous banners, each corporal commanded twenty households, while in Chakhar and Hulun Buir, the number was not fixed but usually less than ten.

county (Chinese *xian*; Mongolian *shiyan*): unit of rural administration in China proper, about equivalent to an American county in size, but often with a much larger population. Headed by an appointed administrator with a term of office traditionally limited to three years.

Da Khüriye (Sino-Mongolian "great monastery"): usual name for the city of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu (modern Ulaanbaatar) in the late Qing. Sometimes called, in pure Mongolian, Yekhe Khüriye (Cyrillic, Ikh Khüree).

daoyin (also written *taoyin*): administrator of a Chinese circuit, a unit including several prefectures (usually translated "circuit intendant"). In Hailar, the daoyin supervised the Chinese population, while the fudutong supervised the Mongols. Called daotai (taotai) under the Qing.

deputy adjutant (*meiren-ü janggi*): office of the two lowest-ranking officials among the five major officials in the banner yamen. Usually supervised the drilling of banner's militia forces.

deputy captain-general (Hulun Buir banners) (Manchu *galai da*; Mongolian *ded bügüde-yin daruga*): an official commanding two banners in a wing of four banners.

duban (also written tupan): military governor of a Chinese province under the Republic. Originally adopted as a replacement for dujun (or tuchün), the previous term for military governor, which had acquired unpopular "warlord" connotations, duban too soon came to be synonymous with warlord.

duguilang ("circle"): local assemblies formed originally to petitioned the banner yamen for redress of grievances, but which evolved into semi-permanent local posses of vigilantes. Name derived from Mongolian "circle."

duke (Chinese *gong*; Mongolian *güng*): lowest of the ranks of the Mongolian titled nobility, below grand duke and above the taiji. There were two ranks of duke.

duli (Chinese "independent"): originally used for soldiers fighting with the Mongolian armies fighting for pan-Mongolian unification in Inner Mongolia in 1913-1915. Afterwards a general term for freebooters and bandits.

dutong (also written tutung or tu-t'ung): 1) Under the Qing, military lieutenant-governors supervising banner garrisons in China proper. 2) In the Republic, military lieutenant-governors supervising the three special regions of Inner Mongolia.

Executive Committee of the Communist International: the main executive organ of the Communist International, seated in Moscow.

Fengtian: 1) Liaoning Province; 2) the Manchurian (Northeast Chinese) warlord clique headed by Zhang Zuolin and his son Zhang Xueliang.

fudutong (also written fututung): 1) originally military deputy lieutenant-governors supervising the lesser garrisons in Manchuria; 2) with the abolition of the other garrisons under the Republic, title restricted to the chief official of the Hulun Buir banners.

gachaa ("village"): unit of rural administration under the sumu in predominantly ethnic Mongol regions of present-day Inner Mongolia.

galai da: Manchu term for the banner lieutenant-commandant

gaming: From Chinese *geming* "revolution," became the usual Mongolian term in Khalkha and western Inner Mongolia for the Chinese Republican authorities. By the 1920s had acquired the connotation of "bandit" or "gangster."

gegen ("majesty"): title of an incarnate lama, usually of somewhat lower dignity than "khutugtu."

Gelaohui (Chinese "Society of Elders and Brothers"): an ethnic Chinese secret society originally associated with anti-Manchu sentiment and

in western Inner Mongolia linked to self-defense organizations of Chinese settlers.

ger: the yurt or Mongolian felt tent formed of a felt covering over a wooden lattice-work frame.

Gonghui (Chinese "public assembly"): assembly of duguilang representatives forming a government of Üüshin Banner opposed to the yamen in 1913-1920. Revived under Öljeijirgal's rule in 1927.

grand duke (Manchu *beile* or *beise*): middle rank of the Mongolian titled nobility, below prince and above duke. Of the two sub-ranks, *beile* was higher than *beise*.

Guominjun (also written Kuominchün): Chinese name of the Citizen Army, the coalition of armies in Northwest China under Feng Yuxiang from 1924 to 1928.

Hetao (Chinese "river bend"): 1) the entire area of the great bend of the Yellow River, including Ordos; 2) more usually, the northwestern area of the river bend which was easily irrigable.

inje: a dowry of servants given with the daughter of a taiji on her marriage to serve her.

Inner Mongolia Party Affairs Steering Committee: reorganized form of the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang party branch after 1928.

janggi: banner official, designating a variety of ranks from the deputy adjutant to the sumu captain.

jasag: the hereditary ruler of the Mongolian autonomous banners.

Jébdzundamba Khutugtu (also written Jebtsundampa, from Tibetan rJe-btsun-dam-pa): the great incarnate lama lineage of Outer (Khalkha) Mongolia; from 1911 to 1924, the Eighth Jébdzundamba Khutugtu was the "Holy Khan" (Bogda Khaan) and Mongolian head of state.

juu: a large monastery, particularly in southwestern Inner Mongolia.

khadag: silk scarf that accompanies all gifts

Khalkha: the dominant dialect and aimag ("tribe" or sub-ethnic group) in Outer Mongolia (modern independent Mongolia). Traditionally divided into four aimags or provinces: Setsen Khan, Tüshiyetü Khan, Sain Noyan, and Zasagtu Khan.

kheid ("hermitage"; Cyrillic *khiid*): originally, at least, the residence of a solitary monk, although large monasteries often grew around them.

Khüriye ("monastery"; Cyrillic Khüree): 1) any large monastery, particularly in Khalkha; 2) the city of residence of the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu, now called Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. Rendered in Chinese *Kulun*, but in Russian and western languages usually replaced by "Urga."

khutugtu ("blessed one"): an incarnate lama of high political and religious significance.

Kuomintang (also written Guomindang): the Nationalist Party of China, founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912.

Kwantung Army (also written Guandong Army, Japanese Kantôgun): Japanese army created in 1919 to garrison the Japanese-leased Dairen-Port Arthur (Dalian-Lüshun) territory and the South Manchurian Railway.

league (*chigulgan*; Cyrillic *chuulgan*; Chinese *meng*): 1) an organization grouping the banners together under the Qing and the Republic. There were six leagues in Inner Mongolia, where the league was weak. In Khalkha, the four leagues were coterminous with the four traditional aimags. 2) modern unit of rural administration in Inner Mongolia.

lieutenant (banners) (Manchu *khafan*; Mongolian *orulan khögegchi*): an assistant to the captain of the sumu.

lieutenant-commandant (Hulun Buir banners) (Manchu *galai da*; Mongolian *ded bügüde-yin daruga*): a commander of two banners. The lieutenant-commandant was under the commandant-general, and each one commanded six sumu captains.

meiren/meiren-ü janggi: official in the banner hierarchy, designating the deputy adjutant in the autonomous banners or the fudutong in Hulun Buir.

Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (Chinese *MengZang weiyuanhui*): the organ of the Nanjing government dealing with Inner Mongolia and Eastern Tibet from 1928 on.

Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department (Chinese *MengZang yuan*): the organ of the Beijing government dealing with Inner Mongolia and Eastern Tibet from 1914 to 1928.

Mongolian People's Party: the name from 1920 to 1925 of the Soviet-supported revolutionary party ruling Mongolia.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: the name from 1925 of the Soviet-supported ruling party in Mongolia.

Neislel Khüriye ("capital monastery"): the official name of the Mongolian capital (modern Ulaanbaatar) from 1911 to 1915 and from 1921 to 1924, and used by Mongols unofficially throughout the period 1911 to 1924.

naadum (*nagadum*; Cyrillic *naadam*): summer games (wrestling, horse-racing, and archery), traditionally affiliated with various religious rituals.

nuur (also written *nor* or *nur*): Mongolian word for lake, common in place-names.

oboo (*oboga*, Cyrillic *owoo*): a cairn associated with the cult of local deities and naadum games.

Pimao Gongsi ("Skin and Wool Company"): the Hulun Buir animal-products trading company founded in 1919 by Duke Tsengde with official capital.

prince (Chinese *wang*): the highest rank of the Mongolian titled nobility, above grand duke. There were two sub-ranks of prince.

Qing (also written Ch'ing): the ruling dynasty in China and Mongolia, proclaimed in 1636 with the conquest of Inner Mongolia, conquered China in 1644, annexed Khalkha in 1691, deposed in 1912.

silver dollar: the principal currency of China under the Republic, coined with Yuan Shikai's head and containing approximately 24 grams of silver. The weight was virtually identical to the Mexican silver dollar widely used in the Qing; such round coinage was called in Chinese *yangqian* ("foreign money").

South Manchurian Railway: Japanese-built and (to 1945) Japanese-controlled railway extending from Harbin in the north through Mukden (modern Shenyang) in Fengtian (Liaoning) to the Japanese-leased port of Dairen (Dalian).

süme ("temple"; Cyrillic *süm*): a Buddhist monastery which originally, at any rate, had only a Buddha-image and no resident monks.

sumu ("arrow"; Cyrillic *sum*, also written *somon*): 1) the principal sub-banner unit under the Qing. In the autonomous banners, the paper strength was 150 families supplying 50 adult men. Headed by a captain assisted by a lieutenant. 2) in modern Mongolia, the unit of administration under the province (aimag), equivalent under collectivization to the collective or *negdel*; 3) in modern Inner Mongolia, the unit of administration under the banner, used only for districts that are primarily Mongolian in ethnic composition.

taiji: 1) any member of the Mongolian nobility in the autonomous Mongolian banners. In most banners, the taijis were reckoned descendants of Chinggis Khan, but in some banners they were reckoned as descendants of his brothers. In Kharachin and Monggoljin banners, they were considered to be descendants of his general Jelme. 2) Those nobility without higher titles (prince, grand duke, duke). In this sense divided into four ranks. The poorer taijis were often indistinguishable in their life-style from the commoners.

Third International: common name for the Communist International, counted as the third after Karl Marx's First International, and the Social Democratic Second International before World War I.

tögrög: 1) the currency of independent Mongolia, introduced in 1925, based on a coin of 18 grams silver, and divided into 100 *mönggö*; 2) any large round silver coin, such as the Mongolian tögrög or the Chinese silver dollar.

township (Chinese *xiang*, Mongolian *shiyang*): the main unit of rural administration in China under the county. In modern Inner Mongolia, used where the rural population is exclusively or almost exclusively Chinese.

ukheri da: term for the commandant-general in Hulun Buir. Pronounced *ugurida* in Mongolian.

ulaa (*ulaga*; Cyrillic *ulaa*): compulsory service on the post-roads, required under the Qing dynasty of all banner *albatu* men.

United Citizen Armies (Chinese *Guomin lian jun*): official term for Feng Yuxiang's Citizen Armies after 1926, when he joined the Kuomintang.

Urga: Russian term for Khüriye or Neislel Khüriye, the modern Ulaanbaatar. This term derives from the Mongolian örgöö "palace tent" which was used briefly for the Jébdzundamba Khutugtu's monastery during the eighteenth century.

White Month (*chagan sara*; Cyrillic *tsagaan sar*): the Mongolian Lunar New Year, falling in January or February, during which Mongols traditionally wear clothes of white, an auspicious color

yamen (Chinese; Mongolian *yamun*; Cyrillic *yaam*): the seat of administration in China, used also for the seats of administration of the Mongolian autonomous banners. At first nomadic, by the twentieth century, most (but not all) yamens in Inner Mongolia were housed in brick buildings.

yangqian (Chinese "foreign money"; Mongolian *yangchiyan*; Cyrillic *yanchaan*): term used in the Qing for the widely circulated Mexican silver dollar, later extended to Republican silver dollar which was of identical weight.

Zhili: the warlord clique headed by Wu Peifu that from 1920 to 1924 dominated northern and central China.

zud (Cyrillic; Mongolian script *jud*): any winter climactic disaster that kills off large numbers of livestock, including excess snow ("white zud"), ice on the pastures ("black zud") and so on.